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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EUROPEAN UNION 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE CASE OF THE PACKAGING 
WASTE DIRECTIVE 
This thesis provides a critical review of the processes shaping the implementation of 
European Union (EU) environmental policy. It focuses on two aspects of this dynamic, 
the interpretation of EU law by Member States and the use of legislative and price-
based policy instruments to achieve policy objectives. The overall aim of the study is 
to examine the extent to which price-based regulation can contribute to the EU's policy 
objective of sustainable development. The focus for the research is the formulation of 
the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive and its implementation in two Member 
States, Britain and Germany. A variety of research methods were employed, including 
literature and document searches, personal correspondences, telephone interviews, and 
postal surveys. The latter stage included a survey of British and German businesses 
affected by national packaging waste legislation. 
The first major finding was that the methods used by Member States to implement EU 
requirements are a major determinant of the sustainability outcomes achieved. By 
adopting command-and-control legislation and punitive environmental charges, 
Germany has achieved high recycling rates and significant reductions in packaging 
consumption. Britain's market-led approach has struggled to achieve its environmental 
targets but has produced a relatively cost-efficient recycling system. However, the 
second major finding was that environmental charges have not altered industry 
behaviour significantly. Whilst German firms were found to be more actively involved 
in preventative waste management than their British counterparts, this has been brought 
about primarily by legislative provisions and the readiness of national authorities to 
resort to constrictive regulation. The main contribution of price-based regulation has 
instead been the generation of hypothecation revenue for pollution control. From these 
findings, a conceptual model outlining the sustainability outcomes produced by 
legislation and price-based regulation is developed and discussed. 
From this evidence, it is concluded that the use of price-based regulation alongside 
state-determined implementation has led to some divergence in the sustainability 
outcomes achieved by EU environmental law. Moreover, the economic approach to 
environmental problems does little to resolve the fundamental conflicts of priorities 
between the EU's environmental agenda and its other policy domains. Some options 
for greater co-ordination of economic instruments at the EU level are suggested and 
evaluated. The thesis therefore provides a wide-ranging analysis of the practical 
application of price-based environmental regulation. Its primary contribution is that it 
assesses how political and practical issues combine to influence the implementation of 
environmental policy. Furthermore, by assessing EU policy in terms of its contribution 
to sustainable development, the study has sought to provide a holistic exaniination of 
the forces determining the success of the EU's environmental programme.-' , i 
i 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT i 
CONTENTS ii 
TABLES viii 
FIGURES X 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiv 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION xv 
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Issues in European Union Environmental Policy 1 
1.2 Themes of the Study: Policy Instruments and Political Influences 2 
1.2.1 Policy Instruments: Price-based Environmental Regulation 2 
1.2.2 Formulating and Implementing Environmental Policy in the EU 4 
1.3 Background to the Packaging Waste Directive 6 
1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study 8 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 8 
CHAPTER TWO AIMS AND MECHANISMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
2.1 Introduction 11 
2.2 Policy Aims and Objectives 12 
2.2.1 The Early Years of the Modem Environmental Movement 12 
2.2.2 The Brundtland Report and Sustainable Development 14 
2.2.3 Perspectives on Sustainable Development 18 
2.2.4 The Political Acceptance of Sustainable Development 25 
2.2.5 Summary 28 
ii 
2.3 Environmental Policy Instruments 29 
2.3.1 Introduction 29 
2.3.2 Criteria for Evaluating Environmental Policy Instruments 29 
2.3.3 Types of Environmental Policy Instrument 31 
2.3.4 The Economic Theory of Price-Based Policy Instruments 36 
2.3.5 Critique of Price-Based Policy Instruments 40 
2.3.6 The Political Acceptance of Price-Based Environmental Regulation 43 
2.4 Conclusions 46 
CHAPTER THREE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU 
3.1 Introduction 47 
3.2 The Development of the European Union Environmental Policy 48 
3.3 The History of EU Environmental Policy 52 
3.3.1 Legal Basis 52 
3.3.2 History of the EU Environmental Programme: Principles and Policies 54 
3.4 The EU Environmental Policy Process: Integration, Actors and Procedures 60 
3.4.1 Models of European Integration 60 
3.4.2 The Key Actors 63 
3.4.3 Decision-Making in the EU: Issues and Processes 75 
3.4.4 Policy-making and Enforcement Procedures in the EU 79 
3.5 Conclusions 82 
CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 85 
4.2 Research Strategy 85 
4.2.1 Research Aims 85 
4.2.2 Research Themes 86 
iii 
4.3 Research Contribution 87 
4.4 Research Methods 89 
4.4.1 Introduction 89 
4.4.2 Pilot Study 90 
4.4.3 Documentary Research 90 
4.4.4 Preliminary Qualitative Research 93 
4.4.5 The Development of Recycling Infrastructure in Britain and Germany 94 
4.4.6 Survey of Firms affected by Packaging Legislation in Britain and Germany 96 
4.5 Conclusion 111 
CHAPTER FIVE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PACKAGING WASTE 
DIRECTFVE 
5.1 Introduction 113 
5.2 The Negotiation and Transposition of the Packaging Directive 113 
5.3 National Packaging Waste Management Systems 117 
5.3.1 Introduction 117 
5.3.2 The German Model 118 
5.3.3 The British Model 126 
5.3.4 Comparing the UK and German Models 134 
5.4 The Development of Packaging Waste Management in Britain and Germany 137 
5.4.1 Introduction 137 
5.4.2 Present and Predicted Reprocessing Capacity in Britain and Germany 138 
5.4.3 The Collection of Waste Packaging 143 
5.4.4 Reprocessors and the PRN System 146 
5.5 Conclusions 154 
IV 
CHAPTER SEX INDUSTRY'S RESPONSE TO THE PACKAGING WASTE 
DIRECTIVE 
6.1 Introduction 156 
6.2 Profiles of the Respondent Groups 156 
6.3 Waste Management Actions in the U K and Germany 159 
6.3.1 Introduction 159 
6.3.2 Characteristics of the Survey Variables 160 
6.3.3 Packaging Waste Collection 161 
6.3.4 Source Reduction 164 
6.3.5 Packaging Re-use 166 
6.3.6 The Purchase of Recycled Packaging 168 
6.4 Relationships between the Waste Management Variables 171 
6.4.1 Correlation and Regression Analysis 111 
6.4.2 Aggregated Waste Management Indices 173 
6.4.3 Waste Management Practices for Individual Packaging Materials 176 
6.4.4 Qualitative Feedback 180 
6.5 Conclusions 184 
CHAPTER SEVEN THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
7.1 Introduction 186 
7.2 Theoretical Background 186 
7.3 Costs Incurred by Packaging Producers 189 
7.4 The Relationship between Environmental Charges and Producer Behaviour 192 
7.5 PoUcy Alternatives 195 
7.6 Discussion of Survey Results 200 
7.6.1 Factors Causing Variation in Waste Management Practices 200 
7.6.2 The 'Impotency' of Price-based Environmental Regulation 203 
7.63 A Typology of Business Responses to Environmental Policy Instruments 207 
7.7 Conclusions 210 
CHAPTER EIGHT IMPLICATIONS OF THE PACKAGING DIRECTIVE FOR 
EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
8.1 Introduction 212 
8.2 Convergence, Persistent Diversity or Divergence in Member State Policies? 213 
8.2.1 Formal Legal Convergence 214 
8.2.2 Convergence in Implementation Style 215 
8.3 Price-based Regulation and the Implementation of EU Policy 220 
8.3.1 Introduction 220 
8.3.2 EU Policy, Price-based Regulation and Infrastructure Development 221 
8.3.3 EU Policy, Price-based Regulation and the Incentive Effect 222 
8.4 The European Union and Sustainable Development 223 
8.4.1 Free Trade and Environmental Protection 223 
8.4.2 The Packaging Directive, Integration and Sustainable Development 225 
8.4.3 The Obstacles to Environmentally-sustainable Policies 226 
8.4.4 The EU's response to the Obstacles to Environmental Sustainability 227 
8.4.5 Policy Alternatives within the present Paradigm 234 
8.5 Conclusions 236 
CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
9.1 Introduction 239 
9.2 Main Findings and Evaluation of the Thesis 239 
9.2.1 EU Policy Implementation and Sustainable Development 240 
9.2.2 Price-based Regulation and Business Behaviour 241 
9.2.3 EU Institutional Procedures and Economic Instruments 244 
vi 
9.3 Prospects for the Future 248 
9.3.1 Flexibility and the Implementation ofEU Environmental Policy 249 
9.3.2 Enlargement 253 
9.4 Towards a Research Agenda 257 
BroLIOGRAPHY 263 
Appendix 1 Contact letter for Preliminary Business Interviews 295 
Appendix 2 Contact letter for Accredited Reprocessors Survey 296 
Appendix 3a U K Survey Questionnaire 297 
Appendix 3b German Survey Questionnaire 302 
Appendix 4 Producer Survey Pilot Feedback Form 307 
Appendix 5a Producers Survey U K Contact Letter 308 
Appendix 5a Producers Survey German Contact Letter 309 
Appendix 6a Producers Survey U K Reminder Letter 310 
Appendix 6b Producers Survey German Reminder Letter 311 
Appendix 7a Distribution of Reprocessing Facilities, Britain 312 
Appendix 7b Distribution of Reprocessing Facilities, Germany 314 
vii 
TABLES 
Table 2.1 Weak and Strong Sustainability 19 
Table 2.2 The Transition to Sustainability 24 
Table 2.3 Mechanisms for Environmental Control 31 
Table 3.1 Voting Procedures under the TEU 53 
Table 3.2 Principles affirmed in the EU Environmental Action Programmes 54 
Table 3.3 Dialogue Groups provided by the Fifth Environmental Programme 59 
Table 4.1 EU Packaging Legislation reviewed for the Research 92 
Table 4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Social Research 97 
Table 4.3 Predicted and Actual Response Rates from Producer Survey 105 
Table 4.4 Responses to Filter Questions 107 
Table 5.1 Development of the Packaging Waste Directive at the EU 116 
Table 5.2 National Measures to Implement the Packaging Waste Directive 119 
Table 5.3 Targets and ResponsibiUties in the 1997 U K Regulations 129 
Table 5.4 Packaging flowing into the UK Waste Stream, 1997-2000 139 
Table 5.5 Predictions of UK Recovery and Recycling Capacity 1998-2001 140 
Table 5.6 Packaging Recycling Rates in Germany 1992-1997 141 
Table 5.7 UK Recovery and Recycling 2001 141 
Table 5.8 Household Waste Collection necessary to fulfil the U K Regulations 144 
Table 5.9 Reprocessor Attitudes towards PRN System 147 
Table 6.1 Analysis of Respondent Characteristics 158 
Table 6.2 British and German Packaging Collection Plans 162 
Table 6.3 British and German Packaging Reduction Plans 165 
Table 6.4 Packaging Re-use by UK and German Companies 167 
Table 6.5 External benefits of Recycling, Energy Saved 168 
Table 6.6 Purchase of Recycled Packaging by UK and German Companies 169 
Table 6.7 Correlation of Waste Management Variables, UK and Germany 172 
viii 
Table 6.8 Consolidated Waste Management Hierarchy Indices 174 
Table 6.9 Waste Management Activity by Packaging Material 177 
Table 6.10 Producer Opinions on the Directive, Mann Whitney analysis 182 
Table 6.11 Producer Opinions on the Directive, Descriptive analysis 183 
Table 7.1 Compliance Costs Incurred by Producers 190 
Table 7.2 Staff Employed to Manage Compliance with Packaging Regulations 191 
Table 7.3 Correlation of Waste Management Actions and Costs, Germany 193 
Table 7.4 Correlation of Waste Management Actions and Costs, Britain 194 
Table 7.5 Policy Alternative Proposition Sets 198 
Table 7.6 Producer Assessment of Packaging Regulations 199 
Table 7.7 Diffusion of Packaging Waste Charges 206 
Table 8.1 Carbon and Energy Taxes in the EU 219 
Table 8.2 Environmental Taxes on Energy Products (ECUs per unit, 1998) 220 
Table 8.3 Examples of Requests for Penalty Payments to the end of 1997 235 
Table 9.1 The Provisional Division of voting rights under an expanded EU 255 
ix 
FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Relationships between Environment and Development 20 
Figure 2.2 Approaches to Sustainable Development 27 
Figure 2.3 The Valuation of Environmental Resources 38 
Figure 2.4 Marginal Costs and Benefits of Pollution using Pigouvian Tax 39 
Figure 3.1 A Traditional View of Sustainable Development Linkages 51 
Figure 3.2 A Systematic View of Sustainable Development Linkages 51 
Figure 3.3 The Push-Pull Dynamic of EU Environmental Policy-Making 67 
Figure 3.4 The Co-operation Procedure 70 
Figure 3.5 The Co-decision Procedure 71 
Figure 4.1 The Waste Management Hierarchy 100 
Figure 4.2 Nominal and Interval Data Measurements used in Producer Survey 103 
Figure 4.3 Likert Scale Questions used in the Producer Survey 104 
Figure 4.4 Classifications of Corporate Environmental Response 108 
Figure 5.1 Green Dot Licence Fees 122 
Figure 5.2 The Structure of the German Dual System 123 
Figure 5.3 PRG Draft Proposals, February 1994 127 
Figure 5.4 V-WRAG Proposals for Packaging Recovery, 1995 128 
Figure 5.5 Funding and Packaging flows in the U K PRN System 133 
Figure 5.6 Recovery and Recycling Charges, Germany and UK 136 
Figure 5.7 PRN Price movements 1998-2000 151 
Figure 5.8 PRN Price movements. Steel and EfW Incineration 151 
Figure 6.1 Company Classifications WM/fA Index 174 
Figure 6.2 Company Classifications WMHAy Index 175 
Figure 6.3 Company Classifications WMHT Index 175 
Figure 6.4 Collection of Packaging Materials 178 
Figure 6.5 Reduction of Packaging Materials 178 
X 
Figure 6.6 Re-use of Packaging Materials 179 
Figure 6.7 Purchase of Recycled Packaging Materials 179 
Figure 7.1 Waste Management Actions and Costs, Germany 195 
Figure 7.2 Waste Management Actions and Costs, Britain 195 
Figure 7.3 Producer Responses to Environmental Policy Listruments 207 
xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACP Advisory Committee on Packaging 
ARGUS Arbeitsgruppe Umweltstatistik 
BAT Best Available Technology 
BATNEEC Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost 
BMU Bundesministerium fUr Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit 
(German Environment Ministry) 
CbvA Cost-benefit versus Action 
CEC Commission of the European Communities 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
COPAC Consortium of the Packaging Chain 
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CORINE Co-ordination of Information on the Environment 
DETR Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
DoE Department of the Environment 
DSD Duales System Deutschland 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
EAP Environmental Action Programme 
EC European Community 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EEA European Environment Agency 
EEC European Economic Community 
EfW Energy from Waste 
EMAS Environmental Management and Audit Scheme 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
ENDS Environmental Data Services 
EP European Parliament 
ESC Economic and Social Committee 
ETR Environmental Tax Reform 
EU European Union 
EUROPEN European Organisation for Packaging and the Environment 
HCSCETRA House of Commons Select Committee on Environment, Transport and 
Regional Affairs 
IGC Inter-Governmental Conference 
IMPEL Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Law 
INCPEN Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment 
IWM Institute of Wastes Management 
LA21 Local Agenda 21 
LCA Life Cycle Analysis (or Assessment) 
LDC Less Developed Country 
LGMB Local Government Management Board 
LIFE L'Instrument Financier pour I'Environment 
MSB Marginal Social Benefit 
MSC Marginal Social Cost 
MRW Materials Recycling Week 
NIMBY Not In My Back Yard 
NIS New Independent States (of the former Soviet Union) 
NUDIST Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Sorting and Theorising 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OJEC Official Journal of the European Communities 
PPP Polluter Pays Principle 
xii 
PRG Producer Responsibility Group 
PRN Packaging waste Recovery Note (also Producer Responsibility Note) 
PWMS Packaging Waste Management System 
SEA Single European Act 
SEPA Scottish Environmental Protection Agency 
SME Small-Medium Enterprise 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNCED United Nations Commission for Environment and Development 
US(A) United States of America 
V-WRAG VALPAK-Working Representatives Advisory Group 
WCED World Commission for Environment and Development 
WEEE Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
WMH Waste Management Hierarchy 
WMHA Waste Management Hierarchy Action 
WMHT Waste Management Hierarchy Target 
xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This thesis would not have been possible or as enjoyable without the assistance of a 
great number of people. First and foremost, I would like to thank my Director of 
Studies, Professor Mark Blacksell, who has been unstinting in his support and in 
challenging me to greater achievements. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Mark Wise 
for his encouragement, his meticulous eye for detail, and for his formidable 
appreciation of the labyrinths of EU politics. Moreover, they have both made 
researching and writing this thesis a genuine pleasure. 
My sincerest thanks also go to the Listitute of Wastes Management for their financial 
support for my fieldwork, and to the Environment Agency for providing information 
used in the surveys. However, nothing would have been possible without the patience 
and assistance of the hundreds of businesses and individuals that responded to my 
surveys and requests for information. Special mention here goes to the staff at the 
Duales System Deutschland for providing literature and answering my endless 
questions. This work has also benefited enormously from dialogue with other research 
institutions. I would particularly like to thank Juergen Gonser and Karin Jordan of the 
Arbeitsgruppe Umweltstatistik at the Technical University of Berlin; David, Denise, 
and Gill at Perchards; Markus Haverland from the University of Nijmegen; and Richard 
O'Doherty from the University of the West of England. 
Back at home, I am extremely grateful to my fellow postgrads for their advice, criticism 
and support. As my academic siblings and thesis proof readers, Jon Shaw and Bettina 
van Hoven-Iganski deserve a special mention, as does Karl Martin Born for his 
impeccable translations and insights into all things German. Thanks also to other 
members of the postgraduate community; Erik Meyles, Francien van Soest, Roger 
Levermore, Catherine Reid, Jon Vernon, Astrid Blum, Liz Hunt, Amy Burgess, Tony 
Massey and Emma Vickery. The Department's technical departments have also been 
enormously helpful throughout this study; special thanks here go to Tim, Brian and 
Jamie in the Cartographic Resources Unit, also Pauline, Adrian and David in IT. 
Finally, a personal thank you to my wife, Rebecca, for being so patient, forgiving and 
supportive, and for enduring academic loneliness with great fortitude. This thesis is 
dedicated to the memory of my mother and to my father. 
xiv 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has the author 
been registered for any other University award. 
The study was financed with the aid of a studentship from the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England. 
A programme of advanced study was undertaken which included a Master's degree in 
Social Research. 
Relevant seminars and conferences were attended at which work was regularly 
presented; external institutions were contacted for consultation purposes and a series of 
papers were prepared for publication. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Refereed Journals 
Bailey, I.G. (1999) 'FlexibiUty, Harmonization and the Single Market in EU 
Environmental Policy,' Joumal of Common Market Studies, 37 (4), pp. 549-71. 
Bailey, I.G. (1999) 'Competition, Sustainability and Packaging Policy in the U K ' 
Joumal of Environmental Planning and Management, 40 (1), pp. 83-102, re-printed 
in R.K. Turner, I. Bateman and J. Powell (Eds) (in print) Waste Management and 
Planning. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Bailey, I.G. (2000) 'Principles, Policies and Practice: Assessing the Environmental 
Sustainability of Britain's Packaging Policies,' Sustainable Development. 8 (1), pp. 
151-64. 
Bailey, I.G. and O'Doherty, R. (2000) 'Paper Chases and Glass Houses: Tradeable 
Permits and EU Recycling Targets,' Institute of Wastes Management Scientific and 
Technical Review. 2 (2), pp. 13-17. 
Bailey, I.G. (in preparation) 'Industry's response to Environmental Charges: The 
Incentive Effect and Hypothecation.' 
Bailey, I.G. (in print) Review of 'Environmental Policy in the European Union,' by P. 
M . Barnes and I. G. Barnes, European Spatial Research and Policy. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Professional Journals and other Contributions 
Bailey, I.G. (1999) 'The Development of the Packaging Regulations: Reviewing the 
Reprocessing industry' Wastes Management. March, pp. 38-9. 
Bailey, I.G. (1999) 'The Development of the Packaging Regulations II: The Response 
from Packaging Producers,' Institute of Wastes Management Scientific and 
Technical Review. September 1999. pp. 10-19. 
XV 
O'Doherty, R. and Bailey, I.G. (forthcoming) 'PRNs, Tradeable Permits and EU 
Recycling Targets,' in Proceedings of the International Centre for the Environment 
1999-2000. London: Macmillan. 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
Bailey, I.G. (1999) 'Principles, Policies and Practice: Assessing the Environmental 
Sustainability of Britain's Packaging Policies,' ERP Environment International 
Sustainable Development Conference. University of Leeds, UK. 
Bailey, I.G. (1999) 'Can Environmental Taxes Save the Planet? Some clues from EU 
Environmental Policy,' RGS/IBG Annual Postgraduate Conference. RGS, UK. 
Bailey, I.G. (2000) 'The Role of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy as a 
means of influencing Industry Behaviour,' ERP Environment International 
Sustainable Development Conference. University of Leeds, UK. 
O'Doherty, R. and Bailey, I.G. (2000) 'Paper Chase: Tradeable Permits and EU 
Recycling Targets,' International Centre for the Environment. University of Bath. 
EXTERNAL CONTACTS 
Arbeitsgruppe Umweltstatistik (ARGUS) at the Technical University of Berlin 
Biffa Waste Services Ltd 
British Electronics Manufacturers Association (BREMA) 
Department of Economics, University of the West of England, Bristol 
Duales System Deutschland (DSD) 
Federation Nationale des Activites du Dechet et de I'Environment 
Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment (INCPEN) 
Metal Packaging Manufacturers Association 
Paperpack Ltd. 
Perchards Packaging Consultancy 
RIGK M B H 
Robin Teverson, MEP and Ken Collins, MEP 
The British Retail Consortium 
The European Organisation for Packaging and the Environment (EUROPEN) 
The Institute of Wastes Management 
The Packaging Federation 
The Producer Responsibility Unit, the Environment Agency 
Faculty of Policy Sciences, The University of Nijmegen 
Department of Economics, The University of the West of England 
Umweltbundessamt (German Environment Agency) 
V A L P A K 
Date 
Signed 
xvi 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Issues in European Union Environmental Policy 
For many years the European Union (EU) Member States generally held the view that 
environmental protection was a national concern which did not warrant more than 
occasional supra-national action. The Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic 
Community did not originally prioritise or even include a reference to environmental 
concerns (Zito, 2000). It was not until the First Environmental Action Programme 
(EAP) in 1973 that the need for co-ordinated action to combat trans-boundary pollution 
and distortions of the Single Market caused by national environmental standards was 
formally recognised. Moreover, it was only with the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1986 that environmental protection was officially incorporated within the EU remit 
(Blacksell, 1994). Considering the late arrival of environmental policy on the 
international political stage and its potential conflicts with well-established economic 
and social priorities, it is not surprising that EU decision-makers have struggled to craft 
an effective and coherent body of environmental policy (Bailey, 1999a). These 
challenges have spanned not only the technicalities of defining policy aims and the 
'best' methods of achieving them - issues common to all policy programmes (Segerson, 
1996; O'Riordan and Voisey, 1998) - but also their assimilation into the unique and 
complex political structure of the EU (Howe, 1996; Haigh, 1998). 
Whilst the EU has made increasingly clear commitments to sustainable development as 
a grand policy goal (Commission of the European Communities (CEC), 1992a), 
agreeing specific courses of action involves often complex negotiations between the 
EU's constituent governments, its permanent institutions and other significant 
stakeholders. The situation is further complicated by the manner in which EU law is 
put into action, in that control over practical implementation is vested almost entirely 
with the Member States. As such, 'EU policy only comes to life in the member states 
and thus only has significance to the extent that it goads or galvanises national 
institutions, organisations and citizens to act' (Lowe and Ward, 1998a: 4). A by-
product of this state-led approach, however, has been that the way EU policies are 
1 
implemented often varies widely between Member States despite their acceptance of 
ostensibly conmion legislative standards. 
Although such issues have long been part and parcel of policy-making in the EU, they 
have taken on new relevance with the Union's increasing predisposition towards price-
based environmental regulation (CEC, 1992a). Price-based regulation is specifically 
designed to integrate the full social costs of environmental exploitation into the 
economies of the Member States. Although they remain bound by the terms of the 
Treaty, the signals sent to national markets using price-based regulation are determined 
primarily by state or regional authorities. Where Member States hold divergent views 
on both the prioritisation and conduct of environmental policy, any significant move 
towards price-based regulation may further embed these differences (Haverland, 1999). 
Moreover, because price-based regulation is a comparatively 'new' approach to 
environmental policy, its practical efficacy remains relatively untested. The first aim of 
this thesis, therefore, is to explore the contribution made by price-based policy 
instruments to the success of the EU environmental programme. The second aim is to 
investigate their operation within the EU's distinctive policy formulation and 
implementation procedures. In order to examine these issues, the study analyses the 
Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (94/62/EC), an EU initiative which most 
Member States have implemented using price-based regulatory techniques. Before 
embarking on this analysis, however, this chapter outlines the direction the thesis will 
take. It develops the key conceptual themes under investigation, introduces the 
legislation being studied, and sets out the objectives and structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Themes of the Study: Policy Instruments and Political Influences 
1.2.1 Policy Instruments: Price-based Environmental Regulation' 
There has been longstanding academic interest in environmental policy instruments, the 
general aim of which has been to understand their environmental and economic 
implications. One of the key discussions has been the relative merits of legislative 
Several variants of the term 'price-based regulation' are used throughout this thesis, including 
economic instruments and environmental charges. Although these should be taken as having an 
equivalent meaning, other variants, notably market-based regulation and environmental taxes are used to 
refer to specific features of price-based regulation, for example, whether pollution charges are 
determined primarily by market forces or government intervention. 
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standards and economic instruments .^ The main attribute of the legislative approach is 
that it imposes clear and enforceable standards and responsibilities. By contrast, price-
based regulation seeks to ascribe monetary values to environmental resources in order 
to encourage their prudent utilisation (under the Polluter Pays Principle, or PPP). There 
has been particular interest in economic instruments recently, first, because of the 
perceived failure of legislative standards to alleviate environmental degradation (Pearce 
et al., 1989; Pearce and Turner, 1990; CEC, 1992a) and, second, as a consequence of 
the suggestion that economic instruments can achieve environmental solutions in a 
cost-effective manner (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Tietenberg, 1990; Bahn, 1999). This 
belief is supported by a large, predominantly theoretical, literature which suggests that 
price-based regulation will encourage industries to reduce the scale of their 
environmentally-damaging activities^. 
Despite the theoretical advantages of price-based policies, the economic approach to 
environmental issues has been adopted in surprisingly few policy progranunes 
(Tietenberg, 1990; Jacobs, 1991; Huppes et al, 1992; Howe, 1996). Although this can 
be partly explained by political concerns over their inflationary impact and 
environmental efficiency (Helm, 1998), the corollary is that there has been 
comparatively little empirical research examining the practical effects of price-based 
regulation. Instead, most studies have either focused on modelling the impact of 
economic instruments (for example, Pearce et al., 1989; 1993; Brisson, 1993; van den 
Bergh, 1996; Bohm, 1997; Ekins, 1997; Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999) or policy 
issues (for example, Levenson, 1993; Fenton and Hanley, 1995; Defeuilley and 
Godard, 1997; Powell and Craighill, 1997; Sinclair and Fenton, 1997; Porter, 1998, 
Turner et at., 1998)^ Only a few studies, notably Labatt (1991; 1997a; 1997b), have 
^ Authors discussing legislative regulation include Collins and Earnshaw (1993), Leveque (1995; 1996a), 
Skea (1995) and Whiston and Glachant (1996). Those examining price-based regulation include Baumol 
and Oates (1979; 1988), Pearce et al., (1989; 1993), Hahn (1989), Tietenberg (1990), Pearce and Turner 
(1992; 1993), Helm (1993; 1998), Turner (1993), Turner and Pearce (1993), Goddard (1995) and Turner 
et al. (1998). Notable critiques of price-based regulation include Daly and Cobb (1990), Daly (1992), 
Beder (1996) and More et al. (1996). 
^ For example, Pigou (1920), Baumol and Oates (1979; 1988), Schelling (1984), Pearce et al. (1989; 
1993), Hahn (1989), Turner and Pearce (1990; 1993), Huppes et al. (1992), Repetto et al. (1992), Stavins 
and Whitehead (1992), Brisson (1993), Goddard (1995) and Gersbach and Glazer (1999). 
However, a number studies have debated the efficacy of environmental charges as a means of changing 
business behaviour on the basis of either logical reasoning or policy analysis. Notable works include 
Opschoor and Vos (1988), Hahn (1989), Jacobs (1991), Goddard (1995), Pearce et al. (1993) and Beder 
(1996). Several reports conducted for the European Commission and national governments also assess 
the impact of price-based policies in this manner, for example, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI)/Department of the Environment (DoE) (1991; 1992), DoE (1993), CEC (1994) and Organisation 
of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1994). 
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specifically analysed business responses to PPP-based charges and referenced these 
against defined environmental targets. With several influential governments now 
beginning to experiment extensively with price-based environmental regulation (Ekins, 
1993; Segerson, 1996; Vogel, 1997)^ , this lack of empirical verification is being 
exposed as a serious deficit in the literature. The first original contribution of this 
thesis, therefore, is its evaluation of the practical benefits of price-based environmental 
regulation. 
1.2.2 Formulating and Implementing Environmental Policy in the EU 
The study's second theme concerns the political dynamics of environmental policy-
making in the EU. Bohmer-Christiansen (1994), Demmke (1994) and Haas (1999) 
argue that understanding the implementation of any policy is impossible without first 
appreciating the circumstances in which it is formulated, as political issues inevitably 
influence the direction policies take, the scale of their ambitions and the manner in 
which they are implemented. Although sustainable development has become almost a 
universal paradigm, its expansive guidelines have proven susceptible to politically and 
economically motivated reinterpretation. Thus, it has proven difficult to translate 
sustainable development's conceptualisation of enduring pathways for human society 
into clear courses of action. The literature discussing sustainable development is 
immense and, out of necessity, this thesis considers the debate only briefly^. Moreover, 
if environmental problems are to be addressed convincingly, the debate must ultimately 
be founded on empirical evidence rather than abstract theorising (Ekins, 1993). That 
said, the thesis seeks to recognise the complexity of the sustainability debate and its 
vulnerability to political manipulation. 
The EU environmental programme is also profoundly influenced by its complex 
political agenda. Although the Union aspires to far-reaching economic and policy 
integration, it remains a grouping of often fiercely independent states (Wise and Gibb, 
1993). The tensions between the EU's expansive integration agenda and its desire to 
defend the sovereignty of its Member States makes the development of common 
' Within the EU context alone, the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and End-of-life 
Vehicles Directives are both likely to be implemented using economic instruments (Materials Recycling 
Week (MRW), 1999a; 1999b). 
* Pezzoli (1997) provides the most comprehensive review of the sustainable development literature. 
Other important contributions include Ekins (1993), Turner (1993), Redclift (1987; 1992), Pearce et al. 
(1989; 1993) and O'Riordan and Voisey (1998). 
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environmental policies a highly intricate process. Although this applies to all aspects 
of EU activity, the environment is recognised as a particularly difficult area to co-
ordinate because of the complex nature of trans-national pollution, the extent that 
environmental initiatives permeate traditionally national policy domains, and because 
of conflicts between the EU's environmental and economic priorities (Collins and 
Earnshaw, 1993, Weale, 1996). 
The politics of EU environmental policy centres on three areas of potential conflict; (i) 
decisions on the acceptance of EU action, (ii) the political dynamics of negotiating 
environmental laws, and (iii) the process of practical implementation in the Member 
States. Prior to the SEA, the EU was only legally entitled to enact environmental 
policies in order to protect free trade in the Common Market. This made it all the more 
remarkable that a substantial body of environmental legislation was developed during 
this period (Lowe and Ward, 1998a). The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have 
further augmented the powers conferred by the SEA such that environmental protection 
is now officially 'an essential objective' of the EU^. However, EU involvement can 
still only be justified where environmental objectives or the defence of the Single 
Market can be more effectively achieved through EU rather than state action (Toth, 
1994). The management of this issue, by means of the hotly debated subsidiarity 
principle, is examined in Chapter three. 
The issue of policy formulation is complicated by the fact that the EU is not a unitary 
state. It might be more accurately defined as a process whose product is the aggregated 
and transformed ideas of its constituent national powers (Zito, 2000). This means that 
the negotiation of policies is often a very state-centred and interest-led process. The 
main tension is therefore between the desire to achieve unanimity on key issues and the 
ambition to have national agendas elevated at the EU arena. Again this is not unique to 
environmental policy but is accentuated by the presence of defined environmental 
'leader' and 'laggard' Member states in the Council. In terms of policy outcome, the 
tension is between 'lowest-common-denominator' bargaining and a more 
'entrepreneurial' style of decision-making seeking to promote greater integration and 
high environmental standards (Collins and Eamshaw, 1993; Sbragia, 1996; Zito, 2000). 
As noted by the European Court of Justice in the Danish Bottles Case (302/86, ECR 4607) in 1988. 
The final point of contention, policy implementation, arises because the majority of 
environmental policy is legally enacted in the form of directives. This means that 
Member States are bound in terms of the overall objectives to be achieved but retain the 
right to determine the detailed arrangements for putting them into practice (Jordan, 
1999). Whilst this deliberately makes EU law flexible without allowing national 
authorities to disavow it entirely, it has led to frequent disputes on the precise timing 
and extent of implementation by Member States. Moreover, the success of directives is 
measured almost entirely in terms of legislative standards, a relatively blunt method for 
assessing how Member States achieve EU standards and, therefore, the overall 
contribution of national policies to sustainable development. 
These factors have combined to produce complex and lengthy policy-implementation 
procedures, and often severe dislocations between the aims enunciated by the EAPs and 
the practical results achieved (Collins and Earnshaw, 1993; Kramer, 1996; EUR-OP 
News, 2000). However, whilst some commentators criticise the EU for being an 
incomplete polity and for its excessive flexibility in relation to policy implementation 
(W. Wallace, 1996; Kramer, 1996), others stress that the level of integration achieved 
within the EU is an impressive political achievement (Wise and Gibb, 1993; Scott et 
al., 1994). The thesis' second original contribution is its examination of how the EU's 
political structure affects the efficacy of price-based environmental regulation. It 
therefore assesses how technical and political factors inter-twine to determine 
environmental policy outcome. Whilst previous studies have also examined aspects of 
this issue (for example, Demmke, 1997; O'Riordan, 1997; Lowe and Ward, 1998a; 
Turner et al., 1998), most, somewhat artificially, have treated politics and policy 
instruments as separate issues. 
1.3 Background to the Packaging Waste Directive 
The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive was formally adopted by the Council of 
Ministers and European Parliament in December 1994 (Official Journal of the 
European Communities (OJEC), 1994). Its primary aim was to harmonise EU 
recycling laws on packaging waste following the introduction of the German 
Verpackungsverordnung (Packaging Ordinance) in 1991 (London and Llamas, 1994; 
Waite, 1995). Fearing that the recycling targets and costs imposed by the Ordinance 
would become technical obstacles to the free trade of packaged goods in the Single 
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Market, other states and the Commission pressed for harmonising legislation under 
Article 100a of the EU Treaty .^ The Packaging Directive requires all Member States to 
introduce measures: 
aimed, as a first priority, at preventing the production of packaging waste and, as 
additional fundamental principles, at reusing packaging, at recycling and other forms of 
recovering packaging waste and, hence, at reducing the final disposal of such waste 
(Article 1) (OJEC, 1994: 12)^ 
However, although the Directive seeks to promote a range of waste management 
objectives, the only commitments actually quantified were those relating to the 
recovery and recycling of packaging waste (50-65% and 25-45% respectively). 
Following heated negotiations in the Council of Ministers and European Parliament 
(EP), the prevention and re-use of packaging waste and the development end-use 
markets for recyclate were only included as general conditions in the final Directive's 
'Essential Requirements' (Annex 11) and Article 6. Golub (1996) cites this as evidence 
of lowest-common-denominator bargaining within EU environmental policy. 
Two points are immediately obvious from this. First, in common with much EU 
legislation, the Directive sought legislative approximation rather than total 
harmonisation. To further this aim, banded targets and derogations were employed to 
cater for the specific exigencies and capabilities of individual Member States (Bailey, 
1999a). In addition, the Directive itself was framed primarily in the form of legislative 
standards rather than price-based regulation. However, Article 15 provides the 
guidance that: 'acting on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, the Council 
adopts economic instruments to promote the implementation of the objectives set by 
this Directive' (OJEC, 1994: 16). It therefore becomes apparent that many Member 
States anticipated implementing the Directive's requirements using some form of price-
based regulation. Because of this and the practical complexities of waste recycling, the 
Packaging Directive has, slightly inadvertently, become a prominent example of price-
based regulation in the EU, making it an ideal focus for investigating the impact of 
* This thesis refers to Articles 100 and 100a although they were amended to Articles 94 and 95 in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, as the former were still in force at the time the Packaging Directive was negotiated. 
' Under the Directive, recycling is defined as 'the reprocessing in a production process of the waste 
materials for the original purpose or for other purposes including organic recycling but excluding energy 
recovery'. Recovery is defined as 'the use of packaging waste as a means to generate energy through 
direct incineration with or without other waste but with recovery of the heat' (OJEC, 1994: 13). 
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economic instruments on business behaviour and their compatibility with the EU's 
state-led approach to policy implementation. 
1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
Against this background, the central objective of this thesis is to use evidence from the 
Packaging Waste Directive to help contribute towards a more general understanding of 
the extent to which price-based policy instruments promote sustainable development 
within the EU. Recognising that EU environmental policies are influenced by a range 
of technical and political factors, the study analyses how, in practice, interactions 
between the two determine policy outcome. It therefore critically evaluates the 
negotiation, transposition and implementation of the Packaging Directive as well as the 
translation of price-based policies from theory into practice. The research has three key 
objectives: 
• To assess, within the example of the Packaging Directive, the efficacy of the 
EU's state-led style of policy negotiation and implementation in relation to the 
promotion of sustainable development; 
• To investigate the extent to which price-based policy instruments have 
encouraged sustainable business practices; 
• To assess the compatibility of the EU's political and decision-making structures 
with the effective operation of price-based environmental regulation. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
To examine these issues, the thesis is structured into eight further chapters. Chapter 
two examines the general theoretical context of environmental policy-making by 
investigating the general aims of environmental policy and the implementing 
mechanisms used to achieve them. The chapter begins by outlining the genesis of 
modern environmental thinking and its evolution from the limits-to-growth hypothesis 
to sustainable development. This is followed by a critical review of sustainable 
development and its acceptance as the main framework for contemporary 
environmental programmes (Redclift, 1987; 1992; Pezzoli, 1997; Turner, 1997). The 
selection of policy instruments to promote sustainable development is then 
investigated, paying particular attention to the conceptual merits of legislative standards 
8 
and price-based instruments. Chapter three then discusses the politics of environmental 
policy in the EU. It begins by reviewing the justifications behind the EU 
environmental programme and its evolution since the First EAP. The nature of 
European integration and the forces shaping the creation and implementation of 
environmental policies are then examined. This is followed by a discussion of the 
practical stages of policy negotiation and enforcement. Throughout the review, the 
tensions between the EU's economic and environmental priorities and between its main 
decision-making bodies are highlighted along with their implications for environmental 
policy outcome. 
Before the thesis considers the expression of these tensions within the Packaging 
Directive, Chapter four describes the methods used to collect and analyse the research's 
primary and secondary data. This section emphasises the compilation of secondary 
material as a framework for understanding the general policy context, the use of 
qualitative data to formulate research hypotheses and, finally, the utilisation of 
quantitative techniques to test their validity. The secondary data used in the study were 
obtained from a variety of official documents, including government consultations, 
policy papers, industry submissions and academic analyses. The main primary data 
were derived from two surveys, the first conducted with reprocessing businesses in the 
UK and the second with 1800 businesses affected by national packaging legislation. 
The remainder of the thesis examines the use of economic instruments to implement the 
Packaging Waste Directive. Chapter five provides a general overview of the 
Directive's negotiation and transposition, then compares the implementation 
methodologies employed in two Member States, Britain and Germany. It considers the 
extent to which policy implementation in each country has been shaped by prevailing 
institutional structures and pohtical stances (see also Haigh and Lanigan, 1995; Haigh, 
1998; Lowe and Ward, 1998a), then argues that two distinctive and ideologically-
driven models of packaging waste management have emerged. The U K model, it 
contends, reflects the British government's desire to achieve EU standards in a cost-
effective manner using market-based regulation. By contrast, the German approach has 
been characterised by stringent environmental standards and the instigation of 
'command-and-control' legislation (Haverland, 1999). It is further argued that these 
policy styles are evident in the way each country has applied price-based environmental 
regulation. The chapter concludes by assessing each system in terms of its ability to 
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produce environmentally and economically efficient systems of packaging waste 
management. 
Chapters six and seven present the primary data derived from the survey of UK and 
German businesses and examine how the two regulatory models have influenced the 
environmental behaviour of industries affected by the Directive. Chapter six sets the 
scene by contrasting the packaging waste management practices adopted by British and 
German businesses. Chapter seven then assesses the extent to which economic 
instruments have influenced business actions in each country. As a prelude to this, the 
literature examining the merits of price-based environmental regulation is revisited, 
then its assertions are tested using data from the study's main survey. On the basis of 
these results, the nature of corporate responses to legislative and price-based policy 
instruments and the contribution of each to sustainable development are reflected on. 
Chapter eight returns to the policy-making dimension of the study to analyse the 
compatibility of economic instruments with the decision-making structures of the EU. 
It investigates the degree to which the Packaging Waste Directive has led to the 
convergence or divergence of national policies, then explores whether price-based 
regulation has improved the implementation of EU policies. Following this, the 
chapter discusses the incorporation of the EU's sustainability ambitions within a 
supranational system primarily geared towards economic and trade development. 
Finally, Chapter nine summarises the study's findings and reviews its limitations. In so 
doing, it examines future challenges for price-based regulation in the EU and highlights 
areas of potential future research. 
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Chapter Two 
Aims and Mechanisms of Environmental Policy 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one identified the main aim of this thesis as an evaluation of the success of 
European Union environmental policy in promoting sustainable development and, in 
particular, the contribution of price-based regulation to this objective. Before the 
analysis proceeds, however, the purpose of this chapter is to establish the conceptual 
basis of the study. Policy analysts usually identify two principal components in any 
policy-making process, the determination of desired objectives and the selection of 
policy mechanisms to secure these goals (Segerson, 1996; Auty and Tribe, 1997). 
Cognitively, this may appear straightforward; without aims, policy intervention will be 
largely directionless, without effective implementing mechanisms, even the most 
consistent principles can have little substance. However, as the subsequent analysis 
demonstrates, the interpretation of these seemingly self-evident maxims is keenly 
contested within the polemics of environmental policy. 
The main purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to review the debate on these two issues. 
The first section explores the literature discussing the emergence of sustainable 
development as the principal aim of international and EU environmental policy (see 
also Pezzoli, 1997). Various interpretations of sustainable development are discussed 
and its acceptance as the predominant paradigm of modern environmental management 
is analysed. Whilst it is recognised that sustainable development is an immensely fluid 
term, an appreciation of its various interpretations is central to understanding the basis 
of EU environmental policy and, moreover, the relationship between ecological 
protection and economic development. The second half of the chapter investigates the 
selection and application of environmental policy instruments. After reviewing the 
main policy mechanisms available, the use of price-based instruments within 
environmental policy is examined. Although environmental economists have 
advocated price-based environmental regulation for nearly twenty years, uncertainties 
over its environmental benefits and economic and political impact have meant that the 
technique has only recently gained real policy currency. Nonetheless, the indications 
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are that the EU sees price-based regulation as critical to the future of its environmental 
programme. The remainder of the chapter therefore examines the theoretical arguments 
for and against price- and market-based instruments as a method for integrating 
economic and environmental policy (Pearce et al., 1989; Gibbs and Healey, 1997), 
along with the reasons behind their belated acceptance by environmental policy makers. 
2.2 Policy Aims and Objectives 
2.2.1 The Early Years of the Modem Environmental Movement 
Though the roots of the environmental movement can be traced back many centuries 
(O'Riordan and Voisey, 1998; Pepper, 1986), its modern manifestation has been 
profoundly shaped by three works; Carson's Silent Spring (Carson, 1962), Hardin's The 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), and the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth 
report (Meadows et al., 1972). Carson's work, examining commercial agriculture, led 
her to conclude that existing farming practices were attempting to control nature in a 
technocentric manner - in order to maximise short-term productivity - without nurturing 
an accompanying appreciation of the environment's resilience and assimilative capacity 
(Carson, 1962). In order to prevent major damage to the environment, she argued, 
industrial and agricultural processes needed to become less reliant on technological 
progress and more sensitive to ecological factors. Garrett Hardin's work built upon 
these ideas and reinforced two further issues central to environmentalist thinking, the 
notion of carrying capacity and the self-destructive tendencies of individuals operating 
for private gain (Hardin, 1968). As his metaphor for the global environment, Hardin 
envisaged a piece of common land, which, he argued, could support a certain number of 
animals without losing its productive capacity. In other words, it had a finite carrying 
capacity. If one herdsman increased the size of his herd in order to enhance his 
personal yield and, by so doing, exceeded the commons' overall carrying capacity for 
livestock, Hardin argued that degradation and loss of productive capacity would set in. 
However, the herdsman would benefit exclusively from having more animals but the 
overall loss to the commons would be shared amongst all parties, leaving the individual 
better off. Furthermore, on the basis of individual gain, the logical course of action is 
for each herdsman repeatedly to make the same choice, thereby moving the commons 
ecosystem from a position of stability towards one of rapid collapse. By realigning his 
analogy back to global issues, Hardin concluded that strong government policy rather 
12 
than reUance on individual actions was essential to protect the long-term sustainability 
of the global conraions. 
However, it was The Club of Rome Report that brought such concepts to widespread 
political and public attention. The report argued that existing planning systems were 
fundamentally geared towards understanding individual components of the global 
system - as determined by economic need - rather than their interactions, and therefore 
constituted neither a holistic nor a realistic consideration of human stresses on the 
natural environment (also Odum, 1970; Dahl, 1996). The Limits model predicted that 
widespread ecological and economic collapse would occur within 100 years if existing 
patterns of population growth, industrial production, resource exploitation and pollution 
continued unchecked. The report's fundamental notion, that technocentric industrial 
processes and spiralling population would combine to exceed the earth's carrying 
capacity, was reinforced by other neo-Malthusian visions of society's breakdown (for 
example, Ehrlich, 1971). Most subscribed to the view that the predicted disaster could 
only be averted by rejecting the previously uncontested orthodoxy of unending 
economic expansion and through strict population control measures (Schumacher, 
1973; Pezzoli, 1997). 
Whilst the concepts, methodology and predictions of the 'zero-growth' proponents were 
criticised by commentators who saw technological advancement as able to surmount 
any limits to growth (for example, Beckerman, 1974; 1995)', the Limits conclusions 
sparked a fierce academic debate and inspired the world's politicians publicly to re-
appraise the relationship between growth and environmental protection at the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (O'Riordan, 
1976). PezzoU (1997) argues, however, that the focus throughout the 1970s was 
primarily on the reactive cleansing of the mess caused by unfettered industrialisation 
rather than the wholesale fusion of economic and environmental policies (see Chapter 3 
for a discussion of the EU approach). Whilst the environment has never again been 
entirely removed from the political agenda ,^ the global recession of the 1970s and early 
A special issue of Futures (Science Policy Research Unit, 1973) also presented an extensive critique of 
the methodologies employed by the Limits model. See also Weintraub et al. (1974). 
^ For example, the EU EAPs produced a large body of pollution-control legislation during the 1970s even 
though environmental policy had no basis in the EU Treaty until 1986 (see Chapter 3). Redclift (1987) 
also cites the World Conservation Strategy and the South Pacific Commission, both established in 1980. 
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1980s forced governments to concentrate principally upon their economic woes. It was 
not until the mid-1980s that environmental issues again captured the political limelight. 
2.2.2 The Brundtland Report and Sustainable Development 
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published 
the report Our Common Future (the Brundltand Report). As with its predecessor, the 
Limits Report, but with firmer evidence of such phenomena as global warming and 
ozone layer depletion, it highlighted the need for humanity to reconsider its relationship 
with the natural environment. However, rather than returning to a neo-Malthusian 
population control philosophy, it attempted to blend economic development and 
environmental protection under the banner of sustainable development (WCED, 1987). 
This it defined as: 
Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (quoted in Haigh, 1998: 69). 
Brundtland's interpretation of sustainable development contained four major themes; 
carrying capacity, quality of life, inter- and intra-generational equity, and consultation 
and partnership (Bennett and Patel, 1995; Clark et al., 1993). 
Whilst carrying capacity is an obvious extension of Hardin's work and the Limits 
Report, numerous commentators have attempted to clarify the practical implications of 
the concept (Pearce et al., 1989; 1993; Daly and Cobb, 1990; Jacobs and Stott, 1992). 
As their basis for so doing, they defined ecosystem behaviour in terms of the laws of 
thermodynamics. The first states that matter and energy can neither be created nor 
destroyed but only transformed. The second states that whenever work is done, the 
amount of useable energy declines until entropy occurs. Within the global system, the 
only significant energy input is from the Sun - in economic terms, this is the Earth's 
income - while the natural resources available can be equated to its capital (Pearce et 
al., 1989). Daly and Cobb (1990) argue that natural processes are low entropy, in that 
they take mainly solar-based energy and are net contributors to natural capital, but that 
production processes extract high levels of natural resources for the accumulation of 
human capital and, hence, are high entropy. They argue that a sustainable economy 
should live principally from the earth's income rather than by depleting its capital stock. 
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Furthermore, because natural capital is not an homogenous item but is instead 
comprised of innumerable, inter-linked and often non-renewable resources, a 
sustainable system needs to anticipate environmental problems rather than react to them 
(Pearce et al, 1989). Implicit within the concept of carrying capacity, therefore, is the 
notion that economies and societies must be sustainable over an extended period of 
time. This is termed the concept of futurity (WCED, 1987). Whilst substantial 
disagreements remain as to what constitutes a sustainable level of natural capital and 
the desired direction of future human development (discussed in later sections), 
technocentric models which deny the very possibility of carrying capacities rarely have 
much credence in modern sustainability thinking (Ekins, 1993). As such, sustainable 
development argues that economic expansion needs to be placed within its ecological 
context rather than being considered as independent of it. As Dahl (1996: 85) notes: 
The narrow criteria of financial profitability for corporations give ... the appearance of 
success, whilst permitting many costs to be externalised to the whole community, leaving 
society itself deeply in debt ... The economic system may seem rational and internally 
consistent, but it does not reflect reality. 
The Brundtland Report's second major theme was that society should be judged against 
quality-of-life criteria that are broader than those relating to economic welfare within 
the formal economy (Redclift, 1987). Quality-of-life measures, Pearce et al. (1993) 
suggest, should include the advance of personal freedoms, self-esteem and self-respect 
(also Daly, 1992). Sustainable development therefore attempts to ingrain a greater 
sense of society, rather than just economy, within future policies. Closely allied to this 
is the notion of equity, which Pearce et al. (1989) argue encompasses both the present 
generation (intra-generational equity) and the fair treatment of future generations (inter-
generational equity). Inter-generational equity is very much a distributional re-iteration 
of Brundtland's statement that the present generation should leave at least as much 
capital (human and natural) as it inherited for future generations. In terms of intra-
generational equity, many authors see sustainability as impossible to achieve whilst 
enormous wealth disparities exist between the developed Northern countries and the 
less developed South and, moreover, while global economic systems reinforce these 
imbalances (Redclift, 1987; 1996; Pearce et al., 1990; Jager et al., 1995). The strong 
redistributive element of sustainable development therefore differs fundamentally from 
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the emphasis on wealth creation and its natural diffusion through free market forces 
implicit in neo-classical models of economic growth. 
Finally, Brundtland stressed the importance of consultation and partnership to 
sustainable development (Myers and Macnaghten, 1998). The report argued that 
neither market forces nor regulation could achieve the sustainability transition without 
widespread democratisation and public support for the policy commitments that 
accompany sustainable development (Bennett and Patel, 1995, Agyeman and Evans, 
1997). Many therefore see locally focused policies rather than top-down dictates as the 
key to constructing sustainable development (Porritt, 1994; Gibbs et al., 1998; Gerelli, 
1995). However, whilst supporting this idea for some sustainability problems (Dovers 
1997), others view the lack of power, finance and knowledge available within local 
authorities, along with their tendency to operate for local rather than global benefit, as 
major impediments to a locally-fostered sustainability strategy (Gibbs et al., 1998; 
Voisey et al., 1996; Burgess et al., 1998; Marvin and Guy, 1997). They therefore point 
out that a strong institutional and integrative framework is needed from higher tiers of 
government in order to support local efforts. 
So whilst Brundtland's vision of sustainable development defined a more reflective 
view of humanity's relations with the natural environment, it neither aspired to, nor 
presented, a comprehensive practical plan. Lee (1993), for example, sees sustainable 
development more as an appropriate vision of human endeavour than a policy 
programme, whilst Jager et al. (1995: 14) view it simply as a basis for 'fostering ... 
"sustainable" synergies between environmental, economic and social policies.' What is 
clear, however, is that there is a distinction between the terms sustainability and 
sustainable development. Sustainability, Jacobs and Stott (1992) assert, focuses almost 
entirely on ecological concerns and minimum acceptable levels of environmental 
quality within an implicitiy constrained economy, whilst sustainable development 
emphasises a new form of development de-coupled from increased resource 
consumption and pollution. As such, human welfare is a more prominent consideration 
within sustainable development. For some, economic growth is even a vital component 
of sustainable development's goal of social redistribution (Jongma, 1995). The 
complex relationship between economic growth and sustainable development is 
discussed further in the following section. 
16 
Though Brundtland's articulation of sustainable development is couched more in the 
terminology of vision than practical action, it nonetheless provided national 
governments and the international community with a basis for operationalising the 
linkages between economy and environment (Jager et al., 1995). However, this in itself 
presents practical difficulties. First, because many environmental problems are 
inherently international in character, respected trans-national institutions are required to 
co-ordinate the actions of national governments towards a 'common' goal of 
sustainability. Gerelli (1995) therefore argues that well-organised supra-national 
groupings such as the EU have a significant role to play in defining strategies for 
sustainable development. Second, practical policies are needed to promote 
Brundtland's principles. This issue is the subject of intense debate and is reviewed in 
the second half of the chapter. Nevertheless, several commentators have attempted to 
define in broad terms how sustainable development might be achieved (see, for 
example O'Riordan and Jager 1995)^ . Furthermore, sustainable development takes an 
ambiguous stance on the extent to which economic growth is a desirable policy goal 
and, therefore, remains vulnerable to dispute and reconstitution by nation states seeking 
to forward their national ambitions. Finally, despite the pressing need to communicate 
progress towards sustainable development (Cheatle, 1995; Brugman, 1997; Sterling, 
1996), it has proven difficult to find accurate, meaningful and objective measures'^ . 
Therefore, despite the immense contribution of the Brundtland report in bringing 
environmental issues to the global political arena, attempts to translate its principles 
into practical courses of action have been beset by numerous difficulties. Moreover, the 
sustainable development debate has extended beyond technical details into fundamental 
discussions on the direction sustainable policies should take. The next section reviews 
the varying perspectives on sustainable development contained within the literature. 
These include directional spending arising out of ecotaxation to encourage, for example, job creation 
and health care, the creation of Local Agenda 21 networks to disseminate 'best' sustainability practices, 
and the decentralisation of economic activity. 
" See, for example the indicators produced by the UK Department of the Environment (DoE) Indicators 
of Sustainable Development for the United Kingdom, (DoE, 1996a). Whilst environmental indicators are 
an integral part of the report, it continues to support policies aiming towards economic expansion. 
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2.2.3 Perspectives on Sustainable Development 
Although Brundtland's version of sustainable development remains the most widely 
quoted, over 70 definitions of the concept can be found (Pearce et al., 1989; Kirkby et 
al., 1995). In many ways, these disagreements are almost inevitable, since it is 
impossible to decipher such concepts as growth, development, equity and futurity 
without becoming embroiled in complex subjective and ethical judgements (Pearce et 
al., 1989; RedcUft, 1992). Fundamentally, the debate divides between those who 
support incremental changes to existing methods for valuing environmental resources 
(the economic view) and those who seek the wholesale ethical and institutional 
restructuring of society (the ecological and equity views)^. Reflecting this diversity. 
Turner (1993) and Gibbs et al. (1998) portray the debate as a spectrum between weak 
and strong sustainability using the typology shown in Table 2.1. However, though 
broad similarities exist between the economic view and weak sustainability, it would be 
inaccurate to classify them as entirely analogous because sustainable development 
embraces such a wide range of ambitions. 
The economic view is best encapsulated by the work of Pearce et al. (1989; 1990; 
1993), who present sustainable development as a positive means of managing growth. 
They argue that although economic production and consumption must be sustainable, 
zero growth is not a credible alternative because ecological processes cannot always 
take precedence over human welfare (also Castro, 1972). Thus economic expansion is 
important for achieving the equity objectives of sustainable development if it leads to 
improved material standards of living for the world's poor (Barbier, 1987). They 
nonetheless stress the importance of maintaining critical natural capital thresholds 
during the process of substituting natural capital for human capital (Pearce and 
Atkinson, 1997). 
Basaigo (1995) provides an alternative classification of approaches to sustainable development. He 
identifies perspectives as either ecological, ethical, economic or planning, to which O'Riordan and 
Voisey (1998) add political science. 
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Table 2.1 Weak and Strong Sustainability 
Version Features 
Very weak sustainability Overall stock of capital assets remains stable over time, complete 
substitution between human and natural capital. Essential link 
between willingness to pay and sustainable development. 
Weak sustainability 
Strong sustainability 
Limits set on natural capital usage. Some natural capital is 
critical, that is non-substitutable. Related to the precautionary 
principle or safe minimum standards. Trade-offs still possible. 
Not all ecosystem functions and services can be adequately 
valued economically. Uncertainty means whatever the social 
benefits foregone, losses of critical natural capital are not 
possible. 
Very strong sustainability Steady-state economic system based on thermodynamic limits 
and constraints. Matter and energy throughput should be 
minimised. 
Source: Gibbs etal. (1998: 1353) 
By recognising the need to balance these prerogatives, weak sustainability depicts itself 
as a more humanitarian and realistic view of sustainable development than that held by 
advocates of zero growth (Auty and Brown, 1997). However, the heart of the economic 
standpoint is the contention that economic growth need not be sacrificed in order to 
achieve environmental sustainability. histead it embraces a concept frequently termed 
'ecological modernisation', the contention that entrepreneurial forces can be harnessed 
for environmental gain, rather than perceiving environmental protection as a brake on 
development or development as an inevitable source of degradation, (Nordhaus, 1992; 
Gouldson and Murphy, 1996). Conversely, the view of strong sustainability is that 
economic development and environmental protection are fundamentally irreconcilable 
and inevitably trade off against each other. The difference between these approaches is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Relationsliips between Environment and Development 
Real Income 
(Human Capital) 
\ y/^ Complementarity 
\ (Ecological 
\ y/^ Modernisation) 
\ . Trade-Off 
(strong sustainability) 
Environmental Quality (Natural Capital) 
Source: Pearce a/. 1989: 18 
According to the ecological modernisation critique, the central problem is that property 
rights over the majority of environmental resources are extremely ill defined. To 
illustrate, if a factory emits polluting fumes to the atmosphere (over which no defined 
property rights exist) there is nothing within the market system to compel the company 
to compensate other parties for their loss of air quality, even where tangible 
extemalities can be readily identified (van den Bergh, 1996). Society has therefore 
historically under-valued and over-exploited the environment in terms of its resources 
and function as a pollution sink (Friedman, 1962). As industrialisation has become 
more widespread, this unvalued damage, or externality effect, has increased to the point 
where it threatens to undermine the basic viability of the economic system. The 
economic viewpoint contends that correcting this distortion requires the introduction of 
market mechanisms which re-intemalise environmental externality costs until an 
optimal balance is achieved between human utility and natural resource conservation 
(Turner, 1993). Under this regime, business will be encouraged to conserve natural 
20 
resources, increase their environmental efficiency and invest in more environmentally-
friendly technologies (Pearce et al., 1989; Gouldson and Murphy, 1996)^ . Furthermore, 
the argument also posits that ecological modernisation will stimulate new industries, 
reduced pollution costs and will make environment protection and economic growth 
complementary, the so-called 'win-win' or double dividend. 
The obvious question, however, is whether there is convincing evidence to support the 
ecological modernisation hypothesis. As Ekins (1993) points out, the issue of 
sustainable development cannot be defined entirely through theoretical debate because 
environmental protection is ultimately an empirical question. Whilst there is evidence 
that reductions in resource and energy consumption have occurred in developed 
countries as a result of heightened environmental consciousness (Auty and Tribe, 
1997), industrialisation within less developed countries (LDCs) has generally been 
accompanied by disproportionately high increases in pollution and waste production^. 
There is therefore considerable conjecture as to whether ecological modernisation 
presents a convincing approach to the environmental problem despite its acceptance by 
several political groupings, the EU included (Bohm, 1997). 
Whilst the economic view of sustainable development is often portrayed as 
conceptually pragmatic but methodologically rigorous (Gibbs, 1996a; Auty and Brown, 
1997), the strong sustainability vision of the ecological and equity views are seen as 
less precise in terms of implementing mechanisms, histead, they stress the need for 
minimum ecological thresholds and a fairer economic order (Daly and Cobb, 1990; 
Redclift, 1992). Some proponents of very strong sustainability even reject sustainable 
development outright, branding it an oxymoron, a western value and a capitalist 
invention (see Turner, 1997), or as a fanciful notion containing moral injunctions in 
place of policies (see Dovers, 1997). More moderate adherents of strong sustainability 
have sought to question, inter alia whether the development or growth ethic is an 
appropriate response to global environmental problems, what time-scale sustainability 
should be planned over, or what consumption and production levels should be sustained 
^ Environmental efficiency is defined by Pearce et al. (1989) as the ecological impact per unit of 
production or consumption. It does not, therefore, necessarily challenge the legitimacy of economic 
growth as a concept. Jacobs and Stott (1992) use the example of catalytic converters, which are used to 
make motor vehicles more environmentally benign but do not discourage their use. 
^ Furthermore, Ekins (1993) notes that whilst energy intensity within OECD fell by 20% in the period 
1973-1986, in the USA it rose again in 1987 and 1988. 
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(Redclift, 1987; 1992; Dahl, 1996). They contest the validity of the principle of capital 
substitutability by highlighting the problems associated with defining constant overall 
capital, a point, in fairness, acknowledged by Pearce et. al. (1989), especially in respect 
of non-renewable resources. Thus, supporters of strong sustainability reject the notion 
that market forces can adequately address environmental problems. Instead, they 
advocate an approach based on international co-operation (Redclift, 1987), the re-
examination of society's ethical values (Paehlke, 1996), the democratisation or 
replacement of political institutions which have perpetuated the growth ethic and, more 
extremely, a re-examination of the resource-use policies proposed by the Limits model 
(Daly, 1992). 
Many adherents to the equity vision of sustainable development view the resolution of 
poverty in Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) as the central pohcy issue (Glaeser, 1988; 
Redclift, 1987; Jongma, 1995). They maintain that sustainability is principally a 
lifestyle issue in the developed world, but that the imperatives in the LDCs are survival 
and the attainment of civilised levels of well-being (Castro, 1972; Redclift, 1987). As 
such, they are less concerned with halting economic expansion and focus more on its 
equitable distribution. Furthermore, they dispute whether western prescriptions of the 
problem and its solutions should be unquestioningly accepted (Peet and Watts, 1993; 
Eder, 1996). 
In many ways, the equity critique expresses its disenchantment more with the political 
dynamics presently shaping environmental policy, which they brand as politically self-
serving and 'weak', than with the underlying precept of environmental sustainability 
(Castro, 1972). Redclift (1987), for example, argues that sustainable development is 
exposed to political manipulation in the international and national arenas through 
policies which fail to question economic growth or which attempt to compartmentalise 
sustainability (Dovers, 1997). In another example, Dovers (1997) and Jewell and Steele 
(1996) argue that Australian and British environmental policies have sought to pursue 
development rather than sustainability and have attempted to assimilate it within the 
status quo rather than adopting genuine environmental ideals. Finally, Gibbs (1996) 
warns that (polluting) business as usual under the pretence of sustainable development 
may be the ultimate outcome of the weak sustainability approach. In summing up the 
ecocentric and equity views of strong sustainability, Redclift (1987: 36) notes: 
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Unless we pitch our conception of sustainable development at a level which recognises 
international structures, it is in danger of being yet another discarded development concept. 
Its polemical usefulness will have outlived its practical utility. 
Though both the ecological and equity views are highly critical of the economic stance, 
Gibbs et al. (1998) suggest that the 'weak' model of sustainability may act as a Trojan 
horse for moves towards stronger sustainability. Conversely, they concede that strong 
sustainability might become drowned out within a policy-making process dominated by 
economic and political expediency, hi response to such concerns, commentators such 
as O'Riordan and Voisey (1998, citing Jordan and O'Riordan, 1993) attempt to 
crystallise the broad policy actions required to manage the transition to strong 
sustainability (see Table 2.2). 
To sum up, a spectrum of opinions on the nature and direction of the environmental 
movement and sustainable development has been expressed in the literature 
(O'Riordan, 1976). Whilst it is possible to argue that human society is either 
ecologically sustainable or not, the inevitable inclusion of social, economic and 
international dimensions within the debate makes agreement on either the definition of 
sustainable development, or the strategies required to achieve it, immensely difficult to 
achieve. The next section therefore explores the reasons behind the acceptance of this 
ambiguous concept as the prevalent political maxim for managing environmental 
problems and the translation of these diverse interpretations within the realpolitik of 
environmental policy. 
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Table 2.2 The Transition to Sustainability 
Environmental Policy Economic Policy Public Awareness Public Discourse 
Stage 1: Very weak 
sustainabiUty 
Lip service to policy 
integration 
Stage 2: Weak sustainability Formal policy integration 
and specific targets, backed 
by few institutional 
structures 
Stage 3: Strong 
sustainability 
Stage 4: Very strong 
sustainability 
Binding policy integration 
and strong international 
agreements coupled to 
performance targets and 
indicators 
Strong international 
conventions, national duties 
of care, and statutory and 
critical support 
Minor tinkering with 
economic instruments on a 
case-by-case basis; some 
reinvestment of income 
towards the goal of 
sustainability 
Substantial restructuring of 
economic incentives; large-
scale reinvestment of 
income toward the goal of 
sustainability 
Full valuations of the cost 
of living, green accounting, 
and creation of a 'civic 
income' for social use 
Formal shift to 
sustainability accounting 
locally, nationally and 
intemationally 
Dim awareness and little 
media coverage 
Wider public education 
involving 'perforated' 
classroom walls 
Curriculum integration, 
with local educational 
initiatives geared to 
community growth 
Comprehensive cultural 
shift coupled with 
technological innovation 
and new community 
structures 
Corporatist discussion 
groups and consultation 
exercises 
Roundtables, stakeholder 
group participation, and 
legislative surveillance 
Community involvement, 
pairing of initiatives in the 
developed and developing 
world 
Community-led initiatives 
become the norm 
Source: O'Riordan and Voisey (1998: 16) 
24 
2.2.4 The Political Acceptance of Sustainable Development 
Two principal reasons explain sustainable development's wide-ranging political appeal. 
The first is that it is a practical alternative to the zero-growth model, in that it suggests 
economic and ecological priorities can co-exist within a complementary framework 
(Gibbs, 1996a). Though the ideas underlying the Club of Rome's contentions have 
never been comprehensively disproved (or proven), implementing its recommendations 
would necessitate a radical and traumatic restructuring of society. Furthermore, the 
Limits prescriptions are considered by some to be ecologically Utopian and arrogant, 
particularly in the respect of the development needs of the LDCs (Castro, 1972; 
Cairncross, 1991). Sustainable development has nevertheless charted a course away 
from laissez-faire approaches to environmental management (Taylor and Buttel, 1992; 
Pearce et al., 1993; Gonzalez, 1997). Sustainable development has also proved 
politically acceptable because its core themes are fluid and can be moulded to suit 
political exigencies (Kirkby et al., 1995). Thus, sustainable development can either 
constitute a foundation for more reflective environmental management or, by 
emphasising the concept of intra-generational equity, a justification for accelerated 
economic expansion. This lack of clarity has led to the condemnation of sustainable 
development from both ends of the ecological-economic spectrum. For example, 
Beckerman (1995) - a staunch supporter of economic growth - regards it as a political 
catch-phrase and vastiy over-rated, whilst Holmberg and Sandbrook (1992) - taking a 
more ecocentric viewpoint - fear it provides governments with a licence to pursue 
expansion policies. Nonetheless, Pearce et al. (1989) maintain that sustainable 
development enables the gradual and practical integration of environmental and 
economic priorities (also Bennett and Patel, 1993). 
However, Pearce et al. (1990) observe that very little international action was taken 
between 1987 and 1990 to transform its ideas into a coherent body of policy. It was not 
until the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development's (UNCED) 
Rio Summit in 1992 that sustainable development became almost universally accepted. 
Turner (1997: 133) even claims: 
Sustainability appears to have become the guiding principle for a global society entering 
the new millennium, superseding almost all others within the environment and development 
communities. 
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This evolution is further encapsulated in Turner and Pearce's (1993) exploration of 
sustainable development's influence on the academic and political agenda (Figure 2.2). 
However, although the preamble of the Earth Summit embraced the ecological and 
egalitarian aims of sustainable development, major political and ideological rifts 
appeared during negotiations to formulate specific policies. Some of the richer 
Northern nations essentially sought to preserve their economic interests by imposing 
stringent environmental standards globally. However, the poorer states of the Southern 
Hemisphere saw their development and equity as central to the debate (Middleton et al., 
1993; Kirkby et al., 1995). Rather than accepting firm commitments to grant the South 
financial assistance and differentiated responsibilities - including debt relief and the 
licence to develop their natural resources as means of escaping poverty - some argue 
that the North sought to fit sustainability entirely into a context which defended their 
national interests (Jordan and Brown, 1997). 
Furthermore, many nations have subsequently attempted to evade practical 
commitments in areas of high national interest, even where agreements were signed^. 
Some writers have consequently claimed that the North's chief tactic at Rio was to 
maintain internal sustainability by importing it from the South (Redclift, 1987; Daly 
and Cobb, 1990). Others contend that Rio was a severe setback for Brundtland's vision 
and did more to expose the problems of international co-operation within a political 
system based upon entrenched national interests than it did to resolve deep-seated and 
pressing environmental problems (Grubb et al., 1993). Even prior to Rio, Johnston 
(1989) argued that sustainable development could never be viable on the international 
political agenda because it meant sacrificing national interests in the cause of global co-
operation. Hurrell (1994: 16) even attacked nation states as: 
Too big for tiie task of devising viable strategies of sustainable development which can 
only be developed from the bottom up ... and too small for the effective management of 
global problems ... which by their nature demand increasingly wide-ranging forms of 
international co-operation. 
* For example, the USA's refusal to sign the Rio Conference's Biodiversity Treaty (O'Riordan and 
Voisey, 1998). 
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Figure 2.2 Approaches to Sustainable Development 
Ricardo Malthus Marx 
Relative Scarcity Absolute Scarcity Social Limits 
Economic critique of "Limits'mid-1970s, technical 
progress, substitution, market signals (neo-Ricardian) 
Limits to growth (early 1970s) 
Club of Rome (neo-Malthusian) 
Critique of Global 2000 Report; summarised 
in 'Resourceful Earth' 1984 
Cornucopian (de-coupling economy and 
environment - technocentrism) 
E N V I R O N M E N T A L E C O N O M I C S 
Efficient resource allocation; 
traditional ethics 
Institutional 
Economics 
Steady-state 
Economics 
Co-evolutionary 
Economics 
Global 2000 Report to US President (1980) 
B R U N D T L A N D REPORT 1987 
Sustainable Development 
T 
Environment as capital; constant assets rule 
Social limits 
to growth 
E C O L O G I C A L ECONOMICS 
Value hierarchy; interdependence; 
uncertainty; 'surprise' instability; 
adaptability, resilience 
Weak sustainability 
Cost-benefit 
Strong sustainability 
precautionary principle 
(Source: Turner and Pearce, (1993: 178) 
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However, whilst verdicts on the success of the Earth Summit are divided, there has 
been almost universal disappointment at the slow pace of progress since Rio. Despite 
the fact that many national governments have adopted sustainable development rhetoric 
and local authority programmes to implement Agenda 21, the evidence suggests that far 
more needs to be done, both at national and local level (Gibbs et al., 1998; Morphet and 
Hams, 1994; Agyeman et al., 1996)^ . O'Riordan and Voisey (1998) are particularly 
critical of the political commitment given to the environment, global partnership and 
welfare of the poor since the Earth Summit, as well as the reluctance of many nations to 
fulfil commitments they made at the Conference. Serious doubts must therefore be 
raised about the prospects for securing meaningful forms of sustainable development 
through existing international channels. 
2.2.5 Summary 
In summing up the sustainability debate, O'Riordan and Voisey (1998: 3) note: 
Sustainability is like democracy and justice. It is a moral idea, a universally created goal to 
strive for, a shared basis for directing the creative and restorative energies that constitute 
life on Earth ... Sustainability has that ring of universal desirability about it: no one is 
prepared to fundamentally challenge its precepts, no matter how vague these are, simply 
because it is an almost holistic human wish for a viable future for this unique planet and its 
inhabitants. It is not surprising that sustainability, democracy and justice are seen as 
composite and comprehensive ideals. The grinding process of transition is of itself 
permanent precisely because sustainability can never be actually attained, or at least cannot 
be envisaged by people because of the immense and fundamental changes in our society it 
entails. 
According to Redclift (1987: 199), however, sustainable development may be more 
than a mere pious hope but it is less than a rigorous methodological foundation for 
environmental policy. Sustainable development, he contends: 
draws on two frequently opposed intellectual traditions: one concerned with the limits 
which nature presents to human beings, the other with the potential for human material 
development which is locked up in nature. 
' Gibbs et al. (1998) note that 40% of the actions agreed under the Rio conference's Agenda 21 
declaration are the responsibility of local government. Whilst this is in line with Brunddand's vision of 
'thinking globally, acting locally,' they stress the importance of adequate finance, authority and 
legislative frameworks for the development of locally-focused sustainable development programmes. 
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It therefore seems that the fundamental problem lies in the interpretation of sustainable 
development within global, national and even regional contexts rather than with the 
underlying concept itself. Attempts at international co-operation, arguably the most 
legitimate response to what are increasingly inter-related global problems, have 
seemingly been stifled by a political reluctance to compromise national interests. As 
such, the problems surrounding sustainable development span vision, commitment and 
methodology. Therefore, despite its acceptance as the guiding philosophy of modern 
environmental policy, sustainable development has yet to transform itself into a clear 
strategy on which to advance environmental policy into the twenty-first century. 
2.3 Environmental Policy Instruments 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Whilst Hahn (1993) contends that by far the most common political response to 
environmental problems has been to ignore them, policy makers have made increasing 
efforts to address the complex task of identifying policy instruments that might 
effectively promote sustainable development. The examination of this key aspect of 
policy implementation begins by establishing the criteria against which policy-
instrument effectiveness is gauged and by identifying and comparing the relative merits 
of the main policy mechanisms. Reflecting the move by many governments to 
incorporate price-based environmental regulation into their policy armoury, the 
remainder of the section examines the methodology behind price-based regulation along 
with its technical, political and institutional limitations. 
2.3.2 Criteria for Evaluating Environmental Policy Instruments 
Although much of the economics literature presents the study of environmental policy 
instruments as a rational science, it stands to reason that environmental economics is 
also influenced by the innate ambiguities of sustainable development. Helm (1998: 8) 
points out that 'sustainable development could act as a guide to policy only insofar as it 
can be defined, measured, and then related to actual policy decisions,' (original 
emphasis); similarly, policy instruments cannot be divorced from their policy context 
(Barbier, 1993). Segerson (1996) concludes that a distinction must therefore be made 
between normative and positive factors in evaluating policy instruments. The 
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normative approach essentially considers which instruments should be chosen to 
achieve particular objectives, whilst positive factors explain why certain approaches 
were actually adopted. This section concentrates primarily on normative factors 
influencing policy instrument selection but consideration is also given to positive 
factors in Section 2.3.6 and Chapter three. 
Some of the most clearly operationalised criteria for evaluating environmental policies 
have been set out by European Commission (CEC, 1994) and the U K DoE (DoE, 
1993). The DoE identifies seven key characteristics of an effective environmental 
policy instrument: 
• Environmental ejfectiveness - their ability to meet policy objectives. 
• Resource costs - the instrument that achieves the desired environmental goal at least 
cost to affected parties. However, the DoE recognises that the most cost-effective 
policy instrument does not necessarily yield the greatest environmental benefit. 
• Administrative costs - incurred as monitoring and enforcement costs by the public 
sector (Heyes, 1998) and as compliance costs by the private sector. 
• Public revenues - the effect, if any, of the policy instrument on public finances. 
However, the DoE acknowledges that environmental policy instruments should be 
designed primarily to change polluter behaviour rather than to raise revenue for the 
government. 
• Innovation - the ability of the instrument to encourage innovation, lower 
compliance costs, or enable higher standards to be introduced in the future. 
• Competition and competitiveness - the DoE argues that policy instruments should 
neither discriminate against individual companies nor produce barriers preventing 
new businesses from entering the market (Segerson, 1996; Bowers, 1997). 
• Fairness - though there are inevitably winners and losers from any environmental 
policy, the distribution of these gains and losses must be considered as part of 
policy instrument selection (also Schelling, 1983). 
These criteria correspond broadly to those identified by Bohm and Russell (1985), who 
also stress that policy instruments should remain flexible in the face of changing 
economic conditions. However, it is also clear that the decision-making process 
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becomes increasingly value-laden as more factors are considered (Hitiris, 1994). 
Segerson (1996) and others (Pearce et al, 1989; Brisson, 1993; Rajah and Smith, 1993; 
Goddard, 1995) argue that environmental policy efficacy can be distilled into two basic 
assessment criteria, the environmental and economic effectiveness of the policy 
instrument. The two frameworks provided by the DoE and Segerson will be used as the 
main basis for assessment in this study. 
2.3.3 Types of Environmental Policy Instrument 
The existing literature has also identified numerous functional taxonomies of 
environmental policy instruments. For example, Segerson (1996) classifies 
mechanisms according to whether they are ex ante - designed to prevent environmental 
damage occurring - or ex post to correct damage already caused. Hahn (1993) 
differentiates between instruments which produce an explicitly defined level of 
environmental improvement and those that implicitly discourage pollution by imposing 
environmental-damage costs on polluters (see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3 Mechanisms for Environmental Control 
I. Quantity mechanisms 
A. Standards 
1. Technology-based standards 
2. Performance standards 
B. Market approaches 
1. Marketable permits 
2. Reducing market barriers 
n. Pricing Mechanisms 
A. Taxes 
B. Subsidies or subsidy elimination 
C. Marginal cost pricing in regulated industries 
Source: Hahn (1993: 115) 
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Leveque (1995) and Richardson (1998) make a similar distinction between instruments 
that produce threshold standards of improved environmental performance - broadly 
speaking legislative standards - and those that provide continuous incentives for 
improvement. Finally, Fenton and Hanley (1995) examine where policy instruments 
should be applied within the production, use and disposal cycle of products in order to 
achieve greatest impact. The classification used in this review divides policy 
mechanisms into the categories most commonly used by policy-makers; legislation, 
litigation, and price-based measures (DoE, 1993; Segerson, 1996), but uses the 
distinctions identified by other studies to help understand the functionality of each. 
Legislation 
The legislation approach has historically been the primary method of environmental 
regulation. In essence, it seeks to define clear and unambiguous environmental 
standards which act ex ante to prevent environmental damage (Segerson, 1996). 
Legislation can either consist of performance standards or be technology-based, for 
example, the specification that new motor vehicles should be designed to run on lead-
free petrol (Hahn, 1993). The principal advantage of standards-based legislation is that 
it offers reasonable certainty as to the end result; in other words, if the only assessment 
criterion is the standard itself, legislation achieves a high degree of environmental 
efficiency'". However, its effectiveness is highly dependent on companies complying 
with legislation and, therefore, the legal and administrative structures which uphold the 
standard (DoE, 1993). Because enforcement procedures are never perfect, in practice 
there is invariably some 'leakage' between nominal and effective compliance (Heyes, 
1998)". Leveque (1995) identifies four variables that affect the efficacy of regulation; 
(i) the existence of private incentives for business to change their behaviour; (ii) the 
degree of informational asymmetry between regulators and regulated; (iii) the extent to 
which companies engage in opportunistic behaviour, such as strategic non-compliance; 
and (iv) the strength of government coercion. He argues that for legislation to be 
effective, governments must hold strong coercive powers whilst information asymmetry 
must be minimal in order that industry cannot conceal the extent or nature of pollution. 
As will be argued in Chapter three, however, reliance on legislative standards (or any other policy 
instrument) without examining the methods by which they are achieved can lead to reductions in actual 
environmental standards (Turner et al., 1998, Bailey, 2000). 
" The UK Environment Agency estimates that the average business compliance rate with existing 
legislation is approximately 74% (Heyes, 1998). 
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Helm (1998) adds that the effectiveness of legislation is further hampered by the risk of 
regulatory capture in situations where information asymmetry exists. This occurs 
where regulators rely on industry for the data or expertise needed to define technical 
pollution-control standards and businesses exploit this relationship so as to influence 
policy in their favour (Leveque, 1996a). This situation usually arises where regulators 
are significantly under-resourced in relation to their responsibilities and has frequently 
been observed within EU environmental policy (see Chapter three). 
In terms of economic effectiveness, legislation does not impose formal charges on 
polluting activities, though obviously costs are incurred by industry in meeting the 
required standards and by public authorities in monitoring compliance (Segerson, 
1996). Both parties therefore have cost-benefit judgements to make. Firms must 
choose whether it is cheaper to comply with or flout legislation, whilst enforcement 
agencies must establish an economic level of monitoring (Heyes, 1998). Although such 
decisions seem to compromise the notion of an environmentally-efficient policy 
instrument, they are inevitable in many areas of policy. Furthermore, because fines for 
disregarding environmental laws are usually decided by the courts rather than 
enforcement agencies, there is often limited scope for varying penalties to finance more 
rigorous monitoring regimes. 
Opinion on the cost-effectiveness of legislative mechanisms is also divided. Some see 
legislation as unnecessarily expensive, arguing that uniform standards are insensitive to 
market conditions and the ability of companies to comply with legislation (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988; Stavins and Whitehead, 1992). Furthermore, in the absence of firm 
scientific evidence on the environmental degradation attributable to particular 
pollutants, policy-makers may impose over-burdensome standards by applying the 
precautionary principle (Helm, 1998). Others view it as the least cost option, however, 
contending that under legislative regimes businesses only pay their pollution abatement 
costs and not any additional incentive charge (Beder, 1996; Leveque, 1996a). Leveque 
therefore suggests that governments should focus on developing self- and joint-
regulation agreements with industry in order to streamline the administration costs of 
environmental legislation whilst still gaining the benefits of environmentally-efficient 
standards (see also Whiston and Glachant, 1996). 
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Finally, there is substantial evidence that legislative standards have failed to reverse the 
general trend towards environmental degradation in America and Europe (Segerson, 
1996). The argument here is that legislation can only produce threshold improvements 
in environmental efficiency and therefore cannot integrate environmental concerns into 
economic policy in the manner envisaged by Brundtland's sustainability intuition, 
hifluenced by academic analysis highlighting the shortfalls of legislative standards, 
policy makers have increasingly sought to establish alternative means of expediting 
environmental policy, key amongst which have been the litigation and price-based 
approaches. 
Litigation 
The pursuit of companies through the courts as an ex post measure for neglect of their 
statutory environmental duties has been one of key functions of many national 
enforcement agencies (Segerson, 1996). However, the prosecution of illegally polluting 
companies by private individuals has become an increasingly prominent part of 
environmental policy enforcement in the USA (Heyes, 1998). Whilst no similar 
tradition of private litigation exists in Europe, the EU has recently signalled its intent to 
increase citizen access to environmental information and judicial processes with a view 
to encouraging more private prosecutions (CEC, 1996a). 
The litigation approach has two principal merits. First, it helps to enforce existing 
legislation by increasing the number of unofficial pollution 'inspectors'; second, the 
threat of litigation costs can act as a powerful ex ante deterrent to would-be polluters. 
Against other assessment criteria, particularly those relating to the integration of 
environmental protection into policy and business thinking, its benefits are less clear 
(DoE, 1993). In addition to the fact that litigation generally only enforces standards on 
a 'case-by-case' basis, its environmental effectiveness and equity are heavily dependent 
on detecting and correctly identifying illegal polluters. Furthermore, since large 
companies have greater resources and expertise at their disposal than the average 
individual, litigation processes are heavily weighted against successful private 
prosecutions. Finally, legal proceedings are rarely economically efficient. Not only are 
the administrative costs of pursuing individual actions high, the legal system is also 
potentially haphazard in terms of its calculation of environmental damages where the 
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law is founded on precedents rather than generic principles (Segerson, 1996). For these 
reasons, the UK DoE has indicated that it has reservations about the widespread use of 
private litigation to enforce EU environmental policy (DoE, 1993; Heyes, 1998). 
Price-based Mechanisms 
'Price-based mechanisms' is a catch-all term encompassing a range of policy 
instruments which apply the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) as a means of regulating 
environmental problems. Though they take various forms, each shares the common 
notions, first, that industrial pollution can be controlled by the re-internalisation of 
environmental extemalities within market prices and, second, that market-based 
systems enable businesses to achieve cost-effective compliance with environmental 
standards (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Pearce et al., 1989; DoE, 1993). However, 
because price-based measures are a form of explicit policy intervention, they do not rely 
on the laissez-faire argument that market prices will automatically ration scarce 
resources without the need for government intervention (Coase, 1960). histead, price-
based policies seek to harness the profit-maximisation (or loss-minimisation) self-
interest of Adam Smith's market in order to achieve greater social and ecological 
stewardship (Schelling, 1983). Most adherents of price-based mechanisms therefore 
support some form of government legislation as the antecedent and underpinning of the 
market-based approach (Beder, 1996; Turner et al., 1998)'^ . 
Using Hahn's (1993) classification (Table 2.3), price-based mechanisms can be divided 
into two categories, pricing and quantity mechanisms. The classic form of pricing 
mechanism is the environmental tax, where government imposes a charge on a 
polluting product or process designed to encourage industry to develop less damaging 
technologies and practices (Rajah and Smith, 1993). An alternative approach is to 
provide subsidies to companies that reduce their pollution, either as a simple financial 
'carrot' or on the basis of deposit-refund or insurance bond systems (Hahn, 1993). 
Though the most common form of Pigouvian tax involves the introduction of 
environmental charges to achieve pre-determined legislative standards, purer forms of 
However, some price-based mechanisms have been successful without being underpinned by 
legislation. For example, prior to the forthcoming ban on leaded petrol in the EU, tax differentials 
between leaded and unleaded petrol encouraged most consumers and manufacturers to switch to unleaded 
fuel. 
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market-based measures introduce taxes, then leave the market to determine both the 
pollution level and the method by which it is achieved (Helm, 1993; 1998). Quantity 
mechanisms can also be used within a market-based format. The most frequent method 
is the tradeable permit system (Pearce et al., 1995), whereby government defines 
desired limits for particular pollutants and either issues or sells permits to companies 
affected by the new standards. The theory behind this mechanism is that companies 
have the option to sell their permits if they can reduce their emissions. Whilst there are 
a number of ways tradeable permits can be organised (see Pearce and Turner, 1990; 
1993; Hahn, 1989 for comprehensive accounts), the theory is that companies with lower 
abatement costs will sell their excess permits to companies that find pollution control 
cost-prohibitive. By offering the 'carrot' of a future financial reward, the tradeable 
permit system also encourages innovation in new technologies that can then be 
disseminated throughout the industry. 
Because price- and market-based mechanisms operate in a variety of ways, there are 
numerous arguments for and against each approach. Many analysts in fact claim that a 
range of instruments combining legislative and other controls is essential for achieving 
both environmental and economic efficiency (Pearce et al., 1989; Gee and von 
Weizsacker, 1994). However, before the relative benefits of price-based mechanisms 
are reviewed, the next section reviews the theory behind the apportionment of 
environmental costs using price-based regulation. 
2.3.4 The Economic Theory of Price-Based Policy Instruments 
Environmental economists claim that the market remains the most efficient mechanism 
for allocating resources in the economy despite its tendency to neglect environmental 
externality costs. They argue, first, that incentives and decision-making are most 
effectively managed by individual businesses and, second, that corporate behaviour can 
be better controlled by changes in market prices than they can, for example, by 
legislation (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Hahn, 1989). If company actions can be re-
directed through informed policy intervention, they maintain, the types of market failure 
that cause externality effects can be readily corrected. This notion was first expounded 
by the French economist, Pigou (1920), who researched methods of including social 
(including environmental) factors within the market-price system (Barbier, 1990). 
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The basis of much environmental economics research has therefore been the design of 
models seeking to establish environmentally and economically-efficient tax levels for 
various pollutants (see, for example, Hourcade et al., 1992; Pearce et al., 1989; 1993; 
Turner et al., 1998; Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999; Gersbach and Glazer, 1999). 
Pearce et al. (1989) distil the principles underlying this technical discipline in their 
summary of the constituents of environmental charges (see Figure 2.3). The main 
principle behind all environmental valuation techniques, however, is that factors other 
than the simple use value of environmental resources must be included within charging 
mechanisms if they are to succeed in conserving natural resources for present and future 
generations. The literature contains a variety of methods for determining these costs, 
including hedonic pricing, contingent valuation and travel-cost approaches. Whilst 
these are not discussed in detail in this review, a footnote summary is provided and 
fuller accounts can be found in Pearce et al. (1989) and van den Bergh (1996)'^. Pearce 
et al. (1989) recognise, however, that environmental economics experiences 
considerable difficulties in ascribing meaningful values to many 'softer' environmental 
costs, despite its methodological rigour. Costanza (1989; 1993) and More et al. (1996) 
are even more uncertain as to whether economics is able to determine the value of such 
ethereal factors as the existence value of environmental resources, whilst even option 
values for future consumption are subject to the problem of discounting''*. 
Pearce et al. (1989) review the direct, indirect, hedonic, contingent, and travel-cost approaches to 
environmental valuation. Direct valuation relates to the creation of a surrogate market whereby buying 
and selling processes attribute a value to environmental resources. Indirect valuation is based upon a 
'dose-response' technique, where estimates of reduced pollution or resource consumption are calculated 
and adjusted to achieve an optimum balance between cost and benefit. Hedonic approaches estimate how 
much of a property differential is due to a particular environmental difference, then infer how much 
people are willing to pay for an improvement and the social value of that improvement. Contingent 
valuation directly asks people what they are prepared to pay for an environmental benefit or accept as 
compensation for its loss. Finally, travel-cost assesses how long and often people are prepared to pay to 
travel to an environmental amenity (and their duration of stay), based on an opportunity cost against the 
revenue gained and utility lost from going to work. Because each technique applies different valuation 
techniques, they are tailored towards assessments of different aspects of environmental quality. 
The valuation of environmental resources techniques shown in the previous footnote are usually based 
on some reflection of human preferences. As well as considering whether individuals wish to use a 
natural resource, techniques must also consider when they would wish to do so. However, from the 
perspective of the present generation, the later a cost or benefit occurs, the less it matters. In other words, 
future costs or benefits are discounted. The problem for environmental economics, therefore, is to 
determine rates of discounting which are consistent with sustainable development's notion of leaving 
future generations with the same level of overall capital as the present one (Pearce et al., 1989). 
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Figure 2.3 The Valuation of Environmental Resources 
Total Economic Value = Actual Use Value + Option Value + Existence Value 
where: 
Option Value = Value in Use (by the individual) + Value in use by future generations + 
Value in use by others (vicarious value to the individual) 
Sustainable Income is defined as Measured Income - Defensive Expenditures -
Residual Pollution Value - Capital Depreciation (human and natural) 
Source: Pearce et al. (1989: 7 and 62) 
In simple terms, the application of a Pigouvian tax is designed to produce the effect 
exhibited in Figure 2.4. The graph shows two basic relationships; first, that as pollution 
reduces, the marginal benefit derived by society from the goods whose production has 
been forfeited (MSB) also reduces and, second, that as pollution abatement increases, 
so do the marginal private and social costs of abatement (MSC). Under the economic 
efficiency criterion, the optimal level of pollution is where any further marginal 
increase in pollution abatement would cost society more than it would gain (the 
intersect of MSC and MSB). Where a company is not exposed to any pollution costs, 
the market theoretically imposes no in-built restriction on the production of pollution 
(WQ). In practice, however, some private benefit may accrue to companies by reducing 
pollution to the point Wp. The aim of applying a Pigouvian tax, however, is to increase 
the cost of pollution from the line MPB to MPB^ such that the company's optimal 
pollution level becomes Wg, the point where the marginal cost equals the marginal 
benefit of pollution (again, the intersect of MSC and MSB). 
Three factors make any pollution abatement beyond this point uneconomic. First, it is 
obviously unrealistic to expect zero-pollution without returning to a pre-historic 
civilisation. Second, whilst many forms of pollution are socially undesirable, those 
addressed by price-based measures are not illegal. For unlawful pollution, 
environmental economists readily concede that legislative prohibition is the most 
appropriate course of action (Schelling, 1983). 
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Figure 2.4 Marginal Costs and Benefits of Pollution using Pigouvian Tax 
Wc w, 0 
0 
100 
MSC 
MSB 
MPB 
MPBt 
Wo 
W, 
Pollution (%) 
Pollution Reduction (%) 
100 
0 
private and social marginal costs of pollution reduction 
marginal social benefits of pollution reduction 
marginal private benefit from reduced pollution 
MPB after imposition of optimal tax per unit of pollution 
pollution associated with a given level of GDP before pollution reduction activity 
Socially optimal level of pollution reduction 
Level or pollution where damage from pollution equals cost of pollution reduction 
Adapted from: Fenton and Hanley (1995: 1319) 
Finally, though marginal pollution abatement costs (MSC) and benefits (MSB) are 
shown as straight lines in Figure 2.4, in practice, both accelerate as pollution or 
abatement levels increases (Beder, 1996). Therefore, based upon the criteria of 
maximising social welfare through natural and human capital substitution, optimal 
pollution, or Pareto efficiency, occurs where MSB = MSC. One important point must 
be acknowledged, however. Though some writers and policy documents refer to price-
based regimes as providing continuous incentives for environmental improvement 
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(Stavins and Whitehead, 1992; CEC, 1994), the strict interpretation according to 
Pigouvian iax theory is that they: 
effectively impose the internalisation of environmental maintenance and replacement costs 
[and] provide behaviourally relevant incentives to polluters and resource users in order to 
arrive at some allocative optimum (van den Bergh, 1996: 136-7, emphasis added). 
Nonetheless, the argument that pollution taxes exert a constant pressure upon 
businesses to minimise their environmental cost burden cannot be entirely discounted 
because price-based mechanisms represent a continuous cost to industries engaged in 
polluting activities (Eichstadt et al., 1999). Therefore, whilst the attainment of specific 
policy objectives will be used as the principal benchmark for evaluating the efficacy of 
price-based environmental policy mechanisms throughout this study, consideration will 
also be given to their continuous incentive effect. 
2.3.5 Critique of Price-Based Policy Instruments 
The principal argument in favour of price-based environmental regulation is that it is 
more environmentally efficient than legislative standards because polluters are made 
financially accountable for their actions (Brisson, 1993; CEC, 1994; Acutt and 
Dodgson, 1997; Turner et al., 1998). As Schelling (1983: 297) puts it, 'slogans are no 
match for higher prices at the gas pumps.' Furthermore, because price factors rather 
than government legislation inform market decisions, environmental objectives can be 
achieved in an economically efficient manner. Whilst supporters of price-based 
regulation acknowledge that it does not provide a definitive answer to the thorny 
questions surrounding sustainable development, they maintain that environmental 
economics can make a substantial contribution to informing policy decisions (Bowers, 
1997). 
However, opponents of the environmental economics have attacked its precepts on a 
number of fronts. The greatest anathema to radical ecologists is the concept of 
environmental valuation (More et al., 1996). Daly and Cobb (1990), for example, 
claim that the assumptions underpinning the economic valuation of environmental 
resources epitomise the 'misplaced concreteness' of economics. They further argue that 
Pigouvian taxation scenarios are constructed around a number of mythical assumptions. 
40 
the existence of perfect competition, perfect knowledge of market conditions by 
individual companies, and the notion that businesses and consumers respond rationally 
to price pressures. They assert that as these conditions rarely apply in reality - that is, 
positive factors distort 'rational' normative decision-making - the behavioural changes 
envisioned by the Pigouvian approach never materialise in practice (also Beder, 1996; 
Gersbach and Glazer, 1999). Finally, Daly and Cobb (1990) propose that because 
market systems are geared towards efficiency rather than justice (the neglect of equity) 
and fail to differentiate between consumers' wants and needs (the disregard of carrying 
capacity), they are an unsatisfactory basis for developing sustainability strategies. 
Costanza (1993) also notes that environmental economics can manage risks (the 
probability of known hazards occurring) but that it is ill-equipped to identify 
uncertainties (unidentified risks with unknown probabilities) within complex global 
ecosystems. 
Other authors concede the theoretical validity of environmental valuation but highlight 
the practical deficiencies of the approach (Cairncross, 1991; Helm, 1998). One major 
concern is the difficulties surrounding the accurate monitoring of pollution and the 
setting of charges at levels which achieve the desired policy outcome (Defeuilley and 
Godard, 1997). If either of these is impracticable, then market-based mechanisms may 
be no more effective than government legislation (Rajah and Smith, 1993). Against 
this, Pearce et al. (1989) argue that such factors can be corrected by adopting a 'dose-
response' method (also termed policy iteration), whereby environmental charges are 
varied until they produce their desired effect. Fenton and Hanley (1995) also point out 
that environmental charges have to be carefully designed to take account of the price 
elasticity of pollutants. Where a product is price elastic, significant reductions in 
demand will occur when Pigouvian taxes are levied. However, demand will be affected 
less for price-inelastic goods. Economic instruments may therefore not be appropriate 
for severe pollutants that exhibit price-inelastic behaviour if the key policy objective is 
to lessen their use. This means that the characteristics of each particular pollution 
market must be understood before price-based regulation can achieve its desired goals 
(Beder, 1996). 
Doubts have also been expressed about the cost effectiveness of economic instruments 
(Rajah and Smith, 1993). Whilst both legislative and price-based regulation contain a 
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cost-to-industry component, those imposed by legislative regimes are comprised solely 
of compliance costs. By contrast, most price-based systems impose both compliance 
costs and an additional incentive surcharge on companies (Leveque, 1995). Beder 
(1996) further claims that the apparent savings from market mechanisms in some cases 
merely reflect the choice by some companies to pay the charge without reducing their 
pollution levels. On this basis, some writers even argue that price-based mechanisms 
can effectively create a licence to pollute (Gibbs, 1996a; Hahn, 1993). 
Finally, there is considerable debate over the distributional impact of economic 
instruments. If, as Friedman (1962) maintains, consumers ultimately pay all taxes in 
the form of higher prices, environmental charges have the potential to 
disproportionately affect poorer sections of the population'^. Stavins and Whitehead 
(1992) argue this effect can be negated by ensuring environmental taxes are spent on 
environmental projects or to reduce taxes that are economically or socially damaging. 
One way this might be achieved is through reduced employment taxes (Smith, 1997)'^. 
This is known as the concept of hypothecation or earmarking. Gee and von Weizsacker 
(1994), for example, advocate an Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) package 
combining carbon taxes, petrol taxes, vehicle efficiency measures with levies on 
pesticides, nitrates and ozone depletants, to offset reductions in National Insurance and 
Value Added Tax, and the hypothecation of surplus revenue for property insulation, 
winter fuel payments and public transport provision. The practice of fiscal neutrality 
within environmental policy therefore seeks to address distributional issues by 
combining a 'double-dividend' of enhanced environmental protection and economic 
expansion. In other words, it attempts to operationalise the concept of ecological 
modernisation (Repetto et al., 1992). However, Turner et al. (1998) note that extreme 
caution is required in the design and introduction of ETR if they are to avoid producing 
contradictory, or even damaging, incentive patterns (also Huppes et al., 1992). 
Spackman (1997) and Mulgan (1997) further point out that, whilst the hypothecation of 
environmental charges might increase the transparency of public expenditure, 
doctrinaire hypothecation policies may distort its distribution and efficiency. 
Pearce et al. (1989:7) argue, however, that businesses can only pass on a part of their pollution charge 
costs t customers. This issue is examined further in Chapters six and seven. 
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Given that sustainable development is a highly malleable concept, it is perhaps not 
surprising that price-based methods of environmental regulation have provoked such 
vigorous debate. However, whilst environmental economists have consistently 
championed the theoretical consistency and benefits of price-based regulation, 
undoubtedly the greatest difficulty is the paucity of empirical evidence to support or 
refute its value. This research aims to move the debate forward from its theoretical 
confines by providing greater understanding of the practical benefits gained from 
environmental taxes. However, despite the problems discussed during this review, 
price-based environmental regulation has begun to command greater attention from 
policy makers. The next section explores the reasons for this transition. 
2.3.6 The Political Acceptance of Price-Based Environmental Regulation 
In response to the perceived limitations of the legislative approach, US and European 
policy milkers have increasingly begun to consider alternative methods of 
environmental regulation. It is therefore somewhat surprising that of the examples of 
price-based environmental regulation extant within the EU, few demonstrate the 
theoretical attributes championed by environmental economists (Huppes et al., 1992; 
Turner et al., 1998, Howe, 1996)'^ . The literature has devoted considerable time 
accounting for this apparent reticence. Evidently a number of the normative criticisms, 
such as the informational and price-elasticity issues raised in the previous section, have 
contributed towards uncertainties amongst 'vote-counting politicians' (Lele, 1991: 613) 
as to whether price-based regulation represents a convincing solution to environmental 
problems (Helm, 1998). 
For Beder (1996), however, problems of political risk dominate the discussion. After 
again highlighting the difficulties of translating the theoretical assertions of 
environmental economics into practical policies, she argues that price-based measures 
often fuel inflationary pressures and reinforce existing distributional inequalities. In 
another criticism, Richardson (1998) and Helm (1998), suggest that economic 
instruments do not reduce state intervention as much as might be expected, but instead 
For example, the UK Treasury announced the introduction of the landfill tax under the slogan 'Taxing 
Waste not Jobs,' and announced that the revenue raised would facilitate reductions in National Insurance 
Contributions (Gee, 1997). 
The most notable exceptions to this are the Swedish carbon tax and the Belgian Ecotax law (Hagengut, 
1997). 
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actually necessitate a degree of re-regulation in order to ensure that market mechanisms 
operate in accordance with policy objectives. Richardson (1998) also notes that 
industry has proven less receptive to market-based measures than might have been 
expected. Whilst some industries welcome the additional flexibility they confer, many 
remain uneasy about the uncertainty and inflationary pressures economic instruments 
add to their business planning. Considering the pivotal role of industry as a formulator, 
facilitator and executant of environmental policy (see Chapter three), its opinions have 
played an important part in reinforcing political ambivalence towards economic 
instruments. 
The adoption of price-based mechanisms has also faced a number of institutional 
constraints. Firstly, because environmental legislation in many countries has 
traditionally been underpinned by the inspection efforts of enforcement agencies, there 
is a strong sense that economic instruments could undermine the safeguard of active 
monitoring in favour of an opaque and untested system of market control (Stavins and 
Whitehead, 1992; Helm, 1998). Provided economic instruments deliver the required 
results, this should present few difficulties. If they fail, however, price-based policies 
and the politicians who advocate them would be extremely unpopular. Perhaps the 
most important institutional question, however, is at what administrative and 
geographical scale to apply price-based mechanisms. Goddard (1995) expresses the 
opinion that, since environmental issues are global symptoms of local problems, 
market-based instruments should be locally controlled'^. However, though many 
European states and the USA have devolved some environmental policy-making and 
monitoring responsibilities, it seems unlikely they will relinquish their hold on fiscal 
affairs (Howe, 1996) for fear that regions may set themselves up as pollution havens in 
order to attract inward investment. Furthermore, because environmental problems do 
not respect administrative boundaries, the political accent has increasingly been on 
trans-boundary co-operation and the aggregation, rather than devolution, of 
environmental policy. Within such a climate, Skea (1995) argues that it is procedurally 
more simple to use legislative norms to establish national environmental policies, then 
experiment with economic instruments at a regional level. 
One example of the benefits of a locally-controlled system over a national one is in the issuing of 
tradeable permits (DoE, 1993). If permits are issued nationally, the situation may arise where trading 
causes polluting activities to become regionally concentrated. Under this scenario, pollution in the worst-
affected areas would become unacceptably acute even if overall national targets were achieved. 
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In many respects, therefore, it has proved difficult to convince political elites that the 
highly technical, normative and theoretical discipline of environmental economics can 
be translated into practical environmental strategies. Though economists have, 
according to Richardson (1998: 35), attempted to 'surreptitiously depoliticise 
environmental processes ... by focusing attention on technical questions of design and 
economic rationality', wider considerations, either expedient or ethical, have inevitably 
come to the fore. Furthermore, economic analysis has sometimes even bordered on the 
arrogant. For example, Goddard (1995: 194) answers concerns that consumers might 
not respond rationally to environmental charges, or that setting environmental charges 
at the 'correct' market level might not solve pollution problems, thus: 
Both positions are based upon ignorance about how the market and price system work, or 
can be made to work, to allocate resource properly. Economists call this problem 
'economic illiteracy' and its has bedeviled environmental policy formation for a long time, 
(original emphasis) 
Considering that the impact of human activity on the natural environment is still poorly 
understood, such absolute convictions must be viewed with some scepticism. Whether 
others suffer from economic illiteracy or economists from environmental illiteracy is 
open to debate. Moreover, as Costanza (1993: 191) suggests, because 'corrosive self-
interest' is at the very heart of the market system, its validity, and therefore that of 
economic theory, outside their specific spheres of competency cannot necessarily be 
assumed. 
However, despite these technical, political and institutional barriers, policy makers 
within the EU have begun to accept that price-based regulation offers benefits which 
cannot be ignored (Gee, 1997). As the environmental debate has moved beyond limits 
to growth towards sustainable development with all its disputed meanings but 
undeniably wider agenda, the pressure to find policies which integrate social, economic 
and ecological concerns into a complementary network has intensified. Reflecting the 
failure of other policy instruments to achieve this integration, economic solutions are 
now being applied to an ever-expanding range of environmental problems. Doubts 
inevitably remain, however, because of the paucity of evidence of their superiority over 
45 
other policy mechanisms. However, their incorporation into the policy armoury of EU 
decision-makers provides an opportunity to begin addressing this deficit. 
2.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed two processes central to the development of environmental 
policy, the formulation of aims and objectives, and the design of implementing 
mechanisms. It has demonstrated that although sustainability issues were originally 
inspired by concerns about environmental degradation, ethical, political and economic 
issues have increasingly influenced the policy debate. Furthermore, despite attempts to 
develop 'objective' scientific methods for setting economic and social development 
within their ecological context, positive issues have again, necessarily and inevitably, 
emerged to shape policy decisions. A wide variety of viewpoints on the direction 
environmental policy should take and the methods that should be employed have been 
expressed in the literature. However, two key points have also emerged. First, 
sustainable development in a form that embraces the complementarity of economic 
expansion and environmental protection has established and maintained its prominence 
as the guiding principle for many environmental policies. Second, economic 
instruments are set to play an increasing role in delivering this vision because of their 
perceived ability to integrate environmental concerns without stifling the possibility of 
future economic progress. 
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Chapter Three 
Environmental Policy-Making in the European Union 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two reviewed the concept of sustainable development and the selection of 
policy instruments to regulate environmental problems. However, locating any analysis 
entirely within the discipline of environmental economics produces only a partial 
understanding of the policy implementation process. This is firstly because its 
predictive models are based on abstracted assumptions of rational market behaviour 
which often translate imperfectly into the real world (see Hahn, 1989; Pearce et al., 
1989; 1993) and, secondly, because economics deals primarily with the effects of 
policies rather than their cause. As a result, this approach is 'poorly equipped to 
analyse the genesis of environmental regulations' (Leveque, 1996a: 33) and the way in 
which political and socio-economic interests determine the objectives and shape of 
environmental policies (Bohmer-Christiansen, 1994). Conversely, analyses based 
entirely on political analysis and policy formulation (Golub, 1996; W. Wallace, 1996; 
Bohmer-Christiansen, 1994) do not combine their political insights with a detailed 
analysis of the mechanics of environmental policy implementation. Indeed, policy-
makers' preoccupation with regulatory output to the neglect of implementation has been 
cited as a major reason for the shortfalls in EU environmental policy (Collins and 
Earnshaw, 1993; Demmke, 1997). 
In this chapter, the key political processes affecting the implementation of EU 
environmental policy are discussed. The reasons for the development of the EU 
environmental programme are discussed, as are its legal basis, its history, and how the 
Union's philosophical foundations have shaped policy development. Following this, 
models of European integration and the key actors involved in creating and 
implementing environmental policy are examined along with the political pressures 
shaping policy development. The discussion concludes by drawing out the major 
political and economic issues relevant to the implementation of EU environmental 
policy. 
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The main argument proposed in this chapter is that although the authority and ambition 
of EU environmental policy has grown substantially in the last 25 years, it remains 
heavily influenced by the Union's economic, free trade and social policy agendas. As a 
result, progress towards sustainable development has frequently been hampered by the 
EU's allegiance to, amongst other things, its macro-economic objectives (Baker, 1997; 
Liberatore, 1997). This uncertainty, it is contended, is further fuelled by the complexity 
of the European polity and the fluid division of authority between the EU institutions 
during the formulation and implementation of environmental policy. Finally, it is 
argued that industrial organisations have become major players in the creation of 
environmental policy and that their attempts to defend vested interests sometimes 
undermine the ecological integrity of EU environmental initiatives. The chapter 
concludes that these factors have combined to produce significant dislocations between 
the aims and outcomes ofEU environmental policy (W. Wallace, 1996). 
3.2 The Development of the European Union Environmental Policy 
Within the existing literature, three main reasons have been proposed to explain the 
emergence of the EU environmental programme; (i) the trans-national nature of 
environmental problems (Haigh, 1992; Kunzlik, 1994; Howe, 1996), (ii) the 
interdependence of economic development, ecological protection and resource 
management (Howe, 1996; Baker, 1997) and (iii) the maintenance of free trade within 
the EU Single Market (van der Straiten, 1993; Kunzlik, 1994; Moussis, 1996). Of 
these, the trans-national nature of environmental problems is the most ecologically 
located, in that it has been long recognised that pollution problems transcend national 
boundaries (Blacksell, 1994). Indeed, Moussis (1996) argues that the common market 
in pollution was established long before any international agreement on the free 
movement of goods. Because many environmental problems can no longer be 
effectively managed at national level, international co-operation and the pooling of 
resources have become essential components of the EU's environmental programme 
(Walker, 1989; Moussis, 1996; Gouldson and Murphy, 1996). 
The second justification, the recognition that the EU's future economic welfare depends 
on its environmental stewardship, arrives at similar conclusions for different reasons. 
Simply put, without responsible management, economic systems run the risk of 
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exhausting their available supply of natural resources and pollution sinks (Jacobs, 
1991). This issue is therefore at least partly one of self-preservation. Moussis (1996) 
develops this notion by arguing that three factors, the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, the Club of Rome report (Meadows et al., 
1972) and student unrest in France and Germany in 1968, prompted the Member States 
to introduce measures addressing Europe's most pressing environmental problems. 
This, he suggests, was required to ward off academically-articulated demands for 'zero 
growth' policies within the European Economic Community (EEC). However, the EU 
environmental programme should not be viewed as simply a political attempt to 
neutralise a populist movement, but more as a realisation that economic policy could no 
longer neglect environmental and resource management problems (van der Straaten, 
1993). If economic development is dependent on more sympathetic environmental 
management (Baker, 1997), then a coherent Conraiunity-wide environmental policy 
seemed the most logical solution (van der Straaten, 1993; Moussis, 1996). Though this 
justification for common European policies is primarily economic in inspiration, it 
concedes many of the basic precepts espoused by Hardin (1968) and the Club of Rome 
report (see Chapter two). 
The final reason for a Community environmental policy, the protection of free trade, is 
more wholly allied to the EU's economic rationale and operating procedures. If 
individual Member States responding to domestic political pressures introduce 
unilateral environmental measures, any resulting differentiation in standards could 
potentially obstruct free trade within the Single Market (van der Straaten, 1993; 
Moussis, 1996). The surest means to prevent this is to harmonise legislation throughout 
the Member States. Though not overtly environmentalist at first glance, this approach 
offers several ecological benefits. First, Sbragia (1996) and Leveque (1996a) argue that 
European environmental legislation is frequently driven forward by the determination 
of influential Member States to pursue ambitious national programmes without 
hampering their national industries. Whilst comparisons might be made with the 
'California effect' in the USA, where America's most economically-powerful state 
makes the adoption of its high environmental standards a pre-condition of inter-state 
trade (Vogel, 1997), EU environmental policy is more accurately depicted as a struggle 
between this and lowest-common-denominator policy-making. This occurs where only 
standards acceptable to all Member States are adopted across the Union (Golub, 1996). 
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Notwithstanding this, the case for EU policy aggregation can also be applied to 
environmental protection at regional level, where sub-national administrations are more 
likely to succumb to local economic pressures when considering the environmental 
implications of new developments (Rydin, 1997). In such circumstances, policy 
Europeanisation helps to prevent individual regions implicitly advertising themselves as 
pollution 'havens'. Finally, commercial interests may also feel less threatened by intra-
Community 'environmental' competition and may become more receptive to new 
environmental initiatives (Moussis, 1996). 
Although the literature has presented both ecological and economic justifications for an 
EU environmental policy (O'Brien and Penna, 1997), the defence of free trade has 
historically played a pivotal role in policy decisions (Weale et al., 1991; Bailey, 1999a). 
Whilst it would be misleading to suggest that the environmental programme is entirely 
an expedient for economic ambitions, its accent on free trade has led some theorists to 
accuse the EU of adopting a distorted view of sustainable development (Baker, 1997; 
Redclift, 1997). Chapter two argued that economic activity within sustainable societies 
should be organised to accommodate certain (albeit subjective) ecological limits 
(Pearce et al., 1993; Daly and Cobb, 1990). Forrester (1999) proposes that though 
'traditional' models of sustainable development recognise the interface between 
economic, social and ecological requirements, the environment remains largely an 
adjunct to the economic system (Figure 3.1). Under a systematic approach to 
sustainable development, however, economic and social activity must always be 
considered within their ecological context (Figure 3.2). Where the EU has taken the 
view that the Single Market takes precedence over environmental policy, it has 
seemingly attempted to fit ecological considerations within an economic framework. 
This is exemplified by the fact that, with limited exceptions such as the Danish Bottles 
Case (see Chapter five) and the Wallonia waste ban (Chapter eight), the vast majority of 
environmental legislation prohibits Member States from restricting EU free trade 
(Porter, 1998). Therefore, although the EU programme was a necessary response to 
common environmental problems, the fact that policy decisions are inevitably 
influenced by non-environmental priorities has meant that decision-makers are often 
forced to moderate straightforward environmental objectives in order to reconcile them 
with other policy goals. 
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Figure 3.1 A Traditional View of Sustainable Development Linkages 
Figure 3.2 A Systematic View of Sustainable Development Linkages 
V A L U E S 
ECONOMIC 
SOCIAL 
ECOLOGICAL 
Source: Forrester (1999: 117) 
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3.3 The History of EU Environmental Policy 
3.3.1 Legal Basis 
Before the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, the EEC possessed no formal 
jurisdiction over environmental policy. Action in this area could therefore only be 
justified under Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome, pertaining to the completion of the 
common market, or the catch-all Article 235, which permits intervention in policy areas 
outside the EU's official remit where this advances the overall aims of the Treaty 
(Baker, 1993; Vogel, 1993a; Archer and Butler, 1996). Whilst the Community's early 
forays into environmental policy were therefore restricted to the protection of the 
Common Market (Kramer, 1990), Lowe and Ward (1998a) argue that its low political 
profile in the 1970s enabled the EU to pursue an active agenda-setting programme. On 
the formal incorporation of environmental policy within European Community (EC) 
competencies in the SEA (W. Wallace, 1996), the principal objectives established were: 
the preservation, protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the 
protection of human health, and the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources' 
(SEA Article 130r). 
Subsequent to the SEA, therefore, new EU environmental legislation was enacted under 
Article 130r or, in a demonstration of the continued influence of economic and trade 
factors. Article 100a' (Kunzlik, 1994). The SEA nonetheless established environmental 
policy as an essential objective of the EU (Koppen, 1993), a point underlined by the 
prolific output in EU environmental legislation since the SEA - over 400 acts up to 
1996 - (Lister, 1996) and the almost total Europeanisation of Member State 
environmental policies (Bennett, 1992). 
The legal standing of EU environmental policy was further strengthened in the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU or Maastricht) in 1992, where efforts were also made to 
streamline environmental decision-making. Although the SEA introduced a degree of 
majority voting on environmental policy - prior to this, measures under Articles 100 
and 235 required unanimous Council support - this was expanded under the TEU to 
those contained in Table 3.1. 
' Under the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 100 became 94-5 and Articles 130s-t became 174-6. As the 
Packaging Directive was introduced prior to Amsterdam, the previous articles will be used in this thesis. 
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Table 3.1 Voting Procedures under the TEU 
1. Quahfied majority voting by Council and co-operation procedure with Parliament (under 
Article 130s(l)). 
2. Qualified majority voting by Council and co-decision with Parliament for internal 
harmonisation measures, public health and consumer protection proposals, trans-European 
networks, and 'general action programmes' relating to the environment (under Articles 
100a, 129, 129a, 129d and 130s(3)). 
3. Unanimous voting by the Council and consultation with the Parliament (in certain cases 
under Article 130s(2), relating to fiscal issues, town and country planning, land use, water 
resource management and measures affecting Member State choice between different 
energy resources and the stmcture of its energy supply (Kunzlik, 1994: 44)). 
4. A unanimous decision by the Council under Articles 100a or 130s(2) to adopt a measure 
by qualified majority. This implies consultation with the Parliament. 87 votes are held 
within the Council, with 62 being required to support a proposal in order to achieve a 
qualified majority (Marks and McAdam, 1996). 
This procedure was designed to make the adoption of environmental measures less 
susceptible to technical obstruction by individual Member States and, in theory, allows 
a more ambitious programme to be pursued than some states might otherwise sanction 
(Haigh, 1992; Sbragia, 1996). In order to mitigate this potential diminution of national 
sovereignty, the TEU also introduced the subsidiarity principle to delineate between 
where EU or Member-State action was most appropriate. It stipulates that the EU can 
only intervene in areas outside its exclusive remit where the nature and scale of 
required intervention means that action can be more effectively achieved at Community 
level. The complexities and importance of subsidiarity within environmental policy are 
discussed further during Section 3.4. However, the point to note at this stage is that 
moves towards total policy Europeanisation have not been unreservedly accepted. That 
subsidiarity has become a prominent part of EU environmental policy emphasises the 
tensions that exist between the desire for common policies and Member States' 
reluctance to relinquish sovereignty on matters which have a major impact on their 
national interests. 
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3.3.2 History of the EU Environmental Programme: Principles and Policies 
Though the EEC possessed no legal jurisdiction over environmental policy prior to the 
SEA, its involvement began as early as 1972 following the United Nations Stockholm 
Conference. The EEC prepared the first of a series of Environmental Action 
Programmes (EAPs) in 1973 to establish specific policies and a more general 
framework in the form of guiding environmental principles (Sbragia, 1996). Those 
contained in the first EAP (1973-1977) included the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), an 
emphasis on preventative rather than remedial action, and the inclusion of 
environmental considerations in all EEC decisions (Archer and Butler, 1996; Wood and 
Yesilada, 1996). These have been expanded over successive EAPs to include the full 
range of principles shown in Table 3.2. Although neither these nor the EAPs are 
definitive commitments to action by the Member States (Wood and Yesilada, 1996), 
neither are they simply pieces of rhetoric because 'they reflect certain policy priorities 
and in turn influence them' (Liberatore, 1997: 108). Therefore, whilst these principles 
fall short of a full inventory of actions necessary to achieve sustainable development, 
they do make a substantial contribution towards defining the characteristics of an 
ecologically-referenced system of environmental protection. 
Table 3.2 Principles affirmed in the EU Environmental Action Programmes 
a. Preventing pollution at source 
b. Incorporating environmental considerations into all planning and decision-making 
c. Adopting the polluter-pays principle 
d. Assessing the impact of EC policies on developing countries 
e. Encouraging international co-operation 
f. Promoting educational activities to increase environmental awareness 
g. Ensuring action is taken at the most appropriate level (regional, national, EC) 
h. Co-ordinating and harmonising the environmental programmes of individual member states 
i. Improving the exchange of environmental information 
(Subsequent to the First Environmental Action Programme) 
j . Ensuring that policies take a precautionary approach to environmental problems 
k. The proximity principle (ensuring that, wherever possible, environmental damage is 
limited and that problems are resolved locally) 
Adapted from: CEC (1984) 
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The EU's environmental principles are therefore a supplementary, if slightly subjective, 
tool for evaluating the contribution of environmental policies to sustainable 
development (Pearce et al., 1993; Gibbs et al., 1998). The success of environmental 
policies has traditionally been judged almost exclusively on the basis of whether 
legislative standards have been achieved. Whilst this is a quantifiable and enforceable 
means of evaluation, it fails to appreciate that the methods used to implement policies 
may have a major bearing on the overall environmental impact produced (Bailey, 
2000). This could have significant implications where, for instance. Member States 
achieve EU legislative standards but their implementation methods actually increase the 
amount of environmental damage. For this reason, the EU's environmental principles 
will be used as part of the assessment of environmental policy success throughout this 
thesis .^ 
Aside from establishing environmental principles, the First EAP focused principally on 
technical pollution-control standards and harmonising legislation affecting EU free 
trade. Many of the initiatives at this time were strongly influenced by Dutch and 
German legislation, as both countries had already embarked on national programmes to 
combat their domestic and shared pollution problems (Hildebrand, 1992). The Second 
EAP (1977-1981) was largely a continuation and expansion of this approach, though it 
did place a greater accent on international co-operation (Baker, 1997). The first 
material shift in emphasis came in the Third EAP (1982-1986), where the integration of 
environmental considerations into other policy areas became the programme's central 
concern (Baker, 1997). This reflected a realisation that environmental degradation 
could not be controlled solely through individual pollution standards since loopholes 
would always exist within such narrowly-focused legislation. Furthermore, it was 
acknowledged that EC integration had become a major influence on economic and 
polluting activity in Europe and, therefore, that the EU needed to recognise its 
responsibilities in this area (Weale and Williams, 1992). 
As a cautionary note. Lister (1996) suggests the EU environmental principles cannot easily be 
interpreted in case law. In particular, the preventative and precautionary principles are potentially anti-
scientific, because they invite regulatory action in the absence of clear scientific evidence. However, as 
uncertainty and incomplete knowledge are constant themes of scientific research, it may be imprudent to 
base policy entirely on 'concrete' scientific knowledge (Williams and May, 1996; Costanza, 1989; Irwin, 
1999). 
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The Fourth EAP (1987-1992) was the first since the formal incorporation of 
environmental policy into Community competencies and, thus, it reflected the EC's 
burgeoning authority in this area. Alongside the programme of specific action areas -
including air, water and soil quality, waste disposal, chemical and nuclear safety and 
nature conservation - two more general points stand out. The first was its greater 
emphasis on the implementation and enforcement of EC legislation (Blacksell, 1994). 
Whilst the period 1989-1991 had seen an immense growth in the portfolio of EC 
regulation, the Commission recognised that without credible implementation and 
monitoring, the environmental programme would fail to achieve its key objectives. The 
second was the EU's acceptance of ecological modernisation, the theory that 
environmental protection and economic growth can be moulded into complementary 
objectives (CEC, 1994; Baker, 1997). In essence, this enabled the EU to contend that 
its programme of economic development need not be abandoned provided it was made 
more ecologically sensitive. This position was doubly significant in that it coincided 
with the 1987 Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987). Even the Maastricht Treaty used the 
terms sustainable growth and sustainable development almost interchangeably in an 
effort to make its adoption palatable to all factions within the Member States and EU 
institutions (Baker, 1997; Archer and Butler, 1996; Leveque, 1996a). The EU's 
unwillingness to compromise its economic ambitions in order to achieve sustainable 
development has again led to accusations that EU environmental policy is 
fundamentally a weak interpretation of the concept (Turner, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1998, 
Baker, 1997; Gibbs, 1996a). 
However, it would be unfair to argue either that the Fifth EAP was not an ambitious 
extension of previous programmes or that the Member States were complacent in their 
attitude toward environmental protection. The Dobris Assessment 'The State of the 
Environment in the European Community' in 1992 (EC, 1992) charted a slow but 
relentless deterioration in Europe's environmental quality. Accepting the challenges 
laid down by the Dobris Assessment, the Fifth EAP acknowledged that existing policies 
had failed to deal adequately with environmental problems caused by EU integration 
(CEC, 1992a). It went on to state that: 
the achievement of the programme and its objective of sustainable development constitutes 
one of the major political and economic challenges for the Community [and]...constitutes a 
major turning point (CEC, 1992a: 145). 
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The Fifth EAP therefore sought to develop a more holistic strategy for EU 
environmental policy based on the concept of sustainable development. It charted six 
areas of environmental degradation where urgent action was required; the management 
of natural resources, integrated pollution control and waste management, reduced 
consumption of non-renewable energy, improved mobility management, environmental 
quality in urban areas and the improvement of public health and safety. Additionally, 
five sectors of the economy were targeted as the focus of attention, industry, energy, 
transport, agriculture and tourism (Blacksell, 1994). 
The Fifth EAP also recognised the need to incorporate a broader range of policy 
instruments into the EU armoury (CEC, 1992a). Previously the EU and its Member 
States had regulated environmental problems almost entirely through legislative 
standards. The Fifth EAP responded to the perceived failure of this approach (as 
expressed in the Dobris Assessment) by proposing that economic instruments and 
voluntary agreements with industry should play an enhanced role in Member-State 
strategies (see Chapter 2) (CEC, 1996b; 1997a; 1997b). However, whilst the EU's 
support for a more dynamic and, arguably, less autocratic approach to environmental 
policy was undoubtedly a serious attempt to realise Brundtland's vision of sustainable 
development, the Fifth EAP continued to adhere to the notion that free trade and 
economic expansion were compatible with, or even essential to, sustainable 
development (Lele, 1991). Furthermore, the EU's adherence to ecological 
modernisation should not be underestimated in terms of its policy implications. 
In addition, though the Fourth and Fifth EAPs both recognised the importance of policy 
implementation, the general consensus is that a fundamental gap still exists between the 
aims of the environmental programme and the practical results achieved (Collins and 
Eamshaw, 1993; Demmke, 1997; CEC, 1998a). The EU has therefore introduced a 
series of initiatives to facilitate the implementation process. Two of the most important 
have been the 'LIFE'^ project and the European Environment Agency (EEA). LIFE is a 
financial instmment designed to assist the development and implementation of 
environmental policy through the funding of research and practical projects (Sharp, 
1998). Schemes funded under LIFE have particularly focused on nature conservation 
L'Instrument Financier pour I'Environment, established under Council Regulation 1973/92. 
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under the Habitats and Species Directive'* but have been less extensively employed to 
deal with waste management, as numerous national schemes already exist^. The EEA 
was formally established in 1990 to succeed the Commission's first environmental 
information prograncune, CORINE^. It differs markedly from national environment 
agencies in that its function is 'largely informational rather than regulatory or 
implementational' (Lister, 1996: 15). However, its purpose also includes the promotion 
of effective environmental protection through the provision of a common information 
system for harmonising EU standards (Wynne and Waterton, 1998). Although the 
Commission has considered extending the EEA's powers to those of an international 
enforcement agency, this has been opposed by some Member States as an unacceptable 
intrusion into national affairs (Clinton-Davis, 1992; Macrory, 1992). Despite the 
Commission's long-standing concerns over the 'implementation deficit' of 
environmental policy, both implementation and monitoring remain predominantly 
controlled by the Member States. Whilst this helps to bolster the credibility of local 
enforcement systems, it has also produced a sometimes disjointed process. 
Furthermore, because the Commission has little administrative machinery or access 
rights to verify Member-State implementation reports, the existing system has proven 
difficult to police effectively at EU level (Demmke, 1997). 
The Fifth EAP also established three ad hoc dialogue groups to advise the Commission 
and help reduce the implementation deficit; the General Consultative Forum, the 
Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Law (IMPEL), and 
the Environmental Policy Review Group (Kunzlik, 1994; Moussis, 1996). These 
groups, whose compositions and remits are shown in Table 3.3, function to assist 
structured information exchange, orderly interest representation and the fostering of 
common approaches to environmental policy implementation. Despite these measures, 
the implementation of environmental policies remains largely outside the EU's remit, 
whilst the problems of effective enforcement are, if anything, becoming more acute 
(CEC, 1998a). This issue is discussed further in Section 3.4.3. 
* Directive on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora, 92/43/EEC. 
' For example, the ENTRUST scheme used to divert funds from the UK's landfill tax towards research on 
ameliorating the environmental impact of landfilling. 
* Council Regulation (EEC) 1210/90. CORINE (Co-ordination of Information on the EnvironmenO, 
which was managed within the Environment Directorate between 1985 and 1991. 
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Table 3.3 Dialogue Groups provided by the Fifth Environmental Programme 
Group Composition Function 
The General 
Consultative Forum 
The Network for the 
Implementation and 
Enforcement of 
Community Law 
The Environmental 
Policy Review 
Group 
Business, organised labour, 
professional groups, NGOs, local 
and regional government, the 
Commission 
National and Commission 
officials involved in the 
implementation of EU 
environmental measures 
Senior officials from the Member 
States and the Commission 
To represent interest groups in a 
stmctured manner in the 
discussion of new policy 
initiatives and their 
implementation 
Exchange of information and the 
development of common 
approaches to practical problems 
concerning the implementation of 
EU environmental measures 
To develop mutual understanding 
and exchange of views on 
environmental policy and 
measures 
Adapted from: Kunzlik (1994: 82) 
In summary, the EU environmental programme has been transformed in the past 25 
years from a narrow body of pollution-control legislation into a core EU policy (Lowe 
and Ward, 1998a; Maloney and Richardson, 1994). It has made increasingly clear 
conmiitments to integrated environmental management and sustainable development 
(Rydin, 1997) and has established judicious principles upon which to found its policy 
involvement. However, two less encouraging themes have also become apparent. 
First, the EU has made only limited concessions to its corrunitment to economic 
expansion and free trade and, therefore, matching the rhetoric of environmental 
integration with practical success has been extremely difficult (Howe, 1996; Gibbs, 
1996b). Second, poor implementation of environmental policies has been a constant 
feature of the EAPs. Collins and Eamshaw (1993) and Demmke (1997) note that even 
well-designed policies will fail to control environmental degradation if credible 
implementation and enforcement procedures do not exist. Notwithstanding the 
conflicts between economic and environmental priorities within the EU system, the 
efficacy of the environmental programme is dependent on the existence of effective 
policy-making and implementation stmctures. The following section considers the key 
forces and actors shaping these processes. 
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3.4 The EU Environmental Policy Process: Integration, Actors and Procedures 
Since the early days of the EEC there has been intense academic and poUtical interest in 
the nature of European integration (see, for example. Archer and Butler, 1996; Balassa, 
1961; Bulmer, 1983; Moravcsik, 1991; Schmitter, 1996; Slater, 1982). Though this 
debate covers all EU activities and has been transformed by the successive treaties, 
Weale (1996) argues that EU integration has a particular relevance for environmental 
policy. This is principally because environmental problems are inherently international 
in character and therefore warrant supranational responses (the first justification for EU 
involvement in environmental policy). Environmental policy therefore amplifies key 
issues concerning international co-operation and the development of common policies 
within the EU (Howe, 1996; Weale, 1996). This discussion of the policy-making 
process begins with a brief review of the main models of European integration and the 
key players involved in the environmental policy process. It then explores three themes 
critical to EU environmental policy, the demarcation of responsibilities between the EU 
and the Member States under the subsidiarity principle, the distinctive character of EU 
policy-making, and issues concerning the formulation, transposition and enforcement of 
EU legislation. 
3.4.1 Models of European Integration 
Whilst federalism and nationalism constitute the polar opposites of inter-state relations, 
few would argue that either has entirely dominated EU politics (Wise and Gibb, 1993). 
However, because federalist and nationalist tendencies regularly emerge within EU 
policy-making, it is important to appreciate how they are manifested within the EU 
polity. Federalism in its purest form favours the creation of a Community founded on a 
strong constitutional and institutional framework, wherein formal and mutually-agreed 
divisions of jurisdiction exist between central and regional government (Wise and 
Gibb, 1993; McDonald, 1999). Whilst there are obviously many forms this can take, in 
most cases, federalism implies the existence of a central executive body which holds 
legislative authority over its regional constituents in agreed policy areas. Nationalism 
may also take many forms but, generally speaking, it either totally opposes integration 
or insists that the nation state must be the primary focus of all government activity. 
Under this form of governance all international relations are managed on an inter-
governmental basis. 
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Three principal models of integration have been used to explain the interplay between 
nationalism and federalism in the EU. The first is confederalism, a tempered form of 
federalism that advocates a more gradual and partial power-sharing process. Under 
confederal systems, the 'central' governing body is rarely an entirely separate entity but, 
rather, is comprised of representatives from constituent regional executives convening 
to make decisions on specific, mutually-agreed policy areas (Wise and Gibb, 1993). 
However, the confederal model is substantively more than a series of ad hoc 
international agreements, since each member of the confederation is bound by formal 
treaties which commit them to common aims and policy-making within specified areas. 
From this, it follows that EU law holds a higher position than national law within areas 
covered by the treaties and is directly applicable in the Member States (Archer and 
Butler, 1996). The operation of this hierarchy in the EU is explored further in Section 
3.4.3. 
Functionalism proposes a modified version of the confederal model based on the 
development of common policies in specific areas where mutual advantage can be 
gained from co-operation. Functional alliances form where national policy-makers 
agree that certain policy areas can be managed more effectively on a collective basis, 
either because of economies of scale or, in the case of the environment, in response to 
trans-national problems (Long and Ashworth, 1999). Under functionalist arrangements, 
the tendency is for state governments to retain responsibility for nationally-sensitive 
policy areas, such as security, defence and foreign policy, but to seek greater integration 
in less contentious areas, notably trade (Balassa, 1961; McDonald, 1999). As with 
confederalism, functionalist models depend on the voluntary but formal concession of 
selected powers to a 'central' decision-making process (Haas, 1964). Archer and Butler 
(1996) argue that a variant of this, neo-functionalism, best characterised European 
affairs from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. The neo-functionalists contended that as 
functional areas became officially integrated, a spill-over process would occur where 
political and economic elites transferred their key loyalties, expectations and goals from 
the national to the EU arena (McDonald, 1999). Whilst this occurred to a degree and 
may even be accelerating with the advent of the Single Currency, there is little evidence 
that a consistent switch away from state-centred bargaining has occurred. 
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Intergoveramentalism proposes a contrasting vision of European integration, which 
claims that EU decision-making is typified by voluntary co-operative agreements 
between independent states. Supporters of this approach argue that EU integration 
should only be extended beyond inter-governmental contact where the creation of 
supranational bodies creates significant additional benefits for all participants 
(McDonald, 1999). Policy negotiations under inter-govemmentalism are therefore 
typified by the defence of national interests and the form of lowest-common-
denominator bargaining found in many international treaties. Despite the increased 
integration engendered by the SEA, TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty, Slater (1982) 
argues that inter-govemmentalism has always formed a significant component of EU 
political relations. Moravcsik (1991: 216) further remarks that: 
From its inception, the EC has been based on interstate bargainings between its leading 
Member States ... each government views the EC through the lens of its own policy 
preferences; EC politics is the continuation of domestic policies by other means. 
Against this, Zito (1999) argues that certain characteristics ofEU behaviour, such as the 
ability of majority voting to move the EU beyond lowest-common-denominator 
decision modes, can encourage a more entrepreneurial style of policy advocacy amongst 
some EU actors. Probably no single existing model can fully describe the complex and 
evolving politics of the EU. histead features of each ephemerally characterise EU 
relations then are superseded as political circumstances, issues and personnel change 
(Wise and Gibb, 1993). As de Tocqueville (cited in Horeth, 1999: 249), notes: 
A new form of government has been found which is neither precisely national nor federal 
... and the new word to express this new thing does not yet exist. 
What is evident, however, is that tensions between national interests and collective 
action have a major bearing on the development and implementation of EU 
environmental policies. Whilst institutional, ideational and interest-led pressures are 
almost inevitable within any political grouping, environmental policy more than most 
demands unified action (Weale, 1996). Thus, the decision-making behaviour of the EU 
Member States has a crucial bearing on environmental policy outcome and, 
consequently, progress towards sustainable development. The question must therefore 
be whether the EU's complex and multi-layered administrative machinery possesses 
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sufficient cohesion that it can develop environmental policies consistent with the aims 
of sustainable development. In order to assess this issue, it is useful to examine the 
roles of key actors in the policy process. 
3.4.2 The Key Actors 
The Commission 
The first role of the Commission, as guardian of the EU Treaties, is to propose 
legislation promoting the Union's aims of economic and political integration. These 
proposals are based on the Commission's interpretation of the Treaties and specific EU 
action programmes (Wise and Gibb, 1993). It is also largely responsible for monitoring 
the transposition and compliance with EU law by the Member States (Cowgill, 1992). 
However, its remit excludes any formal executive role, either in the acceptance of 
legislation - this remains the domain of the Council of Ministers and, more recently, the 
European Parliament (EP) - or the practical implementation of EU policies (H. Wallace, 
1996a; 1996b; Leveque, 1996a). The Commission instead functions principally to 
initiate policy and, in conjunction with the European Court of Justice, to defend EU law 
(Howe, 1996; Wendon, 1998). Golub (1996) argues, however, that the Commission's 
right and duty to introduce proposals which advance EU integration enables it to exert 
considerable influence over policy agendas in the Member States. 
The Commission is divided into Directorates-General covering specific areas of policy 
(Sbragia, 1996). Each Directorate-General is then divided into a number of policy 
domains; the Environment Directorate includes units covering, for example. Integration 
Policy and Environmental Instruments, Environment Quality and Natural Resources, 
and Industry and the Environment. Since the Commission's responsibilities are divided 
between many specialist departments, proposals emanating from one unit unavoidably 
impact on the work of other sections and directorates. For example, environmental 
legislation routinely affects industry and therefore has implications for the Internal 
Market and Competition Directorates (Collins and Earnshaw, 1993). The problem is 
therefore to resolve not only incompatibilities between new legislation and the EU 
Treaties, but also conflicts between different divisions of the Commission. Whilst 
inter-departmental tensions pervade all forms of government, a distinctive, piecemeal 
and exceptionally legalistic style of policy-making has emerged in the EU because 
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legislation must be co-ordinated within the Commission even before it is debated by the 
EP and the Council of Ministers (H. Wallace, 1996a; Metcalfe, 1992). This, critics 
argue, has a particularly strong impact on EU environmental policy since the tendency 
is to produce legislation which is legally consistent but fails to translate the EU's 
expansive visions of sustainable development into effective programmes of action 
(Collins and Eamshaw, 1993; Demmke, 1997). 
Although the Commission plays a prominent role in formulating legislation affecting 
the citizens of Europe, its staff are appointed by Member-State governments rather than 
being directly elected representatives. A number of authors have argued that this 
constitutes a major democratic deficit, since major policy responsibilities have been 
entmsted in the Commission without it being subject to commensurate public 
accountability (Collins and Eamshaw, 1993; Wood and Yesilada, 1996; van der 
Straaten, 1993). Under EU procedures, democratic sanction can only be imposed on 
the Commission by the European Parliament (see section on the EP) or by the refusal of 
Member States to support the re-nomination of individual commissioners. Whilst this 
arrangement is designed to maintain the independence of the Commission and the 
balance of power between institutions, some commentators have proposed that it 
encourages the Commission to be aloof and out of touch with public opinion (H. 
Wallace, 1996a; W. Wallace, 1996). Even disregarding these accusations, the 
Commission's 'top-down' style of policy-making is seemingly at odds with the locally-
focused politics advocated by the Bmndtland Commission as the foundation for 
sustainable development. Nonetheless, by virtue of its place as a main initiator of EU 
legislation, the Commission remains a key institution, both in terms of European 
integration and improved environmental protection. 
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The Council of Ministers^ 
The Council of Ministers is the main executive body of the EU's ordinary agenda. It 
exists essentially to set and prioritise policy issues and to decide upon Commission 
ft 
proposals (Cowgill, 1992; Barnes and Barnes, 1999) . The Council is even less of a 
single entity than the Commission but is instead 'a revolving group consisting of the 
relevant ministers from each of the Member States who meet periodically to decide 
upon Conmiission proposals which fall within their jurisdiction' (Lister, 1996: 15). 
Therefore, though the politically non-partisan but pro-integration Commission is 
responsible for proposing measures to implement the EU agenda, the combined national 
governments hold the definitive reins on power (H. Wallace, 1996a)'. Golub (1996) 
clarifies this distinction by demarcating between the extent to which each institution 
holds influence or power over EU decision-making. Although the Commission has 
considerable influence over the policy agenda because of its right to propose legislation, 
this cannot be equated to the exercise of power since this is retained by the Member 
States through the Council of Ministers. However, because the agenda is defined at 
least partially extraneously from the Member States, this prevents the EU agenda being 
entirely sequestrated by national interests (also H. Wallace, 1996a). 
Although this separation of duties is necessary to avoid the over-concentration of 
authority in one EU institution, it inevitably creates a degree of tension between the 
Commission and the Council. Whilst the Commission has the duty to pursue EU 
integration, more disparate views on specific policies and the general direction of 
integration are inevitably articulated within the Council (Bulmer, 1983; Slater, 1982; 
Pfander, 1996). This friction between policy 'proposers' and 'deciders' is particularly 
pronounced in environmental policy because the Commission and the EP have 
traditionally been more sympathetic to the environmental lobby than the Council 
(Sbragia, 1996; Leveque, 1996b). It is also important to recognise that strategic 
^ Reference is made to 'tlie Council' to describe the Council of Ministers (renamed the Council of the 
European Union in the Amsterdam Treaty). The term Council of Ministers will be used in the thesis, as 
this was its official title during the negotiation of the Packaging Waste Directive. This definition of the 
Council should not be confused with meetings ofEU heads of state acting as the European Council. 
* However, it should be noted that the authority of the European Council supersedes that of the Council of 
Ministers in matters of overall EU strategy (the extra-ordinary agenda), (Wood and Yesilada, 1996). In 
fact, because both institutions are composed of national government representatives, major conflicts 
between the two groups are rarely made public. 
' Though note the new powers held by the European Parliament under the co-decision procedure (see 
Section 3.4.2.3). 
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negotiating is commonplace in the Council, in that Member States often lend support to 
proposals they do not fully support in exchange for concessions in areas where they 
have particular national interests (Leveque, 1996b). A key example of such conflicts 
relates to policies on ciir pollution, where the U K is an avid proponent of air quality 
standards on the grounds they are more economic to monitor, whilst Germany supports 
emissions control standards, since it considers them to be the surest means of protecting 
German forests from airborne pollution (Hajer, 1995). Li another example, Germany 
has consistently pushed for the use of 'Best Available Technique' (BAT) approaches to 
pollution control, whereas Britain supports the more pragmatic BATNEEC (Best 
Available Technique Not Entailing Excessive Cost) approach (Skea and Smith, 1998). 
Prior to the SEA, when the majority of environmental policy decisions required 
unanimous Council approval, individual states were able to disable decision-making 
expediently by exercising their veto power'". Though qualified majority-voting 
procedures partly circumvent such obstructionist tactics, Collins and Earnshaw (1993: 
225) note: 
Despite member states' articulation in Council of deeply entrenched preferences based on 
national circumstances and practices, negotiation in Council remains best characterised as a 
search for consensus...This search for unanimity...increases the possibility that EC 
environmental legislation will be vague, ambiguous and sometimes superficial. 
The expression of national interests and the Council's desire to maintain a unified front 
on key issues have been constant features of EU policy. Whether entrepreneurial or 
'lowest-common-denominator' policies are adopted depends on who holds the majority 
at the Council veto point (Golub, 1996). Sbragia (1996) therefore argues that EU 
environmental policy is epitomised by a 'push-pull' dynamic between environmental 
'leader' and 'laggard' states (see Figure 3.3). She contends that the advancement ofEU 
environmental policies often relies on the introduction of national legislation by leader 
states such as Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. 
Though Sbragia (1996) also notes that environmental ministers enjoy higher prestige within the 
Council than they do domestically and therefore can gain greater credence for their positions by 
demonstrating unanimous support for substantive policy advances. 
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Figure 3.3 Tlie Pusli-Pull Dynamic of EU Environmental Policy-Making 
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This is not always because of environmental zeal, however, as having one's national 
administrative procedures adopted across the EU also reduces the disruption and 
expense of complying with EU legislation (Barnes and Barnes, 1999). When faced 
with a policy 'push', the EU must either challenge national legislation, incorporate it 
within EU law, or allow a potential market distortion to occur. Whether or not the 
standard is adopted depends on the leader state's ability to defend its legislation against 
the counter-arguments of environmental 'laggard' states. Sbragia argues that the cycle 
then begins again, gradually strengthening the influence of EU environmental policy. 
However, though this process increases environmental standards incrementally, the 
dynamic is often a cumbersome and piece-meal way of conducting environmental 
policy. Weale (1996) also notes that the push-pull system is less oriented towards a 
problem-based approach to sustainable development than it is to managing the 
democratic intricacies of the EU's complex political make-up. 
The European Parliament 
Two principal official powers are conferred on the EP under the Maastricht Treaty; the 
ability to propose and veto amendments to EU acts (Articles 189(b) and 189(c)) and the 
right, under Article 144, to dismiss the Commission by two-thirds majority for failure 
to fulfil its statutory roles (Cowgill, 1992). However, although it is the only EU 
institution directly elected by its citizens. Parliament's influence has historically been 
quite marginal. Weale (1999: 45) notes that: 
Regarded from the point of view of parliamentary systems in Europe, the powers of the 
European Parliament appear few. It is not the formal source of legislation. It does not 
appoint or overthrow governments. Its party alignments are not well established. It is less 
attractive than national parliaments to those for whom politics is a career rather than a form 
of early retirement. It does not have the last say on legislative matters. In short, it still has 
to make the transition fully from a consultative body to a legislative body holding the 
executive to account. 
Indeed, its role was almost entirely consultative prior to the SEA and TEU. Under the 
consultation procedure, EC legislation was given a single reading in Parliament for the 
proposal of amendments but neither the Council nor Commission were obliged to 
accept Parliamentary suggestions. An EP amendment accepted by the Commission 
could be passed by qualified majority in Council, but those rejected required unanimous 
support in the Council in order to be included in legislation. The Parliament retained 
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the right under this procedure to issue an official opinion on the final legislation (Wood 
and Yesilada, 1996: 103). This situation further fuelled the accusation that the EU was 
fundamentally a democratically-deficient body (van der Straaten, 1993; Wood and 
Yesilada, 1996). 
The co-operation and co-decision procedures have reinforced the EP's meaningful 
involvement in policy decisions (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5, also Wood and Yesilada, 
1996 for a comprehensive account of these processes). Under the co-operation 
procedure, legislation rejected by the Parliament on a second reading can only become 
law if the Council unanimously over-rides Parliament's veto. In the co-decision 
procedure, a conciliation committee is formed if the Council and Parliament fail to 
agree a proposal. As either party may reject the proposed solution. Wood and Yesilada 
(1996) argue this effectively makes Parliament a co-equal legislative body in policy 
areas falling within this procedure. 
The EP's decision-making powers have been further strengthened by Article 251 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which expands the range of policies falling within the co-decision 
procedure (see Chapter nine). Some commentators nonetheless maintain that policy 
decisions are predominantly taken at some distance from direct democratic scrutiny 
(Wood and Yesilada, 1996; Tsoukalis, 1997). Sbragia (1996) notes, however, that the 
Parliament has assumed a particularly active role in environmental policy, partly 
because of its strong 'Green' contingent and partly since legislation enacted under 
Article 100a now automatically triggers the co-operation procedure. This forces the 
Council to accept EP amendments if it does not wish to see environmental initiatives 
fail entirely (Weale, 1999). The new procedures have therefore created an avenue 
whereby the European Parliament can extend its influence on environmental policy 
decisions beyond those customary for a national parliament (Leveque, 1996a; Weale, 
1999). Moreover, they have increased the number of institutions and interests with 
significant influence over the policy-making process (Zito, 2000). However, it will 
probably be some time before the full impact of the Amsterdam Treaty on EU decision-
making procedures is fully clear. 
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Figure 3.4 The Co-operation Procedure 
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Figure 3.5 Tlie Co-decision Procedure 
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Non-Government Actors 
While the EU institutions and Member States comprise the formal actors in 
environmental policy-making, the literature also recognises the influence of non-
government interest representation groups (Leveque, 1996a). Many environmental and 
other agencies operate under this banner (see Marks and McAdam (1996) for a detailed 
discussion); however, in line with the focus of the research, this section concentrates on 
industry's role within policy formulation and implementation. A number of authors 
have documented the rise of corporate lobbying at the EU (Salisbury, 1984; 
McLaughlin et al., 1993; McLaughUn and Greenwood, 1995; McAleavey and Mitchell, 
1994; Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Schmitter and Streeck 1991a, 1991b; Leveque, 
1996a) and logically equated this with the process of policy Europeanisation (Marks 
and McAdam, 1996). Tsoukalis (1997) even suggests that economic and capital 
globalisation have intensified industry's influence over policy formulation as 
environmental self-determination has shifted away from the nation state, (McGrew, 
1993; Bailey, 1999b). 
Corporate ventures into the EU arena generally take two forms; businesses can either 
oppose legislation that threatens their profitability or strategically support measures 
which offer potential competitive benefits (O'Brien and Penna, 1997). As such, both 
the absolute gains and losses of environmental legislation and their relative distribution 
between competing companies are important determinants of corporate response 
(Leveque, 1996a). This does not mean that businesses have the capability to block 
environmental legislation entirely - this would require appreciable Member-State or EU 
institutional support - in practice, they are more likely to adopt strategies which 
minimise their absolute losses and maximise relative gains (van der Straaten, 1993). 
Leveque (1996a) argues that, in pursuit of competitive gains, sequences of engagement 
frequently emerge in the corporate lobbying process. Those companies threatened with 
the greatest absolute losses from an environmental initiative, or with the most 
sophisticated monitoring and campaigning networks (generally speaking, large and 
multi-national companies), make the first attempt to influence policy-makers. This 
alerts other major companies, which realise they might become absolute losers should 
the first entrants secure competitive advantage. Thus, successive waves of corporate 
lobbying are created. By contrast, the views of the Small-Medium Enterprise (SME) 
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sector rarely gain a full hearing because of their lack of effective lobbying networks. 
Leveque's tj'pology is framed around a divisive competitive ethic but Jacquemin and 
Wright (1994) observe that industries faced with common commercial threats (as often 
occurs with environmental legislation) tend to form issue or sector coalitions. 
Corporate lobbying is therefore essentially a pragmatic and issue-based process, rather 
than one framed around permanent actors fulfilling rigidly defined roles. Woolcock et 
al. (1991) and Egan (1997) also point out that national and cultural differences further 
complicate this mosaic. For instance, German industry has often demonstrated a 
willingness to accept new social responsibilities provided they are introduced in a 
manner which does not disrupt competition (a relationship with government sometimes 
referred to as Ordnungspolitik), whereas British business tends to maintain a short-
termist and financially-oriented view (Egan, 1997). 
Finally, the intensity of industry lobbying is also affected by the 'price elasticity' of 
products or services under policy scrutiny (Leveque, 1996a) (see Chapter two). When 
faced with the prospect of shouldering additional environmental costs for a price-elastic 
product, businesses will campaign intensively against new regulation. Conversely, 
industry may be more receptive to legislation where environmental costs can be readily 
recouped. In most cases, therefore, industries will adopt the least overall cost response 
to environmental regulation. Determining the trade-offs is therefore often a complex 
procedure. Companies must assess, first, whether it will be more expensive to absorb 
the costs of new regulation or mount an obstructive campaign and, second, the publicity 
benefits accruing from co-operation with policy-makers (Smith, 1993; Welford and 
Prescott, 1994). However, industry's response to environmental regulation remains 
essentially interest-led and utilitarian in character. 
Considering the impression given thus far, that industry habitually obstructs EU 
environmental policy, it is worth noting the reasons why policy-makers have elicited 
industry participation to the extent they have. The most obvious explanation comes 
from the Fifth EAP's recognition that legalistic, top-down policies failed to arrest 
environmental decline in Europe and therefore that more inclusive approaches were 
needed (CEC, 1992a; 1996c). In the globalising economy, business is both part of the 
environmental problem and an important element of its resolution (Hawken, 1993). A 
number of writers (McLaughlin et al., 1993; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995; Haas, 
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1999; Mazey and Richardson, 1992) have added that industry has been co-opted into 
policy decisions for less high-minded reasons. They highlight that many EU 
institutions possess insufficient expertise to define technically-complex pollution 
legislation (van der Straaten, 1993) and are therefore reliant on industry for information 
and advice. This is particularly the case with the Environment Directorate, which is 
widely renowned for being under-resourced and low in expertise in relation to the 
magnitude of its tasks (Aguilar Fernandez, 1994; Baker, 1997; Redmond, 1996). There 
is the danger, however, that within such an informationally-asymmetric relationship the 
Commission may be susceptible to regulatory capture (Kunzlik, 1994; Aguilar 
Fernandez, 1994). This can occur in two forms; companies can either use scientific 
results to add authority to their viewpoints and impress politicians with apparently 
'hard' facts (Funcowitz and Raveltz, 1990), or they can exploit scientific uncertainties 
to dispute the environmental risks associated with certain industrial processes 
(Underdahl, 1990). Under these conditions it is conceivable that large businesses will 
succeed in influencing policy-decisions significantly in their favour. 
Leveque (1996a) also identifies that industry, with the assent of the Commission, has 
become increasingly instrumental in determining the methods by which environmental 
policies are implemented. Here he identifies that the 'top-down' approach of early 
EAPs is being gradually augmented by (i) self-regulation, whereby industries 
voluntarily agree to control certain practices in order to stave off restrictive legislation 
and (ii) co-regulation, wherein a broad regulatory framework is established but 
industries retain considerable flexibility in defining how environmental targets are met. 
The most prominent examples of voluntary regulation in EU environmental policy are 
the Eco-labelling" and Eco-Management and Audit Schemes (EMAS)'^ (Welford, 
1995; Johnson and Corcelle, 1995; DoE, 1995). By contrast, the co-regulation option 
best describes the Commission's commitment to price- and market-based 
environmental policies in the Fifth EAP (see Chapter five). Leveque (1995) argues, 
however, that self-regulation might theoretically help in devolving environmental 
stewardship duties to industry but, in practice, it tends to be ineffective. This, he 
" Council Regulation (EEC) 880/92, relating to the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) and labelling of 
product groups. The first product group to go under the EU's LCA hammer was washing machines. 
Council Regulation (EEC) 1836/93, which defines a framework and requirements for business-led 
environmental management systems. Companies meeting these obtain accreditation to the EU EMAS 
standard, which can then be used to market the environmental credentials of the business. 
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contends, is because self-regulation is dependent on government's ability to regulate 
industrial activities through the threat of future legislation and the existence of positive 
market gains to industry from self-regulation (see Chapter two). If companies either 
'free-ride' voluntary regulation or pursue competitive gains in a manner that 
undermines the regulation, self-regulatory agreements will fail to achieve their policy 
goals (Bailey, 1999b; 2000; Whiston and Glachant, 1996; Segerson and Micelli, 1998). 
Leveque (1996b) therefore supports co-regulation based upon clear objectives and 
operating rules as a more practicable way of nurturing effective industry initiatives. 
While schemes such as Eco-labelling and EMAS continue to be supported by the 
Commission, price-based methods of co-regulation are finding greater favour with EU 
policy-makers (CEC, 1998a). 
Whilst it is apparent that industry's involvement in environmental regulation has 
become more intense with policy Europeanisation, its engagement has never been 
straightforward. This is understandable, as there are no simple formulae for reconciling 
industry's coimnercial interests with the more eclectic aims of sustainable development. 
Industry has often been a dissenting voice against environmental policies it views as 
impractical or economically-damaging but it has simultaneously forged partnerships 
with policy-makers to help craft innovative methods of policy implementation. Aside 
from its functional alliances to defend vested interests, the tactical and partisan 
behaviour of industry defies simple and neat classification. What is clear, however, is 
that EU policy-makers have needed to scrutinise industry's engagement in the policy 
process in order to maintain an equitable balance between economic and environmental 
objectives (Beder, 1996; Bailey, 2(X)0). Nonetheless, it is inconceivable that industry 
should, or even could, be excluded from participating in the formulation of 
environmental policy if the programme is to achieve credible environmental integration. 
3.4.3 Decision-Making in the EU: Issues and Processes 
Justifying EU Intervention: The Subsidiarity Principle 
As the debate on models of European integration has shown, decisions on whether 
action should be taken at European-Union or Member-State level are an important 
element of the complex confederalist-intergovemmental persona of the EU. Whilst 
some Member States might welcome greater co-operation and federalisation, the near 
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rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the Danish referendum emphasised the extent of 
political and public uncertainty over how far EU integration should be permitted to 
extend (Scott et al., 1994). Furthermore, the political debate in the UK, particularly 
within the Conservative party, suggests that influential political factions fear that 
creeping federalism is already occurring in the EU (Hoffe, 1996). 
Although the balance between federalism and inter-govemmentalism is partly 
maintained by the segregation of duties between EU institutions, general guidelines are 
still required on the sanctioning of EU intervention. The main framework for this is the 
subsidiarity principle, which Jacques Delors' Commission championed as the basis for 
all EU policies during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Barnes and Barnes, 
1999). It states that: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action 
... only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of scale or effects ... be better 
achieved by the Conmiunity (quoted in Toth, 1994: 268). 
In part, subsidiarity was designed to allay fears of a federal EU hegemony by placing 
the burden of proof on the Commission to demonstrate the need for EU action (Barnes 
and Barnes, 1999). Kunzlik (1994) agrees that subsidiarity requires the Commission to 
work within its powers and proportionately according to need. Against this, it is 
couched in such imprecise language that it simultaneously provides criteria by which 
pro-integration states might argue for increased EU intervention. Its clearest strength is 
therefore that its general framework allows decisions to be made on a flexible case-by-
case basis. Van Kersbergen and Verbeeck (1994: 220) nonetheless make the caustic 
observation that: 
The adoption of subsidiarity was cheered by both defendants of more authority at the 
Community level, like France and Germany, and opponents of such a development, as, for 
instance, the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly, subsidiarity rapidly became 'the 
Euroconcept all can admire by giving it the meaning they want.' 
Even the most cursory scrutiny reveals the principle's extreme vagueness. Green 
(1994), for instance, argues that there are few objective means of deciding whether a 
state can 'sufficiently' resolve a problem, whether solutions can be 'better' achieved by 
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the EU, or what scale of Community intervention is most appropriate in any particular 
case. Toth (1994) further argues that subsidiarity is virtually injusticiable by the ECJ 
without it becoming embroiled in political rather than judicial decisions - a view shared 
by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (House of 
Lords, 1996). 
It has nonetheless been suggested that subsidiarity might be used to manage the 
allocation of environmental responsibilities between national and regional government 
(Scott et al., 1994). By doing this, subsidiarity could help reduce the democratic deficit 
in the EU (Stoker, 1991; Conzelmann, 1995) and, specifically within environmental 
policy, it could enable locally-led solutions to be implemented within framework EU 
policies. This, it is suggested, provides an appropriate interpretation of the 'think 
globally, act locally' strategy envisaged by the Rio Conference's Local Agenda 21 
programme (Gibbs et al., 1996; Local Government Management Board (LGMB), 
1994). However, a number of authors are sceptical as to the extent to which 
subsidiarity will filter down to sub-national government (Scott et al., 1994; Green, 
1994). It is therefore more accurate to view it as a general guide to policy decisions 
than as an exact route-map for regulating European integration (Hoffe, 1994). 
Subsidiarity has consequently become as much a symbol of the problems associated 
with governance in the EU as it has the solution to the allocation of policy 
responsibilities. For some commentators, subsidiarity, or a mechanism serving similar 
functions, is an essential pre-requisite of good governance in the EU (Blackhurst, 
1994). Others maintain that it has merely smoothed over ideological differences 
between Member States 'by being so vague and insubstantial as to allow all parties to 
believe that it is furthering their cause, while in reality furthering none' (Green, 1994: 
298). Moreover, Demmke (1997: 65) claims that subsidiarity might theoretically 
encourage flexible environmental governance but it does little to resolve material policy 
problems: 
A far greater service would certainly be rendered to the cause of environmental protection 
if instead of indulging in ideological disputes about interpretation of the subsidiarity 
principle the public debate concentrated much more on the serious causes of the shortfalls 
in implementation and enforcement and discussed the necessary reform of the 
environmental authorities and of environmental legislation. 
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Demmke therefore highlights the point that whilst mechanisms akin to subsidiarity are 
necessary in most federal constitutions, they are principally devices for managing trans-
national politics. Subsidiarity is neither a complete solution to confederalist-
intergovemmental tensions nor a recipe for promoting sustainable development in the 
EU. According to Bames and Barnes (1999), greater clarity in its application and its 
linkages with the principles of sustainable development are the highest priorities for the 
future. 
Agreeing Environmental Legislation 
Whilst interpreting the subsidiarity principle is a contentious issue in its own right, 
tensions between the EU's environmental 'leader' and 'laggard' states truly come to the 
fore in the formulation of environmental legislation. During these negotiations, the 
standards adopted as EU law depend principally on, first, the Commission's 
interpretation of the Treaties, second, the degree of in-built excess in Corrmiission 
proposals in the knowledge they will be negotiated down (Golub, 1996) and, third, the 
balance of power within the Council on any particular issue (H. Wallace, 1996a). 
Weale (1996) describes the resulting policy-making stracture as a system of concurrent 
majorities. He rejects either the notion that there is a dominant coalition of Member 
States which consistently imposes its will on the minority or the idea of a random 
'merry-go-round' of individual countries grabbing the environmental policy agenda. 
Instead he suggests that veto or obstructive power is sufficiently well distributed 
between EU policy-making bodies that agreement amongst a wide range of actors is 
required before policies can be adopted. Since the issues and interests change with each 
environmental initiative, this precludes either dominant majorities or random 
opportunistic policy-making. With the advent of the co-decision procedure and the 
expansion of majority voting, Weale's typology may now serve as a more complete 
descriptor of EU decision-making than Collins and Eamshaw's (1993) notion of 
consensual bargaining in the Council". Instead, legislation must be made acceptable to 
a sufficiently large majority of policy actors whose positions are informed, at least in 
part, by industry and environmentalist interest groups. Inevitably this leads to a process 
The Europa website notes, however, that only 14% of Council decisions are typically made by qualified 
majority (http^/ue.eu.int/en/Info/index.htm). 
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founded on negotiation and compromise, the tendency of which is to make final 
legislation 'the aggregated and transformed standards of their original champions 
modified under the need to secure political accommodation from powerful veto players' 
(Weale, 1996: 607). The fundamental problem with this decision-making structure, 
according to Weale, is that it encourages a bargaining mentality within policy 
negotiations rather than a focus on 'objective' problem solving. There is therefore an 
implicit conflict between the first justification for EU environmental policy, the need 
for international co-operation to combat trans-boundary degradation, and the praxis of 
decision-making within the confederalist-intergovernmental framework. 
Even though environmental initiatives are not always weakened by the need to obtain 
concurrent majorities, the existing literature suggests this is more often than not the 
case (Golub, 1996; Goodman, 1996; Bailey, 1999a)"'. The articulation of these 
dynamics in the Packaging Directive is explored further in Chapter five. However, the 
question is whether this interest-led process of negotiation and compromise - which is 
prominent within but not unique to either environmental policy or the EU - is capable 
of promoting sustainable development effectively (Weale, 1996). Weale, amongst 
others (Demmke, 1994; 1997; Chayes and Chayes, 1993; Kramer, 1996), suggests that 
it is not and cites the 'implementation deficit' within the Member States as evidence of 
the problems stemming from this dynamic. That said, it is easier to criticise the 
system's obvious failings than it is to propose a system of policy formulation and 
implementation which can promote sustainable development whilst simultaneously 
preserving democracy and national sovereignty within the EU. 
3.4.4 Policy-making and Enforcement Procedures in the EU 
Before proposals for environmental legislation can become EU law, they must pass 
through a series of consultation stages. Panels of experts within the Environment 
Directorate first discuss each proposal in order to assess its practicability. Following 
this, the proposal is forwarded to the college of Commissioners in order that its 
compatibility with the work of other Directorates can be assessed (Kramer, 1990). This 
process of co-ordinating the work of the Commission can take several months or even 
Weale (1996) cites the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (96/61/EC) as an 
example of EU policy upgrading national legislation. The UK attempted to have its national legislation 
adopted as EU law but the final directive became far broader in scope than the UK originally intended. 
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years (Demmke, 1997), suggesting that Weale's concept of concurrent majorities also 
extends to intra-institutional negotiations. Once outstanding issues have been resolved, 
the proposal is formally adopted by the Commission and sent to the Council of 
Ministers, their respective civil services, the EP and the Economic and Social 
Committee'^. Objections or amendments from the Member States are then fed back to 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)'^, whose role includes 
assisting negotiations on the finer points of each proposal. At this stage, the co-
operation and co-decision procedures (Figures 3.4 and 3.5) may be triggered to resolve 
disputes between the Council of Ministers and the EP (Barnes and Barnes, 1999). 
Should these stages be successfully completed, the proposal is accepted by the Council 
and passed to a series of 'comitology' committees which handle the technicalities of 
reconciling EU with national law (Demmke, 1997)'^ . If the requisite majority is 
impossible to reach, the proposal is either returned to the Commission for revision or 
abandoned (Westlake, 1995; Wood and Yesilada, 1996). 
EU legislation can be enacted in many forms but the two principal types of policy are 
regulations or directives. Regulations are, in effect, direct transpositions of EU law and 
are immediately applicable within the Member States without national legislative action 
(Lister, 1996). Directives, on the other hand, are binding upon the Member States in 
terms of the obligation to act and the standards to be achieved but not the legislative 
format or implementation methods employed (Pfander, 1996; Kramer, 1991). 
Therefore, whilst regulations might be seen as vehicles of a federalist policy style, 
directives are more consistent with the confederal approach'*. To date, the majority of 
environmental legislation has been enacted in the form of directives. Three reasons can 
be proposed to explain this. First, directives are preferred particularly by Member 
States that are reluctant to sanction the transfer of legislative activity to the EU. 
Second, because directives permit greater implementation flexibility, they are more 
The European Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is an advisory body to the EU decision-making 
institutions. It is comprised of representatives from employers, trade unions, small business, farmers' 
associations and the professions and functions to add greater democracy and consensus to the decision-
making process. 
Each Member State has a permanent representation to the EU in Brussels, directed by an ambassador, 
called a permanent representative. The tasks of COREPER Committees include the preparation of 
Council discussions and texts for legislative adoption. 
There are currently 31 comitology committees working in the field of environmental policy, of which 
21 are specifically concerned with legislative affairs. 
'* This distinction is not universal, however. Howe (1996) argues that even the use of directives is 
considered too centralised and prescriptive in the USA, despite its more federalised system. 
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sensitive to local political, planning and economic conditions (Collins and Earnshaw, 
1993). This is relevant to all states but is particularly pertinent for those with federal 
political systems, such as Germany and Belgium, where many environmental policy 
functions are carried out by regional government (Denunke, 1997). Finally, most 
directives are designed in a manner which permits Member States to introduce higher 
standards than those contained in EU legislation, provided their measures neither 
impede free trade nor prevent other states from complying with EU law. This enables 
environmental 'leader' states to respond to domestic pressures whilst also, importantly, 
maintaining momentum behind the push-pull dynamic (Kramer, 1991). However, 
because directives entitle Member States to employ their preferred methods of 
implementation so long as legal minima are met, they are undeniably more complicated 
to monitor against Single Market requirements. Furthermore, if as was suggested 
previously, implementation methodology is a major determinant of the overall impact 
of environmental legislation, it is uncertain whether the flexibility inherent in directives 
promotes either uniform or sustainable environmental standards throughout the EU 
(Bailey, 1999a). 
Following final acceptance of an environmental directive. Member States are required 
to transpose EU legislation and notify the Commission of their compliance measures. 
There then follows a transition period before full implementation is required'^. Should 
a Member State fail to transpose or properly implement a directive, first responsibility 
for enforcing EU law falls upon the Commission (Article 169) (Kunzlik, 1994). 
Initially this takes the form of bilateral exchanges with the Member State in order to 
resolve outstanding problems without recourse to formal proceedings. Should this fail, 
the Conmiission informs the state in a '169-letter' that it believes a failure to fulfil 
Treaty obligations has taken place. The letter also specifies a time period within which 
the state's observations are required (Collins and Eamshaw, 1993). Though relatively 
few proceedings progress beyond this point, the Commission may issue a 'reasoned 
opinion' if it is not satisfied with the state's reply. This customarily sets out the reasons 
why the state's justifications are not accepted and a timeframe for compliance. Where a 
Member State persists with a transgression, proceedings may then be initiated with the 
This period can be extremely protracted. For example, the Packaging Directive was adopted in 1994 
but full implementation is not required until 2001. These delays exist ostensibly to allow Member States 
time to agree legislation and implementation plans but, as a corollary, creates a lengthy delay between the 
initiation ofEU legislation and its standards being enforced. 
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ECJ, whose role is to act as final arbiters of the dispute (Cowgill, 1992). Whilst 
receiving a 169 letter is normally enough to shame a Member State into action (Chayes 
and Chayes, 1993), Collins and Eamshaw (1993) and Demmke (1997) both argue that 
the number of infringements of EU environmental policy is increasing and that the 
enforcement procedure is too time-consuming to deal with them effectively. Ken 
Collins, former Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on the Environment, 
reported to the U K House of Lords as far back as 1992 that: 'We have now reached the 
stage where if we do not tackle implementation and enforcement properly, there seems 
very little point in producing new environmental law' (House of Lords, 1992: para. 67). 
More recently, Ludwig Kramer (1996: 7), Head of the Waste Management Unit within 
the Environment Directorate of the Commission leunented that: 'There are only a few 
areas of Community law in which the difference between the written law and the 
practice is as great as in the case of Community environmental legislation.' The 
Commission's sixteenth report XVIth Report on monitoring the application of 
Community law noted that these problems still remain, chiefly as a result of, first, the 
difficulties some Member States experience in implementing EU law and, second, the 
Commission's limited right to monitor national compliance on the ground (CEC, 
1999a). The Commission's most recent measures to improve policy implementation 
are discussed further in Chapter eight. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to identify the key political processes affecting the 
implementation of European Union environmental policy. Three main themes have 
emerged. First, EU environmental policy has been transformed from its initially 
uncertain legal base to become a comprehensive progranmie of reform and regulation 
across Europe. At the forefront of this lie clear commitments to sustainable 
development, the process of environmental integration and the inclusion of a broad 
range of social and economic actors within the policy process. Against this, the EU's 
efforts to reverse environmental decline in Europe have enjoyed only partial success. 
Whilst this can be attributed to a number of factors, the EU's allegiance to trade and 
economic development must be seen as a major influence on the direction and success 
of its environmental programme. Although EU environmental policy has enjoyed 
considerable success, its philosophical foundations remain rooted in the notion of weak 
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sustainability. Whether this is a sufficient response to the environmental challenges 
faced by the EU Member States is an issue which will be explored throughout this 
thesis. 
The second theme concerns the confederal and inter-governmental tensions within the 
complex and sometimes discordant European political system. William Wallace (1996: 
451) even describes it, perhaps slightly harshly, as: 
An incomplete political system: a 'quasi-state,' without the coherent articulation of interests 
and political preferences characteristic of a well-developed polity ... [Within this] ... 
different governments, with different traditions of statehood and different myths of national 
identity, choose different issues [to assert their national sovereignty], further complicating 
the management of Europe's multilateral and multi-level government. 
Whether or not one totally accepts this indictment, it is apparent that the EU's political 
deliberations are punctuated by conflicts between competing interests and visions of 
European integration (Weale, 1999). The impact of this on material policy decisions is 
clearly expressed in the system of concurrent majorities and the bargaining outlook it 
engenders during policy formulation (Weale, 1996). Whilst decisions over EU 
intervention in domestic policies are managed by the subsidiarity principle, the 
formulation and acceptance of common initiatives has proven a battleground between 
the Union's environmental leader and laggard states and other assorted key actors. Li 
policy implementation, the adoption of directives as the primary regulatory technique 
has facilitated the acceptance and implementation of EU legislation but it has also 
exacerbated the difficulties in achieving harmonised environmental standards across the 
Union. 
The third main theme is the poor implementation of the EU environmental programme 
(CEC, 1998a). The number of infringement proceedings has risen apace in recent years 
(Demmke, 1997; Environmental Data Services (ENDS), 1998a), whilst the procedures 
to resolve them remain ponderous and only partially effective (Collins and Eamshaw, 
1993). As with the doubts conceming subsidiarity and policy-making by concurrent 
majorities, the current enforcement process may be more oriented towards managing 
the nuances of EU politics than the effective resolution of pressing environmental 
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problems. Tsoukalis (1997: 276) encapsulates many of the afflictions of EU policy-
making thus: 
Some of the main characteristics of this sui generis political system are the slow and 
inefficient method of decision-making, which is still close to an inter-governmental type of 
negotiation with multiple layers; poor transparency and accountability of its institutions; an 
administrative structure which has serious difficulty in coping with the wide range of 
functions and the financial resources entrusted to it; a large 'implementation deficit' which 
results from the highly decentralised nature of the system and the difficulties experienced in 
exercising effective control, accompanied by the threat of sanctions, over the proper 
implementation of decisions made in Brussels; and perhaps more importandy, the lack of a 
popular base which goes hand in hand with the lack of democratic legitimation. 
This is not to say there are perfect solutions to any of these issues; there are probably 
not. However, it is important to recognise that the mechanisms which are necessary to 
facilitate the functioning of the corpus EU - subsidiarity, consensual interest-led 
bargaining, decision-making by concurrent majorities and the push-pull dynamic - are 
not necessarily the same as those required to achieve an effective environmental 
progranmie. To sum up, the existing literature has discussed the philosophical, 
institutional and political foundations of EU environmental policy and identified several 
major obstacles to the construction of sustainable development within this complex 
political dynamic. Having completed this task, the thesis now considers the methods 
used to examine the expression of these issues and those raised in Chapter two during 
the implementation of the Packaging Waste Directive. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Earlier chapters outlined a range of ideological, political and practical issues central to 
the implementation of EU environmental policy. As an introduction to the empirical 
element of this study, this chapter reviews the methods used to collect and analyse data. 
It re-caps on the aims of the study then outlines the overall research strategy adopted, its 
original contribution and the methods employed. In developing a methodological 
approach for this research, previous studies of environmental policy implementation, 
particularly from the field of waste management, were consulted. These included 
policy implementadon studies by, amongst others, Michaelis (1995), Waite (1995) and 
Whiston and Glachant (1996), theoretical examinations of waste management policy 
(such as Pearce and Turner, 1992; Brisson, 1993), and qualitative analyses of policies 
and their implementation (Lister, 1996; Golub, 1996; Newton and Harte, 1997; Gibbs et 
al., 1998; Eden, 1999). The information from these was supplemented by reference to 
specialist methodological guides (including Sarantakos, 1993; Czaja and Blair, 1996; 
May, 1997). 
4.2 Research Strategy 
4.2.1 Research Aims 
The central aim of this thesis, identified in Chapter one, is to evaluate the extent to 
which price-based environmental regulation is capable of promoting the objectives of 
EU environmental policy. These objectives were identified in Chapters two and three 
as the advancement of sustainable development and the EU's environmental principles. 
Whilst both series of concepts are extremely broad and problematic to assess, their 
operationalisation in this study is explored in Section 4.4. The general approach 
adopted in relation to sustainable development is that of the spectmm of weak and 
strong sustainability proposed by Turner (1993), as this recognises the diverse 
interpretations expressed within the literature. 
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4.2.2 Research Themes 
Essentially, the research assesses the influence of normative and positive factors on the 
outcome of EU environmental policies (see Chapter three). On the normative side, it 
seeks to determine whether price-based environmental policy instruments offer an 
effective means of achieving the sustainable management of packaging waste. Previous 
research has usually measured environmental policy success in terms of a combination 
of the environmental- and economic-efficiency factors reviewed in Chapter two (see 
also Bohm and Russell, 1985; Brisson, 1993; Michaelis, 1995). However, as 
environmental policy outcome is invariably affected by both normative and positive 
factors, this research also examines the relationship between EU decision-making 
structures and the effective operation of price-based environmental regulation. 
hi developing research questions, it is relatively easy to operationalise the first theme 
into measurable and testable hypotheses (there is/is not a significant relationship 
between price-based regulation and particular indicators of sustainable development). 
However, the second theme requires a more analytical and critical approach. Both 
qualitative and quantitative techniques were therefore used during the study. Whilst the 
main empirical analysis uses deductive and quantitative techniques, discussions on the 
relationship between EU policy-making structures and price-based regulation adopt a 
more inductive approach (see Holt-Jensen (1981), Johnston (1983), and Saunders et al. 
(1997) for summaries of the merits and limitations of inductive and deductive research). 
The move away from a rigid adherence to particular philosophical and methodological 
stances has gained increasing acceptance in human geography as researchers have 
recognised that no single technique can fully capture the meaning of the social world. 
Instead, 'multi-method' research is becoming an obvious choice in the conceptually 
diverse discipline of human geography (Philip, 1998). This study is therefore based on 
the general methodological approach suggested by McCall and Bobko (1990: 412): 
What one's method reveals about the problem and how well one executes whatever method 
is chosen seems significantly more important [than rigid methodological stance]. 
The approach adopted during this research also follows the guidelines provided by 
Giddens (1993: 20): 
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Scientific work depends upon a mixture of boldly innovative thought and the careful 
marshalling of evidence to support or disconfirm hypotheses and theories. Information and 
insights accumulated through scientific study and debate are always to some degree 
tentative - open to being revised, or even completely discarded, in the light of new evidence 
or arguments (original emphasis). 
It is nevertheless important to recognise that research can never be entirely value free 
because observations and interpretations are invariably influenced by the individual and 
received v '^orld-view of the researcher undertaking the investigation (Williams, 2000). 
Not only is total value freedom unattainable, it may also be undesirable if it denies the 
possibility of alternative perspectives on research problems - the criticism frequently 
levelled at logical positivism (Williams and May, 1996). This research essentially 
comes from an environmentalist perspective, in that the primary motivation is the 
development of knowledge that furthers the debate on implementing sustainable 
development. Thus, it is primarily concerned with the contribution made by the EU and 
industrial concerns to environmental sustainability rather than the processes themselves 
(see Zito (2000) as an example of an alternative perspective on EU environmental 
policy analysis). However, whilst it is important to recognise the existence of values, 
particularly in the social sciences, it is essential that academic research should strive for 
objective analysis throughout all stages of the research process (Weber, 1974). 
4.3 Research Contribution 
Numerous analytical texts have been written on the subject of environmental policy 
implementation. These generally take the form either of legal and policy analyses 
covering positive issues (Segerson, 1996; Lowe and Ward, 1998a; O'Riordan and 
Voisey, 1998), normative studies (Pearce and Turner, 1992; 1993; Brisson, 1993), or 
empirical research. Empirical examinations of environmental policy may be further 
divided into three general categories. The first is quantitative work exploring attitudes 
to environmental policies from a sociological perspective (Pelletier et al., 1996; 
Grenstad and Wollebaek, 1998; Ebreo et al., 1999). The second is qualitative studies of 
corporate environmental performance (Newton and Harte, 1997; Gibbs et al., 1998; 
Eden, 1999). The third category is policy impact studies, often conducted on behalf of 
governments, which generally presents quantitative data without specifying the 
fieldwork methods used (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 1994; DTI/DoE, 1991; 1992). This latter category also rarely examines the 
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theoretical underpinnings of particular policy approaches and instead focuses entirely 
on implementation practicalities. Only a few works, notably Labatt (1991; 1997a; 
1997b) discussing discretionary corporate responses to environmental initiatives, have 
attempted similar quantitative studies of business behaviour from a geographical 
perspective. 
It is also obvious that these studies come from a variety of academic disciplines, each of 
which adds fresh dimensions to the understanding of environmental policy. However, 
human geography has two valuable roles to play in this research area. First, its strong 
empirical tradition can help in evaluating the practical usefulness of theories proposed 
by more academically abstract disciplines. Second, it is well equipped to analyse the 
spatial effects of environmental policies (Gibbs and Healey, 1997). Nijkamp (1980) 
argues strongly that though predictive modelling techniques can help inform the 
evaluation of environmental policies, ultimately these theories require empirical 
substantiation. Lele (1991: 619) even brands such econometric modelling as 'arcane'. 
More moderately, Dixon (1990: 189) remarks: 
Economists are increasingly being asked to show how their theories and techniques can be 
used to address real, immediate problems, both at the project and at the policy level. The 
record to date is mixed. In part this is a natural result of the inherent limitations of 
economics from a theoretical basis and the diversity of problems it is being called upon to 
address. As a science, economics is an empirical, quantitative discipline that is ill-suited to 
address certain subjective or qualitative topics. The 'value' of human life is a well-known 
example ... others abound in the environmental/natural resource management field. 
Therefore, to re-cap from Chapter one, the main original contributions of this thesis are, 
first, its evaluation of the practical benefits of price-based environmental regulation 
and, second, its detailed examination of both the technical and the political 
determinants of environmental policy outcome. Its originality thus stems from its 
examination of the practical interaction between normative and positive factors during 
the formulation and implementation of EU environmental policy. 
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4.4 Research Methods 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Having reviewed the overall approach adopted for this study, the following section 
identifies and justifies the methods used to collect and analyse data. The research 
process consisted of five main stages: 
1. An initial pilot study of the UK Packaging Waste Regulations prior to their 
implementation 
2. Reviews of academic and professional document and literature sources 
3. Qualitative interviews and correspondence with businesses affected by the 
Packaging Waste Directive 
4. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of recycling infrastructure in Britain and 
Germany 
5. A quantitative survey of business in Britain and Germany obligated to recover and 
recycle their packaging waste as a result of the Directive 
However, one of the initial objectives in planning the empirical research was the 
selection of suitable case study areas in which to examine the implementation of the 
Directive. Considering the nature of the EU implementation process, the obvious 
choice was to examine the packaging waste policies of two Member States in order to 
compare the effects of different implementation strategies on policy outcome. Britain 
and Germany were selected for three main reasons. First, as two of the largest Member 
States, their policies are likely to have a significant impact on the production and 
management of packaging waste in the EU. This is especially true of Germany, as 
several other Member States have adopted variants of its packaging waste system. 
Second, since Germany's packaging legislation has been operating for significantly 
longer than Britain's (see Chapter five), temporal influences on policy outcome can be 
assessed (London and Llamas, 1994). Finally, the two countries have traditionally 
differed in the way they prioritise and implement environmental policies. Whilst it is 
always dangerous to indulge in cultural stereotyping, German environmental policy 
since the 1970s has largely been organised around Vorsorgeprinzip (the precautionary 
principle), strict legislation, and the promotion of high environmental standards (Zito, 
2000). By contrast, Britain is usually characterised as being a reluctant or a pragmatic 
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participant in environmental policy (Lowe and Ward, 1998a; Zito, 2000), as wishing to 
base initiatives on scientific evidence rather than the precautionary principle, and as 
seeking to achieve cost-effective environmental protection (see Chapter three). The aim 
of selecting Britain and Germany as case studies, therefore, was to examine the extent 
to which these differences have affected the application of price-based regulation. 
4.4.2 Pilot Study 
The pilot research was undertaken as part of a Masters degree at the University of 
Plymouth and consisted of two elements; a case study of a business complying with the 
U K Packaging Regulations and a postal survey of 250 companies within the 
construction industry (Bailey, 1997). This stage of the research served two purposes. 
First, it explored the potential of the Packaging Waste Directive as an avenue for further 
research; second, it assisted in the development and testing of research methods for use 
in later studies. So as to avoid unnecessary duplication, the methods used in the pilot 
study are reviewed as part of the main research sections. 
4.4.3 Documentary Research 
\n addition to the normal review of the academic literature, a range of documentary 
sources were used to develop a general understanding of the research area (Brannick, 
1997). In particular, the aim was to explore the legislative frameworks used to 
implement the Packaging Directive in the Member States. Five main types of 
document were examined: 
1. Existing academic analysis of packaging and recycling systems 
2. Government and other official documents, including legislative instruments, 
parliamentary debates and administrative circulars 
3. Consultants' reports, usually conducted on behalf of the European Commission or 
national governments 
4. Industry and trade organisation documents 
5. Specialist press reports 
The existing literature contains numerous studies examining packaging waste policy 
(for example, Pearce and Turner, 1992; Waite, 1995; Michaelis, 1995; Whiston and 
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Glachant, 1996; Defeuilley and Godard, 1997; Bailey, 1999a; 1999b; 2000). Though 
few have attempted extensive empirical analysis of polluter responses to environmental 
regulation, they nonetheless provided useful perspectives on the process of policy 
implementation. For example, Pearce and Turner (1992) examine the potential of 
packaging taxes as a means of promoting the PPP, Michaelis (1995) and Defeuilley and 
Godard (1997) examine the economic efficiency of selected national packaging 
systems, whilst Whiston and Glachant (1996) and Fenton and Sinclair (1996) discuss 
'voluntary' agreements between industry and government as frameworks for packaging 
stewardship schemes. Therefore, despite their varying methodologies and foci, these 
studies provided invaluable background on the nature of packaging waste management 
systems in the EU. Chapter five, which explores the nature of national packaging 
recycling systems within Europe, discusses these works in greater detail. 
Government legislation and parliamentary debates at both EU and national level were 
also extensively reviewed in the early stages of the study (for example, Hansard, 1997; 
OJEC, 1993; Debates of the European Parliament, 1994). Legislative analysis 
encompassing both governmental levels is an essential pre-requisite of any research 
examining EU environmental policy because the Commission uses directives as its 
main legislative catalyst. As Chapter three highlighted, directives are only binding in 
terms of the obligation to act and the standards to be achieved (Lister, 1996). This 
means that the methods used by national authorities to achieve EU standards can vary 
considerably (Lowe and Ward, 1998a; Bailey, 1999a) and that detailed examination of 
EU and Member-State legislation is an essential part of understanding the 
implementation process. The legislation examined is shown in Table 4.1. 
The British government also produced numerous consultation papers concerning the 
UK Packaging Regulations (DoE, 1996b; Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions (DETR), 1998a; 1999a; 1999b). These again provided important detail 
on the methods used to implement the Directive in Britain. Corresponding information 
for Germany and other EU Member States was largely provided by specialist reporting 
agencies (Hagengut, 1997; Perchards, 1998) and through contacts with the U K 
Environment Agency, the German packaging organisation, Duales System Deutschland 
(DSD) and the Arbeitsgruppe Umweltstatistik (ARGUS) at the Technical University of 
Berlin. 
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Table 4.1 EU Packaging Legislation reviewed for the Research 
Jurisdiction Legislation 
EU The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (94/62/EC) (OJEC No 
L365, 31.12.94). 
United Kingdom The Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 
1997 (DoE, 1997) 
The Producer Responsibility (Essential Requirements) Regulations 1998 
(DETR, 1998b) 
The Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1999 (DETR, 1999c) 
Gemiany Verordnung iiber die Vermeidung von Verpackungsabfalien (Ordinance 
on the Avoidance of Packaging Waste) (Verpackungsverordnung -
Packaging Ordinance), 12 June 1991 
Verordnung iiber die Vermeidung und Verwertung von 
Verpackungsabf alien (Ordinance on the Avoidance and Utilisation of 
Packaging Waste) (BGBl. I 1998 S. 1998) 
Though official documents are the starting point of most policy analyses, it was 
important to canvass the views of all parties affected by the Directive, including those 
who opposed the policy. As official documents stressed the active role taken by 
industry during the formulation and implementation of the British and German 
legislation (DoE, 1996b; DETR, 1998b), several industry groups were asked to supply 
copies of their responses to government consultations. In order to obtain a 
representative cross-section of opinions, organisations from each sector of the U K 
packaging chain were contacted, including industry and materials organisations, 
compliance schemes and reprocessing companies (see Chapter five)'. Further details 
on industry's view of the Directive were gathered from specialist environmental and 
industry press service reports, such as Environmental Data Services (ENDS), Materials 
Recycling Week (MRW), Raymond Communications and Packaging News. Kiecolt and 
Nathan (1985), in particular, stress the value of secondary material as a cost-effective 
For opinions concerning legislation in EU states other than the UK, the European Organisation for 
Packaging and the Environment (EUROPEN), the Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment 
(INCPEN), the Duales System Deutschland (DSD), the Arbeitsgruppe Umweltstatistik (ARGUS) and 
Perchards were contacted. 
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and authoritative source of background material. However, they also urge caution in 
the interpretation of secondary data, as the apparent authority of published work can 
make it difficult to distinguish errors and value statements from 'reliable' facts. This 
point was particularly relevant to this research, as many documents were provided by 
businesses with a vested interest in influencing the debate on the Packaging Directive. 
Nonetheless, their use within this study enabled a number of major themes to be quickly 
and comprehensively reviewed. 
4.4.4 Preliminary Qualitative Research 
As the original pilot study was conducted prior to the implementation of the U K 
Packaging Regulations in 1997, it focused principally on how affected companies 
believed they would be affected by the legislation prior to its format being officially 
finalised. The subsequent document search revealed that the mechanisms used to 
implement the Directive in Britain had altered radically between the initial and main 
studies .^ Further exploratory data collection was therefore necessary to understand how 
these changes might influence business responses to packaging legislation. Whilst 
information on the main changes had been provided by documentary data (such as 
Perchards, 1998), a selection of businesses was contacted in order to discuss the 
mechanics of the UK Regulations. The main task in relation to the German legislation 
was to identify the nature of the amendments introduced since the 1991 Packaging 
Ordinance (see Chapter five). This was achieved through contacts with a variety of 
specialist organisations, including DSD, ARGUS, ENDS and Perchards .^ However, 
language difficulties prevented extensive contact with organisations that did not provide 
information in English. 
hi total, 25 UK businesses were asked to provide details of their methods for complying 
with, and their opinions on, Britain's Packaging Regulations (see Appendix 1 for 
contact letter). UK Respondents were selected at random from an Environment Agency 
database of companies obligated under the Regulations (see Ackroyd and Hughes, 
^ For example, the introduction of the Packaging Waste Recovery Note (PRN) system (see Chapter five), 
the main mechanism for proving compliance with the Directive's recovery and recycling targets, was not 
discussed in detail in the original consultation documents in 1996 (DoE, 1996b). 
^ Contacts were through the DSD email information line and its web-site www.gruener-punkt.de.htm. 
ARGUS is currently conducting a major review of packaging waste management systems in the E U on 
behalf of the European Commission. 
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1992; Maisel and Persell, 1996 for discussions of sampling techniques). Of these, 16 
either provided standard corporate literature, responded directly to the questions raised, 
or made contact by telephone. Because v^ r^itten responses were requested, these calls 
were unexpected and could not be tape-recorded. Interview notes were therefore 
transcribed irrunediately following the telephone conversations. Whilst standard 
questions were used in the original letter, the responses in both letter and interview 
form were generally of an unstructured nature. This was not a significant problem, 
however, as this stage of research was primarily aimed at gaining exploratory 
information rather than a standardised dataset. 
Though the qualitative interviews aided the generation of research questions and 
hypotheses, it is recognised that this research technique is susceptible to respondent 
bias. Robson (1993) and Judd et al. (1991) observe that respondents with strong 
opinions on a particular subject - particularly negative ones - are more likely to respond 
to surveys than those who are generally content or indifferent. However, because the 
intention was always to test the preliminary findings on a larger and more representative 
sample (Morris, 1993), the basic objective of this research stage was adequately 
achieved. 
4.4.5 The Development of Recycling Infrastructure in Britain and Germany 
The review of documentary sources and academic literature revealed, amongst other 
things, that packaging waste management systems should possess several key attributes 
in order to achieve their policy aims effectively. These include the establishment of 
balanced reprocessing and waste collection infrastructure, the participation of industry 
and public actors, the development of an effective financing mechanism, and the co-
ordination of each key sector of the recycling industry (Brisson, 1993; Michaelis, 1995; 
Waite, 1995; Hansard, 1997; Turner et al., 1998). As part of the assessment, therefore, 
it was necessary to examine how each of these functions was being managed in Britain 
and Germany. In Germany, this could largely be achieved through secondary sources 
and contacts with recycling organisations. In the UK, it was considered necessary to 
supplement secondary information with a postal survey of recycling (reprocessing) 
companies. 
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The sampling frame for this survey was a database of business registered with the 
Environment Agency as accredited reprocessors of packaging waste'*. It was decided 
that a census survey would be the most effective approach as the database contained 
only 133 independent businesses. Notwithstanding the unlikely event of a 100% 
response, it was adjudged that sampling from within this frame would produce 
inadequate data. The technique of contacting all members of a particular population 
with the expectation of only receiving a sample of replies is generally termed an 
incomplete census (Jancowicz, 1991; Moser and Kalton, 1971: 54). All businesses on 
the register were contacted by letter. This stated the aims of the research, provided 
assurances of confidentiality, and asked respondents' opinions on key aspects of the U K 
Regulations (Appendix 2). If no reply was received within three weeks, the company 
was contacted again. However, because few replies were received in response to the 
follow-up letter, no further contacts were attempted. 
The survey combined a mixture of quantitative and qualitative questions. The 
quantitative questions attempted to measure the performance of each reprocessing 
sector against the capacity requirements needed to comply with the EU Packaging 
Directive, whilst the qualitative questions sought to establish attitudes towards the 
financing and policing mechanisms introduced by the government. Because the 
response rate was lower than hoped (36.1%), both quantitative and qualitative data 
could be examined manually rather than using specialist software. Responses to 
qualitative questions were graded into positive, neutral or negative comments on 
particular questions. They were also divided according to each reprocessing sector 
affected by the Packaging Regulations (paper, plastics, glass, steel, aluminium and 
wood) (DoE, 1997), the aim here being to assess differences of opinion within and 
between individual materials sectors. However, the size of the data set meant that it 
was not possible to use statistical analysis techniques. Shortly after this survey, the 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) undertook a 
similar review, which included data from all accredited reprocessors (DETR, 1999a). 
Whilst this obviated the need for the quantitative data yielded by the survey, the 
information available for analysis was significantly improved. 
Used with permission and acknowledgements. 
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4.4.6 Survey of Firms affected by Packaging Legislation in Britain and Germany 
The main empirical component of the study was the survey of businesses affected by 
packaging legislation in the UK and Germany (the Packaging Producer Survey). Its 
overall aims were; first, to identify the waste management techniques used by 
packaging producers in the two countries in response to their respective legislation and, 
second, to assess the extent to which price-based environmental regulation had 
influenced their actions. The postal survey technique was chosen because it provided 
more extensive coverage of business responses than could be achieved using personal 
or telephone interviews (see Table 4.2 for a review of the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research methods) .^ At the time the survey 
was conducted, nearly 4,000 U K business were obligated by the U K Regulations 
(DETR, 1998b) - this figure is set to rise to approximately 11,000 in the year 2000 
(DETR, 1999d) - whilst over 17,000 German companies have some form of recycling 
responsibilities as a result of the Ordinance (DSD, 1998). While interviews may have 
revealed more in-depth information about the compliance methods used by a small 
selection of companies, these results would have been difficult to generalise reliably. 
Therefore, despite the shortcomings of postal surveys (lack of detailed information, 
difficulties in gaining respondent validation, and the potential for misinterpretation) 
(Moser and Kalton, 1971; Czaja and Blair, 1996), quantitative analysis was considered 
the most appropriate method for achieving the study's main aims. 
Undoubtedly the biggest drawback of self-administered postal survey, however, is the 
fact that the technique is typified by low response rates. Morris (1993) claims that a 
15% response rate is quite common. However, response rates can be substantially 
improved through careful research and questionnaire design; furthermore, many 
problems had already been identified and rectified during the pilot study. Moser and 
Kalton (1971) and Czaja and Blair (1996) highlight a number of research design factors 
which need to be considered in any postal questionnaire; sampling technique, 
questionnaire design, piloting and refining the survey, survey administration, and data 
analysis. The remainder of the section details the methods used in each stage of the 
survey. 
^ For an extensive review of interviews and questionnaires in social research, see Judd et al. (1991) and 
Sarantakos (1993). 
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Table 4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Social Research 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Advantages Economical collection of large Facilitates understanding of how and 
amounts of data why 
Clear theoretical focus for the Enables researcher to be alive to 
research from the outset changes which occur during the 
Greater opportunity for researcher to research process 
retain control of research process Good at understanding social 
Easily comparable data processes 
Disadvantages Inflexible - direction often cannot Data collection can be time 
be changed once data collection has consuming 
started Data analysis is difficult 
Weak at understanding social Researcher has to live with 
processes uncertainty that clear patterns may 
Often does not discover the not emerge 
meanings people attach to social Generally perceived as less credible 
phenomena by 'non-researchers' 
Source: adapted from Saunders et al. (1997: 74) 
Sampling 
The first task in the survey process was to obtain databases of businesses affected by 
national packaging legislation in each country. Whilst this was quite straightforward 
for Britain, in that the Environment Agency maintains a public register of obligated 
companies, no corresponding database exists for Germany in the public domain. 
Although numerous organisations were contacted, including the German Environment 
Ministry^, the Umweltbundesamt (German Environment Agency), the DSD and the 
Gesellschaft fUr Verpackungsmarktforschung (GVM - German organisation for 
packaging market research), it was ultimately necessary to resort to a commercially-
produced directory of German companies. The difficulty with this was that the 
classifications used in the directory (for example, electrical goods, food products) did 
not match those employed by the Packaging Ordinance (see Chapter five). 
^ Bundesministerium fiir Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU). 
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In order to produce a German sampling frame that was representative of businesses 
affected by the Ordinance and which could be compared with the U K dataset, two 
selection criteria were used. First, the main industry sectors targeted by the Ordinance -
manufacturers, distributors and retailers - were included (see Chapter five, also 
Hagengut, 1997; Perchards, 1998). Second, companies were selected on the basis of 
company turnover. The reason for this was that, at the time, the U K Regulations 
exempted businesses with a turnover of less than £5 million or handling less than 50 
tonnes of packaging a year from direct recycling responsibilities. Although the German 
Ordinance contains no equivalent provision, comparing companies of significantly 
different size and functional characteristics would clearly have prejudiced the analysis. 
Therefore, all German businesses with an annual turnover of less than £5 million were 
excluded. As neither data set contained information on packaging consumption, this 
factor was ignored. Using this method, a database of over 4,500 companies was 
created. The exclusion of smaller businesses and, inevitably, the limitations of the 
electronic directory explain the discrepancy between this and the total number of 
companies obligated by the Packaging Ordinance. Although this strategy was not ideal, 
the sample derived was sufficiently large that the chances of bias were minimised as 
much as possible (Maisel and Persell, 1996). 
The next stage was to draw a sample of 900 companies from each frame, based on the 
guideline that statistical analyses usually need 600 or more respondents to be reliably 
generalisable (Babbie, 1989). In both cases, the sample was drawn using random 
numbers generated on Excel spreadsheets. However, the German sample was also 
stratified according to the representation of each activity sector in the original business 
directory. The technique of stratified sampling is commonly used within social 
research to ensure that the respondent group accurately reflects the composition of the 
overall population set (Oppenheim, 1992; de Vaus, 1996). This was important in this 
case because of the difficulties in obtaining a wholly reliable database of German 
companies. The fear was that, despite extensive analysis of the 1991 and 1998 
Ordinances, the sample would be dominated by a sector whose involvement in 
recycling was minimal. The best way to minimise this risk, therefore, was to stratify 
the sample. However, this technique was not ideal as the U K database contained no 
details of company characteristics and, therefore, similar stratification could not be 
repeated. Against this, it was known that, notwithstanding a few inaccuracies, the 
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Environment Agency register was representative of the desired population set. 
However, it was not possible to say with absolute conviction that the two final samples 
were entirely equivalent, though strenuous efforts were made to remove significant 
differences. The implications of these problems are assessed further in the first results 
chapter (see Chapter six). 
Questionnaire Design 
DeVellis (1991) identifies two critical stages in questionnaire design, the 
operationalisation of research aims into specific themes using general theory and 
specific context as guides to question content and order, and the generation of a pool of 
questions to transform themes into measurable variables. The difficulty highlighted in 
Chapters two and three, however, is the operationalisation of such concepts as 
sustainable development and EU environmental principles into readily measurable 
variables (Redclift, 1987; Lister, 1996). The translation of general themes into specific 
contexts is a constant problem for environmental policy studies and one usually only 
overcome by focusing on limited aspects of the wider concepts (Trudgill and Richards, 
1997). Pearce and Turner (1992), for example, use waste minimisation as a single 
assessment criterion, and Brisson (1993) focuses almost exclusively on the economic 
efficiency of waste management systems. However, because the main method of 
measuring the success of environmental policies, compliance with legislative standards, 
has severe limitations, this study sought to explore evaluation methods that took 
account of implementation methodology and a broader range of environmental 
performance criteria. It was therefore decided to base the study's empirical evaluation 
primarily around the Waste Management Hierarchy (WMH). The hierarchy has been 
used by numerous waste management studies (for example, AUaway, 1992; Levenson, 
1993; Fenton and Hanley, 1995; Read et al., 1998). In simple terms, h ranks methods 
of waste management according to their environmental impact (Wilson, 1996; DETR, 
1999b) (see Figure 4.1). At the top of the hierarchy as the least environmentally 
deleterious option is source reduction; this is followed in turn by re-use, recycling, 
incineration with energy recovery and, finally, landfill disposal. The waste hierarchy 
was particularly appropriate for this study as it encapsulates both the legislative 
standards adopted in the Directive (recycling and incineration) and its general 'essential 
objectives' (the promotion of waste prevention and re-use) (see Chapter five). 
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Furthermore, the WMH has been used as a general framework for EU waste policy 
since the Second Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in 1977 (Read et al., 1998). 
Figure 4.1 The Waste Management Hierarchy 
Adapted from: Wilson (1996: 386) 
Strict interpretations of the waste hierarchy are not universally accepted, however. 
Collins (1996), for example, notes that the environmental rationale for paper recycling 
is particularly suspect compared with that for incineration. Similarly, Barrett and 
Lawlor (1997) argue that the hierarchy is spatially insensitive, in that the impact of 
recycling in rural areas (where longer journeys to recycling centres are required) is 
greater than that of landfill. Finally, within the specific context of the Packaging 
Directive, Golub (1996) notes that the WMH was not officially adopted in the 
legislation, though most elements were included in its objectives. Consequently the 
hierarchy should be seen as a qualitative guide to the environmental desirability of 
waste management options rather than as a prescriptive order of merit. 
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In addition to employing the WMH as a framework for evaluating business reactions to 
the Directive, the financial impact of price-based regulation on respondent businesses 
was explored in the questionnaire. The full list of themes explored was therefore the 
following: 
• Business compliance with the Directive's legal standards and 'essential objectives' 
between 1997 and 2001 
• The operational and financial impact of national legislation on affected companies 
• Corporate opinions on the format and efficacy of packaging legislation, including 
the effectiveness of price-based regulation and alternative policy instruments. 
Besides the main research themes, respondents were also asked to provide basic 
company-profile data, including turnover, employees, sector of the packaging chain and 
main business activity. These measures enabled the influence of business profile on 
other indicators and the comparability of the samples to be monitored. Alderman and 
Fischer (1992) and Labatt (1997a) both favour the use of employment figures as a 
measure of company size but because the British and German legislation differentiate 
businesses primarily on the basis of activity sector (and, in Britain, financial turnover), 
financial measures of corporate activity were also included. Copies of the final 
questionnaires are provided in Appendices 3 a and 3b. 
The second stage of questionnaire design is the generation of questions to transform 
research themes into measurable variables (DeVellis, 1991). The first decision was the 
depth of information required from respondents and, therefore, the balance between 
open and closed questions. Most methodological guides suggest that open questions 
are time-consuming and difficult to interpret in large-scale surveys (Gill and Johnson, 
1991; de Vaus, 1996)^ , a problem that was compounded in this research by the need to 
translate any non-numerical answers provided by German respondents. Categorising 
and comparing responses to open questions can also be problematic and subjective. 
Therefore, in order to maintain generalisable, comparable and accessible data, most 
questions were closed and pre-coded even though this meant some issues could only be 
Though several well-recognised software packages exist for qualitative data analysis, for example, 
NUDIST (Non-numerical Unsttuctured Data Indexing Sorting and Theorising). 
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explored relatively superficially. In terms of question content, Converse and Presser 
(1986) stress the need for simplicity, intelligibility and clarity. Though this appears an 
obvious statement - notwithstanding the fact that most questions were re-phrased 
several times in order to improve their clarity and focus - this study generally targeted 
managers with detailed knowledge of packaging legislation and how it related to their 
companies. The survey was therefore able to raise more complex issues than is usually 
feasible during postal surveys. 
The next issue in questionnaire design is that of measurement. Dillman (1978) 
identifies four distinct types of measurable data, attitudes, beliefs, behaviour and 
attributes. A mixture of nominal and interval measurements was used to quantify two 
of the questionnaire's themes, measures of legal compliance and actions to promote the 
WMH. Nominal measures were used to ascertain whether businesses were, for 
example, engaged in particular waste management activities, and interval data to 
quantify the extent of their involvement. Examples of the measurement types used are 
shown in Figure 4.2. However, though the collection of interval data provides readily 
measurable and comparable data, two difficulties must also be recognised. First, many 
companies are reluctant to provide commercially sensitive information about their 
businesses; second, data may not be measured by the organisation in the format 
requested (Labatt, 1997a). Either eventuality may discourage businesses from replying 
to the questionnaire. It is therefore often preferable to request sensitive information in 
ordinal format in order to provide an additional element of respondent confidentiality 
(Robson, 1993). This tactic was used, for example, in relation to the turnover and 
number of people employed by respondent companies. 
Although the study deliberately did not engage in detailed qualitative research, it was 
felt that business' attitudes towards the policies used to implement the Packaging 
Directive should nonetheless be canvassed. In order to achieve this, two series of 
proposition sets were used to explore (i) whether businesses felt national policies were 
promoting greater environmental stewardship (Section C of the questionnaire), and (ii) 
their opinions on the general policy format (Section D). 
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Figure 4.2 Nominal and Interval Data Measurements used in Producer Survey 
Example 1: Nominal Data 
A l Is your company aware of the Producer Responsibihty Packaging 1. Yes 2. No 
Waste Regulations? IF NO, ANSWER SECTION E ONLVa | | | 
Example 2: Interval Data 
B1 Approximately what percentage (by weight) of packaging was reused in 1997? 
B2 Approximately what percentage (by weight) will be reused by the year 2001 ?'' 
Notes 
a Similar instructions and prompts were used throughout the questionnaire to guide respondents, a 
technique recommended by Moser and Kalton (1971) and Robson (1993). 
b Example 2 demonstrates the importance of defining the required information specifically and 
carefully to minimise respondent confusion (Robson, 1993). 
The sets were measured using Likert attitudinal scales (see DeVellis, 1991 and 
Oppenheim, 1992 for detailed discussions of Likert scales), a technique widely used in 
social and geographical research. Their first strength is that they produce ordinal data 
on beliefs and attitudes that can be analysed statistically. In addition, they are familiar 
to many respondent groups because of their extensive use in market research surveys. 
However, Likert scales also have several limitations. First, they provide superficial 
information compared to in-depth interviews (see Gibbs et al., 1998 as an example of 
interviews in environmental policy analysis). Moreover, it is often difficult to compare 
attitudinal data produced by studies where different scaling systems are used (de Vaus, 
1996). Standardised five-point Likert scales were used for all the attitude measures 
employed in the survey (see Figure 4.3 for examples). Social research texts usually 
recommend that between five- and seven-point Likert scales are used to provide 
sufficient sensitivity without confusing respondents or creating spurious levels of detail 
(DeVellis, 1991; Sarantakos, 1993). 
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Figure 4.3 Liliert Scale Questions used in the Producer Survey 
Specific Company Actions +2 +1 
strongly agree 
agree 
0 -1 
neither disagree 
-2 
strongly 
disagree 
The company will only be able to comply 
with the minimum standards set by 
the Regulations 
Company Attitudes +2 +1 
strongly agree 
agree 
0 -1 -2 
neither disagree strongly 
disagree 
The Packaging Regulations will achieve 
a cost-effective solution to Britain's 
packaging waste problems 
Piloting and Refining the Questionnaire 
A series of piloting stages were undertaken before the survey was administered, though 
the Masters research had already established that the proposed questionnaire layout 
generally worked well with corporate respondents. First, the questionnaire was 
reviewed by peers and supervisors at the University. Second, it was sent to two 
external academics working in similar research fields. Finally, questionnaires were sent 
to 20 businesses in each country. Each questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter 
explaining the research and a feedback form using a framework of key points suggested 
by Saunders et al. (1997) (see Appendix 4). The most frequent problems were 
questionnaire length - the original was five A4 sides - and ambiguous questions. 
Though the majority of responses were generally favourable, two U K businesses 
criticised certain aspects of the questionnaire. It was therefore decided to re-submit the 
revised questionnaire to 20 further companies to ensure all questions were relevant and 
clear. The piloting process also enabled tentative response rates for the survey to be 
estimated (Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.3 Predicted and Actual Response Rates from Producer Survey 
Pilot Study Main Survey 
Posted Predicted Response Rate Actual Response Rate 
% response Returned % Returned 
UK 70.4 900 360 40.0 469 52.1 
Germany n/a 900 225 25.0 309 34.3 
TOTAL 70.4 1800 585 32.5 778 43.2 
Administering the Survey 
The first issue to consider in conducting the survey was its timing. Previous experience 
suggested that the latter part of the year should be avoided because many companies 
would be too busy to complete unsolicited questionnaires (see also Jancowicz, 1991). It 
was therefore decided to administer the survey between January and March, as this is 
generally the quietest time of the year for manufacturing and retail companies. The 
second issue was to ensure the questionnaire was received by the most appropriate 
member of staff in respondent companies. Labatt (1997a) suggests that telephoning 
businesses to obtain contact names can significantly boost response rates. However, the 
size of the sample and language difficulties made this exercise unfeasible. 
Furthermore, neither the Environment Agency database nor the original German 
business directory contained reliable contact information. 
Instead, a European business directory was used to obtain names for the German 
respondent group, though this was not particularly successful as less than 250 of the 
900 businesses were listed on this particular register. Also, this approach may be 
counter-productive if the directory is out of date, as questionnaires sent to ex-employees 
are more likely to be ignored. It was therefore decided not to repeat the process for the 
U K but, instead, to address the letter to 'The Managing Director' in the anticipation that 
it would be forwarded to the appropriate member of staff Whilst this was a calculated 
risk, the final response rate appears to have vindicated the tactic. 
105 
All questionnaires were allocated a unique and confidential identification code before 
being posted. This enabled questionnaires to be monitored as they were returned whilst 
maintaining respondent anonymity outside the research (Oppenheim, 1992). Each 
questionnaire was accompanied by a cover letter (Appendices 5a and 5b), explaining 
the aims of the research, its contribution to understanding packaging policy, and 
guaranteeing respondent anonymity, confidentiality and protection from harm. Whilst 
the letter did not promise individual feedback, it indicated that the results may be 
published by the Institute of Wastes Management (IWM) (Bailey, 1999c). Pre-paid 
reply or International Business Reply Service envelopes were included with each 
questionnaire pack. 
As replies were received, they were recorded against the database of questionnaire 
codes. Al l businesses not replying within three weeks were sent reminder letters 
(Appendices 6a and 6b) with further copies of the questionnaire and reply envelopes. 
Some researchers recommend that up to three reminder stages should be attempted; the 
first a letter, the second enclosing a copy of the questionnaire and the third containing 
an abbreviated form of the questionnaire (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1991; Robson, 
1993). However, the pilot study employed two reminder stages - a letter and a duplicate 
questionnaire. It was found that few businesses responded to the first reminder but that 
the second was more successful. This was probably because the original questionnaire 
had been discarded even if respondents did wish to reply. Because of this and resource 
constraints, only one follow-up stage was attempted. Although further reminders may 
have increased the number of responses slightly, the final rates achieved, 43.2% overall 
(52.1% for the UK, 34.3% for Germany), are generally above those expected from this 
data collection technique. 
Data Analysis 
A number of research texts discuss the subject of questionnaire coding (see Moser and 
Kalton, 1971; Czaja and Blair, 1996 and Parfitt, 1997). hi accordance with the 
technique recommended by de Vaus (1996) for streamlining closed-question surveys, 
all questions were pre-coded before the questionnaires were sent out. The main 
preliminary tasks were therefore to check the accuracy of data punching and to ensure 
that only relevant businesses were included in the data analysis (Parfitt, 1997). Two 
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filter questions were used to identify companies for whom the research did not apply 
(see Table 4.4). This analysis also enabled the accuracy of the sampling frames to be 
assessed; further details of this analysis are provided in Chapter six. Completed 
questionnaires were input onto SPSS data sheets for analysis of business characteristics 
within each country and comparison of the two respondent groups. The purpose of the 
data analysis was then to determine, first, the waste management actions employed by 
respondent businesses, second, the link between actions and environmental taxes and, 
third, the attitudes of businesses in the two countries towards packaging waste 
legislation. 
Table 4.4 Responses to Filter Questions 
Number of 
respondents 
% of companies aware of 
national packaging legislation 
% of companies with legal 
responsibility under national 
packaging legislation 
UK 469 98.7 95.9 
Germany 309 93.2 76.4 
Total 778 96.5 88.2 
A standardised sequence of statistical procedures was used to examine the data. 
Frequency and descriptive statistics were produced for each variable, along with 
histograms for all ordinal and interval measures. The aim of this was to assess the 
distribution of the data and the applicability of parametric tests (Clegg, 1990). This 
revealed that very few ordinal or interval measures were normally distributed. The next 
stage was to assess the impact of company characteristics on the data, using Chi-Square 
ij^) for nominal data and Kruskal-Wallis one-way Anova for ordinal and interval data 
(Ebdon, 1985). 
Following this, the variance of each attitude indicator from point zero (neutral attitudes) 
was tested using one-sample t-tests. Although the one sample t-test could be used for 
this purpose because it is reasonably robust to non-normal distribution, the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used to compare the two samples (Shaw and 
Wheeler, 1994). Similarly, Spearman's rank was used to measure correlation between 
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ordinal and interval variables. A range of multi-variate techniques, including multiple 
regression and factor analysis, were also used, though these revealed little by the way of 
significant causal relationships. Further details of this analysis are given in the study's 
results in Chapter six. 
Figure 4.4 Classifications of Corporate Environmental Response 
Corporate Social Responsibility Innovation 
Proactive 
Active waste reduction 
k Leaders 
Accommodating i Intermediates 
Reactive Laggards 
No waste management beyond landfdling 
Score Classification Description of business behaviour 
0 Reactive Innovation laggards - firms making no effort to reduce waste 
through product or packaging modifications 
1-7 Accommodating Innovation intermediates - firms that have shifted from a 
reactive to a receptive attitude; some packaging reduction 
initiatives 
8-15 Proactive Innovation leaders - companies looking beyond the 
traditional boundaries to find solutions to packaging issues; 
firms are highly active in modifying packaging 
Adapted from: Labatt (1997a: 73,80) 
Labatt's studies (1991; 1997a) of corporate waste management in Canada used similar 
variables as those employed in this research to construct a series of corporate waste 
minimisation indices. Labatt (1997a) identified three levels of waste management. 
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reduction, re-use and recycling, then scored business environmental responses 
according to which initiatives had been adopted for their top five products (one point 
per product per initiative with a maximum score of 15 for each business). She then 
used the index to classify companies as either environmentally reactive, 
accommodating or proactive, based on the strength of their corporate social 
responsibility and innovation in response to environmental pressures (see Figure 4.4). 
Other authors have attempted to categorise corporate environmental response along 
similar continua^. Whilst the majority of these classifications are qualitative in nature, 
the development of aggregate waste management measures is one means by which 
corporate environmental response can be assessed. 
Three similar environmental-response indices were created for this research: 
a) The Waste Management Hierarchy Actions Index (WMHA) 
For each waste management action undertaken by respondent companies (the collection 
of packaging waste at company sites or from customers, the reduction, re-use and 
purchase of recycled packaging), a score of five points was allocated. A business could 
therefore score a maximum of 25 points. The equation for this index is: 
WMHA Index = Z (Waste Management Hierarchy Actions) x 5 
This index was then refined to take into account the number of packaging materials 
covered by each waste management action (the WMHAj index). By adding a further 
point to the WMHA score for each material, a business reducing consumption of all six 
materials would score five points for the action and six points for the materials 
included. However, the maximum score a business could achieve for the WMHAj 
index was 49 points, as materials collected from customers and own sites were only 
counted once .^ The equation for WMHAj therefore becomes: 
* Bhargava and Welford (1996) classify corporate responses to environmental issues along a continuum 
they term ROAST (Resist, Observe, Accommodate, Seize and pre-empt and Transcend). 
' Maximum score = 5x5 points for waste management actions -n 4 x 6 points = 24 for materials covered. 
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WMHA I Index = 2 (Waste Management Hierarchy Actions) x 5 + 2 (Materials 
included for each waste management action)'". 
b) The Waste Management Hierarchy Targets Index (WMHT) 
The weightings given under WMHA and WMHA j might be considered slightly arbitrary, 
in that all actions and materials are given the same score, regardless of their 
environmental impact. This was partially overcome by constructing a further measure 
based on the waste management targets set. WMHT therefore measures the combined 
targets set for the above actions, based on the equation: 
WMHT Index = X ((collection % + reduction %) + (re-use % 1997 -I- re-use % 
2001) ^  2 + (purchases % 1997 -i- purchases % 2001) - 2)) 
hi this formula, the average re-use and recycled purchases figures for 1997 and 2001 
were used so as to ensure an even representation for each waste management action. 
Consideration was also given to placing weightings that reflected the environmental 
desirability of each waste hierarchy action. However, it was decided that such a scaling 
would be too arbitrary, especially considering the contested nature of the waste 
management hierarchy. 
c) The Cost-burden v. Action Index (CbvA) 
This index was used to measure the correlation between the percentage waste 
management targets set by companies and the costs incurred complying with national 
packaging legislation. However, it was not possible to correlate percentage targets 
against the total costs sustained by companies, as larger companies would obviously 
incur higher overall liabilities because of their greater turnover and use of packaging. A 
more representative measure, therefore, was the proportionate compliance cost burden. 
This was calculated by dividing total costs by either company turnover or number of 
The relative weightings given under the second index (five for a WMH action, one for each material) 
are designed to avoid it being unfairly weighted in favour of businesses which use a wide range of 
packaging materials, whilst still reflecting attempts to include a greater number of packaging materials 
within WMH actions. 
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employees to produce two CbvA indices. Thus, the correlation equation for CbvA 
turnover was formulated as: 
CbvA Index (Reduction) = Reduction % 1997-2001 correlated against (compliance 
costs -i- company turnover (mid-point of category)) 
Though these scales use similar methods as those developed by Labatt (1997a), it must 
be recognised that the weightings, particularly for the WMHAj Index, involve elements 
of subjective judgement (de Vaus, 1996). These indices nonetheless provide 
aggregated measures of business response directly related to the main aims of the 
Directive. Those that involve such weightings, however, should be taken as 
comparative guides to corporate environmental response rather than as authoritative 
hierarchies. These indices were therefore devised as an experimental method for 
assessing business reactions to environmental policies containing multiple objectives. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review the methods used to conduct this 
research. In pursuit of the study's aims, the task was to establish a methodological 
approach that evaluated the implementation of EU environmental policy in the Member 
States and business responses to price-based regulation. Britain and Germany were 
chosen as the focus of study because of their significant influence over the 
implementation of EU policies and their contrasting approaches to environmental 
issues. The overall strategy was based around the notion that the research problem, 
rather than any pre-determined methodological stance, defines the methods employed. 
Whilst secondary data were used to examine the formulation and transposition of EU 
policies, both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed to evaluate their 
implementation. Qualitative techniques, including interviews and documentary 
sources, were used to provide background information, and quantitative methods in the 
form of postal surveys were used to assess business responses to packaging waste 
legislation and price-based regulation. 
I l l 
As with any research, it is recognised that there is no single 'correct' research 
methodology and that alternative techniques could have proven equally valid. As 
Ackroyd and Hughes (1992: 10) argue: 
It is not clear that any one method has any intrinsic or canonical superiority over any other. 
All have their problems and are in the same boat as far as their worth and merits are 
concerned. 
Bulmer (1988) also notes that there is no 'best' method for conducting research within 
organisations, but that successful studies need to work within the resources available 
and further practical and theoretical understanding equally. Jn particular, there is 
considerable scope for the use of qualitative interviews to explore the reasoning behind 
corporate responses to environmental policies. Such information would undoubtedly be 
of value to environmental policy-makers. Therefore, having justified the methods 
employed in this study, the next chapter examines the negotiation and implementation 
of the Packaging Waste Directive. 
112 
Chapter Five 
The Implementation of the Packaging Waste Directive 
5.1 Introduction 
In simple terms, all policy-making processes can be divided into two basic components, 
the determination of desired objectives and the selection of policy instruments to 
achieve these aims (Segerson, 1996). However, as was argued in Chapter three, the 
confederal-intergovernmental structure of the EU makes its chain of policy-making and 
implementation considerably more complex than those of most political groupings 
(Blacksell, 1994; Archer and Butler, 1996). In essence, the process of EU 
environmental policy is comprised of five main stages; the determination of general 
aims and principles, the formulation of strategic Environmental Action Programmes 
(EAPs), the negotiation of specific legislation, their transposition into national law 
(when implemented as directives as opposed to regulations), and policy implementation 
within the Member States (Bailey, 1999a). 
Thus far, the thesis has discussed the first three elements of this process in a relatively 
general manner. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the way in which policy 
formulation, transposition and implementation were managed in the specific case of the 
Packaging Waste Directive. The analysis begins by discussing the negotiation and 
transposition of the Directive, with particular reference to the EU's institutional 
dynamics and the resolution of conflicts between the Union's economic and 
environmental priorities. It then explores the strategies used by two Member States -
Britain and Germany - to implement the Directive and assesses the extent to which their 
Packaging Waste Management Systems (PWMSs) have established environmentally-
and economically-efficient methods of waste management. The chapter concludes by 
evaluating the development of recycling infrastructure and markets in the two 
countries. 
5.2 The Negotiation and Transposition of the Paclcaging Directive 
The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (94/62/EC) was formally agreed by the 
Council of Ministers in December 1994 and establishes, at its most basic level, targets 
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for the recovery and recycUng of packaging waste within the Member States'. By 
2001, each must introduce systems which ensure that 50-65% of the packaging 
produced or imported into its territory is recovered, and that 25-45% is recycled or 
composted (Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC), 1994). Articles 4 
and 5, though abstaining from setting mandatory standards, specify that these systems 
should also promote the reduction and re-use of packaging waste ,^ whilst Article 11 
imposes further limits on the permissible concentrations of heavy metals in packaging. 
In common with most EU environmental legislation, the Packaging Directive contains 
several derogations, some general and others to meet the needs of specific Member 
States (Kramer, 1991). First, any Member State may introduce recovery and recycling 
targets above those contained in the Directive, provided these can be achieved without 
obstructing EU trade or hindering other states' compliance. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, by virtue of their 'large number of small 
islands...rural and mountains areas and ... low level of packaging consumption' (OJEC, 
1994: 14) are only required to recover 25% of their packaging waste by 2001 and may 
delay full compliance until 2005. 
EU directives are so called because they direct Member States to legislate or take other 
effective action. This means they usually specify the standards Member States must 
achieve, not the methods used to reach the end result (Jordan, 1999). However, the 
Packaging Directive provides greater guidance than is customary for EU environmental 
legislation. It states that: 'Acting on the basis of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, 
the Council adopts economic instruments to promote the implementation of the 
objectives set by this Directive' (OJEC, 1994: 16). It also stipulates that all Member-
State laws and implementing systems should observe the EU's environmental 
principles (Article 15) and must not obstruct the effective operation of the Single 
Market (Article 18). Within this framework, however, decisions as to the format and 
integration of economic instruments are left almost entirely to Member-State discretion. 
Therefore, although broad legislative harmonisation was one aim of the Directive, it is 
As noted in Chapter one, the term recovery denotes the collection of packaging waste for the purposes 
of recouping some form of value. Recycling is defined as, 'the reprocessing in a production process of 
the waste materials for the original purpose or other purposes including organic recycling but excluding 
energy recovery,' (OJEC 1994: Article 3, para. 7). 
^ The importance of waste minimisation to EU environmental policy was also established in the 
Commission's 1996 Communication on the Review of the Community Strategy for Waste Management 
(COM 96(399) final) (CEC, 1996d) and the Fifth EAP (Oko-Institut, 1999). 
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clear that equal value was placed on a flexible and locally-responsive implementation 
process. 
The broad range of derogations and special provisions were, in fact, policy 
manifestations of the strong disagreements which occurred during the Directive's 
negotiation (Golub, 1996). These stenMned less from the draft Directive's advocacy of 
economic instruments and more from concerns about its economic impact and the lack 
of scientific basis behind the Commission's targets. The Commission's original 
proposals were resolutely opposed by a coalition of Council members (Britain, Spain, 
Ireland, Greece and Portugal), which objected to the introduction of mandatory 
reduction and re-use targets as well as the draft Direcfive's 'excessively' high recycling 
rates (see Table 5.1). These measures were generally supported by another grouping of 
environmental 'leader' states, headed by Germany (Golub, 1996). Because the 
coalition opposing the Environment Directorate's proposals was sufficiently large to 
prevent the formation of a qualified majority in the Council, many of the contentious 
items were either abandoned or diluted (Table 5.1) (European ParUament, 1994). In his 
analysis of the institutional dynamics of the negotiation process, Golub (1996) argues 
that the eventual format of the Directive demonstrates the power retained by Member 
States over policy formulation and, more specifically, by whichever grouping holds 
sway in the Council. He contends that this democratic power was not absolute, 
however, as the Commission and EP, along with the minority group within the Council, 
exerted sufficient influence that policy commitments were retained which some 
Member States would not voluntarily have countenanced. Although these concessions 
were ultimately necessary to maintain an accord in the EU process, one frustrated 
Parliamentary deputy branded the final Directive a 'mess of ill-assorted, inconsistent 
compromises' (European ParUament, 1994: 12). Nonetheless, a compromise was 
reached which permitted each Member State a degree of implementation flexibility 
within the broad framework of approximated EU standards. 
Following agreement in Council, the next stage was to transpose the Directive into 
national law, a process the Coitmiission has pursued vigorously. In 1998, six Member 
States received 'reasoned opinions' for failing to transpose the Directive fully. The 
Commission's first rebuked Britain for not transposing the Directive's 'Essential 
Requirements' (the general commitments to waste prevention and re-use); in response. 
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Table 5.1 Development of the Packaging Waste Directive at the EU 
Comm 1 Comm 2 EPECl EPl Comm 3 Common 
Position 
EPEC2 EP2 Adopted 
Per capita limits Yes No No No No No No No No 
Minimum use of recycled materials No No Yes Yes No No No No No 
Hierarchy of preferred disposal Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No 
Opt-ups No No Very 
broad 
Limited Limited Very 
limited 
Very 
limited 
Very 
limited 
Very 
limited 
Derogations No No Very 
limited 
Very 
limited 
Very 
limited 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Five year targets 
• total recovery rate 60% No 60% 60% 60% 50-65% 50% 50-65% 50-65% 
• total recycling rate 25-45% 25% 25-45% 25-45% 
• recycling rate per material 40% No 40% 40% 40% 15% 25% 15% 15% 
Ten year targets 
• total recovery rate 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% No No No No 
• recycling rate per material 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% No No No No 
• maximum landfill & incineration 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% No No No No 
• heavy metals ban No No Yes No No No No No No 
Notes: Comm 1 = Environment Directorate's pre-draft objectives 
Comm 2 = Commission draft directive (12.10.92) 
EPECl = First report by the Environmental Committee of the European Parliament (8.6.93) 
EPl = First reading by the European Parliament (23.6.93) 
Comm 3 = Revised Commission proposal (9.9.93) 
EPEC2 = Second report by the Environment Committee of the European Parliament (7.4.94) 
EP2 = Second reading by the European Parliament (4.5.94) Source: Golub (1996: 323) 
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the British government introduced its own Packaging (Essential Requirements) 
Regulations (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 
1998b). Belgium, Ireland and Portugal received reasoned opinions for similar 
transgressions (ENDS, 1997a), whilst Luxembourg and Greece were admonished for 
failing to adopt legislation by the required deadline (VALPAK, 1998: 12; Commission 
of the European Communities (CEC), 1998b). The Commission was equally intolerant 
of non-agreed exclusions from the Directive. Here, Britain and Finland were cited over 
their failure to transpose the Directive in Northern Ireland and Aaland respectively 
(CEC, 1998c; ENDS, 1997a). Whilst both regions have special status under the EU 
treaties (the reasons cited for the delays), Britain subsequently introduced legislation 
for Northern Ireland, though an application has been made to the ECJ to begin non-
compliance proceedings against Finland (ENDS, 1997a). 
There are two more fundamental cases outstanding at the time of writing. These 
concern the Commission's renewed attempts to overturn, first, a ban by Denmark on 
non-refiUable beverage containers and, second, Germany's re-fill quotas (reviewed in 
Section 5.3.2). Aside from these cases, incomplete transposition of the Directive has 
generally been limited to those Member States that have experienced problems gaining 
domestic agreements on the design of implementing mechanisms and the 
apportionment of legal responsibilities. In the case of Luxembourg and Ireland, this 
has been further complicated by the fact both countries export most of their recyclable 
waste and, thus, need to develop secondary reprocessing agreements. Aside from the 
German and Danish cases, which raise fundamental issues about the relative priorities 
of environmental protection and EU free trade policies, this vigorous round of 
proceedings demonstrates the Commission's determination to ensure that national 
measures conform to the Directive's specified parameters. 
5.3 National Packaging Waste Management Systems 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Although each Member State has developed its own distinct method for implementing 
the Directive, essentially four basic models of compliance exist; (i) the UK's Producer 
Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997 (the Regulations), (ii) 
Germany's Verpackungsverodnung (the Packaging Ordinance), (iii) the voluntary 
agreements established under the Dutch Packaging Covenant, and (iv) the Danish 
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system of integrated waste management. For reasons explained in Chapter four, the 
study concentrates on the British and German models and only considers other national 
systems where they are directly relevant to the study's main themes. A summary of 
national measures is provided in Table 5.2, but for a fuller account see Hagengut (1997) 
and Perchards (1998). 
A variety of primary and data sources were used to analyse the German and British 
PWMSs. Secondary data consisted mainly of parliamentary debates, government 
consultations, submissions from industry to government reviews, consultants' reports 
and specialist media articles, whilst primary data were derived from interviews with 
representatives of the packaging industry and the survey of UK accredited reprocessors. 
The section begins by outlining the structure of the British and German PWMSs, then 
investigates the use of market-based and 'command-and-control' policies by national 
policy-makers. Finally, the performance of the two PWMSs are assessed in terms of 
the reprocessing rates and infrastructure development achieved in each country. 
5.3.2 The German Model 
The German Packaging Ordinance holds a fundamental place in the evolution of 
European packaging legislation, not least because Germany's domestic policies 
generated the push-pull dynamic which culminated in the creation of the Packaging 
Directive (London and Llamas, 1994). The 1991 Ordinance, described by Waite (1995: 
137) as: 'the most prescriptive and demanding piece of environmental legislation 
passed by any European government with regard to packaging waste,' had serious 
implications for EU free trade because it introduced stringent packaging laws at a time 
when there was little EU legislation directly related to packaging waste. The 
Conmiission was therefore compelled either to challenge the Ordinance's legitimacy -
though France, amongst others, was following the German lead (von Wilmowsky, 
1993) - or to introduce harmonising European legislation. Considering the scale of 
Europe's waste management problem, its prominence in the EAPs, and the potential 
threat to free trade in the Single Market, several influential states saw EU legislation as 
the more progressive option. 
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Table 5.2 National Measures to Implement the Packaging Waste Directive 
Member State 2001 target (% of packaging weight) 
Reduction Recycling Recovery 
Packaging Re-use 
Provisions 
Packaging Refill 
Quotas 
Tax on single 
trip containers 
Inndfilltax Producer 
Responsibility 
Austria 10-70 a 80 Some Yes No n/a Yes 
Belgium 50 80 Yes Yes Some n/a Yes 
Denmark 25-45 50-65 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finland 6 42 61 Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
France 25-45 50-65 No No No Yes Yes 
Germany 45 65 Yes Yes Yes n/a Yes 
Greece ? 30 No No No n/a 
Ireland 25 33 Some No No Yes Yes 
Italy 25-45 50-65 No No No Yes Yes 
Luxembourg 45 55 Yes Yes Yes n/a Yes 
Netherlands 10 45 b 65 Yes Yes No Proposed ban Yes 
for packaging 
Portugal ? 25 Yes Yes No n/a Yes 
Spain 10 25-45 45-65 Some No Some n/a Yes 
Sweden 30-90 a 70 Some No Repealed 1993 n/a Yes 
UK 16c 52 Very limited No Yes Yes 
a Separate targets set for each packaging material covered by national legislation 
b The second Dutch Packaging Covenant set an overall recycling target of 65% for 2001. This is a voluntary agreement, however, not part of binding legislation 
c The UK recycling target is a minimum rate for each material covered by the Producer Responsibility Regulations. Adapted from: Perchards (1998) 
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In addition to establishing ambitious recycling targets (Table 5.2), the Ordinance makes 
manufacturers and distributors responsible for the recovery and recycling of their 
packaging waste outside the public waste disposal system. In order to achieve this, the 
Ordinance stipulates that distributors must either remove secondary packaging from 
goods before offering them for sale or provide in-store facilities for consumers to leave 
their used packaging (Perchards, 1998; Raymond Publications, 1998). The federal 
government's desire to promote stringent environmental standards is also reflected in 
the Ordinance's interpretation of the waste management hierarchy. Whilst the 
reduction, re-use and recycling of packaging waste were made key objectives of the 
policy, incineration (the lowest element of the hierarchy before landfill disposal) was 
banned as a method of waste recovery. Finally, the Ordinance provides for the 
automatic introduction of a deposit-refund system for beverage containers if the 
national market share of re-fiUable containers falls below 72% in any given year. This 
ruling was applied in each German state (Land) and permits individual Lander 
governments to impose mandatory deposit systems in their territories should re-use 
quotas not be met (Michaelis, 1995). 
However, these obligations are waived for manufacturers and distributors taking part in 
an industry-organised system for collecting, sorting and recycling used packaging, the 
Duales System Deutschland (Dual System or DSD). This concession only applies to 
sales packaging, however; the recovery and recycling of secondary and transport 
packaging must be independendy organised by obhgated businesses (Michaelis, 1995). 
Although negotiations for the formation of the DSD were concluded before the 
adoption of the Ordinance, in reality, industry was offered little alternative except the 
reinstatement of the Ordinance's take-back and deposit-refund provisions (Haverland, 
1999). The federal government therefore used its coercive powers to the maximum in 
order to 'persuade' industry to co-operate with its environmental agenda. 95 
companies from the retail, consumer goods and packaging sectors originally formed the 
DSD. By 1998, the number of shareholders had increased to 600 (Whiston and 
Glauchant, 1996) and over 17,000 businesses now use DSD's systems to discharge 
their recycling obligations (DSD, 1998). 
The DSD's main function is to organise a private network for the collection and sorting 
of sales packaging waste, based on collection plans agreed with each Land government, 
and using a mixture of kerbside collection (45% of DSD waste), bring schemes (27%), 
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and combined schemes (28%) . Its operations are financed by licence agreements with 
packaging suppliers to use the DSD's Grune Punkt (Green Dot) logo on their 
packaging. This label is primarily designed to inform consumers that the packaging in 
question belongs to a business participating in the Dual System and that it should be 
separated ready for collection by the DSD's contractors. In order to obtain this licence, 
product manufacturers must pay a fee for each unit of packaging bearing the Green 
Dot, regardless of whether it is recycled. The manner in which fees are calculated is 
complicated but, broadly speaking, it takes account of the weight, area, volume and 
materials used in the packaging unit (see Figure 5.1). Funds from the Green Dot are 
then used to finance the DSD's collection systems as, with the exception of plastics, the 
licence fee only covers recovery costs. For more profitable materials, the resale value 
of reprocessed materials means that subsidies are not necessary, whilst for others 
reprocessing costs are allocated directiy to the respective packaging producers 
(Michaelis, 1995). The final link in the recycling chain is provided by the DSD's 
guarantors. As part of the agreements to set up the Dual System, each materials sector 
established a unitary recycling association whose role is to guarantee the reprocessing 
of materials collected by the DSD in accordance with the terms of the Ordinance 
(Michaelis, 1995). A summary of the flow of packaging and funds associated with the 
Dual System is shown in Figure 5.2. 
The original intention of the Dual System was therefore that the DSD should co-
ordinate the actions of industries involved in the recovery and reprocessing of 
packaging waste. However, in its early years, this relationship was not particularly co-
operative and the DSD came close to financial breakdown. Eichstadt et al. (1999) 
attribute this to four problems. First, some manufacturers using the Green Dot were 
free-riding the system by either under-declaring or failing to disclose the volume of 
packaging materials being put through the Dual System. Second, the licence fees in 
force at the time were too low to finance both the collection and reprocessing of waste 
packaging. As the accent of DSD was on collection networks, this led to a shortage of 
reprocessing capacity in Germany and the enforced export of large quantities of 
packaging waste to other EU states, often for landfilling (Waite, 1995; Michaelis, 
1995). This not only destabilised materials prices in Europe but also undermined the 
^ Personal correspondence with the DSD. Recycling studies generally agree that public participation is 
maximised under kerbside collection schemes (Pelletier et al., 1996) except in rural areas, where 
increased travel discourages public involvement (Powell et al., 1996). 
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political credibility of the German government and the entire concept of an industry-led 
Dual System (Lister, 1996, House of Commons, 1997). Third, the high targets imposed 
by the Ordinance forced the DSD to accept almost any contract it was offered and 
enabled some disposal firms to charge exorbitant collection fees. This crisis was 
further compounded when the guarantor for plastics recycling went into bankruptcy in 
1993 and cited the lack of reprocessing finance from the DSD as the cause of its 
demise. 
Figure 5.1 Green Dot Licence Fees 
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Item Fee in Pfennigs (including statutory VAT) 
Volume item fee Area item fee 
< 50-200 ml and > 3 g 0.1-0.6 < 150 - 300 cm2 and > 3g 0.1-0.4 
> 200 ml - 3 litres 0.7-0.9 > 300 - 1600 cm2 0.6 
over 3 litres 1.2 over 1600 cm2 0.9 
Source: DSD (1998: 11) 
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Figure 5.2 Structure of the German Dual System 
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To address this problem, a reconsolidation plan was developed with the assistance of 
the German Environment Minister (the Topfer Plan). The main elements of this were 
the conversion of DSD's debts into long-term credit, the introduction of increased 
Green Dot licence fees, and the foundation of a new plastics guarantor (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fiir Kuntstoff-Recycling mbH (DKR)) by the DSD in conjunction with two 
German energy suppliers (Eichstadt et al., 1999). As a result of the programme, the 
DSD has reduced waste exports to 19% of all packaging waste produced in Germany 
(DSD, 1998) and has invested heavily in new recycling technology and the reduction of 
expensive exports. These actions stabilised the DSD's financial position to the extent 
that it recently announced a 9.5% reduction in the Green Dot fee, effective from 
January 1999''. The success of the reconsolidation plan can largely be attributed to 
three factors; the government's desire not to repeal the Dual System concept, the 
influence of powerful retailers seeking to avoid the re-imposition of the Ordinance's 
more constrictive provisions and, finally, concessions from disposal firms who feared 
losing lucrative recycling contracts (Eichstadt et al., 1999). Therefore, although the 
Dual System has subsequently succeeded in fostering co-operation between industry 
sectors, the main impetus came from the govemment's ability and willingness to resort 
to command-and-control regulation. 
Although Germany's Packaging Ordinance began the process which culminated in the 
EU Directive, certain aspects of its legislation have been repeatedly challenged by the 
European Commission. In 1995, before the transposition deadline for the Directive, the 
Commission argued that Germany's re-fill quotas added disproportionate transport 
costs to drinks importers and therefore transgressed Article 30 of the Treaty (Perchards, 
1998). In its defence, Germany cited Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) studies produced by 
the Fraunhofer Institute, which supported re-use systems over recycling, and argued 
that the restriction on free trade was justified under the environmental protection 
requirements of the Treaty (Otto, 1999). The Commission decided not to pursue the 
complaint at the time, mainly because there was no direct EU legislation on the matter^ . 
Since the Packaging Directive came into force, however, there have been renewed 
efforts to overturn the German quota scheme. Several Member States, including 
Britain and Sweden, lodged formal objections in 1998, claiming that though the 
"* Personal correspondence with DSD. 
' This precedent had been established in the Danish Bottles Case in 1988 (302/86, ECR 4607). Here the 
ECJ affirmed the environment as an essential part of the Treaty and the right of Member States to enact 
legislation in the absence of satisfactory EU measures. 
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Directive accords equal priority to prevention, re-use and recycling, the Ordinance 
discriminates against recycling by granting preference to re-use systems (ENDS, 
1997b; 1997c). At the same time, the German government came under domestic 
pressure to oppose any weakening of re-fiU quotas during negotiations to amend the 
Ordinance in 1998. Following the rejection of several draft versions by the Ldnder-
based Bundesrat (ENDS, 1998b; 1998c), mandatory deposits were retained but will 
now only be invoked should quotas not be achieved for two consecutive years. In fact, 
the German government recently informed industry representatives that because re-use 
quotas were not met in 1998 and 1999, mandatory deposits will be triggered from June 
2001 (ENDS, 2000a). The Commission has responded to the realisation of what was 
previously only a latent threat by instituting proceedings against Germany (ENDS, 
2000b) .^ The other major amendment in the 1998 Ordinance was its relaxation of the 
ban on Energy from Waste (EfW) incineration for transit and sales packaging made 
from directly 'renewable' materials (Perchards, 1998). 
Therefore, whilst Germany was instrumental in defining the agenda of EU packaging 
waste legislation, it has come under pressure to harmonise its systems with those of 
other Member States. As with meiny other areas of policy, the disagreement has centred 
on the extent to which environmental protection should take precedence over EU free 
trade. Though such disputes are almost inevitable considering the potential areas of 
conflict between the two policy objectives, they highlight some of the practical 
difficulties involved in integrating environmental protection into the EU's wider agenda 
(Bailey, 1999a). Nevertheless, the German model remains the most mature in the EU 
and has provided important lessons for other Member States. Not only have other 
states been more circumspect about setting ambitious recycling targets and 
implementation time-frames ,^ they have also concerned themselves more keenly with 
establishing viable reprocessing infrastructures. Probably the most important insights 
from the German Ordinance, however, have been into the trade-offs which exist 
between environmental and economic efficiency (Brisson, 1993). Whilst there are 
signs that Germany is moving slightly away from command-and-control packaging 
The ENDS report notes that this was after a long period of soul searching by the Commission, which 
had been under intense pressure from the packaging industry. Intriguingly, the move was opposed by the 
Commission's Environment Directorate, whose waste unit is headed by Ludwig Kramer, a German 
environmental lawyer known for his 'green attitudes' and refusal to compromise on matters of legal 
principle (Jordan, 1999:77) 
The schedule to implement the Packaging Ordinance was just 18 months (though Austria opted for a 12 
month implementation programme). By contrast, the UK legislation is being phased in over four years. 
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waste policies, the political capital invested in DSD by the German government and its 
desire for high environmental standards has necessitated a continuing emphasis on 
strong and sometimes constrictive regulatory leadership. 
5.3.3 The British Model 
Negotiating the UK Regulations 
Although the British government did not introduce packaging waste legislation until 
after the Directive was adopted, preparations began soon after the German Ordinance 
came into effect^ . The main thrust of government policy at that time was to explore 
implementing mechanisms that could achieve the objectives of the Directive 'in a 
manner which is efficient, equitable and least burdensome' (Department of the 
Environment (DoE), 1996b: Ministerial foreword). The foundation for the DoE's 
approach was the development of a comprehensive dialogue with industry on the 
format and implementation of a business-led scheme for the recovery and recycling of 
packaging waste. However, this co-optive challenge was accompanied by the threat 
that a unilateral solution would be imposed by the government if industry failed to 
produce a suitable plan (Haverland, 1999). 
A number of working parties were established to assist these discussions. Following 
initial forays by INCPEN and COPAC^, the government commissioned the Producer 
Responsibility Group (PRG), a forum consisting of 26 businesses concerned with 
packaging issues, to prepare a framework plan for packaging recycling and recovery. 
The PRC's draft proposals, submitted in February 1994 and establishing principles 
which would form the future PWMS, supported a scheme encompassing all sectors of 
the packaging chain, the creation of a competitive, cost-effective recycling market, and 
the use of price-based measures as a incentive for packaging optimisation (Figure 5.3). 
On completing its report, the PRG was de-commissioned and replaced by another 
packaging chain organisation, VALPAK, and its Working Representative Advisory 
Group (V-WRAG) (ENDS, 1995a). 
For example, the DTI and DoE commissioned two studies by Environmental Resources Limited to 
explore methods for recovering resources from waste (DTI/DETR, 1991; 1992). 
' Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment, and the Consortium of the Packaging Chain, 
respectively. 
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Figure 5.3 PRG Draft Proposals, February 1994 
i. On the basis of current data, recovery of around 58% of the UK's packaging waste (as 
against the 30% currently being achieved) is achievable by the year 2000, but not on a 
voluntary basis. Underpinning legislation was required to assure compliance and to provide 
the necessary incentive to create business operated schemes to organise recovery and 
recycling; 
ii. All parts of the packaging chain need to be involved, from raw materials manufacturers to 
retailers, if effective co-operation is to be achieved and recycling costs minimised. It is 
essential that business sectors co-operate to increase end-use markets for recyclate and to 
cause investment in new reprocessing capacity while retaining a market led approach ;^ 
iii. There is a need for renewed commitment to waste to energy which is more appropriate than 
recycling for some packaging waste; 
iv. There is a need for incentives for minimisation, for example through material-specific 
charging; 
v. There is a need for continuing consumer awareness and participation. 
a The sectors of the packaging chain, as defined by the PRG and the DoE, are (i) raw materials 
producers, (ii) converters (manufacturers of packaging), (iii) packer-fillers (manufacturers of products 
which use packaging), (iv) wholesalers, and (v) retailers. The collective term for these companies is 
packaging producers. 
Adapted from: DoE (1996b: pages not numbered) 
Despite the PRC's recommendation of a shared approach, the government initially 
preferred the administrative simplicity of focussing all responsibilities on one sector of 
the packaging chain (ENDS, 1995b). Even though all companies participating in V-
WRAG favoured some form of shared responsibility, they initially failed to agree a 
common proposal. Retailers generally supported a single onus on converters and the 
use of market forces to diffuse costs and responsibilities to other sectors of the chain 
(ENDS, 1995b), whilst others favoured a variety of multi-point options. The choices 
considered by V-WRAG and its final proposal are summarised in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 V-WRAG Proposals for Packaging Recovery, 1995 
V - W R A G Draft Proposal 
i. Single Point Obligation: One point of legal obligation for packaging recovery and recycling (either 
converters, packer-fillers or wholesalers/retailers), with market forces ensuring all sectors of the chain 
contribute. This option was favoured for its simplicity and low implementation costs, but raised 
concerns over the ability of sectors further up the chain to pass on compliance costs to consumers. 
ii. Omni-Point: Targeting of 'brand owners' for each product as a means of placing product 
stewardship obligations with those primarily responsible for generating the packaging. This scheme 
was seen as complicated and costly to administer. 
iii. Combined Industry Scheme: Obligation on the 'first purchasers of packaging for use,' primarily 
packer-fillers. 
iv. Multi-Point: Obligation on all sectors of the packaging chain and the allocation of an appropriate 
share of the recovery targets in relation to the packaging each handles. It emphasised the idea of 
businesses joining an industry-wide compliance scheme to manage recovery and recycling activities. 
V . Equi-point: A basic requirement on all sectors of the packaging chain to recover packaging waste 
arising on their premises, with additional obligations upon specific sectors (packer-fillers and retailers 
to collect household waste, converters in terms of recycled content in packaging, and raw materials 
manufacturers and reprocessors to reprocess or valorise collected waste). 
Source: ENDS (1995b: 37-8) 
The Shared-Responsibility Concept 
i. Legal duty on all companies to ensure that packaging waste arising on their premises is valorised to 
agreed levels. 
ii. For packaging supplied further down the packaging chain or to end users, a duty of care to take all 
reasonable measures to ensure the valorisation of this waste packaging. 
iii. The establishment of a collective scheme (VALPAK) to manage recovery and valorisation 
responsibilities on behalf of obligated companies. 
iv. Companies choosing to manage their legal duties individually rather than by joining a collective 
scheme should be required to submit an annual report to the Environment Agency to demonstrate 
their PWM plans. Failure to do so should be made an offence and the Environment Agency should 
have the power to require businesses not presenting convincing plans to make good any deficiencies. 
Source: ENDS (1995b: 38) 
Whilst V-WRAG's preference for 'shared responsibility' and a non-quantified duty of 
care across the packaging chain gained widespread industry support (ENDS, 1995c), 
the DoE insisted on clear and binding recovery targets (ENDS, 1995d). Li the end, it 
was the threat of an imposed solution that forced industry's acceptance of mandatory 
recovery and recycling obligations at a meeting convened by the DoE on 15 December 
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1995. The targets and responsibilities agreed at this meeting are shown in Table 5.3. 
The DoE, disgrunded with the belligerent attitude of V-WRAG, decided that wider 
industry consultations and the drafting of legislation should be overseen by a more 
neutral body and appointed a trusted emissary. Sir Peter Parker, to head the newly 
formed Advisory Committee on Packaging (ACP). Following its initial work, the U K 
Regulations were finally brought before the House of Commons in 1996 (DoE, 1996b). 
Table 5.3 Targets and Responsibilities in the 1997 UK Regulations 
Recycling (%) Recovery (%) 
1998-1999 7 38 
2000 11 43 
2001 16 52 
Sector Responsibilities % of Recovery and 
Recycling Targets 
Raw materials manufacturer 6 
Converter 11 
Packer-filler 36 
Retailer 47 
Wholesaler 83 
All figures are expressed as percentages of the total packaging produced or imported into Britain but 
exclude exports. Packaging materials covered by the UK Regulations are paper/board, glass, steel, 
aluminium, plastics and, from 2000, wood. 
Source: DoE (1996b: pages not numbered) 
Though accounts of these negotiations do vary - one commentator, for example, 
claimed the UK government was 'pathetically anxious not to upset industry and 
provided no leadership' - the general view is that industry played an important but 
defensive role during the pohcy's formulation. Whilst the desirability of a business-led 
scheme was supported from the outset, industry's desire for a purely voluntary 
approach provided the government with insufficient guarantees of compliance with the 
Directive. Realising that failure to agree a common approach would risk the 
abandonment of the partnership approach altogether, industry was forced to concede 
ground. The negotiation of the UK Regulations therefore corroborates Leveque (1995) 
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and Whiston and Glachant's (1996) view that voluntary industry environmental 
agreements are partially illusory because they are usually formed to fend off coercive 
pressure from government. The more powerful sectors in industry were nonetheless 
able to reduce their absolute losses by conceding the legitimacy of the initiative then 
engaging defensively in the formulation process (see Chapter seven). 
Producer Responsibility and the PRN System 
In accordance with the agreements reached in 1995, the Producer Responsibility 
Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997 impose legal responsibility for the 
recovery and recycling of packaging materials upon companies which manufacture, 
supply or sell packaging or packaged products (Packaging Producers) (DoE, 1997). 
Thus, companies which only use rather than supply packaging, are exempted from 
direct responsibilities under the Regulations. The 1997 Regulations were followed by 
the Packaging (Essential Requirements) Regulations 1998 (DETR, 1998b). These 
require, first, that packaging should be manufactured in a manner which minimises its 
volume and weight and permits re-use or recovery and, second, that packaging should 
meet EU specifications on concentrations of heavy metals. As with the Directive, the 
'Essential Requirements' contain no mandatory targets on waste minimisation or re-
use. 
From 1998, all companies with an annual turnover exceeding £5 million and handling 
over 50 tonnes of packaging are required to submit annual returns to the Environment 
Agency proving their compliance with the sector targets contained in Table 5.3. Using 
these criteria, the number of obligated UK businesses was initially estimated at 5,000 
(Perchards 1998), though the actual number registering with the Environment Agency 
in 1997 was 3,837 (Environment Agency, 1998a). This figure will increase to over 
11,000 in the year 2000 when turnover thresholds reduce from £5 million to £2 million 
(DETR, 1998a). 
However, two practical issues still needed to be addressed before the policy could be 
implemented. First, substantial investment in the reprocessing industry was required in 
order for Britain to meet EU requirements. Second, it was in everybody's interests that 
the PWMS minimised the financial and operational impact of the Regulations on 
industry, as the majority of companies classified as packaging producers did not wish to 
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be heavily involved in the expensive process of packaging recovery and recycling 
(DoE, 1996b; 1996c). To achieve these aims, two groups of organisations. Compliance 
Schemes and Accredited Reprocessors, became licensed to operate what is known as 
the Packaging waste Recovery Note (PRN) system. 
Companies charged with recovering and recycling their packaging have two 
compliance options. First, they can apply for independent registration with the 
Environment Agency, SEPA ' '^ or the Northern Ireland Heritage Service. Producers 
choosing this option are required to submit annual waste management plans to the 
agencies and provide evidence that they have discharged their obligations. In 1997, 
33.6% of packaging producers chose this alternative (Environment Agency 1998a). 
Second, they can join one of several compliance schemes, organisations registered with 
the Environment Agency to manage producer-recycling networks. In return for 
membership fees and recovery and recycling charges to a scheme (sometimes termed a 
materials levy), producers can secure immunity from prosecution and, as with the 
Green Dot scheme, any practical involvement in the recycling process. Thirteen 
schemes are currently registered with the Agency, of which VALPAK, with over 2,000 
members, is by far the largest (Environment Agency 1998a). Compliance schemes may 
act on behalf of as many producers as they wish, provided they can demonstrate to the 
Agency that their packaging recovery services are effectively organised. However, 
only a few schemes are themselves physical reprocessors of packaging waste. Instead 
most use materials levies to purchase recycling services from accredited reprocessors. 
As such, they are chiefly a means of aggregating producer-recycling obligations into 
more effective bargaining collectives. For this reason, the majority of the UK's 
packaging producers see the compliance-scheme method as the most cost-effective 
means of complying with the Regulations. 
The principal role of the accredited reprocessors is to provide physical recycling 
facilities and services. In most cases, they are existing recycling companies that have 
registered with the Environment Agencies under the PRN scheme. The quantity of 
packaging waste reprocessed in the U K is monitored by the use of PRNs. PRNs are a 
tradable certificate issued by accredited reprocessors in respect of packaging materials 
delivered for recycling or energy recovery. The notes specify the weight and type of 
'° Scottish Environment Protection Agency. 
131 
packaging material processed as well as the reprocessing method used (ENDS, 1998d). 
Although the DETR provides detailed definitions of items that constitute packaging 
(DETR, 1997a, 1997b), PRNs may be produced from either industrial-commercial or 
household waste. Accredited reprocessors are then entitled to issue or sell completed 
PRNs to compliance schemes or producers; they in turn submit them to the agencies as 
evidence of compliance with the Regulations. A synopsis of the packaging waste and 
funding flows in the PRN system is shown in Figure 5.5. 
Under the PRN system, therefore, packaging producers are required to pay for less 
environmentally damaging methods of waste management. However, it also provides 
means by which they can discharge their recycling duties - either through compliance-
scheme membership or PRN purchases - without direct involvement in recycling. 
Furthermore, because the UK Regulations do not distinguish between industrial-
conunercial and domestic waste, most schemes have concentrated on collecting high 
volume, homogenous - and thus lower cost - industrial-commercial waste (Bailey, 
1999b). This arrangement therefore fulfils one of industry's main requests, that the 
Regulations should implement the Directive in a cost-effective manner. 
The PRN system also serves two purposes for accredited reprocessors. First, the 
additional revenue provides financial support for an industry whose development has 
historically been hindered by the volatility of basic materials prices (Bailey, 1999b; 
2000). Second, the expectation is that surplus funds will be invested in new 
reprocessing capacity, an outcome the government has sought to encourage by allowing 
PRN prices to be determined by market forces rather than state involvement. 
According to market theory, prices should respond to the investment requirements of 
each reprocessing sector, which are in turn determined by the Regulations. However, 
the balance of market power is theoretically safeguarded by the aggregate bargaining 
power of compliance schemes and by competition in both the compliance scheme and 
reprocessing sectors (Bailey, 1999a, 1999b). Monopolistic behaviour is therefore 
prevented by market contestability, whilst competition has produced a system which is 
supposedly cost-effective and responsive to changing regulatory conditions. However, 
though the scheme contains 'financial carrots' for industry, it is underpinned by the 
understanding that constrictive legislation will be introduced if it fails to achieve EU 
targets (DETR, 1998a, DETR, 1999a). 
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Figure 5.5 Funding and Pacltaging flows in tlie UK PRN System 
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5.3.4 Comparing the UK and German Models 
Perhaps the most striking feature of both the British and German arrangements for 
packaging recovery and recycling is the sheer complexity of the two systems. Whilst 
this undoubtedly reflects the nature of the task in question and makes comparisons 
difficult, the two schemes nonetheless have three common features. First, both Britain 
and Germany have framed their policies around the concept of producer responsibility, 
the idea that industry should be made accountable for the environmental stewardship of 
its products throughout their entire life cycle (Fenton and Sinclair, 1996). Within this 
framework, however, both governments have granted industry substantial leeway in the 
management of these responsibilities, the UK through its semi-autonomous packaging 
market and Germany under the Dual System. Finally, the PPP has been applied in both 
countries in the form of packaging waste charges for producers, but its diffusion to 
other polluting parties - generally speaking, the service sector and the general public -
has been left to market forces (Bickerstaffe and Barrett, 1993). This theoretically 
enables both systems to charge consumers for the costs of packaging waste 
management without the government having to resort to unpopular public taxes 
(Bailey, 1997). Therefore, although previous commentaries have sometimes presented 
the British and German approaches to environmental policy as highly distinct (Ramus, 
1991; Haigh, 1996), there are strong similarities in the way they have applied price-
based regulation in this instance (Bailey, 1999a). 
However, these similarities mask fundamental differences in the way each country has 
transposed and implemented the EU Directive. The key point of divergence in both 
areas has been the relative priority accorded to environmental protection and cost-
effective compliance. During policy transposition, the UK government recognised that 
even the Directive's lower targets represented a major challenge to Britain's nascent 
recycling industry and took maximum advantage of the leeway granted in the Directive. 
By contrast, the derogations negotiated at the EU have enabled Germany to maintain its 
stringent recycling policies but, equally, it has endured a lengthy stand-off with the 
Conmiission over its re-use provisions for beverage containers. Similarly, even 
following the revised Ordinance's recent relaxation on EfW incineration, German 
standards are still largely informed by its zealous environmental stance. Conversely, 
the Regulations have made maximum use of this comparatively inexpensive means of 
recovering waste. 
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Other differences between the two countries initially appear more significant than they 
actually are. A key example is the apportionment of recycling responsibilities, where 
German policy has focused mainly on the actions of manufacturers and distributors but 
Britain has adopted a broader shared-responsibility concept. Though this could again 
be interpreted as an attempt by the British government to minimise the impact of the 
Regulations, in practice, German manufacturers and distributors have also passed a 
substantial proportion of their waste collection costs to suppliers. This has occurred to 
such an extent that many German raw materials and packaging manufacturers have 
resorted to paying waste management companies directly in an attempt to regain 
control of their costs". Similarly, many UK retailers have attempted to reduce their 
compliance costs by demanding that suppliers re-design their products and reduce their 
packaging requirements. This manoeuvre has caused considerable distortion of the 
sector responsibilities agreed in 1995 (ENDS, 1998d) and has led to a vociferous 
campaign by the converter sector for a 2% reduction in their recycling obligations 
(MRW, 1998a). 
The balance between economic and environmental priorities in the two countries is also 
expressed in their respective use of economic instruments. The simplest but most 
revealing distinction is the point at which packaging waste charges are levied. Green 
Dot charges are calculated on the basis of the total packaging produced by DSD 
members regardless of whether it is recycled. In Britain, PRN charges are raised 
following the reprocessing of waste and therefore only relate to the percentage targets 
contained in the Regulation. This not only alters the relative costs of the two systems 
and the incentives created, it also influences the amount of revenue available for 
investment in infrastructure, innovation and public education. This difference is further 
reinforced by the rates at which recycling charges are set in each country (Figure 5.6). 
Based on current Green Dot fees (excluding area and volume fees) and average PRN 
prices between 1998 and 2000, German prices range from between 3.4 times those in 
Britain (glass) to 14.6 times (plastics) and 25.7 times (aluminium). Whilst this 
distinction is partly offset by the exclusion of non-sales packaging from the Dual 
System (though secondary and transport packaging are covered by the Ordinance), it 
suggests that the German system is primarily geared towards ambitious environmental 
targets and the British arrangements to cost-effective compliance with the Directive. 
' Personal communication with Perchards. 
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Figure 5.6 Recovery and Recycling Charges, Germany and UK 
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The final distinction concerns the extent to which market-forces drive the British and 
German recycling schemes. As discussed earlier, the PRN system was specifically 
designed to reap the efficiency benefits accruing from competition and market-based 
pricing (Beesley and Littiechild, 1983; Gardner, 1996). At the time of writing, there 
were thirteen compliance schemes and 210 accredited reprocessors registered in 
Britain. Although there are a similar number of reprocessing companies in Germany 
(see Appendices 7a and 7b for details of their distribution), the DSD and its associated 
guarantors are responsible for co-ordinating their activities (MichaeUs, 1995; DSD, 
1998; Environment Agency, 1998b; 1998c; DETR, 1999a; MRW, 1999c). Thus, co-
operation between industries has generally taken priority over the promotion of 
competition-led efficiencies. The different priorities in the two countries are further 
underlined by the methods used to calculate collection and reprocessing costs. Whilst 
PRN prices are fixed by market forces in response to legislative and competitive 
pressures, Green Dot charges are centrally determined by the DSD on the basis of, first, 
Life Cycle Analyses (LCAs) of the environmental impact of packaging waste and, 
second, the DSD's operational costs. Although it is dangerous to make more than 
provisional judgements about the environmental merits of each arrangement, the link to 
environmental effectiveness seems clearer in the German model, whilst that to 
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economic effectiveness is more apparent under the British system. That said, there is 
pressure for the DSD to adopt a more competitive regime. The amended Packaging 
Ordinance stipulates, first, that all packaging collection must reprocessed under 
competitive conditions and, second, that waste disposal companies must publish their 
recycling costs in order that their competitiveness can be assessed (Flanderka, 1998). 
5.4 The Development of Packaging Waste Management in Britain and Germany 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Having identified the important features of the British and German systems of 
packaging waste management, the next stage is to analyse their performance against the 
Directive's main objectives. In some respects it is difficult to compare the two 
schemes, as the Ordinance has been in force since 1991, whilst the Regulations are still 
very much in a transitional stage. The Dual System is therefore firmly embedded 
whilst the PRN system has yet to be fully tested. However, the British government and 
industry's involvement in monitoring the development of the PRN system has, as much 
as any predictions can, helped to make detailed comparisons possible. However, it is 
first necessary to identify the criteria used to evaluate each model. Three specific 
themes are considered in this chapter; the development of infrastructure for the 
reprocessing of packaging waste, the establishment of collection systems, and the 
efficacy of environmental charging systems in financing these developments (Sinclair 
and Fenton, 1997). The growth of end-use markets for recyclate and the success of 
environmental charges in changing polluter behaviour, the other main objectives of the 
Directive, are discussed in Chapters six and seven. 
A combination of primary and secondary data sources were used for this analysis. The 
secondary data were derived from government documents, specialist press releases, 
consultancy reports and academic commentaries. The primary data were obtained from 
the survey of UK accredited reprocessors. A corresponding survey of the German 
reprocessing sector was not necessary because the information required was already 
available from secondary data sources. At the time the research was conducted, 133 
separate reprocessing companies were registered with the Environment Agency, all of 
which were contacted for the survey. The response rate of 48 (36.1%), though slightly 
disappointing, can largely be attributed to the unwillingness of companies to disclose 
commercially sensitive information. However, the DETR conducted a similar review 
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in 1999 which provided more comprehensive data on the development of the U K 
reprocessing sector (DETR, 1999a). It was therefore decided that the DETR's 
quantitative data would be more representative but that two pieces of qualitative data 
from the reprocessor survey should be used in the analysis, details of partnerships 
developed by reprocessors to encourage the collection of packaging waste and 
reprocessor opinions on the merits and problems of the PRN system. 
5.4.2 Present and Predicted Reprocessing Capacity in Britain and Germany 
In order to quantify the reprocessing capacity required in each country, the first task 
was to identify the volumes of packaging predicted to enter the British and German 
waste streams in 2001, the Directive's compliance deadline. The DETR's estimates for 
the UK, shown in Table 5.4, indicate that, with the exception of wood, steel and glass, 
consumption of packaging materials will increase by between 1 % and 4% per annum in 
the period 1998-2001 (DETR, 1998a; 1999a). Whilst forward data was not available 
for Germany, packaging consumption excluding wood stood at 11.84 milUon tonnes in 
1997 and has decreased by 16.5% since the Ordinance's introduction in 1991 (DSD, 
1998). The DETR has also produced projections of expected growth in each 
reprocessing sector, based on data provided by U K materials organisations (Table 5.5). 
These figures suggest that the Regulations and the PRN system will encourage 
expansion in all sectors, but that there will be wide variations in this growth. However, 
the DETR also records that there was sufficient reprocessing capacity in all sectors to 
meet the recovery and recycling targets set for 1998 (DETR, 1999a). 
Again, predictions of reprocessing capacity were not available for Germany though, as 
with the packaging consumption figures, data have been published for the period 1992-
1997. Table 5.6 shows the recycling rates achieved for each packaging material and the 
performances achieved for sales and non-sales packaging though, for the purposes of 
this analysis, the total recycling rates for Germany are more comparable with those 
achieved in the UK. Whilst reprocessing rates for non-sales glass and plastics were 
significantly lower than for sales packaging, the general conclusion is still that the Dual 
System has exceeded the Directive's targets by some margin. However, two areas of 
concern remain, the high cost and environmental impact of packaging waste still being 
exported for reprocessing (Michaelis, 1995; Eichstadt et al., 1999), and the amount of 
plastics waste being reprocessed using a process called 'feedstock recycling.' 
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Table 5.4 Packaging flowing into the UK Waste Stream, 1997-2000 (thousands 
of tonnes pa) 
Actual DETR growth estimates 
1997 1998 2001 
Paper 3,611 4,000 4,308 
Glass 2,185 2,200 2,200 
Aluminium 155 109 111 
Steel 833 735 735 
Plastics 1,612 1,700 1,912 
Total, excluding 
wood and 'other' 
8,396 8,744 a 9,266 
Wood 2,372 1,300 1,300 
Other 968 200 200 
TOTAL 11,736 10,244 10,766 
a There has been considerable uncertainty over these figures, however. In 1998, obligated businesses 
reported only 6,965,962 tonnes (excluding wood and 'other'). This has obviously led to uncertainties as 
to the precise volumes of recovery and recycling required to meet the EU target. 
Sources: DETR (1998a: 21), DETR (1999a: 10) 
Feedstock recycling is a process whereby plastics are separated into their constituent 
elements and incinerated in blast furnaces to generate energy. The point of contention 
is that blast furnace reprocessing produces more harmful air emissions than normal 
EfW processes (which are restricted in Germany because of their environmental 
impact) (Eichstadt et al., 1999). In an effort to curb the use of feedstock recycling, the 
1998 Ordinance requires that at least 36% of plastic packaging should be mechanically 
recycled (Perchards, 1998). The DSD and the plastics guarantor, DKR, whilst 
defending the benefits of feedstock recycling, have also embarked on programmes to 
improve the viability of mechanical recycling and to reduce the environmental impact 
of feedstock processes (DSD, 1998). 
The first evidence that the PRN system may fail to meet the targets set by the 
Regulations comes from data produced by the DETR's 1999 review (DETR, 1999a). 
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Table 5.5 Predictions of UK Recovery and Recycling Capacity 1998-2001 
Expected performance {thousands tonnes) % increase 
1998 actual 2001 estimate 
Paper 1,888 1,921 1.7 
Glass 658 730 11.0 
Aluminium a 15 53 262.8 
Steel a 183 235 28.8 
Plastics 126 212 68.2 
Wood n/a 350 n/a 
Total recycling 2,870 3,501 21.8 
EfW and composdng 448 726 61.9 
Total recovery 3,318 4,227 27.4 
expected 
a However, the aluminium and steel industries can reprocess up to 375,000 and 6 million tonnes annually 
respectively, should the materials become available. Currently 75,000 tonnes is reserved for aluminium 
packaging and 144,000 tonnes for steel. 
Source: DETR (1999a: 21) 
s 
The DETR's projections (Table 5.7) are based on, first, the need to recycle 25% of the 
overall tonnage of packaging consumed in Britain and, second, the requirement that a 
minimum of 15% recycling should be achieved for each material. If these calculations 
prove accurate, the paper, glass, aluminium, steel and wood sectors will all meet the 
25% target, but there will be an annual deficit of 266,000 tonnes for plastics by 2001 
and one of 726,000 tonnes for EfW incineration. Moreover, as the DETR's figures are 
contingent on paper, glass, aluminium, steel and wood exceeding their 25% recycling 
quota and cross-subsidising other sectors, anything below this may increase the 
incineration deficit further. Theoretically, this could be as high as 1.9 million tonnes. 
On the basis of these findings, the DETR report highlights factors which may inhibit 
the expansion of reprocessing in each material sector. Whilst a deficit is not predicted 
for either glass or paper, the DETR notes that both are international commodities and 
vulnerable to fluctuations in global demand and prices (also Hanley and Slark, 1994). 
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Table 5.6 Packaging Recycling Rates in Germany 1992-1997 
Thousands tonnes recycled Recycling rates 1997 (%) b 
1992 1993 1995 1997 1998 Total Sales Non-
sales 
Paper 306 966 1,255 1,372 1,415 59 89 44 
Glass 542 2,388 2,572 2,736 2,705 75 87 10 
Aluminium 0 9 31 40 43 72 83 45 
Steel a 29 250 259 312 345 82 73 98 
Plastics 41 281 504 567 600 45 69 14 
Composites b 5 52 297 420 345 
Total 923 3,946 4,918 5,446 5,453 64 84 40 
a From 1995, DSD data re-classified beverage from steel to composites. 
b CEC data allocated composites between the main materials according to their market share give in 
1995 by the Umweltsbundesamt (German Environment Agency) (55% paper, 39% tinplate steel, 3% 
plastics, 3% aluminium). 
Sources: DSD (1998; 1999a), CEC (2000a: 135) 
Table 5.7 UK Recovery and Recycling 2001 (thousands tonnes) 
DETR Reprocessing Capacity required Balance 
estimates capacity 
2001 2001 50% 
recovery 
15% 
recycling 
25% 
recycling 
25% 
recycling 
Recycling 
Paper 4,308 1,921 2,154 646 1,077 844 
Glass 2,200 730 1,100 330 550 180 
Aluminium 111 53 56 17 28 25 
Steel 735 235 368 110 184 51 
Plastics 1,912 212 956 287 478 -266 
Wood 1,300 350 650 195 325 25 
Total packaging 10,566 3,501 5,284 1,585 2,642 859 
25% recycHng 2,642 
EfW 726 
Total recovery 4,227 5,284 
Shortfall 1,057 
Source: updated from DETR (1999a: 21) 
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According to ongoing reports in Materials Recycling Week, the price of both 
commodities are recovering after prolonged slumps caused by plentiful supplies of raw 
materials on the international market. The major obstacle for EfW, in the opinion of 
the DETR, is public resistance to the location of incineration plants near their 
communities, the so-called 'Not In My Back Yard' (NIMBY) effect (see also Goldman, 
1996; Lake, 1996; Elliot, 1998; Rabl et al., 1998)'^ . This is particularly problematic 
considering the prominence of EfW in Britain's latest sustainable waste strategy. Less 
Waste, More Value (DETR, 1999b). At the time of writing, three new EfW plants are 
under construction and eight more are awaiting planning permission (DETR, 1999a). 
However, the greatest challenges are faced by the plastics reprocessing sector, where 
the projected annual deficit is expected to be 43,000 tonnes against the 15% minimum 
and 266,000 tonnes against the overall 25% target (Bailey, 1999b; 1999d; DETR, 
1999a). This has occurred despite the existence of apparently healthy competition 
between the 82 plastics reprocessors currently registered with the Environment Agency. 
The DETR report notes, however, that most major manufacturers of plastics have 
curtailed or entirely severed their involvement in recycling and chosen instead to 
concentrate on producing plastics from virgin materials (DETR, 1999a). The problem 
appears to be that plastics recycling is simply unprofitable, either because recycling 
processes are prohibitively expensive (Beynon, 1993; Bailey, 1999b; 1999d), or 
because collecting viable amounts of lightweight plastics waste incurs very high 
transport costs. Competition in the plastics sector has therefore been limited to niche 
markets despite the incentives provided by PRN subsidies (MRW, 1999d; 1999e). In 
response, the government has taken little direct action but has repeatedly emphasised 
that rapid expansion in plastics recycling is essential if Britain is to meet its recycling 
targets (DETR, 1998a; 1999a). 
In fact, the problems of the plastics sector highlights one of the main problems of 
pursuing environmental objectives using market-led regulation. In this particular case, 
the British government has struggled to convince individual companies of the need to 
develop strategic plans for increasing the recovery and reprocessing of waste materials. 
However, such planning is only likely to occur where market operators perceive it will 
yield significant financial benefits. In simple terms, if there is little prospect of plastics 
Local authority waste planners expressed similar opinions during the MEL Research conference, 
Strategic and Local Planning for Waste in 1998 (MEL Research, 1998). 
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recycling becoming viable, there is little reward for long-term expansion, hi Germany, 
this conflict was circumvented by the unequivocal requirements imposed by the 
Ordinance and the fact that the Dual System has always operated as a regulatory device 
rather than a 'free' market instrument. Having flirted unsuccessfully with a more 
voluntary approach prior to 1993, the government enforced its agenda by sanctioning 
increases in Green Dot charges. Once the DSD had achieved financial stability, it was 
able to co-ordinate its collection and investment programme accordingly. However, it 
is difficult to see Britain's 'free' reprocessing market undertaking such actions without 
clearer financial incentives. hideed, rather than trying to exert pressure on 
reprocessors, some compliance schemes have simply agreed reprocessing contracts 
with overseas reprocessorsArguably this move may not even be related to the 
reprocessing-capacity problem, as there are no mechanisms preventing British 
compliance schemes from using foreign reprocessors if they are cheaper than their 
domestic counterparts, even if capacity is available. It remains to be seen whether the 
British govemment will eventually lose patience and intervene more forcibly to 
counteract the reprocessing sector's apparent lack of urgency. 
5.4.3 The Collection of Waste Packaging 
The second factor determining the efficacy of the British and German PWMSs is their 
ability to develop comprehensive networks for the collection, sorting and transfer of 
waste for reprocessing. In many respects, there is little to say about the German 
model, as the DSD's main raison d'etre is to co-ordinate and finance the collection of 
post-consumer packaging waste. In 1998 it spent the equivalent of £1.4 billion on 
purchasing recycling services (93.7% of its turnover), 73% of which was invested in 
kerbside or mixed collection schemes (DSD, 1999a). Of the 537 sub-contracts the 
DSD operates, 104 are with local authorities, 76 are with private companies in 
conjunction with local authorities and the remainder are private company contracts. 
Against this, the DSD acknowledges that only 5.6 million tonnes of the 6.1 million 
tonnes of packaging waste collected in 1997 were sufficiently free from impurities that 
they could be recycled (DSD, 1999b). Germany's recycling rates (Table 5.6) 
nonetheless attest to the DSD's successes in developing a comprehensive and effective 
network for the collection of post-consumer packaging waste. 
In the most extreme example to date, a compliance scheme took an Environment Agency delegation to 
China to approve a plastics reprocessing site which would significantly reduce its costs for handling this 
material. Other compliance schemes are reported to be considering similar moves (MRW, 1999c). 
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Table 5.8 Household Waste Collection necessary to fulfil the UK Regulations 
(thousands tonnes) 
Packaging flowing 
streams 
Commercial-
hidustrial 
into waste 
Household 
Collection 
required for 50% 
recovery 
Household 
collection 
required ^  
Paper 3,500 500 2,000 0 
Glass 350 1,850 1,100 750 
Aluminium 5 105 54 50 
Steel 177 573 368 191 
Plastics 600 1,100 850 250 
TOTAL 4,632 4,128 4,372 1,241 
a Negative figures for paper are counted as zero to factor out cross-subsidisation. 
Adapted from: DETR (1999a: 18) 
Although the original aim of the UK Regulations was to concentrate on the recovery of 
industrial-commercial waste, it was always recognised that post-consumer waste may 
form an important part of the overall collection effort (DETR, 1998a; 1998c; 1999b). 
Whilst the DETR has quantified the split between the two (Table 5.8), these figures 
assume that all commercial-industrial waste will be recovered. They are therefore a 
conservative estimate of the likely final requirement for household waste recovery. Li 
order to examine the development of post-consumer waste collection in Britain, 
businesses responding to the reprocessor survey were asked to provide details of their 
involvement in waste collection and, in particular, their use of PRN revenue to develop 
partnerships with local authorities and private sector organisations. However, this 
analysis was hampered by the imprecise information provided by some reprocessors. 
For example, although only 15 of the 48 respondents reported having partnerships with 
local authorities - suggesting low interaction between the two groups - one reprocessor 
claimed 'to be working with' (in an unspecified manner) over 300 councils. Moreover, 
most respondents were unwilling to give specific details of partnership agreements, 
presumably because the information was commercially sensitive. The survey results 
were therefore inconclusive. The DETR review was less equivocal, however, and 
impressed the need for reprocessors to improve both the quantity and quality of 
household waste collection (DETR, 1999a). Yet the uneven power held by the 
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accredited reprocessors and local authority waste collection authorities appears to be a 
major obstacle to co-operation between the two sectors. When the PRN system was 
devised, local authorities were denied direct access to PRN revenue, making them 
reliant on reprocessors for additional funding (ENDS, 1996). Whilst it was envisaged 
that these transactions would naturally occur in response to the UK's recycling targets, 
this presumption overlooked the fact that individual reprocessors are not legally obliged 
to invest in waste collection. Reprocessors which have sufficient materials to keep 
their existing plants operating to capacity may therefore have little incentive to hand 
over PRN revenue to local authorities. 
One compliance scheme outlined the problem and the steps it was taking to rectify it: 
The main failing of the PRN system is that collection and sorting is not subsidised. As a 
result it is not helping the UK meet its targets and is not benefitting local authorities. The 
Company aims to overcome this problem by using the aggregated tonnage collected from 
local authorities for PRN acquisition and then dealing only with those reprocessors who 
would be willing to repay an element to be passed down the chain to local authorities. 
In response to this situation, the government has introduced new requirements which 
require reprocessors to report the proportion of PRN revenue spent annually on waste 
collection and the development of end markets (DETR, 1998a). However, the 
government stopped short of prescribing minimum levels of investment in these areas 
(Institute of Wastes Management, 1999). The DETR review also highlighted the 
importance of public education and participation to the expansion of waste collection. 
Whilst the Regulations stipulate that compliance schemes should develop public 
awareness programmes, the review conceded that: 'it is not clear that these are 
necessarily policies with real impact' (DETR 1998a: 41). In response, the DETR has 
made reviews of expenditure on public education initiatives a mandatory part of 
compliance scheme reporting. 
The British government has therefore been forced to re-regulate the recycling industry 
in several areas in order to prevent 'market failures' undermining the attainment of its 
policy objectives. In many ways, these policy iterations are analogous to the learning 
process undergone in the early years of the Packaging Ordinance. However, control 
over the expansion of waste collection for recycling remains largely out of the 
government's hands though, should the existing measures prove inadequate, it may be 
forced to intervene more stridently. In fact, two options were considered in the 
145 
government's Less Waste More Value consultation paper, the introduction of separate 
recycling targets for industrial and domestic packaging, and direct weight-based 
charging for household waste collection (DETR, 1998c). Both were subsequently 
dropped, however, separate targets because they added further complexity to the 
Regulations, and direct charging because of the disproportionate impact it would have 
on less affluent households (ACP, 1998). 
By contrast, the Germany government's legalistic approach to packaging waste policy 
has enjoyed more obvious success. Not only have waste deposit facilities at retail 
outlets and the Green Dot brought recycling directly to the public's attention, the DSD 
has also staged a series of high profile recycling awareness days. During its 1997 
event, over 300 recycling facilities opened to the public, attracting 830,000 visitors 
(MRW, 1998b). As a result of such activities, the DSD reports, 61% of Germans 
support the idea of the Green Dot and 95% sort their packaging waste for recycling. 
Whether similar transparency and success can be repeated in Britain is more debatable, 
as commercial confidentiality is an obvious concern for competing reprocessors and 
schemes. However, the fact that Germany has focused primarily on post-consumer 
waste collection and Britain on industrial waste must be a key factor in explaining the 
relative successes of the two systems. 
5.4.4 Reprocessors and the PRN System 
One of the main purposes of the PRN system was to create a market-based vehicle for 
generating investment in the reprocessing industry. Intuitively, it seems reasonable that 
accredited reprocessors should be happy with a system that supports their industry and 
provides considerable expansion opportunities. However, the structural problems in 
some sectors suggest this may not necesseu-ily be the case. To explore this issue, 
reprocessors were asked their general opinions on the merits and problems of the PRN 
system. Responses were then classified according to whether generally positive, 
neutral or negative sentiments were expressed. Of the 46 reprocessors answering this 
question, 12 held positive views of the PRN system, 18 were negative, and 16 wanted 
to see it develop further before passing final judgement. Table 5.9 summarising the 
opinions of each materials sector shows that, on balance, there is a greater emphasis on 
the negative aspects of the PRN system than might have been expected. Whilst it is 
difficult to generalise from such limited data, the aluminium, steel, glass and EfW 
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sectors expressed the greatest overall satisfaction with the PRN system, whilst paper 
and plastics reprocessors were noticeably less content. There is also the argument that 
if individual reprocessors (in whatever sector) are receiving PRN revenue which has the 
effect of making previously marginal operations more commercially attractive, there is 
no reason for them to protest. If, on the other hand, PRN revenue has failed to make 
some sectors profitable, their disenchantment is more understandable. As one 
compliance scheme put it: 
The glass, aluminium and steel areas have been a success simply because reprocessors 
have not needed to invest one jot in new capacity. 
Table 5.9 Reprocessor Attitudes towards PRN System (% of companies) 
Number of 
respondents 
Negative Neutral Positive 
Paper 13 53.8 46.2 0.0 
Glass 3 0.0 33.3 66.7 
Aluminium 2 0.0 50.0 50.0 
Steel 4 0.0 25.0 75.0 
Plastics 17 58.8 23.5 17.7 
Incineration 7 14.2 42.9 42.9 
The unease about the efficacy of the PRN system is also reflected in the policy debate 
which accompanied the scheme's introduction and which peaked in the 1998 review of 
the Regulations (ACP, 1998; DETR, 1998a). The debate broadly divided into those 
sectors of the packaging chain which supported the existing system - generally 
speaking, the reprocessing industry - and those packaging producers and compliance 
schemes that were convinced it was being manipulated. The disagreements centred on 
two fundamental issues, the PRN system's ability to finance the expansion of the 
recycling industry and the role of reprocessors in the management of PRNs and their 
associated revenue. 
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Stabilising markets and funding expansion 
As noted previously, the satisfaction with the PRN system as a method of generating 
investment revenue varies greatly between reprocessing sectors. Many respondents in 
fact viewed the PRN mechanism as extremely effective: 
All PRN revenue is used to promote recycling in the UK either by supporting price, or 
developing infrastructure or promoting awareness campaigns. If there is a surplus of 
recyclate the revenue can be used to support prices, conversely if there is a surplus of 
manufactured recycled end product then the revenue can be used to support lower sales 
prices to stimulate end markets, (aluminium) 
The revenue from PRNs enables us to buy waste which would not otherwise be viable 
commercially to pay for ... and to help finance expansion schemes, (plastics) 
It is our view that the current PRN situation is such that it provides economic justification 
for the installation of Energy from Waste facilities without which such projects would not 
proceed, (incineration) 
The PRN system is functioning well and will continue to develop. No major changes 
should be made to the overall structure of the system at the present time, (steel) 
The submissions from these reprocessors indicate that their perceptions of the PRN 
system generally correspond with those held by the Environment Agency when the 
scheme was conceived. Other respondents were more pessimistic about its stability and 
the investment conditions being created: 
It is difficult to invest in new facilities when long term guarantee of price (or demand) for 
PRNs cannot be given, (paper/plastics) 
The PRN system has at present collapsed. Unless we get stability in the market place next 
year ... we will have to stop using recyclable material, (plastics) 
The PRN system as it stands today is unsustainable as the surplus available is undermining 
the price structure and forcing the raw material price down. I have given you the basis of 
our problems and concerns [complexity, lack of enforcement, loss of money through PRN 
sales] ... but if I continued, I am sure I could fill ten pages with the problems and 
impossibilities of the scheme, (paper) 
Another plastics reprocessor gave a clearer indication of its problems. The company 
claimed that the cost of reprocessing one tonne of material, including purchase, 
delivery and reprocessing, was £270 per tonne. As the PRN value of plastics was £140 
per tonne at the time of correspondence, the company averred that it was unable to 
make a profit even when produce sales were taken into account. 
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The efficacy of the PRN system as an investment mechanism in fact seems to be 
impeded by two factors, the variability of PRN prices on the free market and the 
uncertainties created by the legislative regime. Whilst it was hoped that PRN prices 
would respond automatically to EU recycling targets and production efficiencies, 
market prices have also been strongly influenced by other supply and demand factors, 
many of which are international in character and beyond the government's control. 
This has been particularly the case for paper and glass. The simple relationship 
between legislative standards and market actions envisaged by the government has 
therefore proved to be an over-simplification. The situation has been exacerbated by 
the fact that producers and compliance schemes are required to report their compliance 
to the Environment Agency on an annual basis. This has made them reluctant to sign 
extended contracts for PRNs and denied reprocessors the finance to plan long-term 
investments (Bailey, 2000). This point was made by one plastics reprocessor. 
There is a potential conflict of interests between the compliance schemes and the 
reprocessors. Compliance schemes wish to obtain PRNs at the most economic rate and to 
remain flexible in what is a rapidly changing system. They are therefore reluctant to enter 
into longer term purchasing contracts. This can potentially work against reprocessors on 
both fronts by failing to create the conditions for a sustainable and expanding reprocessing 
market. 
The Management of PRNs and Revenue by Accredited Reprocessors 
A range of criticisms conceming the management of PRNs was also raised by 
compliance schemes and producers during the 1998 review. Firstly, they argued that 
the scheme did not provide producers with an incentive to set up collection schemes for 
packaging waste, as many reprocessors are charging for PRNs even when the producer 
itself collected and delivered the waste. This, along with the failure of reprocessors to 
fund local authority schemes, were cited as major reasons for the low collection and 
sorting rates in Britain. One compliance scheme noted that: 
An effective PRN system should have provided free proof of recycling to the originators of 
the waste. Those segregating waste and making it available for reprocessing should then 
have benefitted from the value of any Tradeable Permits. This ... notion was ignored and 
instead a ... system whereby reprocessors charged fees to reprocess material has sprung up 
in its place. 
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The most cost-effective option for many producers, therefore, is simply to discharge 
their recovery obligations by acquiring PRNs on the open market without expanding 
their recycling activities. Secondly, producer associations claimed that some parties 
were deliberately exploiting the reporting requirements of the Regulations. They 
suggested that PRNs were either being withheld by reprocessors until close to the 
annual reporting deadline or that they were being acquired by parties unconnected with 
the Regulations, in both cases to speculate on their value (Bailey, 1999b; 2000): 
There are concerns that this market mechanism could be abused by individuals or 
organisations with minimal or zero obligations under the Regulations seeking to profit by 
trading in PRNs, e.g. by stockpiling until the compliance date is imminent. This would 
merely increase the cost to obligated companies, and make no contribution to the growth of 
recycling. This concern would not arise if the mechanism to demonstrate compliance were 
to be separated from the mechanism needed to inject funds into the system as is the case 
with most EU Member States, (producer association) 
The final allegation was that reprocessors were simply using PRN revenue to furnish 
company profits rather than investing in recycling infrastructure. 
Those sectors requiring fundamental investment such as paper, card and plastic have 
demonstrated a complete inability to prove where the funds have gone - and we strongly 
suspect that those funding flows have propped up balance sheets or P&L at a time of 
falling global commodity prices, (compliance scheme) 
The rationale behind charging for PRNs ... was to provide a financial incentive to stimulate 
collection and sortation and capital to increase the UK's reprocessing facilities. However, 
there is no guarantee that reprocessors will use the funds in this way. Indeed one company 
has been offered PRNs at £35 per tonne for waste being incinerated with energy recovery 
and there is no intention of using the money to increase recovery rates. The injection of 
revenue is moving from obligated companies to enhance reprocessor's profits, which is of 
no help to the environment. This is unfair, unjustified and totally against the spirit of 
shared responsibility under which the Regulations were developed, (producer association) 
In fact, the extent of either practice has never been fully proven and the movement of 
PRN prices seems inconsistent with the existence of widespread profiteering. If this 
had occurred, PRN prices should have appreciated steadily and shown marked 
increases around the compliance deadline each January. However, all PRN prices have 
dropped markedly since the scheme was established (the value of plastics PRNs, for 
example, fell by 73.8% between 1998 and 2000) (Figure 5.7). Whilst the monthly price 
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Figure 5.7 PRN Price movements 1998-2000 
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movements for the steel and incineration sectors, for example, (Figure 5.8) shov^ ' small 
increases around the compliance deadlines, the downward trend has been reasonably 
consistent for all materials. However, the multitude of concerns about the PRN system 
persuaded the government that additional controls were required. In addition to the 
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requirement for reprocessors to report the proportion of PRN revenue diverted towards 
infrastructure development, the review supported the ACP's recommendation that the 
issue of PRNs should be restricted to those parties directly connected with the 
Regulations (ACP, 1998; DETR, 1998a). Aside from these restrictions, the 
government has supported the ACP's view that maintaining the PRN system's market-
led approach is essential for the successful delivery of the EU's recovery and recycling 
targets (ACP, 1998). 
It should be noted that the German pricing mechanism for packaging waste has also 
been heavily criticised in terms of its economic inefficiencies and net environmental 
achievements (House of Commons, 1997). Staudt (1997) and Eichstadt et al. (1999) 
both argue that recovery and recycling were already increasing before the Packaging 
Ordinance and therefore that effect of the Dual System was not as significant as its 
management claims. As evidence of this, Eichstadt et al. cite Umweltsbundesamt 
(Federal Environment Agency) figures showing that 1.79 million tonnes of glass were 
recycled in 1990 (p. 145). Staudt claims that as recycling would have reached 3.7 
million tonnes per annum without the Dual System, the 'real' additional figure 
achieved by the DSD, 2 million tonnes, does not justify the costs involved. 
Continuing the attack, Staudt also suggests that the full cost of the DSD to industry is 9 
billion Deutschmarks (£3.2 billion at the time Staudt's report was compiled) rather than 
the official 4.4 billion Deutschmarks (£1.6 billion) reported. According to other 
reports, however, a large proportion of the DSD's ongoing costs are a consequence of 
its set up and early losses, leaving much potential for future savings (Handelsblatt, 
1997). Arguably the recent reductions in Green Dot charges are a sign of this trend, as 
is the DSD's announcement that its waste management costs fell by 240 million 
Deutschmarks in 1999. Whilst a recent Conrnnission report concluded that the German 
system has achieved the greatest absolute environmental benefit of four national 
PWMSs studied (Britain, France and the Netherlands were the others), it found that this 
was achieved at the highest per unit cost (CEC, 2000a). Michaelis' (1995) conclusion 
is that the DSD has not yet achieved economic efficiency but that it has the potential to 
do so. Staudt (1997) nonetheless argues that greater reliance on incineration and an 
integrated waste management approach would have yielded more beneficial economic, 
environmental and social outcomes. However, Eichstadt et al. (1999) produce an 
interesting defence of the DSD's high costs. They argue that lower charges would 
152 
make the recovery and recycling of packaging waste more economic and would 
therefore remove the only incentive for packaging avoidance contained in the 
Ordinance. Consequentiy, they conclude that economic efficiency on the output side 
(wastes) is often in conflict with environmental efficiency on the input side (packaging 
design) (also Brisson, 1993). 
The overall question, therefore, is whether price and market-based models of 
environmental management are capable of producing environmentally-efficient 
outcomes. First, it must be recognised that as neither system is a fully-fledged market-
led model but rather are post hoc additions to legislative intervention, many of their 
deficiencies relate to the fact that they must operate in sub-optimal conditions (though 
this was always likely to be the case). For example, the PRN system is not a market 
with free choice between buyers and sellers, as producers and compliance schemes are 
obliged to participate in order prove their compliance with the Regulations and 
reprocessors are constrained by the unwillingness of producers to enter into long-term 
contracts. As such, 'free' choice is restricted for all players in the PRN market. The 
only market force that might have counteracted restrictive practices, competition 
amongst reprocessors and compliance schemes, does not appear to have created the 
necessary balance. It was therefore impossible for the British govemment to permit 
these distortions to persist and, with the benefit of hindsight, the additional controls 
imposed were inevitable. 
However, there also appear to be deep-seated structural conflicts between the priorities 
of the market and those of environmental efficiency. Firstly, there is the market's 
inability, or disinclination, to use hypothecated resources for environmental purposes. 
If neither market forces nor government regulation provides market players with 
requisite incentives to invest in environmental protection measures, investment is 
unlikely to occur of its own volition. Where market and policy priorities are 
compatible, the interests of both parties may be promoted; where there are clashes, the 
outcome depends on the market constraints in place. Secondly, there is the sheer 
complexity of market systems. Reprocessors participating in the PRN system are 
responding to numerous stimuli, many of which are not controlled by the Regulations. 
Understanding the inputs and outputs dictating market behaviour is an intricate task and 
may require numerous policy iterations. Whilst it would be unfair to claim that market 
forces have acted totally against the aims of the UK legislation, Sinclair and Fenton 
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(1997) argue that market mechanisms are flawed because they do not possess the 
natural mechanisms to overcome such impediments. A less damning assessment, 
echoing Turner et al., (1998), would be that clear govemment guidance is required in 
the design and control of price-based environmental policy instmments if damaging 
disincentives are to be avoided. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the negotiation and transposition of the 
Packaging Directive and its implementation in two Member States. In so doing, many 
of the tensions associated with environmental policy-making in the EU have been 
highlighted. The main, though not entirely new, revelation is the extent to which 
Member-State interests and practices influence each level of EU decision-making. In 
common with most EU legislation, the Packaging Directive was the product, not of any 
mutually-agreed 'rational' criteria, but rather was comprised of diluted and politicised 
objectives intermingled with the derogations and flexibility necessary to make the 
policy acceptable to each Member State. 
Viewed from this perspective, EU environmental policy still demonstrates many 
features of the lowest-common-denominator bargaining that generally characterises 
inter-governmental agreements. Against this, the fact that the Member States are more 
committed to collective action than would be the case in an entirely inter-governmental 
grouping enabled a more radical programme of reform to be established than some 
states would otherwise have accepted. This confederal element of the EU persona has 
enabled environmental policy to develop agreements which are more ambitious than 
anything hitherto established (Zito, 2000). What is less clear, however, is whether the 
EU's particular form of bargaining-focused policy formulation can produce adequate 
responses to the environmental problems confronting the EU. This point is considered 
further in Chapter eight. 
Similar issues have arisen in the implementation of the Directive in Britain and 
Germany. Reflecting its desire to achieve cost-effective compliance, the UK 
govemment has adopted a relatively liberal and market-led system of packaging waste 
management, while successive German administrations have used constrictive policies 
to defend their chosen environmental principles and practices (Ramus, 1991; Lowe and 
Ward, 1998a). The resuh in Germany is a system which has met its stated 
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environmental objectives but has yet to achieve economic efficiency (Michaelis, 1995; 
Staudt, 1997). The British model, by contrast, is relatively cost efficient but is 
struggling to attain its environmental targets. Although the two governments have 
always differed in the way they prioritise and interpret environmental policy (Gee, 
1997; Lowe and Ward, 1998a), price-based regulation, by its very nature, may further 
integrate and entrench these differences. If this occurs, then the gap between the EU's 
environmental 'leader' and 'laggard' states may widen and the common strand of 
sustainable development linking them may become harder to discern. 
However, the study also revealed areas where the policy styles of the two countries are 
converging. The British government, whilst not revoking its 'free' market principles, 
has started to regulate its recycling meuket more earnestly. Similarly, the debate in 
Germany has increasingly focused on methods for improving the economic efficiency 
of the Ordinance, including the introduction of competitive pressures and greater 
financial accountability. Therefore, despite the ideological differences that initially 
informed each policy approach, both models have been forced to reconsolidate in 
response to common practical pressures. Whilst total harmonisation is unlikely, the EU 
policy process provides numerous opportunities for national and regional authorities to 
transfer knowledge and best practice. If these possibilities are properly exploited, they 
should prove invaluable in the development of cost-efficient and sustainable 
environmental management systems in the Member States. 
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Chapter Six 
Industry's Response to the Packaging Waste Directive 
6.1 Introduction 
Having examined the general framev^ o^rks of packaging regulation in Britain and 
Germany, the next two chapters assess their impact on business waste management 
strategies. Chapter six compares the extent to which British and German businesses are 
responding to the Directive's objectives in terms of (i) the mandatory recovery and 
recycling standards outlined in Chapter five and (ii) the 'essential objectives' contained 
in Annex n of the Directive. This latter category encompasses the prevention and re-
use of packaging waste as well as the development of end-use markets for recycled 
materials. Where appropriate, the policies are also assessed in terms of whether 
business actions are consistent with the generic environmental principles established in 
the EAPs. These include the Polluter Pays Principle, the Proximity and Precautionary 
Principles, the adoption of preventative rather than 'end-of-pipe' cures for 
environmental problems and the integration of environmental considerations into all 
spheres of policy and business activity. Chapter seven then explores the impact of 
economic instruments and, specifically, the influence of environmental charges on 
polluter behaviour. The principal data used in both chapters are derived from the 
survey of UK and German packaging producers. 
Chapter six begins with a preliminary assessment of the data. The purpose of this is to 
identify any factors that might prejudice comparisons between the German and U K 
respondent groups (this procedure is recommended by Silk (1979), also Shaw and 
Wheeler (1994) and de Vaus (1996)). This is followed by an appraisal of business 
reactions to mandatory recovery and recycling targets as well as the Directive's 
essential objectives. The final section presents qualitative feedback from businesses on 
the efficacy and impact of national packaging regulations. 
6.2 Profiles of the Respondent Groups 
Several facts about the two respondent groups were established in Chapter four. 
Firstiy, the number of businesses replying to the survey was greater than anticipated 
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during the research design, hi total, 52.1% of British and 34.3% of German companies 
completed the questionnaire. Secondly, it was argued that the sampling process was 
largely successful in identifying businesses affected by national packaging legislation 
(see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). However, because the German database was compiled 
independently rather than using an official directory of obligated companies, it was 
important to identify any discrepancies between the two groups'. Two preliminary 
filter questions were therefore used to establish whether potential respondents were (i) 
aware of national packaging legislation, and (ii) subject to specific legal duties as a 
result (see Chapter four). These data, analysed using Chi-Square tests (Table 6.1), 
confirmed that 96.4% of UK respondents are obligated by the Packaging Regulations 
and that 76.4% of German businesses are affected by the Packaging Ordinance. This 
therefore reduced the number of valid responses to 450 for the UK (50.0%) and 236 for 
Germany (26.2%). 
The next stage was to compare the characteristics of the two respondent groups. These 
were measured in the survey in terms of (i) company turnover, (ii) number of 
employees, (iii) business sector within the packaging chain and (iv) main activity. It 
should be remembered, however, that some variations were expected as the Ordinance 
and Regulations distribute recycling responsibilities differently amongst the sectors of 
the packaging chain. Any variations between the groups should nonetheless be 
recognised and assessed. Chi-Square tests were again used to examine respondent 
profiles and revealed significant variances between the samples for all profile variables 
(Table 6.1). In terms of company turnover, the principal differences were caused by 
the higher representation of German businesses with annual earnings of either below £5 
million or over £1,000 million. As the sampling procedure attempted to remove 
German firms with a turnover of below £5 million, their presence indicates that there 
were inaccuracies in the business directory used to compile the sample. However, 
these respondents were not removed from the sample because the Ordinance does not 
apply the £5 million minimum turnover threshold used in the Regulations (see Chapter 
five). Moreover, as both samples are dominated by businesses in the £5-49 million 
turnover category, the variances were considered to be within acceptable limits. 
' Though the German sampHng frame was compiled following extensive analysis of the Packaging 
Ordinance and other relevant literature (including other academic and professional commentaries). 
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Table 6.1 Analysis of Respondent Characteristics 
Germany UK Chi-Square {^) 
and sig. 
No. of business aware of national 288 463 16.923 
packaging legislation 0.000 
No. of businesses affected by packaging 236 450 67.163 
legislation 0.000 
Turnover (£ million per annum) 
0-4.99 22 3 
5-49 129 272 
50-99 27 65 
100-499 24 63 
500-999 8 16 
1,000+ 19 12 
Total 229 431 45.278 
0.000 
Number of employees 
0-49 10 52 
50-99 47 75 
100-499 98 192 
500-999 21 60 
1,000-4,999 13 45 
5,000+ 8 24 
Total 197 448 13.843 
0.017 
Main business activity 
Domestic trade 161 230 
Import 6 29 
Export 18 28 
More than one category 24 150 
Total 209 437 45.961 
0.000 
Packaging chain sector 
Raw materials producer 2 8 
Packaging manufacturer 4 39 
Product manufacturer 141 229 
Wholesaler 21 33 
Retailer 22 35 
More than one category 42 93 
Total 232 437 16.663 
0.005 
A similar pattern emerged with respect to the average number of employees per 
company. In this case, there was a concentration in both countries of respondents with 
100-499 employees and a higher representation of German businesses with 50-99 
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employees. The variance can again be explained by differences between the Ordinance 
and the UK Regulations, as can the greater number of product manufacturers (packer-
fillers) in the German sample. Whilst the Ordinance focuses the majority of recycling 
responsibilities on manufacturers and retailers, the Regulations spread obligations 
across all sectors of the packaging chain. Thus, a degree of imbalance was to be 
expected. The variations in main business activity are less readily explained except in 
terms of the chance self-selection of respondents. Here, a greater proportion of German 
respondents classified themselves as dealing exclusively in domestic trade or exports 
and a larger share of British firms companies were engaged in more than one category 
of commerce. Though this may reflect the broader trade profiles of German and U K 
industry, it must be remembered that circumstances prevented the compilation of an 
ideal sampling frame for Germany. Working with limited and imperfect data is a 
frequent hazard in scientific research, particularly in the social sciences (Sarantakos, 
1993). However, whilst there were clear differences between the profiles of the two 
respondent groups, the majority can be explained by legislative factors. Their influence 
on business waste management practices was nonetheless monitored throughout the 
data analysis. 
6.3 Waste Management Actions in the UK and Germany 
6.3.1 Introduction 
When planning the survey strategy, consideration was given to the merits of asking 
respondent businesses if they intended to, or were capable of, achieving the statutory 
targets set by the Packaging Directive. This approach was seen as potentially perilous, 
however, first, because it might have seriously reduced the response rate and, second, 
answers to this question would be likely to contain a strong element of social 
desirability bias^. In short, it seemed improbable that companies would confess to an 
illegal act even under the protection of respondent confidentiality. It was therefore 
decided that an implicit assumption should be made that all affected businesses would 
achieve their statutory obligations. That said, there is evidence that such a presumption 
might be over-optimistic. Both the German and British governments have been forced 
to embark on major programmes to pursue free-riders (Michaelis, 1995; Perchards, 
^Social desirability is the phenomena whereby survey respondents provide answers they believe will 
reflect them in a good light. The issues of sensitive questions and social desirability responses are 
extensively discussed in Moser and Kalton (1971) and Czaja and Blair (1996). 
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1998; DETR, 1998a; Bailey, 1999c). Moreover, there were sizeable discrepancies 
between DETR and business estimates of the total packaging produced in the U K in 
1997-8 (DETR, 1999a). The total packaging production reported by U K industry fell 
from 12.5 to 7.7 million tonnes between 1997 and 1998, compared with DETR 
estimates of 11.8 million and 10.2 million tonnes for the same years. Although the 
DETR figures are acknowledged to be best estimates, these discrepancies raise doubts 
as to the honesty of some industry reporting. 
The problem was partially circumvented by asking respondents to provide details of 
their involvement in the physical collection of packaging waste. Whilst this does not 
directly measure the proportion of firms achieving legal compliance, it does quantify 
their active participation in waste reclamation. As neither set of regulations currently 
compels businesses to recover their packaging waste physically (see Chapter five), 
evidence that they are doing so would be a reasonable, if imperfect, indication of their 
commitment to recycling. However, this does not alter the fact that potentially relevant 
information had to be foregone in order to increase the survey response rate. Business 
responses were therefore measured against the four main requirements of the Directive 
and the waste management hierarchy (CEC, 1996d; Wilson, 1996); (i) the collection of 
waste, (ii) the prevention or source reduction of packaging waste, (iii) the use of re-
usable packaging and (iv) the purchase of packaging made from recycled materials. 
For each variable, business response was measured in terms of the proportion of 
companies engaged in each activity and their level of involvement measured as a 
percentage of total packaging production or use. 
6.3.2 Characteristics of the Survey Variables 
The first stages in the data analysis were to review the basic characteristics of the data 
and to establish the most appropriate statistical procedures. Such preliminaries 
(recommended by Ebdon (1985), Griffith and Amrheim (1991) and Shaw and Wheeler 
(1994)) involve the production of descriptive statistics and histograms for each 
variable. These procedures revealed that few of the ordinal or interval variables were 
normally distributed but were instead positively skewed. This meant that the majority 
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of statistical analysis was conducted using non-parametric techniques (Silk, 1979; 
Norcliffe, 1982; Clegg, 1990)1 
6.3.3 Packaging Waste Collection 
Two measures were used to examine the collection of packaging waste by respondent 
companies, the reclamation of waste materials at business sites and the physical 
recovery of packaging back through the supply chain. The purpose of making this 
distinction was to determine the precise nature of industry involvement in packaging 
recovery. Fenton and Sinclair (1996) stress that producers of packaging should assume 
responsibility for the full environmental impact caused by products they introduce to 
the market-place, a code they term environmental stewardship (also Lemer, 1993). 
Thus, environmental stewardship involves a duty of care throughout the production, 
sales, use and disposal of products. Although it is not always environmentally or 
economically effective for businesses to recover packaging waste from customers, 
especially where this involves substantial transportation, such actions are indicative of 
producers' willingness to participate in active pollution stewardship (Hill et al., 1994; 
Powell et al., 1996; Barrett and Lawlor, 1997). One example of 'enforced' stewardship 
in Germany, reported in Chapter five, is the Packaging Ordinance's requirement that 
distributors and retailers provide packaging disposal points at retail outlets (DSD, 
1998). As no corresponding obligation exists in the U K Regulations, the expectation 
was that more German businesses would be engaged in waste collection. 
Table 6.2 shows Chi-Square analyses for the collection of packaging waste from 
producer sites and customers. It demonstrates that though the majority of respondent 
companies in both countries collect production waste, 85.3% of German respondents 
have recovery schemes compared with 64.9% of Britain firms (Chi-Square (x^) = 
30.892, significance = 0.000). However, only a minority of companies in either 
country collect packaging waste from their customers (18.4% in Germany, 13.4% in 
Britain, = 2.820, significance = 0.093). Therefore, on the evidence available, there 
is no appreciable difference between the attitudes of German and UK businesses 
towards post-consumer waste collection. Considering that most sales packaging 
The majority of the data in the set were either nominal or ordinal scale measurements of respondent 
characteristics or attitudes. Only percentage waste management targets and financial costs to producers 
were measured as interval-ratio data. The minimum acceptance criterion for all statistical tests was set at 
the 95% confidence limit. 
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remains with goods until the point of final consumption, this result is not surprising 
(Levy, 1993). It also reflects the fact that most waste collection is organised by the 
DSD in Germany or local collection authorities in Britain. This suggestion was further 
corroborated by the finding that German wholesalers and retailers - the only sectors 
obliged to provide collection facilities - were more heavily involved in post-consumer 
waste recovery (N = 221, y} = 21.351, df = 5, p = 0.001). Unsurprisingly, considering 
the broader split of sector responsibilities in the U K Regulations and its lack of 
provisions forcing retailers to provide waste disposal facilities, no corresponding 
relationships were found in the U K data (N = 431, = 3.990, df = 5, p = 0.551). 
Table 6.2 British and German Packaging Collection Plans 
Germany UK Chi-Square (^) 
and sig. 
No. of businesses collecting packaging 
waste from business premises 
193 279 
% of total respondent group 85.4 64.5 30.892 
0.000 
No. of businesses recovering packaging 
waste from customers 
41 58 
% of total respondent group 18.4 13.4 2.820 
0.093 
Packaging collection rates 1997 
Number of respondents 
Mean collection rate (%) 
Median collection rate (%) 
Mean rank 
166 
40.3 
27.5 
303.4 
330 
21.1 
5.0 
220.9 
Mann-Whitney 
U and 2-tail sig. 
Mean rank and sum of ranks 50369.5 72886.5 18271.5 
0.000 
In fact, the only company characteristic with a significant bearing on waste collection 
in the U K was the number of employees per company, where smaller businesses were 
less likely to collect packaging at their own premises than larger companies (N = 428, 
X^ = 14.372, df = 5, p = 0.031). This was presumably because waste collection is a 
greater drain on resources for smaller companies. However, the division between 
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SMEs and larger companies was not significant in Germany (N = 201, = 5.204, df = 
5, p = 0.392), again because the collection of sales packaging is organised by the Dual 
System. As the DSD only deals with sales packaging, this also explains why more 
German businesses collect their post-production packaging waste (see Chapter five). 
However, whilst a greater proportion of German businesses are recovering their 
packaging waste, both groups have apparently avoided the complex and costly task of 
reclaiming waste through the supply chain. The fact that British companies do not 
receive PRNs free of charge for 'self-collected' waste has undoubtedly contributed to 
their antipathy (see Chapter five). Also, the exclusion of non-sales packaging from the 
Dual System - but its inclusion in business' overall recycling targets - may well have 
encouraged higher recovery rates in Germany. 
The next stage was to compare the average packaging collection rates of the two 
respondent groups. In the survey, this was measured as the percentage of total 
packaging produced or used by respondents in 1997 (Table 6.2). The results again 
indicate that German businesses are collecting a significantly higher proportion of their 
total packaging, a mean of 40.3% (standard error of mean (SE Mean) = 2.81), 
compared with 21.1% in the UK (SE Mean = 1.55). The median packaging collection 
rates were 27.5% for Germany and 5% for the UK. Mann-Whitney tests confirmed that 
these differences were over 99.9% significant. 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were then used to analyse the influence of company 
characteristics on waste collection rates. The only significant relationship revealed was 
that smaller businesses in the UK generally recover less packaging (%2 = 11.445, df = 5, 
significance = 0.043). This stage of the survey has therefore revealed three major 
points. First, significantly more German firms are involved in collecting packaging 
waste, though both groups have generally ignored post-consumer waste recovery. 
Second, German companies are, on average, recovering a larger proportion of their 
packaging waste. Third, this commitment seems to extend to all sectors of German 
industry. It is particularly noteworthy that the German SME sector has taken on greater 
waste management responsibilities. As SMEs usually find it more difficult to devote 
resources to non-core activities, this suggests that active waste management is 
becoming firmly embedded in the German economy. 
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6.3.4 Source Reduction 
The next stage of the analysis was to examine business behaviour in relation to the 
Directive's primary essential objective, the prevention or source reduction of packaging 
waste. In order to assess this, survey respondents were asked to provide details of any 
programmes they had to reduce the amount of packaging produced by their companies. 
57.1% of German respondents had reduction plans by 1998 compared with 12.8% of 
British businesses (Table 6.3). This corroborates the findings from a survey by UK 
trading standards authorities, where just 9% of products were adjudged to make 
efficient use of packaging materials. Of 105 products tested, 15 contained twice the 
amount of packaging required to contain the product adequately (ENDS, 1999). 
The methods used by companies to reduce packaging were also explored in the survey 
(Table 6.3). Two options were considered; reductions in the total amount of packaging 
consumed by respondent firms, and the 'light-weighting' of packaging (the technique 
of reducing the weight of packaging per product unit). The importance of this 
distinction is that it highlights the extent to which businesses are placing absolute or 
relative limits on their use of packaging and therefore relates back to the notions of 
weak and strong sustainability outlined in Chapter two. Weak sustainability, it will be 
remembered, generally supports the substitution of natural capital for human capital 
provided production and consumption processes are made less environmentally 
damaging. However, strong sustainability places a stronger emphasis on 
acknowledging absolute carrying capacities which human society must operate within. 
Huppes et al. (1992) argue that the majority of environmental legislation imposes 
relative improvement or prohibition standards because they specify minimum per-unit 
quality standards. This is not true in all cases; the Montreal Protocol, for example, 
imposed a complete ban on the production of CFC gases. Similarly, participants at the 
Rio Conference committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels 
by the year 2000 (DoE, 1996a; Lowe and Ward, 1998a; Oberthur, 1999). Furthermore, 
not all economic instruments operate in a relativist manner. Tradeable permits, for 
instance, set absolute ceilings on prescribed pollutants (Pearce et al., 1995). Relative 
quality standards nonetheless remain the predominant form of policy intervention. 
Supporters of strong sustainability argue that this approach has severe deficiencies 
where quality standards contain limited reference to the environment's resilience to 
resource depletion (Forrester, 1999). Relative reductions in packaging consumption 
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might therefore be taken to be a policy expression of the weak sustainability approach 
to environmental management, whilst absolute targets are more analogous to the 
concept of strong sustainability. 
Table 6.3 British and German Packaging Reduction Plans 
Germany UK Chi-Square (x^) 
and sig. 
No. of businesses with packaging reduction 125 55 142.429 
programmes (57.1%) (12.8%) 0.000 
Type of reduction programme 
None 75 362 
Reduction in total packaging use 67 35 
'Light-weighting' of packaging 35 18 
Combination of both methods 15 11 135.406 
0.000 
Planned packaging reduction percentages Mann-Whitney 
1997-2001 U and 2-tail sig. 
Number of respondents 195 401 
Mean reduction rate (%) 10.8 2.0 
Median reduction rate (%) 5.0 0.0 
Mean rank 387.3 255.3 
Mean rank and sum of ranks 75522.5 102383.5 21782.5 
0.000 
Although 85% of UK respondent businesses and 39.1% in Germany had adopted 
neither strategy, 34.9% of German respondents have committed to reductions in their 
total packaging consumption. This compares with 8.2% in Britain. A further 18.2% of 
German companies and 4.2% of British firms have begun light-weighting programmes. 
The percentage of businesses adopting a combination of the two approaches was 7.8% 
in Germany and 2.6% in Britain. The main explanation for these differences appears to 
be the way in which the German and British charging systems for packaging waste 
operate'*. Because Green Dot fees are charged for all packaging regardless of whether 
it is recycled, they create a stronger incentive for German industry to reduce excess 
packaging. By contrast, British producers are only required to pay for PRNs according 
to the recovery and recycling targets contained in the Regulations (see Chapter five). 
•* Though a code of practice for packaging design was also published in the UK (INCPEN, 1998). 
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Furthermore, the fact that recycling charges are substantially higher in Germany makes 
it more difficult for businesses to recoup their environmental costs from consumers. 
Greater changes in corporate practice are therefore encouraged. Though it would be 
ambitious to claim that either system has achieved a strong sustainability outcome, the 
German model appears to be more precautionary and is closer to defining overall limits 
on the production of packaging waste. 
The mean packaging reduction rates in each country (Table 6.3) further corroborated 
this conclusion. German businesses with reduction programmes predicted they would 
reduce their packaging use by 10.75% between 1997 and 2001 (SE Mean = 1.10, 
median = 5.0%). This compares with a mean of 1.96% for the U K (SE Mean = 0.32, 
median = 0.0%). Chi-Square and Kruskal-Wallis tests were again used to test the 
impact of company profile characteristics on the packaging reduction variables but no 
significant relationships were found. Again it would be premature to conclude that the 
majority of businesses in either country are reducing packaging consumption. 
However, the notions of preventative action and quantitative limits do seem to have 
gained a firmer foothold in Germany than the UK. 
6.3.5 Packaging Re-use 
After the reduction of packaging waste, the re-use of materials is often, though not 
universally, considered the least environmentally deleterious method of waste 
management (Barrett and Lawlor, 1997; Gray, 1997). Whilst a number of 
environmental leader states, including Germany and Denmark, have made re-use 
provisions a central part of their PWMSs (see Chapter five), the flexible approach of 
the UK Regulations sought to avoid such methodologically-prescriptive legislation. It 
was therefore expected that the survey would uncover sizeable differences between 
each respondent group's commitment to packaging re-use. 
Table 6.4 summarises the number of companies in each country with re-use schemes in 
operation. In total, 23.9% of UK companies had re-use plans, compared with 52.5% in 
Germany. However, though the difference between the mean packaging re-use targets 
set by the two groups was still statisticedly significant, it was not as extreme as for 
reduction. The mean re-use rate in Germany is predicted to increase between 1997 and 
2001 from 24.3% to 32.1% (SE Mean = 2.33), whilst the UK re-use rate is anticipated 
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to rise from 10.5% to 15.8% in the same period (SE Mean = 1.15). Though this 
indicates that both respondent groups are exploring the potential of re-use systems ,^ the 
difference in participation rates can be explained by the fact that re-fill systems are a 
formal part of the Ordinance but not the UK Regulations (Eichstadt et al., 1999). 
Table 6.4 Packaging Re-use by UK and German Companies 
Germany UK Chi-Square (x^) 
and sig. 
No. of businesses with packaging re-use 116 103 53.535 
programmes (52.5%) (23.8%) 0.000 
Packaging re-use 1997 Mann- Whitney 
U and sig. 
Number of respondents 166 321 
Mean re-use rate (%) 24.4 10.5 
Median re-use rate (%) 10.0 0.0 
Mean rank 298.9 215.6 
Mean rank and sum of ranks 49614.5 69213.5 17532.5 
0.000 
Planned packaging re-use 2001 
Number of respondents 155 303 
Mean re-use rate (%) 32.1 15.8 
Median re-use rate (%) 20.0 2.5 
Mean rank 277.7 204.9 
Mean rank and sum of ranks 43037.5 62073.5 16017.5 
0.000 
However, one important qualification is necessary here. Packaging made from wood, 
including wooden pallets, is included in the U K Regulations for the first time in 2000^. 
As most pallets are already managed using closed-loop re-use systems (for example, 
the GKN Chep system), this has undoubtedly inflated the U K re-use figures. It is 
unlikely that wood has had the same effect on German re-use rates as wood is rarely 
used in sales packaging (the main focus of the Ordinance) and therefore a large 
proportion of the German figures can be attributed to the re-fill targets for beverage 
^ Examples include the introduction of re-usable trays for the transport of fresh foods by Tesco's and the 
use of 'tote bin' containers for small products by Makro UK. In both cases, these goods were previously 
transported in single-trip cardboard boxes. 
^ The Environment Agency confirmed the inclusion of pallets in the Regulations during a personal 
correspondence. 
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containers. Consequently, it seems that German businesses are appreciably more 
advanced in the development of re-use systems than their UK counterparts. Again the 
impact of company profile, particularly business size, was minimal. However, in both 
cases, exporters were more likely to have re-use systems in operation. In light of the 
high cost of back-loading waste packaging, this is a surprising result, though again the 
influence of wooden pallets on these figures should not be discounted. 
6.3.6 The Purchase of Recycled Packaging 
The development of end-use markets is the obvious and logical outcome of any 
recycling system. Recycling in fact achieves few environmental benefits if reclaimed 
materials are not re-utilised to conserve energy and natural resources. Indeed, recycling 
usually involves extensive transportation networks and significant detrimental 
environmental impacts. Recycling can therefore only be justified where there are 
healthy markets for the end produce. Barrett et al. (1997: 113) provide an illustration 
of the energy savings gained from recycling packaging materials (see Table 6.5). The 
DETR reviews of the U K Regulations have therefore focussed on the development of 
end markets, whilst the DSD is founded almost entirely on the notion of 'closing the 
recycling loop' (DETR, 1998a; 1999a; DSD, 1998)'. 
Table 6.5 External benefits of Recycling, Energy Saved 
Material Value of energy saving per tonne of 
recycled material 
£ 
Aluminium 186 
Glass 2 
Paper 24 
Tinplate (steel) 16 
Plastics (average) 148 
Barrett etal. (1997: 113) 
Closing the loop refers to systems whereby materials are extracted from waste chains then reprocessed 
and re-utilised, thereby diminishing the need for new resource depletion. A variant of this is down-
cycling, a term used to denote materials reprocessed for secondary uses, such as the manufacture of park 
benches from recycled plastics. The German government generally frowns upon this practice on the 
grounds that it only delays the disposal of re-usable resources. 
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Whilst all sectors of society can contribute to the development of end-use markets, both 
governments have recognised that industry's purchasing behaviour is a key component 
of this loop. Its involvement was assessed in the survey by asking respondents to 
quantify the percentage of their total packaging produced using recycled materials 
(Table 6.6). The results showed that 53.2% of German respondents utilised recycled 
packaging in 1997 compared with 24.9% of British firms. Similarly, the percentage of 
recycled packaging used by respondent companies in Germany is predicted to increase 
from 32.3% in 1997 (SE Mean = 2.62) to 47.36% by 2001 (SE Mean = 2.92). This 
compares with a rise in the UK from 14.38% (SE Mean = 1.35) to 20.49% (SE Mean = 
1.69). The median rates indicate an even greater gap, 30% in Germany in 1997 rising 
to 50% in 2001, against 2% and 10% for UK respondents. 
Table 6.6 Purchase of Recycled Packaging by UK and German Companies 
Germany UK 
Chi-Square (z^) and sig. 
No. of businesses purchasing recycled 115 105 50.860 
packaging (53.2) (24.9) 0.000 
Recycled packaging purchases 1997 Mann-Whitney 
U and sig. 
Number of respondents 161 318 
Mean % of total use 37.2 14.4 
Median % of total use 30.0 2.0 
Mean rank 307.4 205.9 
Mean rank and sum of ranks 49494.0 65466.0 14745.0 
0.000 
Planned recycled packaging purchases 
2001 
Number of respondents 154 278 
Mean % of total use 47.4 20.5 
Median % of total use 50.0 10.0 
Mean rank 274.3 184.5 
Mean rank and sum of ranks 42243.5 51284.5 12503.5 
0.000 
Notwithstanding these differences, there is a clear upward trend in both sets of data, 
reflecting the importance of end markets to the British and German PWMSs. Whilst 
this is an encouraging trend both from an environmental and an economic viewpoint, it 
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is possible that the responses were again influenced by 'social-desirability' factors. 
Indeed, all the data have conceivably been exaggerated by businesses wishing to 
present themselves as responsible environmental stewards. Whilst there is no research 
technique which can entirely eliminate social-desirability distortions (May, 1997), the 
consistency of the data suggests that the trends uncovered were reliable even supposing 
the figures were slightly inflated. 
Unlike the majority of other waste management indicators, the purchase of recycled 
packaging was influenced by several business profile factors. For example, U K 
importers and exporters were, on average, less likely to buy recycled packaging (x^ = 
7.818, n = 421, df = 3, significance = 0.050), whilst larger companies and product 
manufacturers generally used more recycled materials (Kruskall-Wallis (K-W) = 
16.666, n = 316, df = 5, significance = 0.005). In Germany, firms with a higher 
turnover were more likely to buy recycled packaging (x^ = 16.437, n = 213, df = 5, 
significance = 0.006, K-W = 21.012, n = 159, df = 5, significance = 0.001), as were 
German product manufacturers (1997 K-W = 9.926, n = 159, df = 4, significance = 
0.042). 
There is no obvious explanation why larger companies should be more inclined to buy 
recycled packaging than SMEs, though information asynmietry and the ability of larger 
businesses to extract price concessions from would-be sellers may be explanatory 
factors. The antipathy of UK importers and exporters towards recycled packaging is 
easier to account for, however. Importers, in particular, have limited visibility and 
control over their materials sources (though some UK retailers have been especially 
active in developing 'environmentally-ethical' procurement policies), whilst exporters 
have few incentives to embrace packaging stewardship for products which are excluded 
from the UK Regulations (DETR, 1997a). Finally, the willingness of manufacturers to 
buy recycled packaging is explained by the fact they have substantial influence over the 
design of packaging. Arguably the main barriers to the use of recycled packaging, 
however, are govemment hygiene and safety standards, particularly for human-food 
products (Wills, 1975; StiUwell et ai, 1991; Bickerstaffe and Barrett, 1993; Producer 
Responsibility Industry Group, 1994). This therefore reinforces the point made in 
previous chapters that though the waste hierarchy provides a general guide to policy 
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decisions, practical considerations can impede the development of recycling and 
n 
closed-loop systems of waste management . 
6.4 Relationships between the Waste Management Variables 
6.4.1 Correlation and Regression Analysis 
The first stage in analysing the associations between waste management variables 
measured was to conduct Spearman's correlation tests. The results, shown in Table 
6.7, highlight an interesting and surprising variation between the two groups. 
Significant correlations were found between all waste management variables in the U K 
data, but between relatively few indicators in the German set. Whilst there is no 
obvious reason for this, it might suggest that UK companies which have engaged in 
active waste management programmes (remembering this is only a minority of all U K 
respondents) have adopted a blanket approach, whereas those in Germany have 
developed more specialised strategies. However, it would still be misleading to suggest 
that many U K companies are overtaking their German counterparts, since the mean 
collection, reduction and re-use rates in Britain remain well below those in Germany^. 
The next stage was to conduct multivariate analysis of the waste management variables. 
However, the strong associations in the UK data prevented the use of multiple 
regression, as one requirement of the technique is that independent variables must not 
be significandy auto-correlated (Shaw and Wheeler, 1994). Furthermore, the fact, for 
example, that 2001 re-used packaging rates are highly correlated with 1997 re-use rates 
scarcely enlightens the discussion. Conversely, multiple regression techniques did not 
produce any significant findings conceming the nature of German industry's waste 
management practices. It was therefore decided that multivariate models did not 
warrant inclusion, as they did not add substantively to the picture already established. 
The view expressed by EUROPEN is that 'waste management decisions need to take account of the 
nature and composition of waste streams ... Therefore flexibility is crucial' (EUROPEN, 1997: 2). 
' Bhargava and Welford (1996) and Hutchinson (1996) classify business environmental responses on a 
continuum they term ROAST (Resist, Observe, Accommodate, Seize and Transcend). The majority of 
British business responses to packaging legislation can best be described as observance of legislation. 
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Table 6.7 Correlation of Waste Management Variables, UK and Germany 
% reduction target 
UK 
% packaging collected 
% reduction target 
1997 % re-used packaging 
2001 % re-used packaging 
1997 % recycled packaging 
0.219" 
1997 % re-used 
packaging 
0.488** 
0.175** 
2001 % re-used 
packaging 
0.505** 
0.283** 
0.877** 
7997 % recycled 
packaging 
0.508** 
0.149** 
0.526** 
0.537** 
2001 % recycled 
packaging 
0.569** 
0.198** 
0.536** 
0.578** 
0.942** 
Germany 
% packaging collected 
% reduction target 
1997 % re-used packaging 
2001 % re-used packaging 
1997 % recycled packaging 
0.039 0.036 
0.209 
0.052 
0.297** 
0.937** 
0.036 
0.228** 
0.163 
0.132 
0.089 
0.328** 
0.126 
0.179* 
0.940** 
significant at 95% confidence, ** = significant at 99% confidence. 
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6.4.2 Aggregated Waste Management Indices 
In Chapter four, a number of waste management indices were developed for comparing 
the aggregate responses of businesses to packaging waste legislation. Beeu'ing in mind 
the results from previous sections, it was virtually certain that cumulative statistics 
would merely underline the distinctions already identified. Before the indices are 
examined, however, it is useful to re-cap on their construction and logic. The WMHA 
index calculates the total number of waste management activities undertaken by 
individual respondents (collection from own sites and customers, reduction, re-use and 
purchase of recycled packaging) and assigns each a score of five points. The WMHAj 
calculates the number of waste management activities in the same way as WMHA, then 
adds an extra point for every material included under each action. Thus, a business re-
using each material covered by the Directive scores five points for its action and six 
additional points for the materials. Finally, the WMHT index adds together the 
percentage targets for all waste management actions (taking a mean of the 1997 and 
2001 targets for re-use and the purchase of recycled packaging). Accordingly, the 
maximum possible WMHT score a company could be credited with was 400. 
As predicted, the aggregated measures (Table 6.8) merely confirmed that German 
businesses are more actively involved in all aspects of packaging waste management 
than their UK counterparts. However, Labatt (1997a; 1997b) also used the 
consolidated indices to classify business' environmental behaviour (Chapter four. 
Figure 4.4). Under Labatt's taxonomy, companies scoring 0 on each index were 
classified as reactive, those scoring between 1 and the mid-point of the scale were 
deemed to be accommodating, and those scoring above the mid-point were considered 
to be environmentally proactive. A similar procedure was used for the WMHA, 
WMHA I and WMHT indexes (Figures 6.1-6.3). The first observation for each index 
was that a comparable proportion of British and German respondents were 
accommodating national legislation by initiating some form of waste management 
policies other than straightforward disposal. The other major finding was that most 
German businesses are either accommodating or proactive but that British companies 
are predominantly reactive or accommodating. This contrast is particularly noticeable 
in the WMHA index, where the majority of German businesses fell within the proactive 
category. The main problem with Labatt's technique, however, was that it failed to 
differentiate between businesses at the upper and lower end of the accommodating and 
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proactive categories. For example, it did not distinguish between companies scoring 1 
and 199 points on the WMHT scale. Conversely, whilst it might be possible to make 
the scale more sensitive by introducing more categories, this would involve subjective 
classifications and would not produce a defensible classification. Labatt's scales must 
therefore be seen as a relatively crude measure of business environmental behaviour. 
Table 6.8 Consolidated Waste Management Hierarchy Indices 
A' Mean Rank Sum of Mann- 2-tailed 
ranks Whitney U sig. 
WMHA hidex UK 
Germany 
Total 
436 
227 
663 
277.28 
437.10 
120895.0 
99221.0 
25629.0 0.000 
WMHA' hidex UK 
Germany 
Total 
436 
203 
639 
260.31 
448.20 
113495.5 
90984.5 
18229.5 0.000 
WMHT Index UK 
Germany 
Total 
427 
221 
648 
274.82 
420.49 
117347.0 
92929.0 
25969.0 0.000 
174 
Figure 6.2 Company Classifications WMHA j Index 
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6.4.3 Waste Management Practices for Individual Packaging Materials 
The final stage of the analysis was to assess business waste management practices for 
each packaging material covered by the Directive. The importance of this is 
underlined, first, by the problems highlighted in some UK reprocessing sectors 
(reported in Chapter five) and, second, by virtue of the fact that the production and 
waste management of each packaging material produces different environmental 
impacts. For example, plastics are considered to be highly environmentally damaging 
because of their petro-chemical composition and contribution to greenhouse gas 
emissions during manufacture and incineration. As composite materials, they are also 
difficult to recycle (Bailey, 1999b; MRW, 1999d). Conversely, some commentators 
are particularly concerned about the extraction of ore for aluminium production, whilst 
others highlight the ecological incongruities of policies which promote paper recycling 
before EfW incineration (Hanley and Slark, 1994; Collins, 1996)'°. Any differences in 
the management of waste materials should therefore be recognised and evaluated. 
Although quantifying the precise environmental impact of each material accurately 
would require extensive and specialist LCA techniques, it was possible to develop a 
general picture of the Directive's impact for each packaging material using the waste 
hierarchy. 
Considering the results of the previous analyses, it was expected that more German 
businesses would be engaged in preventative or closed-loop waste management for all 
packaging materials. Although this general trend was confirmed (Table 6.9), the main 
exceptions were the steel and wood sectors, where there was little difference between 
the re-use and purchase of recycled packaging in the two countries. This further 
reinforces the points, first from Chapter five, that U K steel and aluminium reprocessors 
have greater capacity for packaging than is required under the Directive and, second, 
that wood re-use and recycling figures have been distorted by the inclusion of wooden 
pallets within the UK Regulations. 
Figures 6.4-6.7 illustrate the main waste hierarchy options employed for each 
packaging material by British and German producers, and re-emphasise the greater 
commitment of German respondents to preventative waste management. Against this 
Hanley and Slark (1994) argue that EfW is preferable to recycling for paper, first, because paper can 
only be recycled a few times, second, because transporting waste paper involves excessive costs and 
environmental impact, and, finally, because recycling detracts from sustainable forest management. 
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general background, both industry groups appear to be more heavily engaged in 
preventative or closed-loop management for paper, plastics and wood than glass, steel 
and aluminium. The well-developed recycling networks for paper undoubtedly help 
explain the high levels of recycling in both countries, a factor that also accounts for the 
popularity of wood re-use in the UK. 
Table 6.9 Waste Management Activity by Packaging Material 
% Companies engaged in WMH activity 
Reduction Re-use Collection Purchasing 
Recycled 
Paclcaging 
Paper UK 
Germany 
14.6 
55.8** 
41.8 
57.1** 
59.6 
89.1** 
60.6 
83.4** 
Glass UK 
Germany 
0.7 
11.7** 
3.9 
20.2** 
6.1 
35.1** 
3.6 
21.1** 
Steel UK 
Germany 
1.9 
6.6** 
16.6 
18.7 
16.4 
50.0** 
11.4 
10.6 
Aluminium UK 
Germany 
0.7 
8.6** 
3.5 
8.1** 
7.2 
20.8** 
4.7 
6.5 
Plastics UK 
Germany 
9.3 
40.1** 
35.6 
51.0** 
39.7 
77.2** 
27.3 
48.2** 
Wood UK 
Germany 
5.1 
14.2** 
36.4 
30.3 
27.1 
48.5** 
22.1 
18.1 
** differences between UK and German waste management rates over 99% significant. 
It should nonetheless be noted that there has also been a more widespread shift towards 
the prevention of paper waste amongst German businesses. This is also true for 
plastics, where over 40% of German businesses are engaged in packaging reduction, 
compared with fewer than 10% of British firms. Whilst the link between this and 
recycling charges is explored in Chapter seven, it initially appears that the punitive 
charges for plastics set by the DSD has persuaded German industry that minimisation is 
a more economic option than reclamation and recycling. 
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Figure 6.4 Collection of Packaging Materials 
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Figure 6.6 Re-use of Packaging Materials 
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Figure 6.7 Purchase of Recycled Packaging Materials 
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From the limited data available, it is unsafe to make more than tentative claims about 
the prevailing waste management trends for each packaging material. This is 
particularly true considering the volatility of many materials markets (see Chapter five) 
(Eminton, 2000). Nonetheless, there appears to be a move away from end-of-pipe 
solutions for paper and plastics in Germany, whilst recycling and re-use seem to be the 
preferred strategies for steel, aluminium and glass. As yet, there is little evidence of 
UK businesses embracing preventative waste management to the same extent as their 
German counterparts, though materials re-use seems to have become more popular. 
Whilst the causes of such variances remain a matter of conjecture, four possible 
explanations stand out. The first is that business behaviour has been influenced by the 
higher recovery and recycling targets set by the Packaging Ordinance. Related to this 
is the fact that the Ordinance has been operating for a longer period of time. It is 
therefore likely that the influence of the legislation over industry behaviour has 
increased over this period (Bailey, 1999a). The third possibility is that a fundamental 
gulf exists between British and German industry in terms of social responsibility 
culture (Woolcock et al, 1991; Knabe, 1995; Egan, 1997). Although this factor is 
outside the scope of this thesis and would be problematic to evaluate objectively, its 
influence should not be discounted. However, the explanation with the most profound 
implications for EU environmental policy and its desire to promote price-based 
regulation, is that the variance is a product of the environmental-charge systems 
operating in each country. The strength of this association is examined further in 
Chapter seven. 
6.4.4 Qualitative Feedback 
In addition to assessing the waste management actions adopted by the two respondent 
groups, the survey also sought to explore their general perceptions of packaging waste 
legislation. Four main themes were explored. The first aimed to establish whether 
managers believed that packaging regulation would change company waste 
management practices. The second asked whether businesses would achieve or exceed 
the minimum standards set by the Directive. The third asked whether the Directive 
would encourage reduction and re-use in addition to recycling. The final theme sought 
to determine whether businesses considered the Directive's recovery and recycling 
targets to be realistic. In each case, respondents were asked to rank their agreement or 
otherwise with given proposition statements using five-point Likert scales (see Chapter 
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four). Whilst such attitude data cannot be treated as 'hard data' in the same way as 
specific and measurable waste management actions, they help to clarify business' 
overall opinions on the efficacy of the Directive and its implementing methodology. 
The results, shown in Tables 6.10 and 6.11, indicate that whilst there were again 
marked differences of opinion between German and British producers in some areas, in 
others there were noticeable similarities. For example, both groups agreed that the 
costs of compliance were encouraging changes in corporate practices and that the 
legislation would promote reduction and re-use as well as recycling. However, German 
businesses were significantly more positive about the environmental merits of the 
Directive. Greater contrasts again emerged in the degree of ambition expressed in 
German and U K waste management plans, where 77% of British companies foresaw 
themselves achieving the minimum statutory targets but 70.7% of German firms felt 
confident they could surpass them. 
However, the data also revealed trends that require further explanation. Despite the 
overall optimism of German respondents, there was a general consensus that the 
Directive's recycling targets are unrealistic. At the same time, neither group felt their 
business had been unfairly discriminated against. This suggests that whilst both 
German and UK companies have reservations about mandatory recycling targets, 
neither group felt they had been unfairly penalised in comparison with other industry 
sectors. The fact that German businesses can express dissatisfaction but, at the same 
time be bullish about their recycling targets implies that they have become accustomed 
to operating within the strictures of the Ordinance. Thus, corroborating the typologies 
provided by the aggregated waste management indices, German companies are moving 
beyond compliance with environmental laws towards voluntary initiatives (also 
Bhargava and Welford, 1996). By contrast, British companies are still adjusting to 
their responsibilities and remain pessimistic about the future. Thus, whilst the 
behaviour of the German respondent group still falls short of Bhargava and Welford's 
attributes of environmental legislation 'transcenders' in that there is little evidence of 
them 'proactively engag[ing] in setting the agenda' (p. 21), their attempts to pre-empt 
possible future regulation should be seen as a significant, and apparently widespread, 
shift towards sustainable business thinking. 
181 
Table 6.10 Producer Opinions on the Directive, Mann Whitney analysis 
Proposition statement N Mean Rank Sum of ranks Mann-
Whitney U 
2-tailed sig. 
The cost of the Regulations (Ordinance) will encourage the Company to change 
its policies on the use of packaging 
UK 
Germany 
Total 
426 
197 
623 
289.09 
361.55 
123151.5 
71224.5 
32200.5 0.000 
The Company will only be able to comply with the minimum standards set by 
the Regulations (Ordinance) 
UK 
Germany 
Total 
425 
217 
642 
339.55 
286.15 
144309.0 
62094.0 
38441.0 0.000 
The Company aims to exceed the targets set by the Regulations (Ordinance) UK 
Germany 
Total 
412 
215 
627 
257.69 
421.90 
106168.5 
90709.5 
21090.5 0.000 
The Regulations (Ordinance) will encourage the Company to reduce and re-use 
more of its packaging than it would otherwise have done 
UK 
Germany 
Total 
423 
198 
621 
295.26 
344.64 
124893.0 
68238.0 
35217.0 0.001 
The recycling targets are too high for industry to achieve UK 
Germany 
Total 
429 
196 
625 
318.42 
301.14 
136602.0 
59023.0 
39717.0 0.247 
The Company has been unfairly discriminated against in the legislation UK 
Germany 
Total 
430 
196 
626 
303.67 
335.07 
130576.5 
65674.5 
37911.5 0.033 
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Table 6.11 Producer Opinions on the Directive, Descriptive analysis 
Proposition statement A' Mean SEMean Standard 
deviation 
Median Mode %of 
businesses 
agreeing 
with 
statement" 
The cost of the Regulations (Ordinance) will encourage the Company UK 426 0.20 0.06 1.15 1.0 1.0 53.0 
to change its policies on the use of packaging Germany 197 0.69 0.06 0.90 1.0 1.0 71.1 
The Company will only be able to comply with the minimum UK 425 0.32 0.06 1.13 1.0 1.0 53.7 
standards set by the Regulations (Ordinance) Germany 217 -0.02 0.08 1.16 0.0 1.0 40.5 
The Company aims to exceed the targets set by the Regulations UK 412 -0.17 0.05 1.02 0.0 0.0 23.0 
(Ordinance) Germany 215 0.78 0.06 0.88 1.0 1.0 70.7 
The Regulations (Ordinance) will encourage the Company to reduce UK 423 0.22 0.06 1.14 1.0 1.0 51.5 
and re-use more of its packaging than it would otherwise have done Germany 198 0.58 0.06 0.91 1.0 1.0 61.1 
The recycling targets are too high for industry to achieve UK 429 0.29 0.05 1.03 0.0 0.0 42.9 
Germany 196 0.19 0.07 0.92 0.0 0.0 37.3 
The Company has been unfairly discriminated against in the UK 430 -0.06 0.05 1.02 0.0 0.0 24.2 
legislation Germany 196 0.08 0.07 0.92 0.0 0.0 27.1 
a % of all respondents with a score of 1 or 2 for the proposition statement 
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Whilst one might speculate whether a similar transition might occur in Britain once the 
UK Regulations have been operating for a longer period, such a move is logically 
dependent on the pattern of incentives created by the PRN system. The uncertainties 
and conflicts within the scheme, reported in Chapter five, and its uneasy coupling of 
economic and environmental objectives seem to have done little to make industry 
receptive to the goals of environmental sustainability. It therefore seems that despite 
the policy Europeanisation produced by the Directive, domestic political-economic 
agendas and implementation styles remain critical determinants of policy outcome. 
Thus, while Germany's determination to be at the vanguard of environmental policy is 
profoundly shaping the behaviour of its industries, the slow progress in Britain reflects 
the pragmatic and sometimes defensive style of UK environmental policy (Haigh and 
Lanigan, 1995). On the current evidence, there is some way to go before this approach 
convinces British industry that environmental stewardship should be a central objective 
of its business strategies. 
6.5 Conclusions 
A number of key facts about corporate waste management in Britain and Germany have 
been uncovered during the producer survey. First, substantially more German 
respondents are involved in preventative or closed-loop systems of waste management. 
Importantly, this process seems to have extended to the SME sector despite, or perhaps 
because of, the costs associated with the Dual System. Undeniably the key point of the 
analysis, however, was that German companies are moving towards preventative rather 
than 'end-of-pipe' methods of waste management. Whilst rigid interpretations of the 
waste hierarchy are heavily criticised for over-simplifying complex environmental and 
economic issues, there is almost universal agreement that source reduction is the only 
truly preventative form of resource management (Allaway, 1992; Lober, 1996; Barrett 
and Lawlor, 1997). The move by German businesses towards preventative 
management is particularly important considering the fact that it is only promoted in 
the Ordinance via the medium of price-based regulation. 
However, similar distinctions can be made for all aspects of the waste hierarchy. It can 
therefore be argued that a far-reaching shift towards sustainable waste management is 
occurring in Germany but that a similar trend has yet to materialise in Britain. Even 
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where this distinction is less acute, for example, in relation to packaging re-use, it 
remains highly significant. A similar situation prevails for the management of more 
environmentally-damaging packaging materials, particularly plastics. Although 
Chapter five noted that both PWMSs impose their highest levies on plastics packaging, 
the difference in charge rates would appear to be a critical differentiating factor. Whilst 
it would be optimistic to claim that Germany is no longer a waste profligate society -
Hagengut (1997), for example, shows Germany to be one of the EU's highest per capita 
packaging consumers - DSD's claim to have moved 'from a waste mountain to a waste 
shortage' does appear to have some credence (DSD, 1998: 5). The only materials 
which are apparently managed in parity are those where Britain already possesses a 
well-developed recovery and recycling infrastructure. In summary, British industry's 
stance seems to be one of reluctant compliance, whereas the Ordinance appears to have 
succeeded in integrating environmental principles into the waste management activities 
of obligated firms. 
The question must therefore be why such divergent environmental outcomes have 
emerged from a process ostensibly designed to harmonise EU packaging laws. 
Although the EU policy process is clearly not designed to enforce total policy 
harmonisation (see Chapter three, also Bailey, 1999a), such disparities require serious 
examination if policy approximation and sustainable development are serious EU 
ambitions (Kramer, 1996; Demmke, 1997). Moreover, uncovering the reasons behind 
this apparently two-tier system, be they political, economic or simply temporal, should 
assist in the development of future environmental policies. Chapter seven now 
considers these issues by examining the influence of packaging waste charges on 
corporate behaviour. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Role of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy 
Implementation 
7.1 Introduction 
The first element of the survey highlighted marked contrasts between the waste 
management practices of British and German packaging producers. Whilst this was not 
surprising considering the distinct policy approaches adopted by the two governments 
(see Chapter five), this chapter explores whether differences in corporate environmental 
behaviour can be explained by the influence of environmental charges. The discussion 
is organised into the following sections. The first discusses the theoretical foundations 
of the economic approach to environmental management. The aim is not to repeat the 
discussion on the selection and application of environmental policy instruments from 
Chapter two, but rather to emphasise the key arguments underpinning the incentive 
effect of price-based regulation. The second section highlights the waste management 
costs incurred by businesses and their effect on corporate actions using further data 
from the producer survey. This is followed by an examination of producer opinions 
towards possible alternatives to the use of producer-related economic instruments 
(DTI/DoE, 1991; 1992; DETR, 1998a; 1999a; 1999b). On the basis of this evidence, a 
model of industry response to legislative and price-based regulation is developed and 
discussed. 
7.2 Theoretical Background 
The main difficulty of unregulated market systems in relation to environmental 
resources is that the full social costs of their utilisation are rarely reflected in market 
prices (Pearce et al., 1989). This creates a tendency towards over-exploitafion and, it is 
argued, economic inefficiencies (Devlin and Grafton; 1998). The economic viewpoint 
maintains that correcting such distortions requires the introduction of compensatory 
market mechanisms which re-intemalise externality costs (Turner, 1993; Burningham 
and Davies, 1995). Brisson (1993) and also Pearce and Turner (1992; 1993) make this 
point specifically in relation to the proliferation of packaging waste. 
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The principal aim of environmental taxes, therefore, is to provide producers or 
consumers with a financial incentive to reduce their environmental damage. The 
ambition is that pollutants should be stabilised at 'socially-optimum' levels - the point 
where the cost of further abatement exceeds the benefit gained by society (measured in 
terms of total social utility) (Brown et al., 1995; van den Bergh, 1996). Two other 
major benefits are also said to accrue from the economic approach. The first is the so-
called 'double dividend'; the stimulation of environmental industries and resource-
efficient production techniques. The second is the hypothecation of environmental tax 
revenues, either for environmental expenditures or to reduce taxation on economic 
'goods', such as employment (Gee and von Weizsacker, 1994, Bohm, 1997; Spackman, 
1997). 
Most supporters of environmental valuation accept that economic instruments 
supplement rather than replace legislative standards (Acutt and Dodgson, 1997; 
O'Doherty and Garrod, 1999). However, the critical distinction between the two 
techniques is that legislative standards only impose threshold constraints on pollution 
(the standards contained in the legislation), while economic instruments can be used to 
monetise each unit of pollution, thereby creating a constant pressure for improvement. 
Polluters pay not just the cost of reducing pollution to the acceptable level (which is what 
they would be required to do under a regulatory system), but also an additional sum on top 
of this. The additional sum arises because the tax is paid on all the damaging activity, not 
just the proportion above the target level. This sum can be seen partly as a payment for the 
residual damage caused by the pollution at the target level, and pardy as a 'rent' on the use 
of the environment. The important point to note is that the payment of the extra amount 
effectively removes rights that the polluter enjoys under a regulatory system (Jacobs (1991: 
160, original emphasis). 
Furthermore, where economic instruments utilise market forces as part of their 
abatement strategy, pollution costs can also be made to respond dynamically to 
changing economic and environmental circumstances (Goddard, 1995). The notion of 
an incentive effect has become a central orthodoxy of many environmental-valuation 
techniques. Pearce et al. (1993: 96), for example, notes that: 
Since price is instrumental in changing behaviour it follows that taxation policy will also 
be an important influence on behaviour which affects the environment (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, Baumol and Oates (1979: 231) remark that: 
In each of these cases [the introduction of environmental charges or subsidies] the basic 
notion is the same: by offering virtue its just (financial) reward, we change the rules of the 
game to induce industry (and individual consumers) to alter their behaviour to promote an 
environmental objective. 
Hahn (1989: 95), stresses both the environmental and economic benefits of price-based 
regulation: 
Both [marketable permits and emission charges] represent ways to induce businesses to 
search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards. They stand in stark 
contrast to the predominant "command-and-control" approach in which a regulator 
specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations. 
The behaviour-changing potential of economic instruments is not undisputed, however. 
Jacobs (1991) argues that whereas legislation compels firms or households to observe 
pre-defined environmental standards, incentives merely encourage them to do so. 
Ultimately individuals may choose to pay the charge and continue polluting as before 
(see also Pezzey, 1993). The point at which environmental charges effectively control a 
particular pollutant therefore depends on the price elasticity of the product or process. 
Consequently, a number of charge iterations may be necessary before the desired 
abatement is achieved. Pearce and Barbier (2000) suggest that environmental valuation 
techniques can overcome these obstacles but Dickens (1996) and More et al. (1996) 
question the competency of economics outside its core thematic areas. 
Jones (1999) further suggests that as businesses usually make investment and 
technology decisions on the basis of total factor costs rather than constituent 
components thereof, the relationship between environmental taxes and business 
behaviour should not be over-exaggerated (also Cairncross, 1991). Hahn (1989: 95) 
concedes that the theoretical structure of environmental economics 'often emphasises 
elegance at the expense of realism' and Jacobs (1991: 152) that many models: 'fail to 
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represent the complexities of the real world, in which "institutional" factors crucially 
affect corporate and consumer decision-making.' 
The empirical evidence of the incentive effect is also somewhat uncertain. Opschoor 
and Vos (1989) and Hahn (1989) argue that environmental charges have failed to create 
significant pollution-reducing incentives but have the 'compelling virtue' (Tietenberg, 
1990: 32) of achieving targets in a cost-effective manner. Similarly, Barde (1997) 
claims that most existing environmental taxes are still too low to alter polluter 
behaviour. He asserts, for example, that carbon taxes must be set significantly above 
$50 per tonne if COj emissions are to be stabilised at their 1990 levels by 2050 
(Sweden, a world leader in environmental taxes, currently charges polluters $41 per 
tonne for carbon emissions). Thus, there is an obvious sufficiency requirement for 
price-based environmental regulation. In defence of the economic approach, Hahn 
(1989), Huppes et al. (1992) and Goddard (1995) note that charges and marketable 
permits are rarely introduced in their textbook form but are instead often 
inappropriately grafted onto regulatory systems where standards play a dominant role. 
The incentive effect of price-based regulation is therefore an important, if controversial, 
element of the economic approach to environmental policy. The literature has both 
defended the need to monetise environmental resources and recognised practical 
weaknesses of this methodology. The remainder of the chapter assesses the merits of 
the debate by examining the relationship between packaging charges and producer 
behaviour in Britain and Germany. 
7.3 Costs Incurred by Packaging Producers 
In enumerating the costs incurred by industry as a result of packaging regulation, it is 
recognised that environmental charges are only one component of total corporate 
liability. This is well recognised in the literature, where indirect costs are classified as a 
form of transaction cost (see Tietenberg, 1990; Jacobs, 1991). The phenomenon of 
indirect costs was also identified in the DoE's criteria for evaluating policy instruments 
(DoE, 1993, see Chapter two). However, despite the fact that informal compliance 
costs are difficult to calculate accurately, some authors suggest they are a major element 
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of the total expenditure associated with environmental legislation (Baumol and Oates, 
1988; Beder, 1996). 
Two techniques were used in the survey to establish the nature and extent of producers' 
indirect compliance costs. The first was to provide a list of suggested cost areas, both 
formal and indirect, whilst also inviting respondents to add further categories. The 
second was to quantify the labour resources devoted to compliance activities, such as 
data gathering and contract management (Walley and Whitehead, 1996). The merits of 
asking respondents to quantify the value of their indirect costs were also considered. 
However, it was decided that such data would contain many 'guestimates' and, 
therefore, would be too subjective for evaluation purposes. The development of 
techniques that accurately categorise and quantify the indirect compliance costs 
sustained by businesses in relation to environmental policy would nonetheless be of 
great benefit to future research in this area. 
Table 7.1 Compliance Costs Incurred by Producers 
Cost Category % of Companies incurring cost 
Germany UK Chi-Square (%^) 
and sig. 
Enforcement Agency registration fee 16.24 59.17 100.739 
0.000 
Compliance scheme membership fee 37.06 72.71 72.915 
0.000 
Per packaging unit recycling charge 60.41 51.15 4.684 
0.030 
Deposit-refund charges on packaging 9.64 1.61 22.265 
0.000 
Green Dot charges on sales packaging 59.90 2.98 267.832 
0.000 
Fees to external consultancies 10.66 7.34 1.950 
0.163 
Higher waste collection costs 61.42 30.05 55.746 
0.000 
PRNs or related compliance certificates 9.14 38.30 55.802 
0.000 
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Table 7.1 summarises the compliance costs incurred by British and German 
respondents. As few respondents mentioned cost categories not already suggested in 
the questionnaire, it was assumed that the majority of possible compliance expenses 
had been correctly identified. This data in fact revealed few trends not anticipated from 
previous analysis of the British and German regulations (Chapter five). As expected, 
the majority of German businesses were incurring Green Dot or other per unit 
packaging charges (related to reprocessing fees as well as collection costs for transport 
and secondary packaging) and British firms were mainly paying Environment Agency, 
compliance scheme or PRN fees. Similarly, the low number of businesses engaged in 
deposit-refund systems reflects the deferral of the Ordinance's take-back provisions and 
their exclusion from the Regulations (Michaelis, 1995). The most important finding, 
therefore, was that many companies are incurring higher waste collection costs. As 
there was again a significant difference between the two groups - 61.4% of German 
firms and 30.1% of British respondents reported higher collection costs - this may be a 
factor causing the different patterns of waste management in Britain and Germany. 
Resource constraints prevented a further survey specifically to examine this point but it 
should be relatively simple to quantify in future research. 
Table 7.2 Staff Employed to Manage Compliance with Packaging Regulations 
Staff employed 
0 1 
''o of businesses 
>]-2 >2-5 >5 
Mann-
Whitney & 
2-tailed sig. 
Total Germany 9.0 1.6 64.0 19.5 5.9 
UK 46.3 13.2 36.0 3.7 0.8 15185.0 
0.000 
Additional Germany 90.5 6.0 3.5 0.0 0.0 
UK 94.0 4.0 1.8 0.2 0.0 41359.5 
0.108 
The impact of packaging regulation on employment costs (Table 7.2) also revealed 
significant differences between the two respondent groups. Whilst 65.6% of German 
companies and 49.2% of British firms had 1-2 members of staff devoted to managing 
compliance activities, 46.3% of UK respondents and 9% of German businesses had no 
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staff dedicated to this function. However, the vast majority of companies in both 
groups claimed to have employed no additional personnel (90.5% in Germany, 94% in 
Britain). This indicates that managing compliance with packaging legislation has not 
proved sufficiently burdensome that either group has needed to engage additional 
staffing resources. This is despite vociferous complaints about the excessive 
complexity of the UK Regulations (ACP, 1998). The suggestion was further reinforced 
by the small number of firms engaging external consultants to advise on the intricacies 
of compliance, where 75.9% of German and 78% of British respondents were managing 
this task internally {j^ = 0.648, significance = 0.421). The probable explanation for this 
is that national environment ministries, enforcement agencies, the DSD and the U K 
compliance schemes have produced a wealth of material relating the compliance 
options open to obligated companies (DETR, 1997a; Environment Agency, 1997; 
VALPAK's quarterly Vantage magazine; DSD, 1999c; http://gruener-punkt.htm). It 
also suggests that ongoing employment costs have not been a significant determinant of 
corporate responses to packaging waste regulation. 
7.4 The Relationship between Environmental Charges and Producer Behaviour 
Whilst it was always unlikely that a postal survey could identify the full range of 
packaging waste costs incurred by obligated businesses, the main weakness in the data 
was the failure to quantify waste collection costs. Recognising this limitation, the 
remainder of the section examines the effect of environmental charges on business 
waste management practices. Again the evaluation criteria are based upon the key 
objectives of the Packaging Directive and the waste management hierarchy. 
The strength of the relationship between charges and waste management actions was 
tested using the Cost-burden vs. Action (CbvA) indices developed in Chapter four. To 
re-cap briefly, these indices factor out company size (in terms of turnover and number 
of employees) by dividing compliance costs by the midpoints of the categories used in 
questions E l and E2 of the survey (Appendix 3). Thus, the CbvA indices measure the 
association between relative compliance-cost burden and each waste management 
action. CbvA indices were also calculated for the consolidated WMHA, WMHAj and 
WMHT statistics (see Chapter six). Based on the assertions of the environmental 
economics literature, the initial hypothesis was that there would be a positive 
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correlation between packaging waste costs and at least some waste management 
variables. It was expected that these would be more pronounced for German producers 
because of the higher recycling fees in existence and their application to a greater 
proportion of the packaging used by respondent companies. 
Table 7.3 Correlation of Waste Management Actions and Costs (CbvA), 
Germany 
Waste Management Variable N Turnover Employees 
Spearman 1-tail sig. Spearman I-tail sig. 
correlation correlation 
Packaging Collection % 91 -0.215 0.021* -0.186 0.045* 
Packaging Reduction % 104 -0.014 0.446 0.040 0.350 
1997 Packaging Re-use % 93 -0.107 0.154 -0.154 0.079 
2001 Packaging Re-use % 85 -0.014 0.448 -0.070 0.260 
1997 Buy Recycled % 90 0.101 0.173 0.149 0.092 
2001 Buy Recycled % 84 0.077 0.244 0.106 0.183 
WMHA hidex 118 -0.174 0.029* -0.187 0.026* 
WMHA J hidex 118 -0.101 0.139 -0.085 0.189 
WMHT Index 117 -0.023 0.403 -0.051 0.302 
However, the results (Tables 7.3 and 7.4) reveal no clear relationship between 
compliance costs and any of the key waste management variables for either country. In 
fact, the only significant correlations were negative, a key example being that between 
packaging collection and CbvA turnover for Germany (Table 7.3). Whilst this might be 
taken to mean that businesses with lower relative compliance costs are more actively 
engaged in waste management, the associations were too weak to lend real credibility to 
such a statement (the strongest was just -0.215 for CbvA turnover in Germany) V It was 
therefore decided that an additionzd test was necessary to establish if there was at least a 
significant relationship between packaging waste costs and whether (as opposed to the 
' Where +/-1 signified perfect positive or negative correlation and any relationship less than +/-0.4 was 
considered too weak to be indicative of a strong association. The fact that correlations as low as +/-
0.098 were statistically significant reflects the large data sets used (Shaw and Wheeler, 1994). 
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extent to which) businesses are engaged in each stage of the waste hierarchy. Again the 
results proved inconclusive. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that while German businesses 
with higher comparative compliance costs are more inclined to collect waste and those 
in Britain are more likely to engage in waste reduction, the general relationship between 
costs and producer actions still appears very weak. 
Table 7.4 Correlation of Waste Management Actions and Costs (CbvA), 
Britain 
Waste Management Variable N Turnover Employees 
Spearman 1-tail sig. Spearman 1-tail sig. 
correlation correlation 
Packaging Collection % 284 -0.052 0.192 -0.098 0.049* 
Packaging Reduction % 334 0.061 0.133 0.043 0.214 
1997 Packaging Re-use % 273 -0.005 0.466 -0.049 0.206 
2001 Packaging Re-use % 259 0.017 0.391 -0.018 0.388 
1997 Buy Recycle'd % 271 0.103 0.045* 0.013 0.416 
2001 Buy Recycled % 240 0.081 0.106 -0.039 0.271 
WMHA hidex 338 0.106 0.026* -0.004 0.467 
WMHAj Index 325 0.080 0.080 -0.037 0.249 
WMHT ]nde\ 353 0.004 0.471 -0.033 0.270 
* Significant at 95% confidence 
The study therefore failed to establish a clear association between the imposition of 
packaging charges and active business engagement in waste management. This is 
despite the evidence from Chapter six that German respondents have significantly 
greater involvement in recycling than their British counterparts and the numerous 
studies which show packaging consumption to have fallen substantially in Germany 
since the Ordinance was introduced (Gesellschaft fiir Verpackungsmarktforschung, 
1996; Eichstadt et al., 1999). The tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the differences 
between the two respondent groups have not been produced by environmental charges 
but are the result of other regulatory factors. 
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Figure 7.1 Waste Management Actions and Costs, Germany 
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Figure 7.2 Waste Management Actions and Costs, Britain 
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7.5 Policy Alternatives 
Although environmental charges form the mainstay of most European PWMSs, both 
the German and British governments have considered the use of other policy 
instruments to increase the economic and environmental efficacy of their recycling 
schemes. The 1998 review of the Regulations, in particular, clearly implied that 
additional mechanisms would be introduced if industry defaulted on EU recycling 
commitments (DETR, 1998a). While the debate has been less intense in Germany, 
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discussions have taken place on methods to improve the economic efficiency of the 
Dual System (Staudt, 1997; Flanderka, 1998). 
In order to test business reactions to supplementary policy instruments, a list of 
suggested alternatives was compiled from government policy documents and re-
formulated into proposition sets (DETR, 1998a; 1999a; 1999b). Respondents were then 
asked to evaluate the proposed strategies using five-point Likert scales. The scales 
were again ranked from -2 (strongly disagree) to +2 (strongly agree). The proposition 
sets solicited opinions on: 
• The use of voluntary agreements in place of legislation 
• The abolition of formal packaging waste charges in favour of market-led initiatives 
to allocate resources 
• The specification that packaging should contain a minimum percentage of recycled 
material 
• The introduction of direct packaging waste charges for consumers 
• Increased expenditure on consumer education (see also Bailey, 1999b; 2000) 
In addition to these, respondents were asked their general opinions on the economic and 
environmental effectiveness of the regulatory mechanisms employed. Again 
proposition sets were provided to examine whether respondents thought: 
• The current legislation and implementing mechanisms would achieve would 
achieve cost-effective solutions to the problem of packaging waste 
• The regulatory regime would produce worthwhile environmental benefits 
• Packaging waste charges were designed to cover the operational costs of recovery 
and recycling 
• Packaging waste charges reflected the full environmental impact of packaging waste 
Analysis of the proposition sets involved two stages. One-sample t-tests were first 
conducted to establish whether the mean responses were significantly above or below 
zero (the neutral opinion point). Mann-Whitney tests were then used to compare the 
opinions of the two respondent groups. The results are summarised in Tables 7.5 and 
7.6. Table 7.5 shows that both respondent companies were generally indifferent to or 
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opposed the majority of alternative strategies suggested. First, UK businesses disagreed 
with the idea of replacing legislation with voluntary targets (Dl), a tacit admission 
perhaps that recycling would not be taken seriously without formal regulation. 
However, German respondents were less opposed (though generally neutral) to 
voluntary targets, a possible reflection of the strain the Ordinance has placed on 
industry. By contrast, German firms refuted the idea that recycling targets could be 
achieved effectively without a formal pricing mechanism - an issue British respondents 
were undecided on - despite the high cost of the Dual System (D2). However, both 
groups were ambivalent towards the introduction of recycled-content quotas for 
packaging (D3). This result was somewhat surprising, particularly considering UK 
industry's strong opposition to this measure during the 1998 review of the Regulations 
(ACP, 1998). 
Whilst British firms were largely neutral to the proposal (again submitted at the 1998 
review) that consumers should be charged directly for packaging waste (D4), German 
respondents opposed the idea. The only policy alternative both groups favoured was 
increased expenditure on public education (D5). This feeling was particularly 
pronounced in the British group, reflecting industry frustration at the lack of onus on 
consumer participation in the U K Regulations, hi terms of their overall appraisal, the 
UK group was adamant that the Regulations were not cost effective (D6). This was an 
issue German respondents were largely undecided on. Considering the higher cost of 
the Ordinance, this result might be considered unusual. Furthermore, German firms 
were clear that the Ordinance would bring worthwhile environmental benefits (D7) and 
both groups agreed that packaging charges reflected the operational costs of recovery 
and recycling (D8). However, their opinions differed on whether the PRN or Green Dot 
economic instruments considered the full environmental impact of packaging waste 
(D9). 
This analysis therefore revealed two important facts about each group's perception of 
their current regulatory regime. Firstly, there seems to be little support for alternative 
modes of regulation. This is generally consistent with the fact that industry managers in 
both countries provided considerable input on the modus operandi for packaging 
regulation. Industry's acceptance of the overall regulatory framework (or, at least, fear 
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Table 7.5 Policy Alternative Proposition Sets 
Descriptive Statistics T-test a Mann-Whitney U 
Measure N Mean Standard 
error 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sig. of 
variance 
fromO 
Mean Rank U statistic 2-tailed sig. 
Dl Industry voluntary targets 
would be more effective than 
legislation 
UK 
Germany 
429 
198 
-0.31 
-0.12 
0.057 
0.083 
1.18 
1.16 
0.000 
0.161 
303.73 
336.26 38065.3 0.030 
D2 Recycling targets could be 
more effectively achieved 
without packaging waste 
charges 
UK 
Germany 
419 
199 
-0.09 
-0.33 
0.050 
0.068 
1.03 
0.96 
0.064 
0.000 
320.69 
285.94 37003.0 0.017 
D3 Govemment should specify 
recycled content quotas for 
packaging 
UK 
Germany 
416 
197 
-0.07 
-0.12 
0.059 
0.087 
1.21 
1.21 
0.223 
0.161 
309.22 
302.30 40051.0 0.642 
D4 Consumers should be directly 
taxed for packaging waste 
UK 
Germany 
426 
196 
0.05 
-0.40 
0.061 
0.093 
1.27 
1.30 
0.445 
0.000 
331.06 
268.98 33415.0 0.000 
D5 More money should be spent 
on public education 
UK 
Germany 
427 
196 
1.08 
0.19 
0.042 
0.082 
0.86 
1.15 
0.000 
0.019 
356.18 
215.75 22980.5 0.000 
a One sample t-tests could be used to compare variances from zero (neutral attitude), as the technique is reasonably robust to non-normal distribution. However, 
Mann-Whitney tests were used to compare the two groups because the data distribution for some variables was significantly skewed. 
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Table 7.6 Producer Assessment of Packaging Regulations 
Descriptive Statistics Mann-Whitney U 
Measure N Mean Standard 
error 
Standard 
deviation 
Sig. of 
variance 
from 0 
Mean Rank U statistic 2-tailed sig. 
D6 National regulations will 
achieve cost-effective solution 
to packaging waste problems 
UK 
Germany 
427 
217 
-0.60 
0.083 
0.051 
0.069 
1.06 
1.02 
0.000 
0.232 
283.82 
398.62 29811.0 0.000 
D7 National regulations will 
produce worthwhile 
environmental benefits 
UK 
Germany 
427 
219 
0.040 
0.46 
0.055 
0.065 
1.13 
0.97 
0.468 
0.000 
300.54 
368.26 36954.0 0.000 
D8 Packaging charges are based 
on operational costs of 
collection and reprocessing 
UK 
Germany 
411 
207 
0.39 
0.26 
0.048 
0.077 
1.13 
1.10 
0.000 
0.001 
314.64 
299.30 40428.0 0.281 
D9 Packaging charges reflect full 
environmental impact of 
packaging production, use and 
disposal 
UK 
Germany 
396 
197 
-0.11 
0.13 
0.050 
0.075 
1.00 
1.05 
0.024 
0.078 
283.11 
324.92 33505.5 0.004 
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of more constrictive measures) was also exemplified in the German retailing sector's 
support for the Dual system during the 1993 crisis (see Chapter five). Furthermore, in 
Une with Leveque's (1995; 1996a) typology of business responses to environmental 
regulation, British industry seems latterly to have focussed on securing relative sectoral 
gains rather than disputing the need for regulation^. Secondly, British businesses are 
more pre-occupied with the financial impact of the PRN system than German firms are 
with the ramifications of the Green Dot. This would suggest that British firms are still 
adjusting to the additional costs imposed by the PRN scheme - a transition undoubtedly 
made more painful by the recent high value of sterling - and that they are less bound 
into a co-operative 'Ordnungspolitik' relationship with government (see Chapter three). 
However, the general opinion in both countries seems to be that there should be no 
major changes to existing legislation but that the emphasis should be on improving its 
enforcement and equity (ENDS, 1998e; 1998f). 
The second stage of the producer survey therefore raises three fundamental questions. 
Firstly, if the differences between corporate waste management practices in Britain and 
Germany cannot be explained by the influence of environmental charges, what factors 
have caused this variation? Secondly, why have economic instmments failed to 
produce their desired incentive effect? Finally, what are the links between economic 
instruments and sustainable development if their incentive effect is less powerful than 
previously thought? The following section explores these questions. 
7.6 Discussion of Survey Results 
7.6.1 Factors Causing Variation in Waste Management Practices 
A number of factors were highlighted in Chapter six as contributing to the different 
environmental outcomes engendered by the Ordinance and the Regulations. These 
included the fact that the Ordinance has been in force nine years compared with the 
three years the Regulations have been operating, the existence of higher recycling 
standards and strong govemment coercion in Germany, the degree of social-
responsibility culture extant in each country, and the influence of environmental 
^ Examples include the provision of independent waste collection networks in supermarket car parks to 
compete with those managed by local authorities (ENDS, 1997d), moves by brewers to pay for bottle 
collection direct from pubs (ENDS, 1997e), and escalations in the use of transport packaging in order to 
increase the amount of waste which can be readily recovered by obligated businesses (ENDS, 1996). 
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charges. As price-based regulation has apparently prompted little positive response 
from industry, how have other factors affected the two policy outcomes? 
Temporal factors 
As the most obvious distinction between the Ordinance and the Regulations, it seems 
self evident that the time allowed for implementing mechanisms to become embedded 
will have a major impact on the environmental results achieved. However, whilst the 
UK Regulations are clearly still evolving rapidly, time may not be the critical factor. 
The Ordinance produced a four-fold increase in recycling in its first full year of 
operation according to official figures (DSD, 1998), though Staudt (1997) argues that 
recycling rates were already increasing in Germany prior to the Ordinance (see Chapter 
five). A second indication comes from the DETR's concerns that Britain will fall short 
of the Directive's targets, even allowing for the transition period provided for in the 
Regulations (DETR, 1999a). Therefore, whilst time factors are obviously important, 
they seem to be only a partial explanation. 
The stringency of the legislative regime 
Clear distinctions were also drawn in Chapter five between the legislative standards 
applied in Britain and Germany. Even following the 1998 revisions, the Ordinance 
contains targets higher than those set by the Directive and threats of further coercive 
measures if these are not achieved. Some DETR officials have privately suggested that 
the UK Regulations would induce a more active response from industry if recovery and 
recycling targets were raised to similar levels as those in Germany (O'Doherty and 
Bailey, 2000). However, V A L P A K opposes this and argues that the government should 
first clamp down on free riders and extend recycling obligations to smaller firms 
(MRW, 2000a; 2000b). 
It would therefore appear that the state's ability to direct legislative and implementing 
mechanisms plays an important part in the attainment of environmental objectives. As 
Jordan (1999: 69) (quoting Joseph Stalin) notes: 'To govern is not to write resolutions 
and distribute directives; to govern is to control the implementation of the directives.' 
Both Germany and Britain have been forced to reconsolidate their packaging systems, 
Germany to redress the DSD's financial crisis and the deficit in reprocessing 
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infrastructure, the UK to improve the efficacy of PRN hypothecation arrangements (see 
Chapter five). However, the centralised structure of the Dual System enabled the 
German government to adjust both its regulatory controls and Green Dot prices but the 
British government's (and industry's) preference for market-based pricing has severely 
curtailed the intervention options available. The threat of more constrictive regulation, 
now apparently invoked in Germany, may also be a decisive factor if it prompts a 
positive response from industry (see Chapter five). 
Social responsibility culture 
Although the social responsibility of British and German businesses was not directly 
assessed in the producer survey, the general impression from Chapter six was that 
German respondents have accepted the environmental necessity of government 
regulation. Such factors could conceivably be assessed in future research using 
indicators such as companies' involvement in EMAS and ISO 14000 environmental 
management programmes. The DSD's emphasis on encouraging public participation is 
also a clear distinguishing feature (Chapter five). This has taken three basic forms; 
investment in collection networks (73% of packaging waste in Germany is now 
recovered through kerbside or mixed collection), the symbolic association of the Green 
Dot with recycling, and the organisation of annual recycling-awareness days (Michaelis, 
1995). By contrast, the U K Regulations have maintained a low public profile aside 
from occasional retailer initiatives, mostly in the form of 'green box' or 'bag for life' 
schemes. Whilst the DETR has sought to reinvigorate the public awareness initiatives 
operated by UK compliance schemes (DETR, 1998a), one of the biggest obstacles to 
public participation has been the failure to provide local authorities with guaranteed 
access to PRN funds, a situation which has stunted investment in waste collection. 
Therefore, of the possible factors separating the British and German PWMSs, the most 
important appear to be the coercive powers held by national authorities in terms of 
legislation and implementing mechanisms, and the extent to which environmental 
initiatives galvanise public participation. However, this does not alter the fact that the 
German model has achieved environmental objectives largely at the expense of 
economic efficiency, or that in both cases environmental charges have facilitated the 
execution of policy implementation rather than determined its direction. 
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7.6.2 The 'Impotency' of Price-based Environmental Regulation 
The finding that environmental charges produce only marginal changes in polluter 
behaviour has substantial implications for the wider use of price-based policy 
instruments. Whilst the notion of environmental incentive taxes has a formidable 
theoretical coherence, the reasons for its fragility under empirical investigation require 
further investigation. Two factors appear best to explain this phenomenon, the low 
financial impact of environmental charges and the ability of producers to diffuse the 
costs imposed by price-based regulation. 
The Financial Impact of Environmental Charges 
Prior to the survey, a number of contacts were made with UK-based manufacturers and 
retailers (see Chapter four). Though these data are limited and do not include opinions 
from German industry, their comments help to explain the absence of a relationship 
between environmental charges and business actions. One electronics manufacturer, 
for instance, stressed that its annual compliance costs amounted to £30,000 compared 
with a turnover of £870 million. The respondent therefore argued that the possible 
savings from projects re-evaluating the design and consumption of packaging did not 
justify the expenditures involved. Three other respondents acknowledged that the 
Regulations had increased the pressure for packaging re-design but felt they were 
overshadowed by other business considerations (such as the logistics and marketing 
benefits of packaging). This corroborates Jones' (1999) point that businesses rarely 
make major operational commitments in response to relatively minor cost pressures. 
Another manufacturer suggested that as the business routinely explored all 
opportunities for packaging 'optimisation', neither the Regulations nor economic 
instruments had influenced their decisions. The British Retail Consortium (BRC) 
submission to the 1998 review of the Regulations echoes these sentiments (BRC, 1998: 
3-6): 
Many retailers have long been doing all they can to encourage recycling and minimise 
packaging use. Examples include provision of banks on car parks; specification of 
recycled materials in packaging; packaging minimisation programmes; increased use of 
reusable packaging as demonstrated by closed-loop reusable schemes; and heavy 
investment in equipment for recovery of backdoor packaging waste. However, packaging 
is necessary in terms of product protection and health and safety considerations. Reuse will 
occur if there is an economic benefit to it. 
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A major explanation for the lack of relationship between compliance costs and business 
actions therefore seems to be that environmental charges are simply too low in relation 
to company turnover and profit to have a major impact on business behaviour. This 
attitude may be further reinforced by the tendency to seek 'fiscally-neutral' 
environmental taxes. It is frequently argued that environmental taxes should not 
increase the aggregate tax burden on the economy but should instead shift the balance 
from economic goods to environmental bads (Gee, 1997; Ekins, 1997). However, 
policies adopting this approach may be methodologically flawed when viewed from the 
perspective of corporate decision-making. If businesses are faced with new 
environmental taxes but concurrently rebated on their labour costs through reductions in 
employer's National Insurance contributions, this may dissipate much of the behaviour-
changing potential of environmental charges. This argument clearly requires further 
development but, at face value, it may help explain why the Landfdl Tax has not 
stanched the increase in waste going to landfill disposal in the UK (DETR, 1999b). 
Economists would argue that this is simply a question of price elasticity and that 
environmental charges can be raised to the point where optimal abatement incentives 
are created (Jacobs, 1991; Pearce and Turner, 1992). However, there are two problems 
with this position. First, considering the recycling costs already incurred by German 
industry, it may be politically unfeasible to raise environmental taxes to the point where 
polluting products become price-elastic (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Second, higher 
charges are likely to encourage more firms to disregard the law, bringing the issue of 
effective enforcement again to the fore (see Chapter two). A final consideration for the 
PRN system concerns the fact that market forces are the only mechanism determining 
this particular environmental charge. As recycling markets respond to a variety of 
influences, including the regulatory regime, producer willingness-to-pay, competitive 
pressures, intemational commodity prices and general macro-economic conditions, it is 
dangerous to over-stylise the relationship between environmental charges and polluter 
behaviour. 
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Cost Diffusion 
Cost diffusion, as the name suggests, occurs where businesses seeking to maximise 
profits (or minimise losses) disperse avoidable costs through the supply chain. This can 
take several forms, though the most common are increases in product prices and 
pressure on suppliers to re-design products or offer price concessions. Although this 
has the benefit of disseminating the PPP to all polluting parties, it can also dissipate the 
incentive effect if, though dilution, environmental costs become a negligible 
consideration at each stage in the chain. The overall impact of the Regulations on the 
Retail Price Index has been estimated at 0.1-0.7% per annum (Daily Telegraph, 1997). 
The extent of cost diffusion by the two respondent groups is assessed in Table 7.7. It 
shows that whilst neither group intends to recoup all compliance costs from customers, 
German respondents favoured some price increases though, interestingly, the British 
group did not support this option. Although there was some indication that German 
firms would inform their customers of the reason for price increases, British 
respondents again seemed intent on keeping packaging waste costs out of the public 
gaze. 
These results therefore suggest that as environmental charges increase, cost diffusion 
becomes more widespread. It was not considered feasible to interrogate respondents on 
the methods used to disperse environmental costs to suppliers, as this can be achieved 
in numerous ways. It is nonetheless likely that some amount of cost diffusion up the 
supply chain is taking place (Hill, 1997). Hill also proposes that market-led measures 
have not proved as effective as legislation in terms of exerting environmental pressures 
through the supply chain. Jacobs (1991) concludes, however, that the higher visibility 
of consumption-based taxes sets up a stronger dynamic for change than producer-
related charges but concedes that the political unacceptability of direct consumer taxes 
is a major obstacle to this strategy. Therefore, whilst a single study cannot conclusively 
prove or disprove the potency of incentive taxes, polluters clearly respond to numerous 
market stimuli, many of which fall beyond the compass of govemment regulation. 
Price iterations may be a politically pmdent way of determining the acceptable 
boundaries of economic instmments but there is no guarantee that the incentive effect 
will be reached first. Ultimately, both policy-makers and polluters are required to make 
fine tactical judgements in pursuit of their preferred policy outcomes (Leveque, 1996a; 
Heyes, 1998). 
205 
Table 7.7 Diffusion of Packaging Waste Charges 
Descriptive Statistics Mann-Whitney U 
Measure N Mean Standard 
error 
Standard 
deviation 
Sig. of 
variance 
fromO 
Mean Rank U statistic 2-tailed sig. 
Company will increase prices to UK 424 -0.62 0.056 1.15 0.000 288.28 32121.0 0.000 
recover all compliance costs Germany 196 -0.15 0.083 1.16 0.076 358.57 
Company will increase prices to UK 416 -0.26 0.059 1.20 0.000 273.93 27220.5 0.000 
recover part of compliance costs Germany 195 0.46 0.084 1.18 0.000 374.41 
Company will inform customers of UK 408 -0.32 0.053 1.07 0.000 277.77 29893.5 0.000 
reasons for price increases Germany 195 0.18 0.081 1.14 0.029 352.70 
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7.6.3 A Typology of Business Responses to Environmental Policy Instruments 
The final question raised by the survey concerns the sustainability benefits engendered 
by price-based environmental regulation. This can be answered in part by constructing 
a model conceptualising industry's response to economic and legislative policy 
instruments (Figure 7.3). It has been argued that legislative standards produce clear but 
usually narrowly focused environmental-improvement standards (Bohm and Russell, 
1985). Moreover, their environmental efficacy depends on the enforcement capability 
of govemment agencies (Leveque, 1995). Recognising that legislative standards integr-
Figure 7.3 Producer Responses to Environmental Policy Instruments 
Government 
intervention 
Legislative 
standards 
Strength of link 
Strong 
Existing 
business practises 
Environmental 
charge 
Reduced profit 
Cost 
\7f dispersion 
Supplier redesign 
Higher product 
prices 
Cost to producers 
Revenue hypothecation 
II Revenue 
concentration 
Strong sustainability 
changes in production/ 
consumption patterns 
! ... ^ , 
Environmental project 
expenditure 
Achievement of weak sustainability 
objectives, 'end-of-pipe' solution 
Medium Weak 
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ate environmental concerns less comprehensively than economic instruments and that 
effective enforcement may be appreciably lower than nominal compliance, legislative 
standards have, at best, a moderate link with strong sustainability outcomes. Even this 
depends on the coercive power held by government and the degree of information 
symmetry between regulators and regulated during the preparation of pollution 
standards (Leveque, 1995). 
Price-based regulation, by contrast, seeks to generate abatement incentives and 
hypothecation revenue by re-internalising the environmental extemalities created by 
industrial activity. Under this system, earmarked taxes can then be used, inter alia, for 
environmental expenditures. However, the evidence is that the incentive effect of 
environmental taxes is often minimal, first, because governments seek to avoid 
damaging the economy with high taxes and, second, because they are a relatively minor 
component of the total factor costs for price-inelastic commodities. Cost dispersion 
processes may then further erode the incentive effect. Though company profits may be 
affected slightly, the likelihood is that a proportion of any shortfall will be regained 
through cost savings elsewhere. Where these conditions are met, the link between 
price-based regulation and strong sustainability will tend to be weak. 
However, the use of Green Dot and PRN revenue for investment in recycling 
infrastmcture suggests that the hypothecation of environmental taxes has been the main 
benefit of the two PWMSs (see Chapter five). Regardless of the market distortions 
currently afflicting the PRN system, a process has been established whereby the 
revenue raised from many polluters has been concentrated towards abatement activity. 
This has funded an annual recycling programme of £1.4 billion in Germany and has 
made £56 million available in Britain^ (DETR, 1999a; DSD, 1999a). As a result, 64% 
of packaging waste produced in Germany is now recycled and, potentially, the recovery 
rate in the UK could achieve 50% by 2001. Nevertheless, the sustainability outcomes 
produced by environmental hypothecation are generally weak, as pollution must occur 
before revenue becomes available for investment. Expenditures are therefore targeted 
at 'end-of-pipe' measures rather than combating the source of pollution and even this is 
' This figure is an estimate produced ft-om DETR data (DETR, 1998). Approximately 90% of PRN 
trading takes place between August and January. To derive the revenue available, therefore, average 
prices for this period were factored against the number of PRNs issued in 1998. 
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dependent on the judicious use of hypothecated revenue by its recipients'*, hi the UK, 
this appears to have been the main environmental downfall of the market-led system. 
For governments seeking to use hypothecation to pursue stronger sustainability 
outcomes, there is therefore a strong case not only for overseeing the flow of funding, 
but also for ensuring that earmarking arrangements divert a proportion of revenue 
towards challenging the production of the pollutant being taxed. 
It should be noted, however, that both practical and theoretical objections have been 
lodged against the hypothecation of environmental taxes. They are seen by many as 
having a distortionary effect on the economy; O'Riordan (1997: 38) notes that the UK 
Treasury has a 'well-established and even doctrinaire opposition to earmarking because 
of the rigidities it introduces into taxation revenue.' Barde (1997) criticises 
hypothecation because it moves environmental taxes away from their original purpose 
of changing polluter behaviour and adds that if taxes do incidentally reach the incentive 
level, reductions in pollution may induce over-capacity in pollution-control facilities 
and, hence, economic inefficiencies (also Rajah and Smith, 1993). There is also the 
question of matching environmental tax revenues with expenditure requirements. 
Smith (1997) considers that only where this occurs naturally (in Smith's opinion, an 
unlikely contingency), can both be set at the correct level. Against this, the evidence 
from the Packaging Directive suggests that where earmarking is designed to ameliorate 
the problem targeted by the tax, it is possible to create a focused and closed-loop 
system of taxation and expenditure. 
As with all models, the temptation is to over-simplify relationships in order to make 
complex systems more comprehensible (Hahn, 1989). It is apparent that the outcomes 
produced by environmental policy strategies are shaped by many inter-connected 
factors. This model does not purport to unravel all the intricacies of corporate 
responses to legislative and economic instruments but, rather, it seeks to conceptualise 
particular facets of industry behaviour and relate them to the policy objective of 
'* Defensive expenditures have also been the main focus of the UK's Landfill Tax Credit Scheme and 
sometimes revenue has been earmarked for uses with only a peripheral link to the environmental problem 
being addressed. The House of Commons Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional 
Affairs (HCSCETRA) Thirteenth Report noted that although the scheme seeks to encourage more 
sustainable waste management practices, a disproportionate amount of revenue was being allocated to the 
protection or provision of public amenities in the vicinity of landfill sites compared with measures 
promoting re-use, recycling and end-use markets (HCSCETRA, 1999). 
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sustainable development. It is therefore presented primarily as a basis for discussion. 
Hovi'ever, it is clear from this analysis that the greatest gains from economic 
instruments have come from the generation of revenue to defray environmental 
expenditures rather than from their incentive effect. 
As noted earlier, this is not the first study to question the environmental efficacy of 
price-based regulation. Hahn's (1989: 108) assessment of emission fees in France, the 
Netherlands and the USA, concludes that u'ith a few exceptions: 
The major motivation for implementing emission fees is to raise revenues, which are 
earmarked for activities which promote environmental quality ... most charges are not large 
enough to have a dramatic effect on the behaviour of polluters. In fact, they are not 
designed to have such an effect. They are relatively low and not directly related to the 
behaviour of individual firms or consumers ... presumably, starting out with a relatively 
low charge is a way of testing the political waters as well as determining whether the 
instrument will have the desired effect. 
However, the prevention of packaging was a primary objective of the Packaging 
Directive and as most Member States declined to introduce legislative standards with 
this intent, economic incentives have been the main mechanism employed (Eichstadt et 
al., 1999). Whilst some successes have been achieved, these have been created by 
legislation and 'command-and-control' measures rather than the re-internalisation of 
externality costs. It is nonetheless apparent that the advances in environmental 
protection achieved in both countries would not have been possible without the 
provision of funds to finance major environmental expenditures. Thus, it is apparent 
that economic instruments serve a very real and useful function but, if stronger 
sustainability is to be achieved, the development of hypothecation measures geared 
towards changing production and consumption patterns needs to be part of the overall 
policy approach. 
7.7 Conclusions 
Any research examining the implementation of environmental policies inevitably 
encounters the fact that policy-makers are required to balance competing policy 
objectives (Haigh, 1998). As such, environmental sustainability cannot be considered 
in splendid isolation from economic and social considerations. There are therefore no 
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perfect solutions; each policy instrument has its relative merits and limitations, and no 
single mechanism can achieve the social and ecological aspirations of sustainable 
development. The economic approach has been vaunted in some quarters as the most 
effective method for managing environmental problems, but the evidence from this 
study suggests that its potential is difficult to realise fully in practice. Furthermore, as 
Beder (1996: 61) notes: 
If environmental degradation is indeed a result of a failure to price environmental goods 
and therefore harness self-interest to the common good, then economic instruments could 
well provide a much needed solution. However, if environmental degradation has resulted 
from making environmental concerns secondary to economic concerns, and having 
decisions made by people who see environmental resources merely as an adjunct to 
production, then economic instruments will merely perpetuate the problem and subvert any 
potential for political and value-based change. 
Ten years on from the first of their Blueprint series, Pearce and Barbier (2000) reflect 
on the changes that have occurred in environmental policy since its publication. They 
conclude that environmental economics has become a common language for scientist 
and policy-makers alike and that its opponents are fewer as many have realised some 
virtue in the economic approach. However, they concede that putting the economic 
message into practice has been more difficult than anticipated, as it has necessitated 
changing (unsustainable) institutions that have been built up over many years. As an 
addendum, they warn that the focus should now be on the task of applying 
environmental economics rather than on reconstituting the problem. Whilst this study 
has not sought to oppose these conclusions, it has highlighted some of the practical 
difficulties (and benefits) of putting environmental economics into practice. It has 
presaged the dangers of over-stylising the relationship between polluter costs and 
behaviour in complex market situations and argued that, as a result, policy instruments 
must be carefully selected if both environmental and economic objectives are to be 
achieved. In particular, it has been suggested that the incentive effect of economic 
instruments may be more elusive than expected. In some cases, it may be unattainable. 
Hj'pothecation has a better practical record though, wherever possible, it needs to 
incorporate measures to combat the production of pollution rather than ones that merely 
ameliorate its effects. Even where hypothecation arrangements only produce weak 
sustainability outcomes, however, prudent utilisation of this approach could avert a 
protracted policy detour in search of the incentive effect of economic instruments. 
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Chapter Eight 
Implications of the Packaging Directive for EU Environmental Policy 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of 
environmental policy instruments that takes account both of normative economic 
considerations and the political-commercial realities of their application. It proposed 
that if environmental charges are analysed in isolation from industry's broader and 
more opportunistic decision-making processes, this creates an idealised and distorted 
view of policy-instrument efficacy. Policy-makers must instead be aware that 
businesses invariably make commercial trade-offs when planning responses to price-
based regulation and that normative modelling is rarely an accurate predictive tool. 
Recognising, therefore, that the context in which price-based environmental regulation 
operates must be appreciated if their functionality is to be properly evaluated (see 
Chapters two and three), this chapter considers how the EU's policy-making style has 
affected the success of economic instruments. 
Chapter three identified three main characteristics of EU environmental policy. First, 
the EU is a unique political and judicial system with highly complex institutional and 
decision-making arrangements (Barnes and Barnes, 1999). Although its general aim is 
to promote European integration, practical policy-making involves intense negotiation 
between policy actors intent on protecting their national or sectoral interests. Tensions 
within the integration process are expressed in terms of; (i) deliberations on whether 
EU or Member-State action is more appropriate (guided by the subsidiarity principle), 
and (ii) the Commission's extensive use of directives to inject flexibility into the 
implementation process. The key question here, therefore, is whether the introduction 
of economic instruments to implement the Packaging Waste Directive has promoted 
greater convergence in Member-State environmental standards than occurred under 
'traditional' command-and-control regulation. 
The second characteristic is that progress towards legislative harmonisation and 
sustainable development has been hampered by the poor implementation of EU 
environmental law by the Member States (CEC, 1996c; 1998a; 1999b). By common 
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assent, the procedures to combat this under Article 169 are cumbersome and often only 
partially effective (CoUins and Eamshaw, 1993; Demmke, 1997; Barnes and Barnes, 
1999). The second question is whether price-based regulation within the framework of 
Member State-led implementation has improved policy implementation or whether the 
problems experienced under command-and-control regimes are being replicated within 
the price-based approach. 
The final characteristic is that despite the significant benefits flowing from the 
Europeanisation of environmental policy, conflicts of interest - either intermittent or 
fundamental depending on one's perspective - exist between the objectives of the 
environmental programme and other EU priorities, notably economic and trade 
development. Again there is general agreement that the integration of environmental 
considerations into other policy spheres is incomplete despite it being an essential 
requirement of sustainable development (Blacksell, 1994; Forrester, 1999). The 
chapter therefore examines the extent to which the formulation and implementation of 
the Packaging Directive has assisted the integration of environmental concems into 
other policy spheres and the management of potential conflicts. This raises the final 
question explored in this chapter, whether the EU's fundamental mission of economic 
and trade development is compatible with the tenets of sustainable development. 
8.2 Convergence, Persistent Diversity or Divergence in Member State Policies? 
The extent to which EU legislation has promoted the convergence of Member-State 
environmental policies has been extensively debated in the literature (see, for example, 
Aguilar Fernandez, 1994; Haigh, 1994; Scott et al., 1994; Majone, 1996; Lowe and 
Ward, 1998a). While these studies broadly agree that policy and judicial 
Europeanisation have profoundly influenced the environmental actions of the Member 
States, they acknowledge that national institutions continue to take most of the 
important decisions concerning the practical implementation of EU policies (Aguilar 
Fernandez, 1994; Majone, 1996). Two aspects of convergence must therefore be 
considered; the formal harmonisation of legal standards and the convergence or 
otherwise of national policy-implementation styles. These styles reflect the prevailing 
institutional and planning procedures in each Member State and, in turn, influence the 
design of economic instmments. This section therefore explores three questions. First, 
in what areas are Member-State packaging policies converging or diverging? Second, 
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how far can these trends be attributed to general EU institutional procedures or the 
specific use of economic instruments by the Member States? Finally, to what extent do 
the EU's legislative and institutional arrangements impinge on the environmental 
effectiveness of economic instruments? 
8.2.1 Formal Legal Convergence 
Chapter five noted that EU action on packaging waste was initially prompted by the 
German Packaging Ordinance of 1991 and concerns amongst other Member States that 
their industries would be negatively influenced by the German legislation. If action 
was not taken by the European Commission, they feared, their businesses would be 
forced to compete against discriminatory regulations, particularly in relation to re-fill 
quotas, in order to gain access to the German market (Simmonsson, 1995). Although 
the Commission immediately challenged the re-fill quotas (Chapter five), there was a 
general acceptance that EU legislation was needed. Thus, the debate on subsidiarity 
appears to have been quite muted (Golub, 1996; Haverland, 1999). Discussions centred 
less on whether EU regulation was appropriate and more on what form it should take. 
As with previous EU environmental legislation, the trade argument was a critical 
factor. However, the prominence of the environmental problem in question swung the 
political pendulum in favour of harmonising legislation rather than an ECJ case against 
the German Ordinance. Though post-consumer waste is not a trans-national problem in 
the same sense as air or water pollution, intemational waste shipments had become 
particularly contentious in Belgium', whilst most Member States were experiencing 
problems managing their domestic waste disposal. Overturning the German legislation 
would therefore have been counter-productive both for the EU environmental 
programme and for national waste management strategies (Golub, 1996). In the event, 
many Member States welcomed the Commission initiative (Haverland, 1999). 
Despite the tortuous process of policy negotiation (see Chapter five), Haverland (1999) 
argues that the Packaging Directive has encouraged a marked convergence in 
' Wallonia introduced a ban on waste imports in 1992 in order to prevent the region becoming the 
'dustbin of Europe.' The ECJ accepted the Belgian law even though it inhibited the free movement of 
waste as a good in the Single Market (Case C-2/90, Commission vs. Belgium [1992] 1 ECR 4431). The 
Court decided that the proximity principle of environmental policy meant that, wherever possible, the 
international movement of waste should be kept to a minimum. It also established a more general 
principle, that where there was a particularly acute local environmental problem, as was the case in 
Wallonia, some 'exceptional' exemptions to the free movement of goods should be granted (Lister, 
1996). 
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packaging waste legislation in the Member States. Logically, once all states had 
accepted the Directive's final recovery and recycling standards, they were obliged to 
transpose and implement its provisions in full. Whilst this might seem an obvious 
point, it demonstrates that EU legislative standards created greater policy convergence 
than would have occurred without Commission intervention. Haverland (1999) 
considers it unlikely either that Germany would have amended its original Packaging 
Ordinance or that regulation would have been introduced in Britain without the impetus 
of EU legislation. The introduction of harmonising legislation has been shown to have 
a similar impact on national policies in the area of water quality legislation (Haigh, 
1994; Ward, 1998) and can therefore be seen as a powerful force in promoting policy 
convergence. On the other hand. Chapter five argued that the inclusion of banded 
targets in the Directive shows that EU legislative processes are only capable of 
producing approximated harmonisation because of the need to accommodate the wishes 
and implementation capabilities of both leader and laggard states (see also Liefferlink 
and Andersen, 1998; Knill and Lenschow, 1998). 
8.2.2 Convergence in Implementation Style 
Notwithstanding the convergence of formal environmental standards as a result of EU 
legislation, it is common practice for the Member States to adapt directives to their 
preferred objectives and procedures during their implementation (Weale, 1996; Lowe 
and Ward, 1998a). This enabled Germany to tackle the problem of packaging waste 
using its customary blend of precautionary and prescriptive policies and Britain to 
retain its arguably more pragmatic and neo-liberal stance towards environmental policy 
(Bailey, 1999a). It should nonetheless be recognised that the process of legal 
harmonisation circumscribed the actions of Member States and, therefore, the degree of 
permissible diversity. The fact that the U K government was forced to introduce 
additional regulation to the 'market-led' reprocessing sector in order to increase its 
chances of complying with EU targets is a clear example of such a constraint (see 
Chapter five)^. Accordingly, where EU directives contain clear standards and 
implementation deadlines, the EU's institutional procedures and requirements place 
^ In fact, Vogel (1996) argues that free-market policies rarely lead to reduced regulation and cites the 
experiences of industrialised countries that have adopted neo-liberal philosophies but increased industry 
regulation in order to ensure that market forces do not undermine public policy objectives. A case in 
point in relation to rail privatisation in the UK can be found in Shaw (2000). 
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tangible boundaries on the leeway open to national authorities (Kramer, 1991) .^ Whilst 
such constraints are not unique to environmental policy, this does not alter the fact that 
directives have acted as a powerful force in maintaining an 'approximated' cohesion in 
EU environmental policy despite their method-permissive character. Looking to the 
future, it is possible that the Commission's ambition to increase the number of 
framework directives containing only broad objectives and time-frames - ostensibly to 
simplify and make environmental policy more flexible - may relax these constraints 
(Barnes and Barnes, 1999). Though their impact on policy convergence will only 
become clear when more framework directives come into effect, they are nonetheless a 
development that requires monitoring and research. 
Notwithstanding the constraints imposed by EU procedures, the implementation of the 
Packaging Directive in Britain and Germany has been heavily influenced by national 
approaches to environmental policy, as national governments have lost none of their 
preferences or decision-making capacity during the latter stages of the policy process 
(Golub, 1996; Kohler-Koch, 1996; Bailey, 1999a). Haverland (1999) cites two factors 
as explaining the persistent diversity of national packaging policies; one generic and 
one specific to the Packaging Directive. The first is institutional inertia, which occurs 
where Member-State governments are unwilling to abandon existing implementation 
structures because of the political capital invested in them (Knill and Lenschow, 1998). 
This was exhibited in Germany by the Bundesrat's opposition to policy European-
isation in the form of weakened re-fill quotas (see Chapter five). Similarly, the federal 
govemment preferred to spend 800 million Deutschmarks baling out the DSD in 1993 
rather than see the system crumble, despite its long-term viability being less assured at 
the time than it is currently. Even the present UK administration, which promised a 
sweeping review of the PRN system when in opposition, has been noticeably more 
cautious about reform since it came to power. Instead, following the initial swathes of 
packaging legislation, most EU governments have adopted an incrementalist approach 
to policy change and preferred to test each policy adjustment tentatively in order to 
avoid major expenditures or political risks'*. 
^ Kramer (1991) further notes that, in accordance with Article 177 of the Treaty, Member States cannot 
avoid their responsibilities to take or refrain from certain actions by failing to adopt the necessary 
implementing measures by the relevant deadline or in a correct manner. The ECJ ruled in Case 152/84 
(FN I) Marshall, 748 that any other interpretation would enable Member States to rid directives of their 
direct effect simply by failing to implement them or implement them properly and would be contrary to 
the intentions behind the implementation flexibility of directives. 
Vogel (1993b) observes that the US federal government also tends to conduct its environmental policy 
in this highly circumspect manner. 
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The second cause of persistent diversity, according to Haverland, was the high profile 
of packaging waste policy for some sectors of industry and the public. Whilst public 
opinion has not been a decisive factor in Britain because of the relative obscurity of the 
PRN scheme, industry's desire not to be burdened by a second and potentially 
contradictory tranche of regulation has dissuaded the government - which took much 
self-credit for its extensive consultation process prior to the UK Regulations - from 
making wholesale changes to the system (ACP, 1998). In Germany, the 
contentiousness of the Dual System made it virtually impossible for the federal 
govemment to make radical changes to the scheme without back-pedalling on its 
commitments to reduce packaging waste. Furthermore, its cautious approach was 
generally supported by German industry, which was reluctant to abandon the seven 
billion Deutschmarks it invested setting up the Dual System (Haverland, 1999). Thus, 
both governments have recognised that maintaining industry goodwill is critical for the 
success of their packaging policies, whilst industry's priority has been to minimise the 
dismptive effects of major policy shifts. 
Though the full extent of policy convergence cannot be evaluated until the Directive's 
compliance deadline in 2001, the main processes acting in favour of convergence have 
been, first. Member States' agreement that packaging policy was a legitimate area for 
EU intervention and, second, the use of legislative standards to promote formal 
integration. Within this framework, however, the derogations in the Directive and the 
Commission's emphasis on flexible implementation have led to continued diversity in 
the way the Directive has been applied. Kerremans (1996) ascribes this partly to the 
complex nature of EU policy-making and the fact that long-term co-operation is needed 
between Member States in order to maintain policy consensus. Exemptions for 
minority groups at both ends of the spectmm are therefore commonplace even under 
majority voting. More importantly, the flexibility of directives enables Member States 
to minimise administrative costs and implement EU legislation at a pace they can 
manage .^ Thus, it is in the Commission's interests to tolerate 'controlled' diversity in 
Member-State standards in order to maintain the support of national authorities for the 
overall environmental programme. The policy-making skill therefore lies in judging 
' Though Knill and Lenschow (1998) argue that the level of embeddedness of national administrative 
structures is a stronger influence on policy actions than the costs of adaptation to EU legislation. 
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how best to maximise the benefits of implementation flexibility whilst maintaining a 
reasonable coherence in the environmental acquis (Kramer, 1998; Temmink, 1999). 
However, the evidence from the Packaging Directive indicates that economic 
instruments have, in fact, increased the diversity of national policies beyond that 
intended by the Commission. Whilst there can be no uniform 'rational' formula for 
calculating and apportioning pollution costs in all Member States, as different 
circumstances prevail in each country (Rees, 1997), the recycling charges in Europe 
owe more to the ideological allegiances of each national authority than they do to any 
objective valuation criteria. Far from harmonising the environmental costs, incentive 
patterns and systems of revenue hypothecation in the Member States, the flexible 
approach has infused existing differences deeper within national economies. 
Regardless of whether any system is superior to others, allowing economic instruments 
to be implemented at Member-State level increases the likelihood of fragmentation in 
the EU environmental programme. Whilst it might again be argued that this enables 
Member States to manage EU environmental policy according to their capabilities, 
uncertainties as to the incentive patterns created by economic instruments makes the 
boundaries to divergence less easy to discern. It should be remembered that even the 
UK govemment took two years to recognise and act against the market distortions 
caused by its own PRN system. The Commission and Court of Justice are therefore 
likely to find it more difficult to determine whether Member-State economic 
instmments contravene EU free-trade mles than they did to identify and challenge 
infringements of the Directive's legislative provisions. As the boundaries become less 
easy to adjudicate, maintaining the cohesion and purpose of the EU environmental 
programme will become an increasingly stern challenge (Bailey, 1999a). 
Another example of where EU institutional procedures have caused policy divergence 
can arguably be found in the case of the Commission's carbon/energy tax initiative. 
Although carbon taxes were the subject of extensive studies in the early 1990s, littie 
progress was made towards their introduction on an EU-wide basis (CEC, 1992b; 
1997c). The principal reason for this was that the Council automatically employs 
unanimous voting for all taxation issues, enabling Member States to invoke Article 93 
and block EU legislation that conflicts with their national interests. As any EU-wide 
carbon tax initiative is likely to impact upon state taxes, subsidies and industry 
competitiveness, it was almost guaranteed that the proposal would founder on national 
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objections (Bames and Bames, 1999). Both Britain and France fought what they saw 
as a fiscally doctrinaire carbon tax, whilst the initiative was also opposed by the 
powerful energy-intensive industry lobby (Long, 1998). 
Table 8.1 Carbon and Energy Taxes in the EU 
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Other excise tax (non-VAT) 
Other Energy Products 
Other excise taxes 
Carbon/energy taxation 
Sulphur tax 
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^ From April 2001 
o Only in the autonomous region of Galicia 
Source: Barde (1997: 228-9, updated) 
Despite these objections, the EU was keen to put measures in place which 
demonstrated its global leadership under the Kyoto Protocol on climate change (Zito, 
2000). The Conmiission proposal for an EU-wide carbon tax was therefore replaced by 
an agreement allowing Member States to introduce national taxes on energy 
consumption and emissions. This has led to a range of national initiatives, including 
the Danish and Dutch carbon and energy taxes and, from 2001, similar measures in the 
UK (see Table 8.1). Although there is considerable overlap in national energy taxes -
for example, all countries have differentiated duties on different types of motor-vehicle 
fuels - Bames and Bames (1999: 147) allege that the only common energy tax with a 
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noticeable effect on consumption is the excise duty on mineral oils^. More conspicuous 
are the variations in the scope and scale of national taxes (see Table 8.2). Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland have led the move towards incentive taxes whilst, for differing 
reasons, Austria, Portugal, Italy and Germany have largely eschewed them. However, 
provided national taxes do not impinge on inter-state trade in the EU - a point enlarged 
upon shortly - the Member-State-led approach does little to prevent greater divergence 
in national environmental tax regimes or, consequently, environmental standards. On 
the premise that the EU possesses neither the democratic legitimacy nor the practical 
means to interfere in the fiscal affairs of the Member States, it seems that 
environmental taxes are unlikely to encourage greater convergence in national 
environmental incentives and standards. 
Table 8.2 Environmental Taxes on Energy Products (ECUs per unit, 1998) 
gas oil 
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LPG 
(tonne) 
Kerosene 
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Coal 
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natural 
gas 
(m^) 
electricity 
(%) 
Unleade 
d petrol 
(kl) 
France 40.6 25 A - - 0.018 - 497.5 
Germany 77.1 39.1 22.0 - - 8.5 580.6 
Netherlands^  42.4 - yi.i - - - 660.7 
UK 58.5 14.9 58.5 10.5 0.0097 - 564.5 
a - includes excise and environmental taxes on all fuel products. 
Source: Eco-Tax Database of Forum for the Future at Keele University 
8.3 Price-based Regulation and the Implementation of EU Policy 
8.3.1 Introduction 
Although the Packaging Directive has become a large-scale experiment in price-based 
environmental regulation, many aspects of its implementation follow the classic pattern 
of EU environmental policy (see Lister, 1996; Lowe and Ward, 1998a; Barnes and 
Barnes, 1999). Following protracted negotiations and consensual bargaining, the 
* It is doubtful whether fuel taxes could have a major impact on consumption because fuel products are 
generally highly price inelastic (see Chapters two and three). 
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Council of Ministers agreed a modified Commission proposal and Member States have, 
in the main, transposed and begun to implement its requirements. The Commission has 
resolved most minor transposition failures, leaving only those where there are 
fundamental clashes on whether particular methods of environmental management 
contravene the EU Treaty (in this case, the German and Danish re-fiU provisions). As 
often occurs, leader states which originally pressed for the adoption of their national 
measures in EU legislation have already met the Directive's targets, whilst some of the 
more laggardly are struggling to adapt to EU requirements. In many respects, 
therefore, little has changed from the customary pattern of implementing EU 
environmental law. 
The Commission and Court of Justice will ultimately judge the implementation of the 
Packaging Directive on the basis of whether Member States have met the required 
recovery and recycling standards. The Member States have generally used 
environmental charges in two ways to achieve these targets and the Directive's 
Essential Requirements', first, as a means of facilitating investment in recycling 
infrastructure and, second, to encourage industry to reduce, re-use and recycle its 
packaging waste (see Chapters five and seven). The question, therefore, is whether the 
economic instruments applied by the German and British authorities have helped to 
achieve either objective more efficiently than straightforward legislation? 
8.3.2 EU Policy, Price-based Regulation and Infrastructure Development 
Chapter five argued that the hypothecation of environmental charges for infrastructure 
development in Britain and Germany had produced measurable effects, but 
acknowledged that the management of this revenue has varied markedly in the two 
states. However, the use of economic instruments for this purpose was not inevitable 
and only followed careful deliberation by both governments. All environmental 
regulation, whether command-and-control or price-based, requires polluters to 
undertake or refrain from certain activities and, thus, compliance costs are always 
incurred (Jacobs, 1991; Goddard, 1995). Neo-liberal theorists argue that industry 
should be left to determine the methods used to achieve govemment targets even if the 
nature of the environmental problem in question makes govemment involvement 
unavoidable (Friedman, 1962; Barrett et al., 1997). Whilst the Packaging Ordinance 
and the Dual System exhibit few laissez-faire influences, even the PRN scheme 
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increases rather than restricts the state's options for intervening in the market 
mechanism. However, the U K govemment's view was that anything short of a 
mandatory pricing instmment would fail to meet EU targets, not necessarily because of 
any industry disingenuity, but simply because the scale of co-ordination required to 
establish collection, sorting and reprocessing networks necessitated a formal financing 
mechanism (Nunan, 1999). As the packaging problem was the result of market failure, 
introducing a regulated economic instmment provided greater assurances that the 
necessary redistribution of funds would take place (Pearce and Tumer, 1992). Similar 
logic persuaded the German govemment that industry needed to be coerced into 
devising a workable system of packaging waste management (see Chapter five). In 
both cases this led to industry's agreement to environmental charges (as evidenced by 
the PRC's original proposal cited in Chapter five), the principal benefit of which has 
been to finance waste recovery and recycling. There has therefore been a well-defined 
link between tax hypothecation and the achievement of legislative standards. 
8.3.3 EU Policy, Price-based Regulation and the Incentive Effect 
It was demonstrated in Chapter seven that economic instmments have been only 
partially effective in terms of changing polluter behaviour. Some commentators go 
further, maintaining that the Packaging Directive has failed to increase recycling above 
the levels which would have been achieved without EU legislation (see Chapter five). 
Whilst such claims are highly speculative and can be equally levelled at economic 
instmments and legislative standards, the evidence suggests that recycling rates were 
already increasing in Germany prior to the Packaging Ordinance (Staudt, 1997; 
Eichstadt et al., 1999) and that it is faltering in the U K in spite of, or even because of, 
the PRN system (DETR, 1998a; 1999a). 
Notwithstanding this, the European Commission recently expressed concems to the 
International Solid Waste Management Association (ISWMA), first, that Member-State 
recovery and recycling standards were diverging beyond the derogations provided for 
in the Directive and, second, that some countries would fail to meet EU targets 
(Cooper, 2000). Although it was argued that this disparity is primarily the result of 
factors such as the stringency and length of time national legislation has been in place, 
the influence of economic instmments should not be entirely discounted. The 
economic inefficiencies created by the German government's decision to veer towards 
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the precautionary principle and punitive pollution charges have not prevented industry 
from meeting EU requirements in the short term (Michaelis, 1995; Staudt, 1997). It 
might transpire that this approach causes longer-term harm to the German economy 
(Staudt, 1997) though, against this, the govemment's environmental zeal has stimulated 
innovation and arguably given German industry a competitive edge in European 
environmental markets (Beuermann and Burdick, 1998; Ostermann and Schmidt, 
1998)). Nonetheless, the German approach established a clearer association between 
pollution and the financial costs incurred by polluters. By contrast, Britain's decision 
to take a cost-minimisation approach is seemingly destined to cause its default against 
EU recycling targets. 
Goddard (1995) argues that the failure of price-based instruments to achieve policy 
ambitions is more often the result of a failure to appreciate how market mechanisms 
work than outright market failure. He contends that 'free' markets should not be 
blamed for profit maximisation but recognises that regulation is required in order to 
counteract the externality effects of market actions. As the incentive effect has proven 
largely elusive, economic instruments have apparently failed to achieve greater changes 
in industry behaviour than legislation standards. However, the hypothecation of 
revenue for pollution prevention (Chapter seven) has partly overcome this obstacle. 
Moreover, the British and German experiments with environmental taxes reinforces the 
conclusion that national policy preferences have a profound influence on 
environmental-policy outcomes and therefore their effects need to be better understood. 
8.4 The European Union and Sustainable Development 
8.4.1 Free Trade and Environmental Protection 
The relationship between EU free trade and national environmental standards is one of 
the most intricate and perplexing facets of the EU environmental programme. The 
issue is dealt with in the EU treaties in a legally consistent, but arguably precarious, 
manner. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, Articles 94 and 95 (goveming Member-state 
actions in relation to the Single Market) only become relevant to environmental issues 
where national legislation creates technical barriers to the free movement of goods 
(Lister, 1996). This meant there was an overpowering case for introducing the 
Packaging Directive under the former Article 100a, as packaging by definition 
accompanies the goods whose free movement the Treaty protects. Articles 130r and 
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130t (amended to Article 175 at Amsterdam) further clarified the balance between the 
two prerogatives. These established the Commission's right to introduce high 
environmental standards across the EU but permitted Member States to introduce 
stricter legislation provided it remained compatible with other aspects of the Treaty 
(Article 130r(4)) (Hughes, 1996). As these articles overlap in jurisdiction where 
national actions promote environmental protection but restrict free trade, the 
Commission and ECJ are frequently called upon to interpret which Article holds 
precedent within specific cases. The landmark judgements in this area - the Cassis de 
Dijon ruling in 1979 ,^ and the Danish bottles and Wallonian waste ban cases - each 
defended the free movement of goods but permitted limited restrictions on trade where 
there is a pressing environmental rationale and an absence of EU legislation to regulate 
the issue satisfactorily. 
Previous sections have suggested that the use of economic instruments by Member 
States will make adjudication on national provisions increasingly complex. However, 
most systems of environmental taxes used to implement the Packaging Directive have 
not resulted in trade infringements. For example, although Germany exacts higher 
environmental charges than the UK, both schemes exclude exported packaging but 
include imports. Neither therefore inhibits the free movement of goods or the 
contestability of their markets, as German businesses exporting to Britain are only 
obliged to pay environmental charges comparable to those levied on their U K 
counterparts and vice versa. Furthermore, as the physical reclamation of packaging 
waste is largely managed by recycling organisations rather than individual businesses, 
the technical trade barriers in this respect have proved negligible. Whilst the threatened 
deposit-refund charges in Germany demonstrate that economic instruments can 
potentially discriminate against imported goods, the major trade infringements to date 
have not been caused by price-based provisions. 
However, it might be argued that the trade-neutrality of environmental taxes could have 
considerable implications for the 'push-pull' dynamic of EU environmental policy 
(Sbragia, 1996). The push-pull dynamic, it will be recalled from Chapter three, occurs 
where an environmental 'leader' state introduces legislation which threatens EU free 
^ The Cassis de Dijon ruling (Case 120/78, OJC 256, 3 October 1980) established that products must be 
allowed access to markets throughout the EU provided they are safe and pose no threat to the consumer. 
The ruling, which reversed the previous onus on this matter, therefore requires national authorities to 
demonstrate why another Member State's standards do not adequately protect its citizens. 
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trade and the Commission, in order to ward off this threat, proposes EU-wide 
legislation. Proponents of flexible environmental policy routinely use the push-pull 
argument as a basis for supporting the devolution of environmental policy, claiming 
that the actions of leader states encourage higher environmental standards across the 
EU. However, if national taxes remain compatible with the free-trade elements of the 
EU Treaty, the pressure for harmonisation may also diminish. This has arguably 
already been observed in relation to fuel duties and carbon/energy taxes in the Member 
States. Whilst there is still likely to be pressure to harmonise the legislative standards 
which usually accompany environmental taxes, the effects of an environmental tax 
system are manifestly more far-reaching than individual legislative provisions, such as 
the German re-fill quota. In simple terms, the abandonment of re-fill quotas would not 
precipitate the complete dissolution of the Dual System. However, the adjustment of 
an environmental tax could fundamentally alter the incentive patterns for industry and 
have wide-ranging environmental implications. This does not necessarily mean that 
'EU-compliant' taxes will completely negate the push-pull dynamic - this is probably 
far from true - but rather that a growing emphasis on price-based regulation could 
reduce the dynamic as a source of upward pressure on EU environmental standards. 
8.4.2 The Packaging Directive, Integration and Sustainable Development 
If, as the previous section indicated, the use of economic instruments in the Packaging 
Waste Directive has created few implications for the Single Market aside from 
accentuating differences in national environmental standards, what has the case study 
revealed about the ability of EU environmental policy to promote sustainable 
development? Chapter three signalled that the integration of environmental criteria into 
policy decisions is a critical component of sustainable development and one that the 
Commission has repeatedly emphasised in the EAPs (CEC, 1992a, 1994; Baker 1997). 
At face value, this pledge makes a straightforward connection between environmental 
integration and the achievement of sustainability. However, Chapter two established 
that sustainability and sustainable development encompass a range of perspectives 
regarding the relationship between society and nature, as well as the interchangeability 
of natural and human capital. If the question is simply whether economic instruments 
have integrated environmental concems into the wider community, clearly they have 
intemalised the environmental costs of packaging waste for over 28,000 business in 
Germany and Britain. However, their failure to influence industry behaviour suggests 
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that the existence of integration alone is insufficient to promote sustainability. Whilst 
integration is clearly necessary, there is also an obvious sufficiency requirement. 
Consequently, it is not satisfactory to analyse EU environmental integration as a 
straightforward causal process leading to a simple notion of sustainability. The more 
relevant question must therefore be what form of sustainability are the EU's 
institutional procedures and ideational ambitions encouraging? 
8.4.3 The Obstacles to Environmentally-sustainable Policies 
Musschenga (1994: 165) argues that there are five main issues which policy-makers 
must resolve if they are to succeed in creating sustainable environmental policies. The 
first is the acceptance that environmental problems exist, or the awareness problem. 
Whilst it has taken many years to overcome environmental 'ignorance', Musschenga 
concedes that the overpowering evidence of ecosystem damage, both global and local, 
has convinced policy-makers that something must be done (Ekins, 1993; O'Riordan 
and Jager, 1995; Pezzoli, 1997). The raft of international conferences from Stockholm 
to Kyoto is further evidence that environmental issues are being taken increasingly 
seriously by the world's policy community. However, the awareness pre-condition is 
compounded by what Musschenga describes as the uncertainty problem, or the lack of 
agreement as to the seriousness of environmental problems and the best ways to 
approach them. Because the impact and extent of many forms of environmental 
degradation are still poorly understood, there are few clear guidelines on which to base 
action. Rational choices are therefore often impossible (also Costanza, 1993). 
Furthermore, where vested interests exploit this indecision, the uncertainty problem 
may encourage institutional inertia and lead to inadequate or inappropriate action being 
taken (Bohmer-Christiansen, 1994). 
The third concern is the motivation problem. If one accepts that effective approaches 
to environmental problems will necessitate high expenditures and changes in lifestyle, 
many entailing a decline in certain aspects of human welfare, the question is whether 
people will be willing to make such sacrifices. To borrow the economics parlance, 
governments confronting the motivation problem must decide the extent to which 
human capital should be foregone in order to conserve natural capital (Pearce et al., 
1989). This is further complicated by the democracy problem, which Musschenga 
describes as the difficulties in gaining political agreement on the most appropriate 
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measures to be taken. The impediments to international agreement were particularly 
well illustrated in the interest-led wrangling which accompanied the Rio Earth Sununit 
in 1992 (see Chapter two). Musschenga further proposes that those imposing 
restrictions on lifestyle risk immediate punishment at the ballot box and therefore 
questions whether democratic systems are capable of delivering measures to secure 
what are extremely ill-defmed 'greater' public goods (see also Lele, 1991). Finally, 
there is the justification problem. Radical measures to combat environmental problems 
will inevitably lead to some limitations on individual freedoms. If actions are to be 
based around the primacy of individual liberty, as they surely must be in liberal 
democracies, every limitation must be defended by an appeal to principles which 
justifiably over-ride that of personal freedom (Rawls, 1972). 
Although Musschenga separates the environmental problem into various strands in 
order to understand the issues politicians must resolve, many of them are closely inter-
linked. For example, the idea that policy-makers may not be re-elected if they initiate 
radical environmental programmes links the democracy problem to the awareness and 
motivation problems. In simple terms, one cannot assume that the general public has 
the same appreciation of environmental problems as policy-makers or that they are 
prepared to accept immediate personal sacrifices in order to promote sustainability. 
This is the essence of Pearce et al's (1989) problem of future discounting (see Chapter 
two). Musschenga's conceptuaUsation nevertheless achieves two useful objectives. 
First, it highlights the fundamental dilemmas faced by policy-makers in relation to the 
environmental problem (see also Jacobs, 1994). Second, it provides a useful 
framework for analysing EU environmental policy because it identifies that 
sustainability is likely to be achieved in evolutionary stages rather than through a 
seismic re-orienting of society. Thus, it has a practical focus and incorporates 
O'Riordan and Voisey's (1998) notion of the sustainability transition. The framework 
can therefore be used to evaluate the EU's progress towards sustainable development 
by exploring the level to which it has surmounted each obstacle. 
8.4.4 The EU's response to the Obstacles to Environmental Sustainability 
In addressing the awareness problem, Chapter three argued that the EU environmental 
programme is at least partly a well-intentioned response to the concems expressed at 
the Stockholm and subsequent conferences. Furthermore, EU environmental policy has 
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progressively moved beyond its emphasis on free trade as a justification for policy 
intervention towards a broader appreciation of environmental problems. As Baker 
(1997: 92) comments: 
Historically the Union has based its environmental protection policy not so much on a 
belief in the legitimacy of environmental protection as such but rather on the assumption 
that environmental protection measures have economic and, particularly, trade 
consequences. Yet despite the centrality of economic growth a new, albeit subordinate, 
imperative of environmental protection did evolve. 
Against this. Baker (1993) reminds us that the EU has struggled to find a formulation 
of sustainability that is compatible with its other policy objectives. This was clearly 
illustrated in the Maastricht Treaty, where 'sustainable growth', 'sustainable 
development' and 'sustainable progress' were used as if they were interchangeable 
concepts. She argues that this inconsistency could not have emerged accidentally, as 
the Treaty was the product of protracted and politically sensitive bargaining wherein 
such metamorphoses in terminology could not have occurred by chance. In fact, even 
these manifestations were the result of intense lobbying against the Treaty's original 
formulation, 'sustainable growth' (Verhoeve etai, 1992). 
Notwithstanding this, the EU's commitment to sustainable development in the Fifth 
EAP demonstrates its increasing acceptance of the environmental problem. This 
recognition is further evidenced in the Packaging Directive by the Commission's 
decision to propose EU legislation rather than challenge the German Packaging 
Ordinance. It is less certain, however, whether economic instruments have helped to 
solve the awareness problem, particularly in relation to public awareness. Rather, the 
price signals sent by the PRN system have failed to conduce a significant change in 
public behaviour (O'Doherty and Bailey, 2000), whilst the decision by most U K 
businesses not to increase product prices has done little to increase public awareness 
(see Chapter six). Even in Germany, devices such as the National Recycling Days and 
the symbolism of the Green Dot have played at least as great an educative role as 
economic instruments. Nonetheless, the increasing number of publicity initiatives on 
waste and other environmental issues indicates that national policy-makers are keen to 
overcome the public awareness problem. 
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The prominence of the precautionary principle in the EAPs suggests that the EU has 
also taken steps to confront the uncertainty problem. Costanza (1993) notes that even 
in the absence of firm scientific evidence, the adoption of precautionary and 
preventative policies can reduce the risk of irreversible environmental damage. Yet the 
evidence from the Packaging Directive suggests that the EU and its Member States are 
more inclined to enunciate precautionary principles than they are to practice them. 
This is illustrated in the Directive's 'Essential Requirement' on waste prevention. Here 
Member States are required to ensure that: 
Packaging shall be so manufactured that the packaging volume and weight be limited to 
the minimum adequate amount to maintain the necessary level of safety, hygiene and 
acceptance for the packed product and for the consumer. (OJEC, 1994: Annex II) 
But that: 
Member States shall [from June 2001] presume compliance with all essential requirements 
set out in this Directive including Annex II in the case of packaging which complies with 
[the relevant harmonised and national standards]. (OJEC, 1994: 15, emphasis added) 
Thus, although undertakings on waste prevention were accepted in principle and 
phrased in a manner which implied that action should be taken, no tangible 
commitments were agreed at the EU to achieve this aim (Bailey, 1999b). In their place 
was a supposition that reductions in packaging waste would follow naturally from a 
vague stipulation that excessive packaging should not be used. The only direct actions 
to date in the UK have been the voluntary code of practice published by INCPEN 
(INCPEN, 1998) and the suggestion that PRN charges might encourage source 
reduction (see Chapter five). The Commission will shortly release revised targets for 
the Directive covering the period 2001-2006. These are expected to increase recovery 
standards to as high as 90% but will again refrain from introducing binding measures 
on waste reduction (DETR, 1999a). 
However, it is possible to justify this approach on purely practical grounds rather than 
condemning it as an outright sustainability 'deficit'. Many states have little history of 
recycling, let alone waste prevention, and therefore binding reduction targets would 
probably be an unrealistic goal for some. Furthermore, the decision to experiment with 
economic instruments has enabled national authorities to explore how far the technique 
can be used to achieve multiple policy aims. Yet this does not alter the fact that EU 
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policy failed to make specific commitments to limit the production of packaging waste 
and is therefore only precautionary when viewed in the context of the weak 
sustainability model (see Chapter two). This was not a policy oversight but, rather, is 
symptomatic of the EU's ambiguous early forays into sustainable development and 
leanings towards ecological modernisation (the theory that economic development can 
be de-coupled from environmental degradation through environmental management 
processes (Chapter three)). Even so, the success of the weak sustainability approach is 
logically dependent on there being no deep-seated incongmity between increased 
economic activity and acceptable levels of environmental quality (Welford, 1999). 
Redclift (1996; 1997) argues that policy-makers' belief that perpetual economic 
expansion can be reconciled with environmental sustainability is one of the 
Q 
fundamental contradictions of sustainable development . 
hi the final analysis, interpreting the precautionary principle is fraught with difficulties 
for the simple reason that precautionary assessments are necessary because scientific 
knowledge is rarely conclusive. This lack of knowledge makes it difficult to judge 
whether policies are merely precautionary or wholly unnecessary. Such uncertainties 
have prompted some Member States, including Britain, only to favour action based on 
firm scientific evidence (Lowe and Ward, 1998a). Moreover, as social and economic 
priorities must also be considered by EU decision-makers, there can be few instances 
where the precautionary principle does not entail a subjective evaluation of priorities. 
The case of the Packaging Directive nonetheless emphasises that uncertainties as to the 
extent of environmental problems can create a tendency towards incremental planning 
rather than actions to promote stronger sustainability (Weale, 1996). The situation is, 
of course, again exacerbated by the concurrent majorities decision-making procedure of 
the EU. If one accepts that economic instruments are only capable of producing weak 
sustainability and are dependent on legislative standards for their 'regulatory bite' (see 
Chapter seven), price-based intervention is unlikely to change this situation. 
The final three hurdles, the motivation, democracy and justification problems, appear 
the most intractable within the EU's current political structure. Chapter three argued 
that the EU environmental programme involves an embedded struggle between the 
desire to promote improved standards of living and the realisation that this must be 
Although policy-makers have been heavily influenced by economists, such as Beckerman (1974) and 
Pearce and Barbier (2000), who defend strategies that combine sustainability and economic expansion. 
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accompanied by responsible environmental management. This is embodied in the 
multiple objectives contained in Article Two of the Amsterdam Treaty: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic 
and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities ... to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection ... sustainable 
and noninflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of 
economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/index.html) 
The Article demonstrates the many strands of the motivation problem for EU decision-
makers. In order to achieve these multiple objectives, EU decision-makers must 
somehow reconcile social, economic and trade objectives with those of sustainable 
development. In practice, because the former constitute the Union's key raisons d'etre 
and more immediately affect people's lives, they frequently take precedence in 
planning decisions (Barnes and Barnes, 1999). Whilst most national decision-makers 
agree that the transition to sustainability is a major undertaking (Balleud, 2000), 
Welford (1999: 1) suggests that most governments have made little real effort to 
reverse the degradation caused by economic globalisation. He adds that policy-makers 
have generally clung to traditional economic indicators despite Pearce et al's (1989) 
argument that quality of life - including environmental considerations and distributional 
equity - should become the principal benchmark of society. The reason for this, 
Robertson (2000) argues, is that it is difficult for policy-makers to justify the long-term 
expenditures and losses in immediate material welfare which accompany sustainable 
development. Robertson nonetheless argues that shifting to a sustainable path will 
necessitate the fundamental restructuring of political and financial systems and the 
development of a more unified environmental agenda. 
Although Musschenga's democracy problem is common to all political groupings, it is 
complicated in the EU by the fact that decision-making and policy implementation are 
shared between numerous national and EU institutions. Achieving any form of 
'overlapping consensus' therefore involves intense bargaining between competing 
national and institutional interests (Jacobs, 1994: 162) (see Chapter three)). Whilst 
there is an obvious dislocation between this mode of decision-making and the form 
Musschenga suggests is necessary to resolve the sustainability problem, the EU cannot 
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simply over-ride democratic politics in the name of 'efficient' decision-making (Zito, 
1998; Horeth, 1999). Furthermore, there is little evidence that the USA, with its 
stronger federal centre, has been willing to relinquish the democratic checks that inter-
state bargaining brings to environmental policy-making (Howe, 1996). Even if a 
radical accord on environmental issues were possible, Musschenga's democracy 
problem suggests that its supporters would become susceptible to electoral rejection, 
especially if the measures imposed restricted immediate welfare. Therefore, in 
assessing how EU and national institutions might circumvent the democracy problem, 
the focus of attention must eventually return to the wishes of their electorates. As 
Jacobs (1994: 163) notes, 'If we were not to survive the environmental crisis, this is not 
liberal democracy's fault but our own.' 
The justification problem is arguably the greatest dilemma facing EU environmental 
policy. For obvious reasons, democratic principles and the protection of individual 
liberty are absolute cornerstones of the Union. Any infringements of personal liberties 
must therefore be referenced against an overlapping consensus that they are necessary 
to combat common threats. Clearly, where only hesitant steps have been made to 
address the motivation and democracy problems, this justification has yet to 
materialise. Hession (1998) argues that liberal models of governance have become pre-
eminent in modem democracies because they offer the benefits of state stability while 
preventing the rise of totalitarian monoliths. Rawls (1972) amplifies this point when he 
highlights the duties of the individual in a 'free society' (howsoever defined): 
From the standpoint of natural justice, the most important duty is that to support and to 
further just institutions. This duty has two parts: first, we are to comply with and do our 
share in just insfitutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to assist in the 
establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be done 
with little cost to ourselves (Rawls, 1972: 332). 
The problems come when conflicts arise between natural duties. On this point, Rawls 
observes: 
[Though the reasons favouring the adoption of any natural duty are fairly obvious] the real 
difficulty lies in their more detailed specification and with questions of priority: how are 
these duties to be managed when they come into conflict... There are no obvious rules for 
settling these questions. We cannot say, for example, that duties are lexically prior ... Nor 
can we simply invoke the utilitarian principle to set things straight. I do not know ... 
whether a systematic solution formulating useful and practicable rules is possible (Rawls, 
1972: 339-40). 
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Whilst sustainability might readily be conceived as a just institution, making it a natural 
duty to defend or introduce it, policies aiming towards stronger sustainability are likely 
to impinge on the natural duty to defend individual liberty and welfare. Even assuming 
Member States accept this challenge, this is a key reason why they have experienced 
such difficulties integrating sustainability alongside better-established 'natural' 
priorities. However, it is difficult to envisage how stronger sustainability might be 
promoted within a system that does not possess the necessary attributes or mandate to 
undertake the associated sacrifices. Coates et al. (1997: 256-7), reviewing the role 
political paradigms play in resolving spatial and economic equalities could equally 
have been discussing capitalism's attempts to resolve environmental crises. 
The root causes of spatial inequalities cannot be tackled by spatial policies alone ... 
Inequalities are products of social and economic structures, of which capitalism in its 
many guises is the predominant example. Certainly inequalities can be alleviated by 
spatial policies ... but alleviation is not cure: whilst capitalism reigns, however, remedial 
social action may be the best that is possible ... the solution of inequalities must be sought 
in the restructuring of societies. 
If a paradigm shift towards sustainability values were to take place - and realistically 
this would have to be an evolutionary process - policy Europeanisation and economic 
instruments would have major roles to play in advancing the sustainability agenda and 
correcting market distortions. But, at present, the fragmented and, arguably, 
contradictory nature of the EU policy agenda means that the environmental programme 
tends towards amelioration rather than cure. Whilst there is obviously an element of 
truth in the Commission's conviction that the Member States' failure to implement 
existing policies is largely to blame for this shortfall (CEC, 1992a; 1999b), the 
viewpoint treats environmental degradation as primarily a technical problem. If this 
means that the EU institutions fail to deal realistically with the values problems 
surrounding economic development and sustainability, then policy Europeanisation, 
subsidiarity and economic instruments cannot fulfil their potential. As O'Brien and 
Penna (1997: 185 and 197) argue: 
The 5EAP is a 'redrafting of Rio' in the context of ... processes of regulation and 
integration rather than a systematic rearrangement of society-economic-environment 
relationship. The contested economic, social and political institutions charged with 
sustaining the environmental agenda are the same institutions whose political dynamics are 
dissolving it. 
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According to this thinking, neither adjustments of responsibilities up or down the 
governmental ladder nor the most innovative of policy instruments will stimulate 
significant change. At their worst, extended discussions on the institutional issues of 
trans-national governance will divert attention away from a more productive debate on 
the substantive and pressing shortfalls in the implementation and enforcement of EU 
environmental policy (Demmke, 1997). Furthermore, where economic globalisation 
and the involvement of corporate interest groups in policy decisions act as further 
barriers to sustainability, defensive management and a gradual transition in values are 
the most that can result from the current political order. However, the alternative is 
'green dictatorship'. The aim is not to advocate the latter, but rather to recognise the 
limitations of the present institutional and ideational structures. 
8.4.5 Policy Alternatives within the present Paradigm 
On a less pessimistic note, Bames and Barnes (1999) take a more immediately practical 
perspective. They suggest that, in fact, EU environmental policy is not in need of a 
radical overhaul, as the main measures needed for effective environmental management 
are already in place. They add that environmental taxes and other 'new' policy 
instmments have much potential and warrant further exploration (see also Bailey, 
1999b). Rather, they return to the criticism that national authorities have failed to 
implement and enforce the EU programme properly. Only once these issues are 
addressed, they contend, will it be possible to determine whether the existing measures 
are a sufficient response to the sustainability challenge. This perspective corresponds 
to the Commission's view in that it ascribes the resolution of the motivation, 
democracy and justification problems to the Member States and suggests that the 
faithful implementation of existing policies will promote sustainable development. 
Although this analysis of outcomes may be slightly optimistic, its predictions and 
apportionment of responsibilities are more consistent with the existing balance of 
power and policy options than ones which demand a radical transformation of society's 
values (Golub, 1997). 
Probably one of the most significant recent developments in enforcement is the 
introduction of fines for Member States which defy ECJ mlings (Article 171). The 
Commission has recommended seven cases where it believes Member States should 
receive daily fines for persistent infringements of EU environmental law (see Table 
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8.3). The ECJ imposed the first actual fine on Greece for a second breach of an ECJ 
ruling in July 2000, and the Commission plans to initiate similar proceedings against 
Germany and Britain in the near future (ENDS, 2000c)^. 
Table 8.3 Examples of Requests for Penalty Payments to the end of 1997 
Member State Subject Penalty payment 
(ECU/day) 
Date of decision Settled 
Italy Radiological 
protection 
159,300 29 January 1997 Yes 
Italy Waste 
management plan 
123,900 29 January 1997 Yes 
Germany Surface water 158,400 29 January 1997 No 
Germany Wild birds 26,400 29 January 1997 Yes 
Germany Groundwater 264,000 29 January 1997 Yes 
Belgium Wild birds 7,750 10 December 1997 Yes 
Greece Waste water 
management 
24,600 26 June 1997 No 
Source: CEC (1998a: annex HI) 
In the absence of some idealistic mass realignment of Member-State values, substantive 
increases in the EU's enforcement capabilities is the most immediate priority. Further 
initiatives might include an expanded role for the European Environment Agency or, 
more ambitiously, the harmonisation of Member State carbon/energy taxes (Barde, 
1997). The prospects for future policy co-ordination and enforcement are discussed 
further in Chapter nine. Though these actions still fall short of Costanza's (1989) call 
for policies which take account of environmental uncertainties (promoting the 
precautionary principle), evidence from the Packaging Directive suggests that 
economic instruments backed by regulatory powers have the potential to encourage 
significant changes if they are sufficiently well-referenced against environmental 
criteria. The question remains, however, whether the EU's liberal-democratic. 
' These actions are for failure to implement the Bathing Water and Environmental Impact Assessment 
directives respectively and follow initial ECJ rulings against the two Member States. 
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capitalist model of governance can adapt to the shifts in attitudes and regulatory 
disciplines that accompany sustainable development. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In drawing together the themes explored in this chapter, caution is required on two 
fronts. First, it is essential to avoid drawing expansive conclusions on the evidence of a 
single study. Whilst the Packaging Directive provides important lessons for future 
price-based environmental policies, the study's key findings require further 
corroboration and the ideas presented need to be developed through future research. 
The second is to avoid the misapprehension that there are simple answers to the 
paradoxes of EU environmental policy. Three main arguments have been proposed in 
this chapter. First, it has been suggested that the Packaging Directive has encouraged 
some policy convergence in the Member States but that economic instruments have the 
potential to encourage the greater fragmentation of environmental outcomes. Second, 
economic instruments have been only slightly more successful than legislative 
standards as a method for implementing EU environmental policy. Finally, it has been 
argued that the EU must overcome a series of fundamental ethical and moral dilemmas 
if its policies are to achieve sustainable development. At the same time, the intention 
has been to steer clear of trite solutions. Whilst it appears logical that the EU's system 
of liberal democracy and consumer capitalism is ill-equipped to secure more than weak 
forms of sustainability, there is no practical evidence that dictatorships, however 
'green' and benign, would be more successful in dealing with substantive policy 
challenges. 
Instead, the purpose has been to explore the dilemmas faced by the EU in relation to 
environmental policy. By the same token, it is recognised that actions within the 
existing framework will inevitably produce imperfect results and that practical 
alternatives are difficult to conceive. For some, the obvious remedy would be to reject 
the orthodoxy of consumer capitalism and to develop the debate on practical 
alternatives (Trainer, 1985; Daly, 1992; Seager, 1993; Paehlke, 1995). However, 
O'Riordan and Voisey's (1998) concept of the sustainability transition and Turner's 
(1993) spectrum of sustainability seem more obviously realistic frameworks to work 
within. As the European Union must protect all its legitimate interests and duties - the 
defence of the environment, the well-being of its citizens and the sovereignty of its 
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Member States - it is unreasonable to expect ambitious policy shifts. However, it is 
also important to recognise that the outcome of the present approach is likely to be 
weak sustainability. New policy instruments are unlikely to change this situation 
because they are essentially technical solutions when the most severe challenges 
concern how society perceives the importance of the environment. 
Aside from the problem of values, it has been argued that neither the divergence in 
Member State policies nor the uneven standards of implementation have been remedied 
by the move towards economic instruments. The main force behind policy 
convergence has consistently been the imposition of legislative standards. Economic 
instruments have principally been a technical instrument for providing environmental 
expenditure revenue. More encouragingly, there have been only sporadic instances 
where EU institutional procedures have fundamentally hindered the effectiveness of 
economic instruments. The German and Danish cases show that the free-trade 
provisions of the EU Treaty can conflict with its environmental remit (which 
theoretically supports the waste management hierarchy) but, generally, economic 
instruments have been successfully assimilated within the existing structure. 
Instead, the main factor determining the environmental efficacy of economic 
instruments has been the implementation methodologies employed by individual 
Member States. If, in fact, economic instruments do encourage the fragmentation of 
national standards, upholding the aims of the EU environmental programme will 
depend upon the legislation used to underpin them and the Commission's ability to 
enforce EU law. Both the Packaging Directive and the EU energy/carbon tax case 
suggest that economic instruments applied at a national level send uneven price signals 
to market systems. Therefore, without greater analysis by the Commission of the 
incentives contained in national taxes, the state-led approach may lead to further 
dislocations in the environmental acquis. There is some indication that fines for 
Member States could help to combat the implementation deficit but it will be some 
time before it is possible to determine whether they significantly reduce the number of 
infringements of EU environmental law. 
Ultimately, the EU environmental programme is still evolving at a rapid rate. The new 
competencies and procedures bestowed in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have 
yet to take full effect. What is apparent, however, is that economic instruments can 
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serve a useful purpose within the wider programme, but they are not a panacea. Too 
little is known about their practical impact, making further research in this area a high 
priority. However, considering that the EU possesses neither the democratic legitimacy 
nor the institutional power to adopt more radical or centralised environmental policies, 
the most appropriate focus for the present must be on ensuring that existing measures 
are properly applied. This will provide a more solid basis for assessing whether the 
EU's existing policies and philosophy towards the environment are a sufficient 
response to the challenges of sustainable development. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions and Prospects for the Future 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the processes shaping the implementation of 
European Union environmental policy. In particular, it has sought to present evidence 
evaluating the role of price-based regulation and the contribution of the EU's approach 
to environmental policy to the promotion of sustainable development. During the study 
a number of areas have been identified where economic instruments have led to major 
improvements in environmental standards. However, it has been argued that in key 
areas they have fallen short of their main objectives and the principles of sustainability. 
These failures can be attributed to a combination of factors; the tactical responses of 
businesses to environmental taxes, the assumptions made by policy-makers when 
designing price-based instruments, and the complexities of the EU's policy-making and 
implementation structures. To conclude this discussion and synthesise its findings, this 
chapter has three main objectives. The first is to review the study's key findings and 
success in achieving its aims. The second is to consider the future prospects for price-
based environmental regulation in the EU. The final aim is to suggest further research 
opportunities that have emerged as a result of this investigation. 
9.2 Main Findings and Evaluation of the Thesis 
Within the broad remit outlined above, three main objectives were set for the research: 
• To assess, in the case of the Packaging Directive, the efficacy of the EU's state-
led style of policy negotiation and implementation in relation to the promotion of 
sustainable development; 
• To investigate the extent to which price-based policy instruments have 
encouraged sustainable business practices; 
• To assess the compatibility of the EU's political and decision-making structures 
with the effective operation of price-based environmental regulation. 
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9.2.1 EU Policy Implementation and Sustainable Development 
There is broad agreement within the literature that the formulation of EU 
environmental policy fluctuates between a form of inter-govemmental, lowest-
conmion-denominator bargaining and a more confederal, entrepreneurial style of 
policy-making (Weale, 1999; Haas, 1998; Zito, 1998). There is also consensus that 
although ultimate control over the adoption of policies is vested in the Member States, 
no single institution or coalition consistently dominates the policy-making process. 
Instead, influence is sufficiently well distributed between the EU's major institutions 
that agreement must be reached between a wide range of actors before policies can gain 
acceptance (Weale, 1996). The Packaging Directive has proved no exception to these 
rules. The Commission's original proposals received the support of several 
environmental 'leader' states but were opposed by a more sceptical coalition headed by 
Britain and France (Golub, 1996). Because the latter group prevented the formation of 
a qualified majority in Council, several of the Environment Directorate's more 
ambitious proposals, including those for mandatory packaging reduction and re-use 
targets, were removed entirely, whilst its suggested recovery and recycling targets were 
significantly eroded (Bailey, 1999a). 
The analysis therefore revealed a number of interesting points. The first is that whilst 
this division of responsibilities is a necessary part of democratic politics in the trans-
national EU polity, it encourages a bargaining mentality amongst its key actors rather 
than one geared towards the 'rational' identification and resolution of environmental 
problems (Weale, 1996). This situation is inevitably fuelled by the inability of science 
to provide firm guidance on environmental problems, a knowledge vacuum which is 
often filled by interest-led arguments (Zito, 2000). The second point concerns conflicts 
between EU policies, particularly those relating to its environmental ambitions and 
trade commitments. In spite of the EU's general support for the waste management 
hierarchy, the Council was unable to agree waste reduction and re-use standards - two 
of the hierarchy's key elements - in the Packaging Directive. Mandatory reduction 
targets were considered to be economically damaging and unrealistic to implement, 
while re-use was deemed to restrict EU free trade. Notwithstanding the obvious 
practical difficulties of implementing meaningful reduction and re-use targets, it seems 
that the sustainability of EU waste policy was ideologically impeded by the Union's 
commitment to other policy priorities (Bailey, 1999a). Whilst acknowledging that all 
political agreements involve negotiation and compromise, it was argued that the 
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prominence of this bargaining mentality within the EU political system often 
counteracts the benefits gained from collective environmental decision-making. 
However, the study's main finding in this area concerns the extent to which state 
authorities adapt EU legislation during the process of practical implementation. 
Although flexible implementation has been a constant and deliberate feature of EU 
environmental policy (Lowe and Ward, 1998b; Barnes and Barnes, 1999), it was 
argued that the way national authorities implement EU legislation has a major influence 
on their contribution to sustainable development. For example, the German packaging 
waste policy sought to promote stronger sustainability by adopting stringent legislation, 
centralised management and punitive environmental charges, though whether these 
objectives have been achieved is still the subject of heated debate (Staudt, 1997; 
Flanderka, 1998). The UK's consultative, cost-conscious and market-led approach has 
led to economic efficiency but weak sustainability outcomes. It therefore seems that 
assessing national policies purely in terms of legislative standards does not provide an 
adequate evaluation of their overall contribution to sustainable development. A key 
focus for future EU policy, therefore, needs to be the implementation methodologies 
employed by national and regional authorities (Jordan, 1999). 
Ultimately, however, the conceptual ambiguity of sustainable development made it 
difficult to provide a categorical evaluation of the procedures used to implement EU 
policies (see Chapter two). Equally, the criteria used to evaluate sustainable 
development inevitably depend on the standpoint of the observer. In this case, the 
study was conducted from an environmentalist perspective (Chapter four). Whilst EU 
policy was assessed using criteria reflecting the diversity of the sustainable 
development debate, including Gibbs et al's (1998) definitions of weak and strong 
sustainability and O'Riordan and Voisey's (1998) concept of the sustainability 
transition, inevitably its findings - as with all social research - were influenced by the 
researcher's personal perspective (Kitchen and Tait, 2000; Williams, 2000). 
9.2.2 Price-based Regulation and Business Behaviour 
According to the existing literature, price-based environmental regulation serves two 
main purposes. First, environmental tax revenue may be earmarked for environmental, 
economic or social expenditures. Second, environmental charges can be used to 
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encourage industry or consumers to reduce their environmental impact (Baumol and 
Oates, 1988; Gee and von Weizsacker, 1994; van den Bergh, 1996). The study showed 
that while the German and British schemes have generally been successful in 
generating hypothecation revenue, both have experienced problems in allocating 
resources to priority areas. The main difficulty in Germany was that insufficient 
attention was paid to the development of reprocessing infrastructure. In Britain, the 
problem has been in ensuring that private-sector reprocessors use PRN revenue for 
environmentally related purposes (Bailey, 1999b). Both governments have sought to 
resolve these issues by increasing the regulation of their packaging waste management 
systems. Whilst the centralised structure of the Dual System made it relatively 
straightforward for the German government to adjust both its regulatory controls and 
Green Dot prices, the situation in Britain has been complicated by the govemment's 
(and industry's) preference for market-based pricing. 
The conclusion, therefore, is that since the source of many environmental problems lies 
in the failure of market systems to acknowledge the value of environmental resources, 
the utmost care must be taken when introducing market-based solutions. Because 
'free' markets are founded on profit maximisation rather than social justice or 
environmental sustainability, government intervention must ensure that such factors are 
not neglected. Conversely, Britain's market-led scheme has proved relatively 
economically efficient while Germany's 'command-and-control' regime has placed a 
major economic burden on its industries and possibly reduced their capacity and 
willingness to accommodate environmental regulation in other areas (Knabe, 1995). 
The survey of packaging producers (Chapter six) demonstrated that German businesses 
are more heavily engaged than their British counterparts in each element of waste 
management promoted by the Directive. Two aspects were particularly significant in 
terms of sustainable development; the proportion of businesses involved in packaging 
waste reduction (57.1% in Germany, 12.7% in Britain) and the development of end-use 
markets for recyclate (53.2% of German companies, 24.5% of British firms). However, 
in terms of the incentive effect created by environmental taxes, no significant 
correlation was found in either country between packaging waste charges and business 
willingness to participate in activities which reduce landfill disposal. Two primary 
explanations for this were proposed. First, it was suggested that packaging charges 
were too low in relation to the logistics and marketing benefits of packaging to have a 
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major bearing on business decisions (Jones, 1999). Second, many businesses, 
particularly within Germany, were recouping at least a proportion of recycling costs 
through increased product prices and, by doing so, were disseminating but diluting the 
incentive effect of environmental charges. Therefore, contrary to the claims in the 
economics literature, the study concluded that economic instruments produce only 
marginal changes in the behaviour of industry and that those observed were mainly 
produced by legislative requirements and the coercive power held by national 
authorities. This is not to say that economic instruments cannot help in the fight 
against pollution, but that their capabilities should not be over-estimated. As More et 
al. (1996: 407) comment: 
Decisions can be made on various grounds: economic, moral, aesthetic or rational. In our 
society, however, economics has become the language of default. We are unused to 
dealing with other grounds for decisions so, when confronted with a difficult choice, we 
turn quite naturally to economics - surely one of the most sophisticated and powerful tools 
for decision-making ever devised. Yet this may lead us to extend economics to areas 
where it is ill-suited to serve, a disservice both to the issue at hand and to economics. 
However, as well as the importance of these conclusions, it is also important to 
recognise the study's limitations. The first caveat is that the analysis examined a single 
piece of legislation. Some of the problems highlighted, such as the recovery of used 
materials through the supply chain and the development of end-use markets, clearly do 
not apply outside the waste management industry. Similarly, the research investigated 
one variant of price-based regulation. Its findings may therefore not be valid for 
tradeable permit systems, subsidies or other economic instruments. However, it would 
be premature to dismiss this as an idiographic study. Firstly, packaging waste is only 
one element of a wider waste management problem. Several existing waste taxes -
such as the UK landfill tax and the Danish trials with weighed refuse collection' - also 
seek to change industry or consumer behaviour. (Powell and Craighill, 1997). 
Moreover, PRN-style mechanisms are being considered for other waste streams, 
including end-of-life vehicles, waste electrical and electronic equipment, batteries and 
biodegradable waste (DTl/DoE, 1991; 1992; DoE, 1993; Pearce and Turner, 1993; 
' Under these trials, weight-based charges were introduced for non-compostable household waste. At the 
start of the scheme, waste was weighed on collection and households were charged at the same rate as 
the waste collection element of municipal taxes. The result of the direct charge has been a 15-20% 
reduction in the weight of non-compostable refuse collected. As the charge rate did not change, the 
reduction is attributed to households taking the opportunity to reduce their bills by separating 
compostable materials and increasing their participation in recycling (see Barrett et al., (1997:112)). 
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Fenton and Hanley, 1995; Palmer etal, 1997; Turner etal, 1998; DSD, 1999c; MRW, 
1999f; Thurgood, 2000). That said, more research is undeniably needed in order to 
explore the issues raised by this study further. 
The study's methodological limitations should also be acknowledged. The most 
obvious concern was whether the sampling frames used in the producer survey were 
representative of the overall population of businesses affected by packaging regulation. 
Respondent self-selection is always a problem; for example, did only the most pro-
active German companies return the questionnaire and how far did non-responses 
influence the results? Similarly, some doubts were expressed about the comparability 
of the two respondent groups. Whilst Chapter six showed both samples to be generally 
representative of the sectors targeted by packaging regulation, it proved difficult to 
compare the two groups in areas where the two sets of legislation diverged. Similarly, 
there is the problem of respondent validation in postal surveys. Though every effort 
was made to minimise the need for respondent interpretation, it is always possible that 
questions may have been misconstrued or misunderstood. 
In terms of the evaluation methods used, some economists consider the assessment of 
business responses to environmental taxes in terms of turnover as controversial or 
simplistic. Whilst it is a relatively crude measure and would benefit from further 
refinement, these objections seem slightly conjectural considering the number of 
businesses that evaluate their environmental strategies in precisely this manner 
(Watkins, 2000). Finally, although this study's remit was to examine the influence of 
environmental taxes on business practices, there were clearly other important variables, 
such as the stringency of legislative standards, the length of time legislation has been in 
place, and differences in corporate social-responsibility culture. Whilst these factors 
were considered briefly in Chapter seven, it would be useful for future studies to 
develop broader evaluation frameworks. 
9.2.3 EU Institutional Procedures and Economic Instruments 
The third objective of the study was to assess the compatibility of the EU's decision-
making structures with the effective operation of price-based environmental regulation. 
The main finding was that there have been few conflicts between nationally-
implemented charges and other aspects of the EU Treaty in the case of the Packaging 
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Directive. Two reasons for this were suggested; first, the EU institutions have no 
power to dictate the fiscal measures used by Member States to implement EU law and, 
second, most national packaging taxes are, by design or default, compliant with EU 
free-trade rules. Clashes between the Commission and Member States have only 
occurred where the Commission believes national legislation contravenes Articles 94-5 
of the Amsterdam Treaty. Even the most controversial of these, the deposit-return 
scheme for beverage containers in Germany, is not opposed on principle but because it 
imposes disproportionate transport costs on non-German manufacturers. 
However, if the trend towards price-based regulation continues, there is a danger that it 
may remove some momentum from the push-pull dynamic of EU policy-making. This 
dynamic begins where environmental 'leader' states introduce new standards then, in 
order to protect national competitiveness, seek to have them adopted across the EU. 
Such proposals are often resisted by 'laggard' states on the grounds that they are either 
environmentally or economically unjustified. The result, usually, is the adoption of a 
diluted proposal and an incremental increase in environmental standards across the 
Union (Sbragia, 1996). If the free-trade argument becomes less relevant under price-
based regulation, the pressure for harmonisation may also diminish. However, it is 
unlikely that the pressures creating the push-pull dynamic will evaporate entirely, not 
least because most economic instruments are introduced as part of wider E U 
commitments under the EAPs and international agreements; hence, all parties are 
working within common frameworks. Therefore, whilst there appear to be few 
conflicts between price-based environmental regulation and the EU Treaty, economic 
instruments may further problematise the already cumbersome processes of policy 
formulation and implementation. 
Chapter eight then examined the paradoxes inherent in the EU's attempts to fit its 
sustainability ambitions alongside its longstanding commitments to economic and trade 
development. As a liberal-democratic system founded on capitalist ideals - and 
moreover, according to W. Wallace (1996) and Horeth (1999), as an incomplete 
political entity - the EU cannot legitimately impose the kinds of restrictions on welfare 
and freedom that may be required to achieve sustainable development (Jacobs; 1994, 
Musschenga, 1994). It was argued that even assuming agreement could be reached on 
the nature and seriousness of environmental problems, EU decision-making processes 
are ill-equipped to agree and justify the necessary courses of action, especially where 
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these might entail radical changes to society's values and objectives. As price-based 
regulation is currently applied within the wider neoliberal-capitalist paradigm of 
economic expansion, the technique is likely to ameliorate environmental problems 
rather than solve them. However, whatever the limitations of the present system, it was 
acknowledged, first, that the EU programme has produced major advances in 
environmental protection and, second, that there are few immediately practical or 
morally defensible alternatives to liberal democracy. Therefore, notwithstanding the 
conflicts within EU policy, the chapter concluded that the immediate priorities should 
be to ensure that existing measures are fully and faithfully applied and to assess their 
environmental efficacy against the principles of sustainable development (Bames and 
Bames, 1999). 
One final task in appraising the work of this thesis is to highlight its contribution to 
contemporary debates in human geography. It is widely acknowledged that sustainable 
development embraces a broad range of issues; indeed, its defining feature is its 
attempt to constmct a holistic analysis of interactions between economy, society and 
environment (Bell and Morse, 1999). It is therefore apparent that interfaces between 
geography, economics, management studies, policy studies and the natural sciences are 
an integral part of exploring sustainability issues. This thesis has demonstrated 
particularly interesting links between economic, industrial and environmental 
geography by examining the stmctural and practical issues surrounding the 
environmental sustainability of economic and political processes. It has sought to 
illuminate the ways in which environmental, political and economic issues become 
entwined in the EU and the effects of these on the practical application of 
environmental policies. Furthermore, as these interactions occur at several levels in 
EU, national, regional and business planning, each stage of policy implementation 
presents its particular challenges and conflicts of interests and priorities. 
Another important contribution comes in terms of the application of regulation theory 
to environmental problems. The regulation theory approach focuses on relationships 
between the processes of accumulation that characterise modern capitalism and the 
ensemble of institutional processes that comprise the mode of social regulation (Peck 
and Miyamachi, 1994; Gibbs, 1996). More specifically, it explores the manner in 
which social regulation guides and stabilises accumulation processes so as temporarily 
to avoid capitalism's crisis tendencies produced by its natural disregard for externality 
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effects (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Gibbs (1996) suggests that regulation theory has 
particular application in respect of sustainable development because of the latter's 
specific integration of environmental, social and economic concerns into a holistic 
analytical framework. 
Of course, regulation theory is not solely a geographical construct. Baldwin and Cave 
(1999) note that it has been employed in such diverse disciplines as law, economics, 
political science, history, psychology, management and social administration. 
However, a regulation theory approach to geographical analysis of environmental 
policy is especially useful in understanding the scale and limitations of institutional 
regulation with respect to environmental externalities. In terms of scale, it appears that 
strategic environmental regulation is shifting towards the EU, a move which is a 
corollary of the region's economic integration. Within this context, more concrete and 
tactical forms of regulation have been applied by the Member States. However, the 
important point is that the framework of regulation and broad ideological conflicts 
between competing capitalist and environmental interests are increasingly being 
contested at a supranational level. If one accepts the notion that the EU is primarily 
organised around economic imperatives, this suggests that the current organisation of 
regulation may tend towards weak forms of sustainability unless it is also combined 
with changes in the values and attitudes of key decision-makers (Goodwin et al., 1995). 
It is also important to note the limits to effective social regulation during the practical 
implementation of environmental policies. The central question here concerns the 
extent to which industries operate within, or autonomously of national, regional, or 
even intemational institutional checks. There is already a lengthy literature 
documenting the loss of national control over economic activity resulting from 
globalisation (for example, Gwynne, 1985). The evidence from this investigation 
suggests that the immense resources required in the modern state to monitor the 
environmental behaviour of businesses at the local level significantly impairs the state's 
effective regulatory capacity. This problem of scale - which was evident in both 
Britain and Germany - coupled with the U K government's desire to seek quasi-market 
solutions to environmental problems, indicates that significant transformations in 
values and attitudes will be necessary in many areas before the tensions between 
economy and environment are satisfactorily eased. Approaching regulation theory 
from a geographical perspective has therefore aided the exploration of many of the 
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structural and spatial complexities of implementing sustainable environmental and 
economic policies. 
Again it is dangerous to make broad generalisations about the nature of EU 
environmental governance from a single study. Further research on the relationship 
between price-based regulation and EU policy processes is required before this is 
possible. This research has therefore, as much as any individual work can, made good 
progress against its main objectives and raised important questions about the 
practicalities of environmental policy implementation. However, as Chapter eight 
noted, there are few answers that can neatly unravel the relationship between 
environmental and economic policy or their management within the complex entity of 
the European Union. As O'Riordan and Voisey (1998: 3) eloquently put it: 
The sustainability transition ... is the process of coming to terms with sustainability in all 
its deeply rich ecological, social, ethical and economic dimensions. The transition is as 
much about new ways of knowing ... as it is about management and innovation of 
procedures and products. As a species, we have barely begun to imagine how to think 
sustainably. 
In exploring some of broader issues surrounding the practical attainment of 
environmental sustainability, as well as through its empirical work, this study has 
sought to advance this process of debate and learning. 
9.3 Prospects for the Future 
Having reviewed the study's key findings and their research contribution, the chapter 
now considers the outlook for price-based regulation in the EU. Two issues are likely 
to assume particular importance in the coming years. The first concems the flexibility 
of the EU environmental programme and, more expressly, the prospects for co-
ordinating Member-State economic instruments. The second acknowledges the 
changing composition of the EU and the challenges posed by the accession of the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. The following section examines how each 
of these dynamics is likely to affect the political balance of environmental policy in the 
European Union. 
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9.3.1 Flexibility and the Implementation ofEU Environmental Policy 
This thesis has highlighted a number of difficulties stemming from the EU's flexible, 
state-led style of environmental policy. However, it would be wrong to claim either 
that tangible controls do not exist (the EU Treaty, the EAPs and EU law are all 
significant and binding commitments) or that flexibility has not yielded major benefits. 
It has been instrumental in maintaining a balance between inter-governmentalism and 
confederalism within the EU and, moreover, it has made environmental policy sensitive 
to the wishes and capabilities of its constituent powers (Jordan, 1999). More 
worryingly, state-defined implementation has led to uneven and, arguably, diverging 
environmental standards in the Member States. For reasons explained previously, this 
is a trend which economic instruments seem unlikely to reverse. These concems are 
further compounded by the increasing number of infringements of EU environmental 
law in recent years (Demmke, 1997; Haas, 1998; Barnes and Barnes, 1999) .^ 
Therefore, although there are sound reasons for supporting the EU's flexible approach 
to environmental policy, the fear must that the programme in its current format will 
stmggle to maintain its coherence and focus on sustainable development. 
Whilst implementation flexibility is a necessary and integral part of environmental 
policy management in trans-national institutions, this does not preclude improvements 
being made to the present arrangements. Considering the record of poor 
implementation, tackling monitoring and enforcement is an obvious priority. However, 
as this issue falls largely outside the scope of this thesis (see House of Lords (1997) for 
a fuller discussion of the role of national authorities and the E U in environmental 
policy enforcement), this section focuses on the co-ordination of price-based regulation 
in the Member States. 
The first issues to consider are what options might be available and what modes of 
control might be politically, economically and environmentally acceptable to all 
Member States. Obviously there is no constitutional mandate in the Treaty enabling 
the EU institutions to prescribe how Member States should implement environmental 
law. Nor would such a 'top-down' approach be effective. It would be more likely to 
^ According to the latest Commission survey, 29% of all suspected infringements of EU law and 25% of 
open court cases in 1999 related to environmental policy. Furthermore, 45% of these concerned the non-
respect of ECJ judgements. It would appear that the problem is mainly one of poor implementation, as 
the transposition rate of EU environmental law was 97% compared with an average of 94.5% over the 
twenty policy areas surveyed (ENDS, 2000d). 
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be insensitive to local circumstances and to make policy implementation expensive, 
especially where national authorities were forced to adopt unfamiliar or inappropriate 
administrative procedures (Jordan, 1999). Similar objections prevent the Commission 
taking a doctrinaire stance on the design eind setting of environmental taxes. Even if 
the constitutional difficulties were somehow waived, the centralisation of 
environmental taxes would require unanimous Council approval under Article 93 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Decision-making in this area would therefore effectively be 
paralysed. Furthermore, since the costs of pollution reduction vary between individual 
polluters and countries, uniform charges (and standards) would have a disproportionate 
effect on less-developed Member States (Manser, 1993). On this basis and the premise 
that nationally-led economic instruments cause few problems for inter-state trade, the 
logical approach is for the Commission to encourage differentiated environmental 
charges where they promote an appropriate balance between environmental protection 
and economic development in each Member State (Halkos, 1996). 
If it makes little economic or environmental sense to adopt a overbearing approach to 
policy implementation, future co-ordination must be limited to the definition of general 
rules for the application of environmental taxes. Whether or not a less inter-
govemmental outlook eventually emerges hinges largely on the extent to which 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) encourages the federalisation of fiscal policies. 
This year, EU finance ministers 'broadly endorsed' new criteria for the introduction of 
tax cuts in the Member States, the general aim of which is to maintain budgetary 
discipline within the Single Market (Financial Times, 2000: 1). Although some 
observers fear this may undermine national sovereignty on tax issues, it demonstrates 
that greater fiscal co-operation is possible. An indication of this trend in relation to 
environmental policy came in the Commission's reports to the 2000 Inter-
Govemmental Conference (IGC); this recommended the extension of QMV to more 
areas of environmental policy, including taxes raised purely for environmental purposes 
(IGC, 2000a; 2000b). Under this proposal, QMV could be expanded to all 
environmental polices except those related to town and country planning and land use 
(aside from waste policy). 
If such streamlining of EU environmental decision-making comes to fmition, there are 
a number of areas where national environmental taxes might co-ordinated. First, where 
EU legislation advocates the adoption of economic instmments, the creation of banded 
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environmental taxes could be considered. The aim here would be to make tax systems 
responsive to the needs of individual states whilst ensuring they are based on scientific 
evaluations of environmental and economic impact rather than short-term political 
objectives. If this were still considered too prescriptive, another option would be to 
require Member States to demonstrate, in advance of implementation, the link between 
their environmental taxes and the sustainability outcomes sought by EU legislation. To 
do this in retrospect, as has occurred with the Packaging Directive, only adds to the 
time between the initiation of legislation and the first evaluation of its effectiveness .^ 
Whilst Jacobs (1991) notes that the effect of environmental taxes can rarely be 
guaranteed - making charge iterations inevitable - excessive reliance on a dose-
response methodology can be expensive for industry and deter investment in pollution 
abatement (as Britain's experience with PRNs testifies, also Welford and Prescott, 
1994). It is therefore seems logical that the environmental and economic effects of 
economic instruments be more fully evaluated before they are applied in practice. 
The second option would be to introduce rules governing the incentive patterns created 
by environmental taxes, a key element of which should be the strengthening of rewards 
for improved environmental performance. This objective might be pursued either 
through increased environmental taxes (the German approach in the Packaging 
Ordinance) or the greater use of subsidies (Jacobs, 1991). Subsidies are generally 
employed as financial rewards for reduced pollution, or as grants or 'soft' loans to 
businesses investing in environmental protection (Rees, 1997). Though both the British 
and German packaging waste models grant de facto subsidies to their reprocessing 
sectors, this study has shown that recycling charges have produced only marginal 
changes in polluter behaviour. The question is therefore whether an alternative tack, 
the use of subsidies to recycle taxes back to producers, would stimulate a greater 
response. This approach is similar to that employed, admittedly with variable success, 
by the Environmental Bodies Credit Scheme under the Landfill Tax (HCSCETRA, 
1999). The subsidies approach does create its own problems, however, as subsidies 
would either act as a drain on public finances or restrict the revenue available for other 
environmental investment. Furthermore, the misuse of Landfill Tax credits by some 
landfill operators serves notice of the dangers of under-regulated subsidy schemes 
^ In 1998, the Environment Directorate of the European Commission instituted a project to evaluate the 
implementation of the Packaging Directive in the fifteen Member States (E3/ETU/980111). The results 
of this are scheduled for publication in late 2000, four years after the transposition deadline in the 
Member States. 
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(ENDS, 1998g). Nonetheless, by providing positive incentives to industry, subsidies 
may facilitate their engagement in pollution prevention. 
The third option would be to introduce general rules on the hypothecation of 
environmental taxes. The aim here would be to prevent recurrences of the PRN 
situation, where individual market players were able to exploit regulatory loop-holes 
and manipulate the hypothecation system (see Chapter five). Learning from the British 
experience, the Commission could require that Member States meet two pre-conditions. 
First, they should ensure that recipients of hypothecated revenue account for the 
proportion directed towards environmental expenditures (DETR, 1998a; 1999a). 
Second, national authorities should specify the uses revenue may be put to under the 
hypothecation scheme. This, it has been argued in Chapter seven, should include an 
element of pollution prevention. A more ambitious tactic would be to specify that 
minimum percentages of tax revenue should be diverted towards environmental 
projects, though this is again likely to be too prescriptive and susceptible to 
manipulation. 
In the final analysis, it is doubtful whether the Member States are ready to accept 
greater EU involvement in the practical implementation of environmentid policies as 
national sovereignty on fiscal matters and the subsidiarity principle remain politically 
sensitive issues. The difficulty, as Horeth (1999) sees it, is that much of the 'zero-sum' 
political discourse considers that strengthening one institution (the EU decision-making 
process) by definition weakens the other (national processes) (also Zito, 2000). For this 
reason, only general suggestions for policy co-ordination have been made here. 
However, the danger is that a disjointed EU environmental programme will struggle to 
retain its coherence and, more specifically, its focus on sustainable development. This 
suggests that a degree of mutually agreed co-ordination (in addition to that already 
imposed by legislative and Treaty requirements) should be extended to policy 
implementation. In order to make this process consensual rather than authoritarian, 
national authorities should make the agreement of common implementation rules a key 
component of the policy-negotiation process. Whilst this will undoubtedly complicate 
policy-making rules further, it should help to reduce disparities and produce a more 
'level playing field' in relation to environmental policy and EU free trade. 
252 
9.3.2 Enlargement 
Whilst this thesis has concentrated mainly on the EU's internal political dynamics and 
their influence on environmental policy, the changing geopolitical structure of Europe 
since the late 1980s has brought new dimensions to the environmental debate (Bames 
and Bames, 1999). The most influential of these is likely to be the accession of new 
Member States to the Union (Blacksell, 1998). This is especially true considering that, 
of the thirteen states currently applying for EU membership, the majority are from 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (CEC, 1997d)'*. Many of these countries suffered 
appalling environmental mismanagement during the Soviet era and are undergoing 
slow and painful transitions to Western political and economic philosophies (Klarer and 
Francis, 1997; Blacksell, 1998; Saiko, 1998). Two issues concerning the CEE 
accessions are of particular importance in the context of this thesis. The first is how 
enlargement will affect the EU's already complicated decision-making procedures. 
The second concems the role of price-based regulation in the environmental 
rehabilitation of the CEE states. 
The first stage in the accession process is for CEE states to harmonise their laws with 
those of the EU. The view of the European Commission, expressed at the Environment 
Council in 1996, was that this should include all aspects of the environmental acquis 
(Mayhew, 1998). This process is expected to take at least ten years in some cases 
because of the sheer scale of the work and the costs involved (Turner, 1997, cited in 
Bames and Barnes, 1999; Saiko, 1998). According to the Commission, even Slovenia, 
which enjoys one of the most prosperous economies in Eastern Europe, faces immense 
practical and institutional challenges in conforming to EU environmental standards 
(CEC, 1999c). The strategy proposed at the EU's Cardiff Summit in 1998 was that 
some of the funding for environmental approximation in the CEE countries should 
come from the PHARE programme^ but that the majority should be financed by the 
applicant states themselves (Barnes and Bames, 1999). However, a number of other 
bodies have also established funds to aid environmental and economic transition in the 
According to the current timetable, the first wave of accession will include the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The other states being considered for EU membership are 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Turkey (Barnes and 
Barnes, 1999). 
' The PHARE programme was set up to support economic and political transition in Poland and 
Hungary. In 1999, it had a budget of 6.693 billion Euros (http://europa.eu.int/comm/ enlargement.htm). 
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CEE nations, including the European Investment Bank and the Global Environmental 
Facility (Klarer and Francis, 1997). 
Aside from the practical challenges posed by enlargement, each wave of accessions 
alters the balance of power in the EU institutions and, potentially, the direction of the 
environmental programme (Bames and Barnes, 1999). The last enlargement in 1995, 
which incorporated Austria, Finland and Sweden, might reasonably be argued to have 
increased the influence of the 'green' lobby, though Liefferlink and Andersen (1998) 
claim that consistent alliances between environmental-activist states have failed to 
materialise because of differences in strategic outlook. However, the fact remains that 
it will be more difficult to reach agreements in an EU comprising twenty or even thirty 
members. Although one should not automatically assume that the CEE governments 
will be a negative influence on environmental policy, their presence will undoubtedly 
alter the balance in the Council and the European Parliament (Table 9.1) and 
overshadow the pro-environmental shift produced by the 1995 accessions (CEC, 
2000b). Considering the transitions taking place in CEE states, the fear must be that 
they will seek to slow the pace of environmental policy in order to protect their fragile 
market economies. Under present voting mles, this could lead to policy stagnation and 
the dissipation of the push-pull dynamic. Less sensationally, lowest-common-
denominator bargaining could re-emerge as the predominant form of policy-making. 
Pre-empting such contingencies, the issue of expanded policy-making was one of the 
few environmental issues debated at the EU's 1996/7 Inter-Governmental Conference. 
The main theme here was the need for greater policy flexibility, first, to help manage 
the lengthy transitions required by some prospective members and, second, as a route 
forward for environmental policy where not all Member States wish to take part (Lowe 
and Ward, 1998b). Whilst the practical reasons for this tactic are plain, it opens up the 
prospect of a two or even three-tier EU environmental policy and could upset the 
delicate balance between Union's free-trade and environmental policies. 
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Table 9.1 The Provisional Division of voting rights under an expanded EU 
Member State Population 
(millions) 
Population 
(%) 
European 
Parliament 
Seats 
Council 
Votes 
Commission 
Existing 
Belgium 10.21 1.87 25 5 1 
Denmark 5.31 0.97 16 3 1 
Germany 82.04 15.04 99 10 2 
Greece 10.53 1.93 25 5 1 
Spain 39.39 7.22 64 8 2 
France 58.97 10.81 87 10 2 
h-eland 3.74 0.69 15 3 1 
Italy 57.61 10.56 87 10 2 
Luxembourg 0.43 0.08 6 2 1 
Netherlands 15.76 2.89 31 5 1 
Austria 8.08 1.48 21 4 1 
Portugal 9.98 1.83 25 5 1 
Finland 5.16 0.95 16 3 1 
Sweden 8.85 1.62 22 4 1 
UK 59.25 10.86 87 10 2 
TOTAL 375.36 626 87 20 
Applicants 
Bulgaria 8.23 1.51 21 4 1 
Cyprus 0.75 0.14 6 2 1 
Estonia 1.45 0.27 7 3 1 
Hungary 10.09 1.85 25 5 1 
Latvia 2.44 0.45 10 3 1 
Lithuania 3.70 0.68 15 3 1 
Malta 0.38 0.07 6 2 1 
Poland 38.67 7.09 64 8 2 
Czech 10.29 1.89 25 5 1 
Republic 
Romania 22.49 4.12 44 6 1 
Slovakia 5.39 0.99 16 3 1 
Slovenia 1.98 0.36 9 3 1 
Turkey 64.39 11.80 89 10 2 
TOTAL 545.56 100 963 144 35 
Source: CEC (2000b: 63) 
The second issue concerns the ability of the CEE countries to cope with the strictures of 
price-based environmental regulation. As part of the association agreements, the 
Commission routinely measures the progress of each applicant state against two 
economic criteria, the existence of a functioning market economy and their capacity to 
withstand competitive forces within the Union (CEC, 1999c). The Commission 
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currently considers that the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia 
have met the former requirement and that Slovakia is very close. Against the second 
standard, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have made greatest progress, Hungary and 
Poland are proceeding apace and Estonia still has considerable work to complete. The 
Commission's view is that other CEE states could catch up within ten years if 
determined efforts are made. At the same time, the report expresses concerns about 
corruption and breakdowns in the rule of law, particularly in Romania. 
However, Britain's experiences with the PRN system demonstrate that the existence of 
a market economy alone is not sufficient to assure the success of price-based 
environmental regulation. For economic instruments to succeed, market systems must 
be able to allocate resources efficiently and in accordance with govemment policy 
objectives. The extent to which either precondition can yet be met by the CEE states is 
questionable, as legal and administrative weaknesses have created serious obstacles to 
the approximation process (Barnes and Barnes, 1999). The environmental impact of 
industrial activity is still severely under-regulated in most CEE countries, whilst 
privatisation and the transition to the market economy have squeezed profits and 
intensified competitive pressures (Saiko, 1998). Neither of these bode well for the 
formal internalisation of environmental costs, whilst endemic cormption in some 
national authorities makes the task of effective enforcement even more daunting 
(Saiko, 1998)^ . Manser (1993: 93-4) suggests that in Poland, for example, establishing 
'tough enforcement by a competent local ecological "police"' is a higher priority than 
any switch from legislative to price-based regulation. More optimistically, some 
reports claim that the expansion of trade between EU and CEE countries has forced 
many CEE manufacturers to adopt EU product standards even where the enabling 
legislation has yet to be transposed (EAP Task Force, 1995). 
Nonetheless, aside from the immediate clear up, the most urgent priority is to develop 
institutions and procedures capable of effective environmental management, as only 
then will it be possible to support the wider use of market-based environmental 
* Aside from corruption, Manser (1993) discusses three main obstacles to the effective monitoring and 
enforcement of environmental policy in the CEE states. First, the decentralisation of monitoring 
activities compared with the main decision-making apparatus in most CEE countries means that local 
enforcement offices lack the necessary staff and skills to enforce legislation. Second, many industrial 
plants simply lack the necessary control equipment. Third, some CEE governments have allowed 
industry to side-step fines or charges in order to protect their country's economic performance in times of 
recession. 
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regulation (Klarer and Francis, 1997). Though many CEE governments have 
increasingly deployed PPP-based environmental regulation since 1989, including 
measures to regulate packaging waste in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia 
and Slovakia (Perchards, 1998), the correct sequencing of events is critical to the 
economic and environmental revival of Eastern Europe. Attempts to expand market-
based regulation before legislative frameworks and enforcement competencies are in 
place could damage both causes (EAP Task Force, 1995). The pitfalls of 'shock 
therapy' have arguably been a key lesson from the transition of former socialist states 
to the market economy. Although it is essential that the value of environmental 
resources are not neglected in the CEE economies, it seems prudent that the former 
socialist states and those directing the accession process in the EU pursue 
environmental capacity-building, particularly in respect of enforcement, before 
embarking on an ambitious programme of market-led regulation. 
9.4 Towards a Research Agenda 
This thesis has explored a range of issues concerning the implementation of EU 
environmental policy. It is hoped that the ideas expressed have relevance beyond the 
academic community, and that they will prove useful to policy-makers and industry 
managers alike. Inevitably, considering the complexity of the issues discussed, it has 
been impossible to provide an exhaustive analysis of the subject. Like most studies, it 
has left questions unanswered and has proposed conclusions that require further 
investigation. It is therefore appropriate to conclude the thesis by outlining a suggested 
research agenda for the future. 
Unquestionably the highest priority is for further research examining business 
responses to price-based environmental regulation. Although the study produced 
important conclusions conceming the incentive and hypothecation functions of 
environmental charges, further research would improve understanding of these 
complex relationships. The first suggestion, therefore, is that the empirical work begun 
in this study should continue in the form of further industry surveys. These should 
focus on comparing different types of economic instrument and regulatory regimes in 
order to test the wider applicability of the tentative conclusions proposed in this study. 
It would also be useful to gain a more in-depth appreciation of industry's opinions of 
price-based environmental regulation. By aiming for a broad picture using postal 
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surveys, the reasons why businesses react to regulatory pressures in the way they do, or 
what might persuade them to engage with the sustainability debate more seriously, 
could not be explored fully in this research. The second strand of the proposed 
research agenda, therefore, is the use of qualitative methodologies to examine business 
reactions to price-based regulation. 
The general aim of employing qualitative research here would be to further our 
understanding of the processes influencing business environmental thinking and 
practice. For example, business sector, geographical location, corporate culture, 
supply-chain pressures, stakeholder groups both within and outside the organisation, 
and local or regional govemment policies are all potential influences on the 
environmental behaviour of firms. Each of these may act as barriers to, or 
opportunities for, more sustainable business practice. Attempts to explore such issues 
using quantitative methodologies and postal surveys would involve high levels of 
interpretation by research participants and would, as a likely consequence, yield 
incomplete and unreliable data. 
Semi-stmctured interviews offer a clear way forward in this context. Here common 
themes could be examined whilst enabling important or unexpected issues to be 
broached and elaborated upon. When exploring why respondents, corporate or 
otherwise, think or behave in a particular way, adopting a more inductive approach is 
often less constrictive than structured quantitative questioning. Proposition sets may 
also be included within interviews to help maintain stmcture whilst not stifling open 
debate. While there are always problems in generalising interview data gained from 
comparatively few respondents, this can be partly overcome by focus groups. These 
would enable groups of business managers to interact in identifying and prioritising 
potential barriers to sustainability. Finally, case studies could be used to examine 
business responses to different forms of environmental regulation (this technique was 
employed during the Masters pilot study). The main advantages of this technique were, 
first, that it provided the opportunity to talk to various members of the organisation and 
gain a broader view; second, that it helped to overcome the time constraints often 
imposed at interviews; and, third, that it provided first-hand experience of the 
difficulties companies face in complying with environmental legislation. Participant 
case studies were therefore an extremely effective way of exploring issues in greater 
depth. 
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There are also several potentially useful research avenues concerning the formulation 
and implementation of EU environmental policies. Perhaps the highest priority here is 
for research examining the CEE accessions and their impact on EU policy formation. 
Whilst this chapter has proposed that EU expansion may cause serious problems for the 
environmental programme, it will be some time before this can be fully assessed. 
Barnes and Bames (1999) argue that even the influence of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
on environmental policy has yet to be properly determined. Two research possibilities 
can therefore be suggested. The first would be to examine the effect of the CEE 
accessions on the institutional dynamics of the EU and, more specifically, on the push-
pull dynamic, subsidiarity, consensual bargaining and decision-making by concurrent 
majorities. The second would be to explore the implementation capabilities of the CEE 
states, where particular attention needs to be paid to the application of price-based 
regulation and enforcement issues. 
A more local-level research opportunity not pursued in this thesis but alluded to in 
Appendix Seven is further exploration of environmental policy implementation at the 
intra-state scale. Appendix Seven, by noting the distribution of reprocessing facilities 
in Britain and Germany, demonstrated some clear pattems. For materials such as 
aluminium and steel, for example, only a few accredited reprocessing centres existed. 
For others, such as paper and plastics, there was distinct clustering around major urban 
centres with relatively few found in rural and peripheral areas. 
It is immediately obvious that such patterns are in response to clear economic drivers. 
For example, the distribution of steel and aluminium reprocessors undoubtedly reflects 
economy of scale factors. Large volumes of materials are required to make such 
recycling operations viable and, in fact, most are integrated production and 
reprocessing facilities. The location of centres for other materials is also in response to 
the need to be close to source markets, in this case waste materials collected from 
industrial and household sources. 
However, whilst such processes are fairly straightforward to understand, their 
implications for 'sustainable' waste policy and management require further 
investigation. The first issue to consider is the application of the proximity principle in 
waste management policy (Porter, 1998). The key questions here are, first, whether the 
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current distribution of reprocessing facilities is an appropriate interpretation of the 
proximity principle in terms of reducing environmental impacts from transport and, 
second, whether the policy instruments in operation encourage reprocessing or disposal 
of waste as close as possible to its point of origin. From the evidence in Chapter five, it 
would appear that the PRN system is less locally focused than the Dual System as it 
does not oblige waste producers to use the nearest facility if it is not the most 
economic. 
However, any detailed examination of the proximity principle at an intra-state level 
would not be straightforward. The first task would be to produce inventories of waste 
movements from producer to reprocessor in order to ascertain the distances wastes are 
transported. Such audit trails are highly complex and information may often be 
incomplete, especially where waste producers or their agents are not required to use the 
nearest facility. Commercial confidentiality is also an obvious concern. It is therefore 
suggested that only relatively local-scale studies are likely to produce reliable results. 
Moreover, evaluating whether particular networks conform to the proximity principle 
will require assessment in the context of Best Practicable Environmental Option, 
balancing a range of economic and environmental factors, rather than solely against 
proximity criteria. Careful research scoping and design will therefore be of paramount 
importance in such studies. 
The second issue is how the spatial concentration of reprocessing affects waste 
management and sustainability in rural and other peripheral areas. One topic of 
particular significance is the development of recycling in the former East Germany, 
where the data suggest that relatively few reprocessing centres are located in the new 
Lander. This apparent imbalance raises a number of questions relevant to both 
environmental and economic geography. For instance, does waste transportation to the 
West create a significant environmental impact? Has this imbalance led to lower 
recycling in the East and increased landfilling, fly-tipping and other environmental 
problems? Finally, to what extent have the new Lander lost out on sustainable waste 
management as a major growth industry in Germany? Similar issues could also be 
examined in Britain, particularly in areas such as the South West, which has few 
reprocessing facilities and its own well-documented economic problems. 
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Again, however, a note of caution is necessary. As well as the complexities of data 
collection already identified, it is clear that waste management is taking on increasingly 
intemational dimensions. This was demonstrated by the use of foreign reprocessing 
centres by U K reprocessors to obtain recycling certificates. This means that analysing 
waste management strategies purely on an intra-state level has its limitations without 
analysis of the wider national and international contexts. Even so, there remain 
numerous opportunities to investigate waste management policies and processes from 
both a bottom-up and a top-down perspective. 
The final area of potential future research concems recent developments in EU 
environmental policy-making. Many issues have been discussed in this investigation 
without being fully resolved. For example, to what extent will extended QMV 
streamline environmental policy-making? How much will framework directives and 
the Inter-Govemmental Conference's resolve to make environmental policy more 
flexible affect the Member-State environmental standards? If there is greater co-
operation in the design and implementation of environmental taxes, how will this 
process be managed and what effect will it have on progress towards sustainable 
development? To what extent can or should the implementation methodologies 
employed by the Member States be co-ordinated at EU level? Finally, how might the 
EU realign its fundamental values to better reflect those of sustainable development? It 
is therefore clear that this research is presented as much in the spirit of a beginning as 
of an end. Some issues have been clarified, new ones have emerged and much remains 
to be done. If these opportunities are taken up by other researchers, the coming years 
will witness an important advance in the study of environmental policy 
implementation. 
It is also important to stress that human geography can make a substantial contribution 
to this research agenda. Its most obvious role is analysis of the spatial patterns caused 
by different environmental policies. This is particularly important considering the 
uneven pattems of environmental protection in the EU Member States and the further 
disparities that are likely to result from the CEE accessions. Gibbs and Healey (1997: 
199) suggest that spatial analysis of environmental issues should take at least two 
forms. First, it should 'consider how incorporating sustainable development in both 
weak and strong forms impacts upon economic development over space' and, second, it 
should provide guidance on the most appropriate spatial scale to implement policies 
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aiming towards sustainable development. Finally, it has been argued that while 
sophisticated techniques have been developed for predicting how policy instruments 
should operate, many of these predictions have never been rigorously evaluated (Pearce 
and Turner, 2000). By fulfilling this role, geographical analysis can make an important 
contribution to the wider sustainability debate. When the issue at stake is as important 
as the long term viability of modem society, such knowledge gaps need to be speedily 
addressed. Only then will it be possible to determine with greater confidence whether 
the EU's current approach to environmental policy is capable of infusing the 
sustainability into development. 
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Appendix 1 Contact letter for Preliminary Business Interviews 
Date 
Contact Name 
Company Name 
Address 
Dear 
Re: Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997 
I am a doctoral student with the Department of Geographical Sciences, University of 
Plymouth, currendy conducting a research programme to examine the implementation of the 
EU Packaging Waste Directive and the UK Packaging Regulations. 
The aim of the research is to explore the impact of the Directive and Regulations on businesses 
obligated by the UK legislation. Obviously, it is essential for me to obtain the opinions of as 
many affected industries as possible in order to gain a full understanding of these policies. It is 
my intention, therefore, to conduct a major survey of packaging producers in Britain and 
Germany. I am writing to you asking for assistance in providing preliminary information for 
this survey. 
At present I am establishing an outline picture of how businesses in the UK perceive the 
Regulations. I would therefore be extremely grateful if you could spend a short time 
commenting on the questions raised below: 
• Does your Company have specific plans for complying with the Packaging Regulations? If 
so, would it be possible to obtain a copy? 
• What is the principal method employed by your Company to comply with the Regulations 
(compliance scheme or self-registration)? 
• How are you managing the task of collecting packaging data in order to calculate your 
Company's recovery and recycling obligations? 
• Can you please give brief comments on your Company perception of the Packaging 
Regulations in terms of i) the efficacy of the PRN system and the use of economic 
instruments and ii) the extent to which the EU Directive promotes packaging minimisation. 
If you could please respond in writing to me at the above address, I would be extremely 
grateful. Please be assured that any responses you provide will be treated in accordance with 
the ethical research code of the University of Plymouth. This guarantees the anonymity, 
confidentiality and protection from harm of all research participants. 
May I thank you for any help you can offer this research. I hope to hear from you soon. 
Yours sincerely. 
Ian Bailey 
Department of Geographical Sciences 
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Appendix 2 Contact letter for Accredited Reprocessor Survey 
Date 
Contact Name 
Company Name 
Address 
Dear 
Re: Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997 Research 
I am currently conducting a research programme with the University of Plymouth, examining 
the implementation of the Packaging Waste Regulations. The research is a comparative study 
of the systems introduced within two European Union member states, the UK and Germany. It 
aims to evaluate their effectiveness in terms of (i) promoting sustainable waste management 
practices, and (ii) the impact of packaging regulation upon market systems and obligated 
producers. 
As part of this research, I am contacting major companies in the packaging chain, including all 
compliance schemes and reprocessors. The purpose of this is to compile a profile how the 
reprocessing sector perceives the legislation. It would be of great assistance to the accuracy 
and objectivity of this study if you could supply the following information: 
• Details of your current reprocessing centres and their capacity in terms of recycling and 
energy from waste (EfW), preferably also split by material type. 
• Plans for new centres or expansions to existing recycling and EfW capacity. 
• Details of partnerships with local authorities/industry to develop packaging collection 
schemes. 
• The company's official position regarding the merits and problems of the PRN system. 
• If you also have a publicly available operating prospectus, this would be extremely helpful. 
I would like to stress that this research is bound by the University's code of ethical research. 
This ensures that all information remains strictly confidential, respondent interests are not 
compromised, and that participant anonymity outside the research is protected. I would further 
stress that the research is entirely academic in character and that the only objective is to 
produce an objective assessment of the recycling market for packaging waste. 
I very much hope that you can assist this research and I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
Yours sincerely. 
Ian Bailey 
Department of Geographical Sciences 
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Appendix 3a UK Survey Questionnaire 
QUESTIONNAIRE CODE NUMBER 
Please remember that all details y/'iW be treated as strictly conHdential. For each 
question, tick the answer which best describes your organisation. Please read all 
options before selecting your answer. Please leave any questions you do not wish 
to answer blank. 
SECTION A: IMPACT OF THE PACKAGING REGULATIONS UPON INDUSTRY 
This section asks about the impact of the Packaging Regulations on your company. PLEASE TICK 
ONE BOX ONLY FOR EACH QUESTION UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED. 
A1 Is your company aware of the Producer Responsibility Packaging 1. Yes 
Waste Regulations? IF NO, ANSWER SECTION E ONLY 
A2 Does your company have legal responsibilities under the 1. Yes 
Packaging Regulations? IF NO, ANSWER SECTION E ONLY 
2. No 
2 No 
A3 Which of the following methods has the company chosen in order to recovery and recycle its 
packaging? 
1. Joined a compliance scheme 2. Organised packaging recovery independently 
3. Other Please specify 
A4 Does the company collect waste packaging at its own 
business sites? 
I Ye-. 2. No 
A5 Does the company recover waste packaging from its customers? 1. Yes 2. No 
A6 Approximately what percentage of the total packaging used by the company 
is collected direcdy (both at company sites and from customers)? 
A7 Which packaging materials does the company collect directly? PLEASE TICK THE BOX FOR 
EACH CATEGORY OF PACKAGING MATERLVL THE COMPANY COLLECTS 
1. Paper/cardboard 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glass 
5. Plastic 
3. Steel 
6. Wood 
A8 How many of the company's employees are involved full time in managing 
its compliance with the Packaging Regulations? 
A9 How many extra staff has the company employed in order to manage its compliance with the 
Regulations? 
1. None 2. 1 or more If 1 or more, please specify 
A10 Has the company employed any outside assistance to assist it 
achieve compliance with the Regulations, e.g. a consultancy? 
1. Yes 2. No 
297 
SECTION B: PACKAGING POLICY 
This section discusses the paclcaging policies adopted by your company. This section is split into 
three topics, Reduction, Reuse and Recycling. Please tick one box only for each question unless 
specified. 
PACKAGING REDUCTION 
BI Has the company set targets for reducing the quantity of 
packaging it uses? IT NO, GO TO QUESTION B5 
1. Yes 2. No 
B2 What is the company's percentage reduction target between 1997 and 2001 ? 
B3 How is this reduction measured? TICK EACH BOX WHICH DESCRIBES YOUR 
COMPANY'S STRATEGY FOR REDUCING PACKAGING 
1. A reduction in the total amount of packaging the company uses 
2. A reduction in the weight of packaging for each unit of product sold 
B4 Which packaging materials is the company reducing its usage of? PLEASE TICK EACH BOX 
WHICH APPLIES 
1. Paper/cardboard 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glass 
5. Plastic 
3. Steel 
6. Wood 
REUSABLE PACKAGING 
B5 Is the company using more reusable packaging than it did before 1. Yes 
the Packaging Regulations were introduced? 
B6 Approximately what percentage (by weight) of packaging was reused in 1997? 
B7 Approximately what percentage (by weight) will be reused by the year 2001 ? 
2 No 
B8 What types of reusable packaging materials does the company currently use? PLEASE TICK 
EACH BOX WHICH APPLIES 
1. Paper/cardboard 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glass 
5. Plastic 
3. Steel 
6. Wood 
RECYCLING 
B9 Is the company using more recycled packaging than it did before 1. Yes 
the Packaging Regulations were introduced? 
BIO Approximately what percentage (by weight) of packaging used 
by the company was recycled in 1997? 
Bl 1 Approximately what percentage (by weight) will.be recycled 
by the year 2001? 
2. No 
B12 What types of recycled packaging materials does your company currenUy use? PLEASE TICK 
E A C H BOX WHICH APPLIES 
1. Paper/cardboard 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glass 
5. Plastic 
3. Steel 
6. Wood 
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SECTION C: FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PACKAGING REGULATIONS 
CI Which of the following categories of cost has the company incurred as a result of the Packaging 
Regulations? PLEASE TICK EACH BOX WHICH APPLIES: 
a. Registration fee to a national enforcement agency 
b. Membership fee to a packaging compliance scheme or other similar organisation 
c. Unit or weight-based packaging recovery charges to a compliance scheme 
d. Deposits on non-returnable packaging produced by the company 
e. 'Green Dot' or similar charges 
f. Consultancy fee to packaging scheme 
g. Increased costs for waste collection 
h. Payment for packaging recovery certificates, e.g. PRNs 
i. Other, please specify 
C2 What is the estimated cost to the company of complying with the 
Packaging Regulations for 1998? 
C3 Please consider the following statements, and indicate on the scale given the company's opinion on 
each statement. 
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 
strongly agree neither disagree strongly 
agree disagree 
C3a The company will increase prices to customers t 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 
to recover a l l the costs it incurs in complying I I I I I I I I I 
with the Packaging Regulations 
C3b The company will only recover g a r t of these I I I I I I I I I 
packaging costs from its customers ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Jii 
C3c The company will inform customers of the I I I 1 [ 1 I I I 
reason for these price increases 
C3d The cost of the Regulations will encourage the i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 i 
company to change its policies on the use of I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 
packaging 
C3e The company will only be able to comply with I I I I I 1 I I I 
the minimum standards set by the Regulations ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
C3f The company aims to exceed the targets set by • , , . • . , • . . 
the Regulations I | | | | | | | | 
C3g The Regulations will encourage the company i 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 t 
to reduce and reuse more of its packaging I 1 I 1 I 1 I I I 
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Section D: GOVERNMENT POLICY ON PACKAGING WASTE 
For each statement, please tick the box for each statement which best describes your 
company's opinion on government policy on packaging. TICK ONE BOX ONLY FOR 
EACH QUESTION 
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 
strongly agree neither disagree strongly 
agree disagree 
D l The recycling targets are too high for industry 
to achieve 
D2 The same recycling targets should apply in I I 
all EU states ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
D3 The company has been unfairly discriminated I 1 1 I I I I 
against in the legislation ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
D4 Voluntary targets from industry would have I I I I I I [ I 
been a more effective way of promoting ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
recyclingthan government legislation 
D5 The company could have achieved its I I I I I I I 
recycling targets more easily if the government' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
had not introduced charges for packaging waste 
D6 The government should specify that all I I I I I I I 
packaging contains a set percentage of 
recycled material 
D7 Consumers should be taxed direcdy for I I I I I 11 I 
packaging 
D8 More money should be spent on public i 1 i 1 i 1 i 
education about recycling I 1 I 1 I 1 I 
D9 The Packaging Regulations will achieve a I I I I I I I 
cost-effective solution to Britain's packaging ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
waste problems 
DIO The Regulations will produce worthwhile I I I I: i | I 
environmental benefits 
D l 1 In the company's opinion, packaging charges paid by the company are set on the basis of: 
a) The cost of collecting and recycling 
packaging waste 
b) The full environmental impact of packaging 
production, use and disposal 
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SECTION E: BUSINESS PROFILE 
This section asks some details about your company. All details will be treated as strictly 
confldential. For each question, tick the answer which best describes your organisation. 
El What is the annual turnover of your company? TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
3. £50-£99 million I. £ 0 - £ 4 . 9 9 million 
4.£100-£499 million 
2. 2. £5-£49 million 
5. 5. £500-£999 million 6. £1,000 million+ 
E2 How many people does your company currently employ? TICK ONE BOX ONLY 
1.0-49 I I 2.50-99 I I 3.100-499 
4.500-999 I I 5.1,000-4,999 | | 6. 5,000h-
E3 What would you describe as the company's main area of activity (based on turnover)? TICK ONE 
BOX ONLY 
1. Domestic trade 2. Import 3. Export 
4. More than one category 
E4 Which sector(s) of the Packaging Chain does your business primarily operate in? Tick each box 
which applies 
1 Raw materials producer 
4. Wholesaler 
2. Packaging manufacturer 
5. Retailer 
3. Product manufacturer 
E5 What weight (tonnes) of each of the following packaging materials did your company use in 1997? 
(full, not just obligation): 
1. Paper/cardboard 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glass 
5. Plastic 
3. Steel 
6. Wood 
The paginating of this questionnaire has been changed to conform with thesis layout 
requirements. The content remains unaltered. 
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Appendix 3b German Survey Questionnaire 
Fragebogen Nr. 
Alle Antworten werden strikt vertraulich behandelt und nicht weitgegeben! Bitte 
kreuzen Sie fiir jede Frage die zutreffendste Antwort an. Bitte lesen Sie alle 
Antwortmoglichkeiten, bevor Sie Ihre Antwort markieren. Bitte iiberspringen Sie 
die Fragen, die Sie nicht beantworten woUen! 
TEIL A: AUSWIRKUNGEN DER VERPACKUNGSVERORDNUNG AUF DIE 
UNTERNEHMEN 
Dieser Absctinitt erhebt die Auswirkungen der Verpackungsverordnung auf Ihr Unternehmen. 
BITTE KREUZEN SIE PRO F R A G E NUR EINE ANTWORT AN BZW. FULLEN SIE NUR EIN 
KASTCHEN AUS. 
A l Kennt Ihr Unternehmen die Verpackungsverordnung? 1. Ja 
FALLS NICHT WEITER MIT TEIL E! 
A2 Hat Ihr Unternehmen rechtliche Verpflichtungen, die sich aus 1. Ja 
der Verpackungsverordnung ergeben? 
FALLS NICHT WEITER MIT TEIL E! 
A3 Wie sammelt und recycelt Ihr Unternehmen den anfallenden Verpackungsabfall?? 
2. Nein 
2. Nein 
1. Teilnahme an einem bestehenden Entsorgungskonzept (z.B. DSD) 
2. Eigenes Entsorgungskonzept 
.V Andcres Bitte spezifizieren 
A4 Sammelt Ihr Unternehmen Verpackungsabfalle 
an den eigenen Standorten? 
A5 Sammelt Ihr Unternehmen den Verpackungsabfall Ihrer 
Kunden? 
I. Ja 
1 Ja 
2. Nein 
2 Ncm 
A6 Welcher Anteil des gesamten Verpackungsmaterials wird 
durch Ihr Unternehmen wieder eingesammelt 
(an den Standorten und von Kunden)? 
A7 Welche Verpackungsmaterialien sammelt Ihr Unternehmen? BITTE KREUZEN SIE NUR DIE 
MATERIALIEN AN, DIE IHR UNTERNEHMEN SELBST S A M M E L T 
1. Papier/Pappe 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glas i 
5. Plastik 
3. Eisen/Stahl/Blech 
6. Hoi/ 
A8 Wieviele Ihrer Mitarbeiter sind unmittelbar mit der Regelung 
der Anforderungen der Verpackungsverordnung befaBt? 
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A9 Wieviele Arbeitskrafte hat Ihr Unternehmen zusatzlich eingestellt, um den Anforderungen der 
Verpackungsverordnung zu geniigen? 
1. Keine 2. 1 Oder mehr Falls 1 oder mehr, wieviele? 
AlO Hat Ihr Unternehmen Unterstiitzung oder Beratung von 
anderen Unternehmen angenommen (z.B. Untemehmens-
beratungen), um den Anforderungen der Verordnung 
zu geniigen? 
1 la 2. Nein 
TEIL B: UMSETZUNG DER VERPACKUNGSVERORDNUNG 
Dieser Abschnitt beschiiftigt sich mit der Umsetzung der Verpackungsverordnung in Ihrem 
Unternehmen und ist in die drei Teiie Abfallverringerung, -wiederverwertung und -recycling 
aufgeteilt. Bitte kreuzen Sie nur eine Antwort pro Frage an. 
V E R R I N G E K U N O D K R V E R P A C K U N ( . S \ 1 K N ( ; E 
B1 Hat sich Ihr Unternehmen konkrete Ziele zur Verringerung des 
Verpackungsmaterials gesetzt? F A L L S N I C H T W E I T E 
M I T F R A G E B5 
I Ja 2. Nein 
B2 Wieviel Prozent des Verpackungsmaterials soil zwischen 1997 
und 2001 eingespart werden? 
B3 Wie soli diese Einsparung erreicht werden? BITTE KREUZEN SIE DIE ANTWORT AN, DIE 
DIE STRATEGIE IHRES UNTERNEHMENS BESCHREIBT 
1. Eine Verminderung des Gesamtaufkommens an Verpackungsmaterial 
2. Eine Verminderung des Verpackungsgewichts des verkauften Produkts 
B4 Welche Verpackungsmaterialien versucht Ihr Unternehmen im Verbrauch zu reduzieren? BITTE 
KREUZEN SIE DIE ZUTREFFENDEN ANTWORTEN AN 
1. Papier/Pappe 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glas 
5. Plastik 
3. Eisen/Stahl/Blech 
6. Hoi/ 
WIEDERVERWERTBARE VERPACKUNGEN 
B5 Verwendet Ihr Unternehmen heute mehr wiederverwertbare 1. Ja 
Verpackungen ais vor Einfiihrung der Verpackungsverordnung? 
2. Nein 
B6 Welcher Anteil des Verpackungsmaterials (Gewicht) wurde 
1997 wiederverwendet? 
B7 Welchcr Anteil des Verpackungsniaterials (Gewicht) soil im Jahre 
2001 wiederverwendet werden? 
B8 Welche Arten von wiederverwertbaren Verpackungen nutzt Ihr Unternehmen schon heute? BITTE 
KREUZEN SEE DIE ZUTREFFENDEN ANTWORTEN AN 
1. Papier/Pappe 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glas 
.5. Plaslik 
3. Eisen/Stahl/Blech 
6. Holz 
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RECYCLING 
B9 Nutzt Ihr Unternehmen heute mehr recyceltes 
Verpackungsmaterial ais vor Einfiihrung der 
Verpackungsverordnung? 
1 Ja 2. Nein 
BIO Welcher Anteil des Verpackungsmaterials (Gewicht) wurde 1997 recycelt 
Bl 1 Welcher Anteil des Verpackungsmaterials (Gewicht) wird im Jahre 
2001 recycelt werden? 
B12 Welche Arten von recycelten Verpackungsmaterialien nutzt Ihr Unternehmen schon heute? BITTE 
KREUZEN SIE DIE ZUTREFFENDEN ANTWORTEN AN 
1. Papier/Pappe 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glas 
3. Plastik 
3. Stahl 
6. Holz 
Teil C: FINANZIELLE AUSWIRKUNGEN DER VERPACKUNGSVERORDNUNG 
C1 Welche der nachfolgend aufgelisteten Kosten entstanden Ihrem Unternehmen im Zusammenhang 
mit der Verpackungsverordnung? BITTE KREUZEN SIE DIE ZUTREFFENDEN ANTWORTEN 
iiliilBitlfiM^^ 
a. Registrierungsgebiihren an eine nationale Umsetzungsbehorde 
b. Mitgliedsgebiihren in einem Entsorgungskonzept 
c. Stiick- oder gewichtsmaUigeGebuhren zur Abfallsammlung 
d. Anzahlungen fiir Verpackungsmaterial, das nicht zuriickgegeben werden kann 
e. "Gruner Punkt" o.a. 
f. Beratungskosten in Zusammenhang mit Verpackungen 
g. Gestiegene Kosten der Abfallsammlung 
h. Zahlungen fiir Wiederverwertungs- oder Recyclingszertifikate 
i.andere, bitte spezifizieren 
C2 Wie hoch waren 1998 die geschatzten Kosten der 
Verordnung in Ihrem Unternehmen? 
C3 Bitte lesen Sie die folgenden Aussagen und geben Sie die Haltung Ihres Unternehmens zu den 
Aussagen an 
C3a Das Unternehmen wird die Verbraucherpreise 
:erhohen,um dieiZusatzlichemKosten der 
Verpackungsverordnung aufzufangen 
C3b Das Unternehmen wird nur einen Teil dieser 
Kosten von seinen Kunden: wiedererhalten 
C3c Wir werden unsere Kunden die Griinde der 
Preiserhohung informieren 
+2 
stinune 
vol] zu 
+1 
stinune 
zu 
() 
wedcr-
noch 
-1 -2 
stimme stimme 
nicht zu absolut 
nicht zu 
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C3d Die zusatzlichen Kosten der Verpackungs- | 
verordnung wird das Unternehmen dazu ' 
ermuntern, seine Verpackungspolitik zu 
iiberdenken 
C3e Das Unternehmen wird nur die Minimal- j 
anforde rungen der Verpackungsverordnung 
erfuUen konnen 
C3f Das Unternehmen hat sich das Ziel gesetzt, 
die Ziele der Verordnung voU zu erreichen 
C3g Die Verordnung wird die Firma dazu bewegen 
weniger Verpackungs-material zu nutzen und 
mehr davon wiederzuwerten, ais es sonst getan hatte 
Teil D: VERPACKUNGSPOLITIK 
Bitte lesen Sie die Aussagen und geben Sie die Meinung Ihres Unternehmens zur 
Verpackungspolitik an. BITTE KREUZEN SIE NUR EIN KASTCHEN PRO FRAGE AN. 
+2 +1 0 -1 -2 
stimme stimme weder- sdmme stimme 
voll zu zu noch nicht zu absolut 
niclit zu 
Dl Die Recyclingziele sind fiir Unternehmen zu p 
hoch angesetzt worden 
D2 In alien EU-Staaten sollten dieselben p 
Recyclingziele gelten 
D3 Das Unternehmen wurde durch die r-
Gesetzgebung unfair benachteiligt _ 
D4 Freiwillige Zielsetzungen durch die ^ 
Unternehmen waren effizienter gewesen ais _ 
gesct/.gcbcrische MaBnahmen 
D5 Das Unternehmen hatte seine Recyclingziele r-
. rascher erreicht, wenn die Regierung nicht 
Gebiihren auf Verpackungsabfalle erhoben hatte 
D6 Die Regierungs sollte festlegen, daB 
Verpackungsmaterialien einen bestimmten 
Anteil an Recyclingmaterial enthalten sollten 
D7 Endverbraucher sollten direkt fiir Verpack- r-
ungen steuerlich belastet werden L 
D8 Fur offentliche Informationskampagnen zum 
Thema Recycyling sollte mehr Geld F 
ausgegeben werden 
D9 Die Verpackungsverordnung wird eine r-
kostenwirksame Losung der Verpackungs- L 
abfallprobleme mit sich bringen 
D10 Die Verpackungsverordnung wird meBbare r-
Verbesserungen im Umweltbereich nach 
sich Ziehen 
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D l l Nach Ansicht des Unternehmens ibasieren die Verpackungsgebiihren, die das Unternehmen 
entrichtet, auf: 
a) DentatsachlichenKostenidesiSammelns unds 
Recycylings der Verpackungsabfalle 
b) Den Kosten der Produktion, Nutzung und 
Entsorgung von Verpackungsmaterialien 
einschlieBlich der dabei entstehenden Umweltbelastungen. 
TEIL E: PROFIL DES UNTERNEHMENS 
Dieser Abschnitt erhebt einige Details Ihres Unternehmens. Alle Einzelheiten werden strikt 
vertraulich behandelt und nicht weitergegeben oder veroffentlicht. Bitte kreuzen Sie die auf Ihr 
Unternehmen zutreffendste Antwort an. 
1. DM 0-14,99 Mio 
3. DM 140-274 Mio 
5. DM 1.3X0 Mrd-2,749 Mrd 
E l Wie hoch ist der Jahresumsatz Ihres Unternehmens? BITTE NUR EINE ANTWORT 
2. DM 15-139 Mio 
4. DM 275 Mio-1,379 Mrd 
6. DM iiber 2,750 Mrd 
E2 Wieviele Mitarbeiter beschaftigt Ihr Unternehmen gegenwartig? BITTE NUR EINE ANTWORT 
1.0-49 
4. 500-999 
2. 50-99 
5. 1.000-4.999 
3. 100-499 
6. uber 5.000 
E3 Wo wiirden Sie das Hauptgeschaftsfeld (basierend auf Umsatzzahlen) Ihres Unternehmens sehen? 
2. Import I. Binnenhandel 
4. > 1 
3. Export 
E4 In welchen Teilen der Verpackungskette ist Ihr Unternehmen vorwiegend involviert? MEHRERE 
ANTWORTEN MOGLICH 
i. Produktion von Rohmaterialien 
3. Herstellung von Produkten 
5. Einzelhandel 
2. Herstellung von Verpackungen 
4. GroBhandel 
E5 Wieviel Tonnen der nachfolgend aufgelisteten Verpackungsmaterialien nutzte Ihr Unternehmen 
1997?: 
1. Papier/Pappe 
4. Aluminium 
2. Glas 
5. Plastik 
3. Eisen/Stahl/Blech 
6. Holz 
The paginating of this questionnaire has been changed to conform with thesis layout 
requirements. The content remains unaltered. 
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Appendix 4 Producer Survey Pilot Feedback Form 
Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997 
Feedback Form 
1. I..ength of Questionnaire - do you feel thai business managers would lake the lime to 
complete and return the questionnaire? Is it too long or too short? 
2. Question Content - Are the questions and instructions clear and easy to understand? 
Were any points not clear? Do you find the questionnaire layout format helpful? 
3. Factual accuracy - Do you feel all the questions arc relevant in your experience of the 
UK Packaging Regulations? Are there any imporlanl features of the legislation which 
' are not explored within the questionnaire? 
4. Sensitive Information - Is there any information requested in the questionnaire that you 
• would not feel happy about providing? Do you feel the assurance of confidentiality is 
lilliiiiiiBiHiiiiBH^ 
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Appendix 5a Producers Survey UK Contact Letter 
The Managing Director 
Company Name 
Address 
Date 
Dear Sir or Madam 
Re: Producer Responsibility Packaging Waste Regulations 
I am a doctoral student with the University of Plymouth and am currently conducting a 
research programme examining the implementation of the European Union Packaging Waste 
Directive. Results of the study will be published in the UK by the research's co-sponsor, the 
Institute of Wastes Management. 
The aims of the research are, first, to explore the impact of the Directive on national packaging 
legislation, and second, to evaluate the methods used to implement the Directive. As you are 
aware, environmental legislation is having an increasing effect on industry and it is therefore 
essential that new measures are able to achieve their objectives without undermining industrial 
competitiveness. 
Obviously, if the study is to evaluate environmental policies meaningfully, the views of 
industry should form a core part of its results. I am therefore conducting a survey of 1,800 
companies in Britain and Germany to assess the impact of packaging regulations within these 
states. If sufficient companies respond to the survey, the research will be able to provide an 
authoritative picture of the Packaging Directive's impact on industry and could help guide the 
development of future environmental policies. 
I am therefore writing to ask if you could spend a short time responding to the enclosed 
questionnaire and returning it in the Freepost envelope provided. The questionnaire 
should take about 30 minutes to complete and will provide invaluable information for this 
study. May I also assure you that all information will be treated as strictly confidential and 
that the identity and details of participating companies will not be disclosed or identifiable at 
any point in the research results. 
I would like to thank you for your assistance in this work, and look forward to hearing from 
you soon. 
Yours faithfully. 
Ian Bailey 
Department of Geographical Sciences 
Enc: Packaging Waste questionnaire, SAE 
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Appendix 5a Producers Survey German Contact Letter 
Der Generaldirektor 
Company Name 
Address 
Date 
Europaische Direktive iiber Verpackung und Yerpackungsabfall 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, 
ais Doktorand am Geographischen histitut der University of Plymouth, England fuhre ich eine 
Untersuchung zu den Aufwirkungen der Europaischen Direktive uber Verpackung und 
Verpackungsabfall in den Mitgliedsstaaten der E U durch. hi Zusammenhang mit diesem 
Forschungsvorhaben, das ubrigens durch das britische histitute of Waste Management 
mitfinanziert wird, mochte ich Sie um Ihre Mithilfe bitten. 
Die Zielsetzungen des Forschungsvorhabens umfassen zum einen die Analyse der 
Auswirkungen der Direktive auf die Verpackungs- und Verpackungsabfallgesetzgebungen in 
den Mitgliedsstaaten und zum anderen eine Bewertung des Erfolgs von marktorientierten 
Implementiemngsmethoden, dargestellt am Beispiel der Direktive. Wie Sie sicher wissen, 
beeinfluBt die Umweltgesetzgebung in zunehmenden MaBe die Tatigkeit von Untemehmen 
aller Sparten. Es ist daher wichtig, daB neu eingefuhrte MaBnahmen nicht nur ihre 
umweltpolitischen Ziele erreichen, sondem auch die Konkurrenzfahtigkeit der Untemehmen 
nicht negativ beeinfluBen. 
Wenn diese Untersuchung tatsachlich die Umsetzung der Direktive bewerten soli, ist es 
unerlaBlich, daB die Meinungsbildung innerhalb der betroffenen Untemehmen das Kemstiick 
der Untersuchung bildet. Aus diesem Gmnde fiihre ich in England und Deutschland eine 
Umfrage zur Auswirkung von Verpackungs- und Abfallentsorgungsrichtlinien durch. A m Ende 
der Studie sollte dann ein aussagekraftiges Bild der Auswirkungen solcher Verordnungen auf 
die Untemehmenstatigkeit in den genannten Landem stehen; anhand der Ergebnisse einer 
solchen Studie konnten dann zukunftige umweltpolitische MaBnahmen bereits vor ihrem 
Inkrafttreten auf wirtschaftpolitische Vertretbarkeit gepriift werden. 
Ich mochte Sie daher bitten, den beiliegenden Fragebogen auszufiillen und mit Hilfe des 
beiliegenden adressierten, frankierten Umschlags an mich zuriickzusenden. Das 
Ausfiillen des Fragebogens selbst dauert etwa 30 min, liefert aber fiir das Projekt unerlaBliche 
Informationen. Ich kann Ihnen an dieser Stelle versichem, daB alle Informationen 
selbstverstandlich vertraulich behandelt werden und daB eine Identifizierung der Untemehmen 
anhand der Fragebogen unmoglich sein wird. 
Ich mochte Dinen schon jetzt fiir Dire Mithilfe danken und hoffe, bald von Ihnen zu horen. 
Mit freundlichen GriiBen 
Ian Bailey 
Department of Geographical Sciences 
Anlage: Fragebogen, frankierter Ruckumschlag 
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Appendix 6a Producers Survey UK Reminder Letter 
Date 
The Managing Director 
Company Name 
Address 
Dear Sir or Madam 
RE: PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (PACKAGING WASTE) REGULATIONS 
SURVEY 
You may recall that I wrote to you in early January, requesting your company's participation in 
a survey to assess the impact of the Packaging Regulations on your organisation's policies 
towards packaging waste management. 
The study, which is being conducted as part of my doctoral thesis, aims to compare the effects 
of the different forms of packaging legislation introduced within the Member states of the 
European Union. It then seeks to assess their ability to produce worthwhile environmental 
benefits in a manner which does not undermine industrial competitiveness. 
According to my records, I have not yet received a reply from your company. I understand that 
my request may have come at a busy time and that workload pressures are great at all times of 
the year. However, if the study is to reflect the impact of the Regulations on industry 
accurately, it is important that the views of as many affected companies as possible are taken 
into account. 
Since I last wrote, the European Commission is now itself seeking studies on the effectiveness 
of packaging regulations in the Member States. It is hoped that work from this survey may be 
submitted as part of this study and therefore that the impact of packaging legislation on 
industry can be reported directly to the Commission to help inform future decisions on waste 
management issues. 
I am therefore writing to ask again if you could spend a short time responding to the 
enclosed questionnaire and returning it in the Freepost envelope provided. The questions 
should take about 30 minutes to complete. May I also again reassure you that all information 
provided will be treated, in accordance with the University's code of ethical research, as 
strictly confidential and that the identity and details of participating companies will not be 
disclosed or identifiable at any point in the research results. 
I very much hope you are able to assist this study, and I look forward to hearing from you soon. 
Yours faithfully 
Ian Bailey 
Department of Geographical Sciences 
Enc: Packaging Waste questionnaire, Freepost envelope 
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Appendix 6b Producers Survey German Reminder Letter 
Date 
Der Generaldirektor 
Company Name 
Address 
Betrifft: Europaische Direlctive iiber Verpackung und Verpackungsabfall 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, 
Im rahhen meiner Doktorarbeit am Geographischen Institut der University of Plymouth, GB, 
fiihre ich eine Untersuchung zur Europaischen Direktive iiber Verpackung und 
Verpackungsabfall in den Mitgliedsstaaten der E U durch. Die Zielsetzungen des 
Forschungsvorhabens umfassen (i) die Analyse der Auswirkungen der Direktive auf die 
Verpackungs- und Verpackungsabfallgesetzgebungen in den Mitgliedsstaaten und (ii) eine 
Bewertung des Erfolgs von marktorientierten Methoden der Implementierung, dargestellt am 
Beispiel der Direktive. Da die Umweltgesetzgebung in zunehmenden MaBe die Tatigkeit von 
Untemehmen beeinfluBt. Ist es wichtig, daB neu eingefuhrte MaBnahmen nicht nur ihre 
umweltpolitischen Ziele erreichen, sondern auch die Konkurrenzfahigkeit der Untemehmen 
nicht negativ beeinfluBen. 
Sicher erinnera Sie sich daran, daB ich Direm Untemehmen einen Fragenbot zu dem oben 
genannten Vorhaben zugeschickt habe. Meinen Unterlagen entnehme ich, daB noch ich keinen 
Riickbrief aus Ihrem betrieb erhalten habe. Es ist mir vestandlich, daB Sie meine Anfrage 
eventuell zu einer fiir Ihr Untemehmen ungiinstigen Zeit erreichte und einige der gestellen 
Fragen einen relativ sensiblen Geschaftsbereich betreffen. Allerdings ist es fiir gename 
Aussagen uber Auswirkungen der Verpackungsverordnung underlaBlich so viele Eindriicke 
Deutsche Untemehmen wis moglich reprasentieren zu konnen. 
Ich bitte Sie daher nochmals zu erwagen, ob Sie eine kurze Weile zur Beantwortung des 
beigefiigten Fragenbogen aufbringen konnen. Ich habe den Fragenbogen verkurzt damit er 
schneller auszufullen ist. 
Ich kann Ihnen an dieser Stelle nochmals versichem, daB alle Informationen selbstverstandlich 
vertraulich behandelt werden und daB eine Identifiziemng der Untemehmen anhand der 
Fragebogen unmoglich sein wird. 
Ich mochte Ihnen schon jetzt fiir Ihre Mithilfe danken und hoffe, bald von Dinen zu horen. 
Mit freundlichen GriiBen 
Ian Bailey 
Department of Geographical Sciences 
Anlage: Fragebogen, frankierter Riickumschlag 
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Appendix 7a Distribution of Reprocessing Facilities, Britain 
1. Plastics 2. Aluminium 
4. * Incineration 
^ Composting 
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5. Paper 6. Steel 
It 
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Appendix 7b Distribution of Reprocessing Facilities, Germany 
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